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Preface
THIS volume of essays on United States trade with Asia and the
Far East deals with a timely subject the import of which cannot be over
emphasized. The extension of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act
in 1958 for an unprecedented four-year period and the increasing aware
ness in this country of the expansion of the foreign economic relations
of the Soviet Bloc countries, which were hitherto of little quantitative
importance in world trade, have provided the setting for the symposium.
While the essays do not constitute a handbook or pretend to offer a
blueprint of foreign economic policy from the point of view of any
particular country, their scope is sufficiently wide and their authorship
suitably varied so that the airing of the problems confronting United
States trade in Asia and the Far East through these pages may well
fulfill a special function in the present international situation and in the
face of what we believe to be the American mood that something posi
tive be done.
The essays were first presented at a Conference on American Trade
with Asia and the Far East held on April 17-18, 1958 at Marquette
University under the auspices of the Institute for Asian Studies in co
operation with the Marquette Management Center. These have been
edited by Professor Robert J. Barr who has also contributed the intro
ductory chapter in which the principal issues are outlined. In so far as
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this volume is found useful by its readers, credit should go to its editor,
the individual authors, and the Marquette University Press.
Yuan-Ii Wu
Director, Institute for
Asian Studies

Introduction
papers explore the factors influencing the nature
and volume of United States trade with Asia and the Far East.* In a re
stricted setting, this exploration could be pursued by examining the
demands of the various countries for imported commodities, and the
productive potentialities of these countries for exportable commodities.
But this would not be adequate for the countries under survey at the
present time.
Asian countries exhibit a diversity of economic and social condi
tions. Some of them, recently released from colonial status to inde
pendence, aspire to full membership in the world community of nations,
and particularly to living standards rapidly rising to approach parity
with the rest of the world. Some, long accustomed to unchanging
economic, social and political patterns, are now affected by Western
ideas of progress and democracy. Some wish to achieve a greater de
gree of economic independence and self sufficiency. Finally, some lie
under the threat of external aggression.
All nations, and especially the Asian nations, are determined to
subject to conscious control the direction and velocity of their domestic
THE FOLLOWING

* The term "Asia and the Far East" includes the following countries: India,
Pakistan, Ceylon, Burma, Thailand, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Malaya,
Republic of Indonesia, Republic of the Philippines, Republic of Korea,
Hong Kong, Taiwan, Japan, Australia and New Zealand.
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development. No nation is any longer willing to allow its economic
fortunes to be determined either by other nations upon which it has
become economically dependent, or by the play of undirected economic
forces. Nations supplying raw materials to the world are insisting upon
a greater degree of stability in their markets. The ferment of progress
is a heady stimulant whose results are not always predictable. The
threat of aggression distorts the normal development of economic life.
Underlying all the other problems of the area is the great problem
of food for the teeming populations. Agricultural development is of
urgent necessity. Counterbalancing the obstacles to this development
which leap to mind are advantages of rich natural endowment, and in
some countries, an almost virgin frontier comparable in a measure to
that of the United States in the last century.
Hence in a broader setting the explorations of United States-Asian
trade problems necessarily include consideration of a whole range of
factors in their application to the specific conditions of the countries
under review. Consequently, the papers explore the objectives and
methods of consciously elaborated domestic development plans and
programs. They explore requirements inherent in these plans, the bal
ance, consistency and attainability of their objectives and the reasons
why attainments have fallen short of objectives if they have done so.
They explore the· peculiar difficulties facing colonial economies in their
attempts to diversify production and trade and in so doing to develop
commercial, industrial and financial institutions, entrepreneurship and
saving. The tensions both between the Asian nations and others, and
between classes and groups within the Asian nations themselves are
the subject of some consideration, though it is obvious why problems
of this sort, important as they are, could not receive adequate con
sideration in the space available in this volume and under its title.
Attached to the main body of papers is a series of background
papers which aim to present a summary of the factual information
pertinent to the subject.
*
*
*
It may be worthwhile to analyze here a little more fully the prob
lems which present themselves in a study of the "factors influencing
the nature and volume of American trade with Asian countries."
From the standpoint of the United States the aspects of trade with
Asian countries are: ( 1 ) the commodity composition of our imports
from and exports to those countries; (2) the countries to which we
xii

export and from which we import specified commodities; ( 3) the pro
portions which this trade bears to our total trade, and to our trade with
other specified regions and countries. The same analysis can be made
for each of the Asian countries, from its standpoint, of its trade with
the United States, or with the world as a whole, or with specified
regions or countries. And in setting forth the present status of this
trade, its origins and likely course of development should be discussed.
International trade is a network of interdependent movements of
commodities, services and funds. Like all true networks, the individual
elements enter relationships of mutual dependence and determination,
not only with each other but with the network as a whole. It is also
clear that each element at any particular moment is what it is because
of historical circumstances. Finally, a little thought will produce the
conclusion that consistency is the fundamental rule of the international
trade network. That is to say, an individual movement seen from the
sending or from the receiving country is an identity; a flow in one di
rection must be balanced by an opposite flow of an equally valuable
asset in the other; each nation's total outward flows must balance its
total inward flows. It would, however, impose an unnecessarily re
strictive condition on the magnitude of the flows to require that each
nation's outward flows must balance its inward flows with each other

nation individually.
A simple illustration may clarify these remarks. The invention of
the automobile resulted in a rapidly increasing demand for rubber.
From Brazilian seeds grown in Kew Gardens, rubber trees were planted
in Malaya, and the dominant element of the United States-Malayan
trade pattern was determined - a combination of adventitious cir
cumstances, conscious planning and natural endowments. The flow of
rubber from Malaya to the United States was accompanied by a flow of
other commodities from the United States to the United Kingdom and
a flow of still other commodities from the United Kingdom to Malaya.
Since the values of these commodity flows were not identical, the bal
ance was achieved by payments of United States dollars earned by
British-owned rubber plantations in Malaya first to the United Kingdom
and ultimately to the United States. Thus, omitting numerous com
plicating details, the trade and payments pattern between the United
States, the United Kingdom and Malaya developed in response pri
marily to an originally French invention. The subsequent invention of
synthetic rubber - itself a combination of adventitious circumstances,
xiii

conscious planning and "natural" economic progress - produced strains
in this sub-network necessitating numerous adjustments. As a rule, the
strains and adjustments are accompanied by profits to some, losses to
others - to individuals and to countries - and thus tend to create
conflicts of interest which spread over from economic to political and
social relationships.
It should be noted that the international network of trade and
payments is duplicated in detail by similar internal networks within
each country.
As a first classification of factors determining trade we may take:
( 1) those natural advantages of countries and regions of which Ricardo
spoke when he first clarified the theory of international trade; (2) those
adventitious (historical) circumstances which the economist may note
but which may not necessarily originate within the economic world;
( 3) those purposefully elaborated development plans which have be
come so numerous in postwar years and which impose upon the net
work a pattern different from that which would arise solely from the
background of natural endowments; and (4) those requirements of
consistency imposed by the nature of trade and payment networks,
internal and international.
The first two classes of factors, important as they are, lie on the
periphery, or outside, the area of economic science. It is with the last
two classes that we are primarily concerned. Thus. more elaborate dis
cussion of their characteristic problems is called for. Yet certain natural
and historical factors have been so important in forming the present
· structure of Asian economies and trade that a discussion of their
nature and effects is also in order.
The dominant influence on some of the Asian countries under re
view is colonialism. This means that the economic potentialities of the
colonial area were developed primarily in subservience to the demands
of the economically advanced industrialized countries of the world not necessarily solely the demands of the metropolitan center though
these of course were often of great weight. It means also that the
bargain that was struck as remuneration was often disadvantageous to
the colonial area - though here certain consideration must be given
to the notoriously "adventurous" character of many early concessions
and the fact that losses as well as great profits emerged. What is really
at issue is the fact that "contracts" which turned out to be unduly dis
advantageous to the colonial area could not easily be revised since one
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of the contractors was not really free and equal. It means also that the
people of the colonial area were not seriously accorded the equal rights
of full copartners in the economic development of their areas. Here
too, however, we must recognize the contemporaneous existence of
similar disparities in class privileges within advanced industrial nations
_ disparities which have only lately been reduced or eliminated.
All this is well known but is here brought out into the open to em
phasize the reason why certain types of problems have emerged in the
former colonial areas of Asia. It is understandable that not only the
fact but also the sign of their former dependence must be abolished.
And since this sign is the excessive and unbalanced development of
the raw material sector of the economy, this unbalance must be re
dressed by compensatory hurried development of the industrial sector
- in the course of which it may be forgotten that the raw material
sector was perhaps the one exhibiting the greatest existing comparative
advantage. Not only former colonial areas, but independent though
underdeveloped areas have been affected by the drive for industrializa
tion.
Another influence has not yet had as significant results as may be
expected in the future. Prices of raw materials ( the commodities which
Asian countries typically export) fluctuate with greater amplitude than
those of manufactured products ( the commodities which Asian coun
tries typically import). Also, the volume of raw material imports by
industrial countries varies in the same direction as their prices. Con
sequently, the terms of trade and the level of productive activity of
Asian countries are excessively unstable. The demand is insistent that
some control over these matters be exercised by international agreement.
The effort to accelerate diversification and industrialization puts
demands upon government coordinating agencies, central banking sys
tems, financial institutions related to the flow of savings-investments,
entrepreneurship and labor training institutions which would strain even
advanced economies. All of these institutional establishments must
undertake tasks of great magnitude involving highly seasoned judgment
and extensive statistical fact finding, in circumstances where these re
sources are inadequate. It is no wonder then that honest misjudgments
as well as naive blunders have resulted in misdirection of effort, do
mestic inflation and balance of payments crises. Even advanced eco
nomies have not always made better records in these respects. Positive,
and sometimes more emotional than wise, efforts are made to change
xv

the direction of trade away from the former metropolitan center toward
countries which did not participate in the former economic and po
litical dominance of the colonial area. Economic stress is then created
in all three areas. Above all, in view of the generally low level of pro
ductivity and savings potential, is the necessity of a massive flow of
capital from advanced nations, preferably private capital. Yet private
foreign capital has been perhaps justifiably timid about embarking upon
the needed investments in public utility or even industrial installations
in the conditions of resurgent independence in the postwar world.
The reverse side of the diversification-industrialization program is
that of agricultural production. Conditions of land ownership inherited
from the past, techniques of agricultural production and allocation of
land and labor resources to nonfood crops for export, have conspired
to hold many Asian countries on a subsistence level. It is true that
some countries have produced a surplus to alleviate the deficits of
others. The region as a whole, however, has produced little agricul
tural food surplus above a subsistence level. In conjunction with dense
and rapidly growing populations, the effort to industrialize has some
times got out of balance with the base in agricultural food production.
Here again everything must be done at once - changes in land oc
cupation, own�rship and exploitation, in social custom, in technique
and in capital investment.
Not all the Asian countries fall into the group of former colonies.
Another historical condition i s the result of the war with its disruption
of prewar international economic relations and physical destruction of
productive facilities. Not to be overlooked are population movements
- influx of refugees, displacement and loss of skilled manpower.
Productive facilities must be re-established when savings potentials
have been impaired; market connections must be re-established when
commercial rivals have successfully penetrated one's former preserves.
A prime requirement for this sort of rehabilitation is again a ready
flow of international investment funds. In the long run the flow of
private funds is to be hoped for, but in the meantime international
institutions were established to facilitate the process. However, even
these arrangements have proved inadequate to the severe postwar cir
cumstances and extraordinary governmental assistance has proved nec
essary. The form in which government aid has been extended has in
its turn raised difficult problems.
Finally, another circumstance has affected some of the countries
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under review, that is, technological developments and in particular the
development of industrially produced substitutes for natural products
of the area, e.g., synthetic rubber and synthetic textile fibers. Not to
be overlooked in this sector also is the development of material-saving
processes, e.g., thinner tin plating. Also worthy of note here is the
application of machine methods to the production of agricultural prod
ucts, in special circumstances and usually in conjunction with govern
ment pricing schemes, resulting in an "unnatural" temporarily reversed
flow of agricultural products from industrialized to underdeveloped
countries. These circumstances have produced problems of enforced
and hurried structural adjustment and of strained competitive relation
ships - in some sense they have produced an "upside down" inter
national world.
Upon this already troubled scene in recent years has come the
threat of further deliberate disturbances arising from politically inspired
Communist trade maneuvers. The direction which commodity trade
would normally take under the influence of cost-price considerations is
distorted, placing additional adjustment strains upon the economies of
the countries involved, strains which are made more tense by the fear
that at any moment the trade relationships will again be disturbed and
further adjustments will thus be called for. Associated with the threat
of trade war is that of military aggression, direct or indirect, although
this factor is more limited in the range of countries affected at the
moment. Both these threats introduce considerations of military as
well as economic assistance, primarily from the United States.
Although former colonial areas have been especially forward in
promoting development plans, other nations also participated in this
characteristic postwar phenomenon. The essence of a plan is the con
scious direction of economic progress along certain selected lines, gen
erally in the industrial sector as this is the sector of the economy which
most obviously distinguishes the developed from the underdeveloped
countries. Results of this redirection of economic effort include shift
ing direction and commodity composition of trade: new imports - par
ticularly capital goods which are likely to come from different countries
of origin; possibly reduced exports - at any rate in the short run less
ened production of former export goods along with increased con
sumption of domestic production. The effort to accelerate investment
very likely exceeds the domestic saving potential and can only be ac
complished by the import of foreign capital, lacking which domestic
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inflation results. Altered cost-price relationships, exchange difficulties
and modified import and export demands are a consequence. An at
tempt to accommodate to or control all these difficulties may be made
by restrictive commercial policy; in fact, such restrictive policy may
from the beginning be a part of the controls by means of which the
development plan is executed. And it goes without saying that monetary
and fiscal policy of a high order of effectiveness is required if disastrous
consequences are to be avoided.
The special role of the United States in relation to these problems
follows both from the historical role which this country has played in
Asian affairs, and the position it occupies at the present juncture of
being the largest reservoir of capital. Our imports from Asian coun
tries have been the natural products of the specific areas, typical prod
ucts of their climate - tea, spices, rubber, jute, etc., but also including
tin; and other "artificial" products of economic development
silk,
handicraft articles of wood, fiber and other materials. Our exports
were usually smaller in total than our imports and extended over a
wide range of products. These relationships have changed. Except for
silk, the commodity composition of our in1ports remains substantially
what it was with some increases in mineral raw materials, which, after
all, are the commodities in which these countries possess great natural
advantages. . It ls in the overall balance of trade and in the composition
of our exports that significant changes have taken place. Specifically,
the Asian countries have come to the United States for capital goods,
for investment capital and for agricultural products. We have de. veloped a substantial export surplus and have extended economic and
military aid in large amounts as partial compensation.
The problems which arise in this connection are those of com
mercial policy (our own as well as Asian) by which those trade and
capital movements are facilitated which further the aims of general
policy, and those are hindered, which interfere with achievement of
these aims.
The wide range of problems raised by the circumstances mentioned
in the preceding paragraphs may be brought into focus in relation to
the "rule of consistency." It is not simply that a particular country
must make an adjustment once and for all to a new condition of its
economic life. The adjustment made involves other adjustments in its
domestic economic arrangements, and each of these in tum is likely to
constitute a change in the conditions facing other countries. Thus, any
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disturbance is transmitted from its point of origin throughout the trad
ing system; and its effect is finally absorbed by a diffused and complex
set of adjustments including those intended to insulate a country from
disturbances and adjustments in its trading partners.
In the large, the general effects of postwar events have been to
distort the prewar trade and payments network as follows:
1) First have come a series of structural changes in the pattern of
domestic production as adjustments to technological changes, acceler
ated diversification and industrialization.
2) Second have come shifts in the direction of trade which are, on
the whole, surprisingly small considering the powerful incentives at
work, though one may venture to guess that the prewar pattern was so
firmly founded on natural endowments that only a long course of de
velopment could produce substantial change.
3) Third have come shifts in the commodity composition of trade,
mainly in imports into Asian countries, in response to efforts at in
dustrialization.
4) Fourth have come changes in the total volume of trade in re
sponse to unsettled domestic affairs, restrictive practices and diversion
of resources from export lines to lines for domestic consumption.
5) Following upon many of these changes have come balance of
payments difficulties.
6) Problems of adjustment to economic forces of cost-price rela
tionships are frequently severe enough in all conscience; when exacer
bated by the political forces of politically inspired trade war their mag
nitude is often enhanced beyond the adjustment capacity of the normal
economic mechanisms.
One may be forgiven for being dismayed at the magnitude of all
these problems, but the following papers push on to concrete proposals
for their amelioration or solution. No panaceas are offered. But
people who wrestle intimately with the problems, as have all the au
thors of this collection of papers, come away from their experience
with practicable and effective suggestions for improvement. It is the
purpose of these papers not only to lay bare the problems which beset
the development of American trade with Asia and the Far East, but
also to propose policies to private business and to official organization
which might facilitate this development in the belief that the enlarge
ment of this trade would benefit the peoples of all countries.

xix

The political climate
of America's trade with Asia
The Honorable Clement]. Zablocki
Member of Congress
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of the United States in the wodd economy,
together with the impact of the tremendous military, political and so
ciological developments of the past two decades, call for a better un
derstanding, on our part, of our foreign trade and assistance policies,
and of their effects upon the lives and aspirations of countless other
peoples.
I am particularly conscious of the fact that much more light needs
to be shed on the complex issues of our trade with other nations. In
this respect, the specialized, regional approach should prove especially
helpful. It should be helpful to our businessmen - to our industry, to
our investors, to our importers - whose interests are increasingly af
fected by the issues of foreign trade. It should be helpful to our
citizenry at large - to the millions of men and women throughout our
land who at times fail to appreciate the full impact of foreign trade on
their own welfare. And it should prove of great value to our govern
ment, and to the governments of the nations with whom we trade, be
cause governmental policies can greatly encourage, or impede, the
growth of trade and its consequences.
THE CHANGING ROLE

THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF FREE ASIA

Asia and the Far East is a vitally important area with which I
have become familiar through my work as the Chairman of the Sub
committee on Southeast Asia, the Far East, and the Pacific, of the
United States House of Representatives.

2 American Trade with Asia and the Far East

The strategic importance of this area to the Free World, and to
the United States in particular, cannot be overemphasized. The bal
ance of power between the Free World and the Communist bloc may
very well lie in the arc which stretches from India, Pakistan and Af
ghanistan on the west to Japan and Korea. These nations, located on
the periphery of the Communist bloc have a population of a billion
and one-half, possess rich resources of raw materials and have an
overwhelming industrial production potential. The conquest of this
region by the Communists - be it military conquest or domination
through subversion, infiltration or economic penetration - would give
the Communists the raw materials and the industrial production po
tential which would bolster their drive for world domination.
Let us make no mistake about this fact: it is essential to the Free
World that the arc of defense and cooperation in the Pacific hold firm,
and that the independence of the Far East and Southeast Asia be
fully preserved and strengthened.
A realistic appraisal of American foreign trade and assistance
policies with respect to Asia and the Far East must be made against
this background. An appraisal based on any other premise can lead
to mistaken and dangerous conclusions as far as the security of the
United States and of the Free World is concerned.
OUR GOVERNMENT'S POLICY

Our government's policy with respect to the free nations of South
east Asia and the Far East is firmly based on the recognition of the
strategic importance of that region to mutual long-range security. The
United States has embarked upon a long-range program of assistance
in the Far East - assistance intended, first, to halt the spread of Com
munism, and secondly, to bolster the internal strength of the countries
which stand as bulwarks against this threat to democratic ideals and
world peace.
The cardinal principle of our foreign policy programs with re
spect to this area has been to aid the peoples of the Far East to help
themselves. Some people, either misunderstanding or wilfully mis
interpreting our objectives, have charged that the United States is try
ing to dominate the free nations of that region. Such is not the case.
We have not attempted to defend them with our own troops and mili
tary equipment, to feed them with our own food, and to support them
with our own money. Such forms of assistance would defeat our over
all objectives. Instead, we have tried to give the peoples of the Far
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East, through their governments, a better opportunity of improving
their lot in life. We are giving them such an opportunity by sharing
with them our technological "know-how," by aiding them in solving
their own economic problems, by making development capital avail
able to them, by encouraging wider trade and through other means.
To date, by far the largest portion of our assistance to this region
has consisted of direct military aid and defense support. Our purpose
is to strengthen the economies of those countries, to assist them in
getting economic development under way, and, in the meantime, to
bolster their defense capacity, at least for a "holding" operation. We
have embarked upon this course in full understanding of the fact that
we are all engaged in the common cause of defense against the inroads
of the Communists and our programs are designed to accomplish our
collective security objectives in the most effective and economic way.
In our efforts to help the nations of Southeast Asia and the Far
East to help themselves, our trade policy plays a vital role. This is
an area in which private enterprise, and private investment, can con
tribute greatly to the success of our over-all national objectives.
THREE POINTS TO BE MADE

With this background, I would like to comment, first of all, on
the general characteristics of our trade with Asia. Secondly, I shall
briefly review the political aspects of this trade - both from the stand
point of our own government, and from the standpoint of the govern
ments of the free nations of the Far East. Finally, I shall outline my
personal observations and suggestions as to the ways in which our na. tional policy can be better implemented, and our trade with Asia ex
panded, by positive action on the part of our government and on the
part of the governments of the nations with which we are trading.
GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF TRADE WITH ASIA

The trade of any area depends on many factors, among which the
stage of economic development of the area is of particular significance.
When we consider the nations of the Far East, two things come
to mind, immediately: one, their large resources of raw materials; and,
secondly, their teeming populations. These two elements, combined
with an intense desire to attain a higher level of living, can produce
economic progress and industrialization, when aided by favorable gov
ernment policies and the availability of capital. Such economic prog
ress is the ambition of the countries of the Far East.
Apart from industrially-developed Japan, however, most of the
4
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countries of that area are still in the early stages of economic develop
ment. Their general economic conditions have been favorable in recent
years and they have achieved widespread gains in production, parti
cularly in newly-developing industries. Their earnest efforts to improve
the plane of living of their peoples have begun to show encouraging
results.
The value of trade in this region has been increasing, with imports
amounting to $10.7 billion dollars, and exports to $8.8 billion, in
1956. One-third of this volume is traded within the region. Of the
remaining trade, about 25 per cent is with northwestern Europe, and
about 20 per cent with the United States. The balance - about 21
per cent - is scattered among the Latin American countries, Canada,
Africa and, to the extent of about 5 per cent, with the Communist
bloc. The area, as a whole, has a trade deficit which has been rising
in recent years.
American trade with Asia includes many commodities, with Japan,
the Philippines, India, Korea, Pakistan, Indonesia and Taiwan ac
counting for the bulk of the transactions. In 1956, our exports to that
area amounted to $2.7 billion dollars while our imports were less than
$2 billion. We have an export surplus with respect to our major trading
partners in the Far East, with the exception of Indonesia, Malaya,
Thailand and Ceylon. That export surplus, as I mentioned, applies
also to the area as a whole.
The trade deficit which the free nations of Southeast Asia and the
Far East are experiencing together with their dire need for capital,
have direct bearing on many of their governmental policies.
THE POLITICAL CLIMATE IN THE FAR EAST

Most countries in this part of the world have two firm objectives.
In the first place, they are determined to preserve their political and
economic independence, not only from the Soviet Union, but also from
the United States or any other nation. Secondly, they are anxious and
determined to speed up their own economic development. Foreign
trade policy is important to them from both points of view.
The urgent need for substantial amounts of development capital,
necessary if they are to fulfill the mandate imposed upon them by their
peoples, often places the governments of these countries in a tough
spot. Their countries' export earnings are insufficient to pay for con
sumption imports and development capital from abroad. They are,
consequently, faced with a dilemma.
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They may be unable to increase their exports to the nations of
the Free World for one of many reasons: barriers to expanded foreign
markets, embargoes, fluctuations in foreign demand, inability to pro
duce more, and the like. On the other hand, they are reluctant to
grant any concessions, or to make any commitments to foreign gov
ernments and to foreign private capital which could be interpreted as
infringements of their sovereignty.
To solve this dilemma, they have turned in their search for mar
kets and for capital to the Communist bloc, adopted various trade re
strictions, and at times imposed onerous regulations upon foreign
enterprise within their boundaries. Some of these practices have done
little to encourage American and Western European capital to par
ticipate to a greater extent in the economic development and indus
trialization of this region.
There is a special factor which the free countries of the Far East
- and Japan in particular - have had to face, and which is directly
related to the policies of our government. I refer to our embargo on
trade with Red China and Communist Korea, and on our restrictions
on trade in strategic goods with the rest of the Communist bloc.
THE POLITICAL CLIMATE:
UNITED STATES POSITION

Our over-all foreign policy is based on the assumption that the
United States has one real enemy in the world: international Com
munism. We further believe that the Communists are striving for
world domination, either through military conquest or through less
overt, but equally effective programs and policies.
We have, therefore, used our foreign aid and trade policies to
halt Communist expansion and to strengthen the free nations of the
world against Communist subversion and aggression. Further, we
have used those policies - and particularly our trade policy - to pre
vent the Communist bloc from receiving any strategic or vital goods
from the free world. Our allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organi
zation, and other recipients of our Mutual Security assistance, have
cooperated with us in this embargo on the shipment of strategic goods
to the Communist bloc.
It would be unrealistic to presume that the restrictions on trade
with the Communists, and particularly the total embargo on trade
with Red China and Communist Korea, have no effect on the free
nations of Southeast Asia and the Far East. In some instances, these
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restrictions have disrupted their normal channels of trade, and barred
them from at least potential markets in contiguous territories dominated
by the Communists.
The effect of our foreign assistance and trade policies is parti
cularly conspicuous when we consider the case of Japan. Industrially
speaking, Japan is more highly developed than other countries in the
Far East. Fundamentally, however, the economy of Japan is in a
sensitive position. Her principal resource is the skill and industrious
ness of her people. She is greatly dependent on other countries for
raw materials and for markets. Japan has been called the "Great
Britain of the Orient."
If Japan is to survive, and to provide a tolerable plane of living
for her people, she must export. Southeast Asia, unfortunately, does
not have the purchasing power to buy the goods which Japan must
sell. The only other possibilities are to trade with the West - or to
turn to Red China and Soviet Russia.
Thus far, Japan has cooperated in refraining from expanding her
trade with the Communist bloc. At the same time, she has been im
porting more goods and services from the United States than we pur
chase from her. In 1956, for instance, Japan exported $547 million
dollars' worth of goods to the United States, while her imports from
the United States amounted to $887 million. We had a net export
trade balance with Japan in that year of $340 million.
By virtue of her strategic position, and her industrial production
capacity, Japan is important to the United States and to the Free
World. At the same time, our restrictions on trade with the Com
munists are necessary from the standpoint of our over-all strategy
against the Communist menace. A constructive solution to the re
sulting problem would rest, it would seem to me, on the adoption by
our country of a more realistic trade policy - a trade program which
would effectively support our national policy goals not only by restrain
ing trade with the Communists, but also by vigorously promulgating
wider trade opportunities within the Free World.
The United States, working in cooperation with other free nations,
should strive more actively, it seems to me, to assist Japan in selling
her merchandise in the free world's markets. This does not mean that
we should throw our markets open to unlimited quantities of Japanese
goods. Such a course could hardly be considered as a remedy. I be
lieve, however, that with some imagination and good will we could
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evolve some formula that could afford wider Free World market op
portunities to Japan, at the same time diffusing the competitive effects
over the entire economy instead of allowing a few vulnerable domestic
industries to bear the full impact of Japanese exports.
The political climate in this country toward United States con
tinued and expanded trade with Asia is characterized by some rigid
and rather shortsighted attitudes. We use our trade policy, and rather
effectively, to prevent the Communists from being strengthened in
their plans for world domination by obtaining strategic goods in the
Free World. At the same time, we tend to forget at times that trade is
a two-way street. Our trade policy could use more imagination, and
more flexibility, in effectively implementing our national security policy
by actively stimulating trade and investment within the Free World.
SOME SUGGESTIONS FOR
UNITED STATES TRADE POLICY

To this end, I should like to submit some suggestions which, op
erating within the established framework of our national policy, may
help to increase private participation in the economic development of
the free countries of Southeast Asia and the Far East, and to stimulate
a greater volume of trade with that important region.
In our democracy, as in many countries of Asia, public opinion
has an impqrtant effect on government decisions. As our first ob
jective, therefore, I would suggest that greater effort be exerted to pro
mote public interest in; and understanding of the· issues and benefits
which can follow from a well-coordinated trade policy.
As far as direct government action is concerned, I have two spe
cific suggestions.
First, I believe that there is a need for the simplification, and
better coordination with our allies, of United States restrictions on trade
with the Communist bloc. At present, the United States system of
economic defense and strategic trade controls rests on four basic docu
ments: the Export Control Act, controlling goods which originate in,
or pass through, the United States, administered by the Department of
Commerce; the Foreign Assets Control Regulation, governing all trans
actions with Communist China and North Korea, administered by the
Treasury Department; the Transaction Control Regulations, govern
ing all transactions with the Communist-dominated countries of Eastern
Europe, also administered by the Treasury; and the Mutual Defense
Assistance Control Act, known as the Battle Act, administered by the
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International Cooperation Administration. The Battle Act provides for
the termination of United States military, economic or financial aid to
countries exporting strategic goods to the Communist bloc.
The scope of these different controls is extensive, and the maze of
regulations, licensing requirements, penalties and the like, confronting
American businessmen interested in doing business with Asia and the
Far East, is at times discouraging. It seems to me that much of the
red tape attendant upon the administration of these trade controls could
be reduced, and that the restrictions which have to be maintained for
strategic reasons could be simplified and better coordinated with other
free nations.
Secondly, I would recommend that our government implement the
often-expressed conviction that private investment in the Far East and
in Southeast Asia can appreciably contribute to the attainment of our
nation's foreign policy objectives. To this end, it would appear ad
visable to provide closer coordination between our government pro
grams in that region with the goal of increasing private investment in
Southeast Asia and in the Far East. A close review of our Federal tax
policies, relating to business transactions abroad, also seems to be
indicated. In this respect, the differential treatment of Americans doing
business, for instance, in South America, as compared with those doing
business in Southeast Asia and in the Far East, should be reviewed.
I believe that modern reforms along the lines which I have sug
gested would help in assuring greater, and more effective, participation
of private enterprise in the economic development of our friends in
Southeast Asia and in the Far East.
OUR ALLIES CAN ALSO CONTRIBUTE

Action on the part of the United States government, however,
can achieve only a part of our objectives. In order to encourage pri
vate enterprise, and foreign trade, to make maximum contribution to
the economic development of the free nations of Southeast Asia and
of the Far East, the governments of those nations may wish to review
and reconsider some of their own policies.
American businessmen who trade with that area, and who have
invested there, appear to have three major complaints. First, they are
somewhat discouraged by quota and other barriers intended to limit
the importation of foreign consumer goods. Secondly, they complain
of high taxes, apparently administered at times in an arbitrary manner,
and of various restrictions imposed by the governments of those coun-
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tries on foreign enterprise operating within their boundaries. And,
thirdly, they point to problems which arise because of the uncertainty
about future governmental nationalization policies, and casual attitude
toward the sanctity of contracts.
Some steps have already been taken to remedy the situation. I
am confident that, with patience and good will, even greater progress
can be achieved in removing these deterrents to wider, more active
participation of private capital in the important task of developing the
full economic potential of the free peoples of Southeast Asia and of
the Far East.
CONCLUSION

The technological developments of our age have helped to over
come the barrier of distance, and brought the United States into much
closer contact with the free peoples of other continents. Simultaneous
ly, however, these developments, as well as the military and political
problems of our era, have greatly increased the interdependence of the
entire free world.
In full understanding of our interdependence, we should strive to
attain an ever higher degree of peaceful cooperation within the Free
World in solving our mutual problems - be they military or economic
in nature.
There is still much to be done to improve the plane of living of
free men and women everywhere. I am certain, however, that the
enthusiasm with which the free peoples have tackled this task is one
of the brightest characteristics of our age.
If we proceed in an enlightened, realistic manner, I believe that
the future will have rich rewards in store for all of us. I am particularly
confident that the United States will find the stimulus to even greater
progress for our own people in the economic and political advancement
of our friends across the Pacific.
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I

WILL TRY to brief and point up the overall position of United
States trade with the total area here under study - Australia, New
Zealand, Borneo, Singapore, Malaya and Hong Kong. To do this, of
course, requires some reference to trade statistics. I cannot claim pre
cise accuracy for the resultant data to be presented. Except for Aus
tralia and New Zealand, comprehensive trade figures are hard to come
by. Borneo, Sarawak and the like, do not seem to be too much in
terested in compiling such material. It can be observed, however, that
in the broad sense certain relationships can be determined. Further,
I believe decent conclusions can be drawn.
Comparing United States trade in the six areas under study with
our country's Asian trade as a whole gives us a result that is reasonably
acceptable. But comparing this trade with United States world-wide
trade, the area, business-wise, takes on much different and smaller
proportions.
Trade dollars do not tell the whole story of the strategic materials
of the area such as its tin, rubber, oil and base metals. Trade dollars
also take no recognition of the impact resulting from that trade on local
economies, peoples and politics. Totaling up and reckoning trade dol
lars, therefore, is simply a means of gauging the pace of business and
in only one way defines the significance of the commerce involved.
When considering the total trade of the area under study we should
keep in mind that all of the political entities are within the sterling
bloc. They have a general and overall import policy which establishes
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that hard-currency exchange can only be had for goods which are not
available from soft-currency areas, and particularly from the sterling
area. At one time, when there was stringent dollar management, the
term "not available" was literally interpreted as meaning "physically
unavailable." Today this has been liberalized somewhat by the import
authorities sometimes taking into consideration the price, delivery and
quality of the soft-currency goods vis-a-vis goods from the United
States. The net result of this liberalization, however, has not meant
any startling improvement in our exports to these countries. Our
Malayan trade is a good example. There was a heavy unbalance in
favor of Malaya at a rate of better than one to four in 1957. Through
its rubber and tin Malaya has been the strongest dollar earner in the
sterling bloc. With its independence, there is the hope that Malaya
will press for greater use of its earnings for purchases in the United
States - Malaya's best single customer.
A change in Malaya's buying habits will not substantially alter
the overall trade pattern of this group. One example points this up.
In 1956, United States exports to Australia and New Zealand totaled
about 270 million dollars. We bought from them about 165 million.
Total trade 435 million dollars. The United Kingdom at the same time
was selling Australia and New Zealand over 1.1 billion dollars worth
of goods and rightfully bought about a billion dollars worth of Aus
tralian and New Zealand products. Total trade, 2.1 billion dollars or
about five times the volume of business the United States did. There
is no real basis for believing United States traders will make any sus
tained inroads into this United Kingdom-Australian-New Zealand trade
pattern if we count on supply only from the United States.
To place our trade with Oceania in proper perspective let's con
sider these latest figures:
a) Total United States exports to the area were $390 million.
b) Total United States exports to all of the Asiatic countries, as
covered in this volume, were about $2.6 billion.
c) Thus this territory, dominated by British trade, absorbed 15
per cent of our total Asiatic exports.
d) But compare these $390 million with a total United States ex
port trade of about $19 billion and we find this area accounts
for only slightly more than 2.0 per cent of our country's over
all export business.
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As for imports :
a) Total United States imports from the area were $425 million.
b) Total United States imports from all of the Asiatic countries
were $1.85 billion.
c) This group of six entities thereby provided 23 per cent of our
total Asiatic imports.
d) When compared to total United States imports, however, the
area supplied about 3 .4 per cent of our national requirements.
On an overall export-import trade basis, Australia, New Zealand, Bor
neo, Singapore, Malaya and Hong Kong accounted for just over 2.5
per cent of our world-wide two-way trade. Not too significant as a
statistic! But please remember this 2.5 per cent is only a statistic. The
content of the trade and other considerations have much more meaning.
To assign a further proportion to our trade with Oceania, let us
compare it with the business we do with some of our foreign trade
partners in Latin America. For example, our two-way trade with
Colombia is in the same class dollar-wise as our trade with Oceania.
Colombia is much smaller in population and land area. But in Col
ombian trade the United States takes the dominant role both as a
buyer and a supplier comparable to that of the United Kingdom in
Australia and New Zealand. United States' two-way trade with Brazil
alone or with Cuba alone is about one and a half. times the volume we
do with all of Oceania. We do about twice as much business with
Mexico as we do with the six countries of the group under study. And
one last comparison; United States trade with our number one partner
in Latin America - Venezuela - is carried on at almost three times
the dollar volume we do in Oceania.
United States trade with Latin America does in some measure
dwarf our business with the countries of Oceania. But American
foreign traders cannot stand by and hope good things will just happen
to them in the area. Here is a statistic that deserves our consideration.
The global imports from all sources of this group of six countries
reached an interesting 4.7 billion dollars in 1956. The United States
having sold only 390 million dollars worth of this total means we only
obtained about 8 per cent of the business available. We ought to be
looking for ways and means to improve our national position. We
know who is getting the bulk of that business - the United Kingdom.
And they are doing it primarily via a money blockade. There is one
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sure way of running such a blockade and that is to be equipped to
operate in the currencies available.
Many United States companies are already on the move in that
direction. They are either supplying the market from United Kingdom
facilities or they have set up in Austraila as my company has. The
value of such an investment is not necessarily measured in terms of
the profit return on the investment itself. We have found that once we
start up in a country this operation stimulates trade, in other of our
product lines, between the factories in the United States and the foreign
country of our new operation. In effect, we begin to sell more Milwau
kee-made goods in the country in which we have made the investment.
Additionally, we can ship products from the new operation to third
country areas to which we could not previously sell from Milwaukee.
At the time of making a foreign investment the question arises,
of course, as to the remission of profits in dollars to the parent com
pany. It is the usual practice that new manufacturing operations in
foreign countries must receive the sanction of the foreign governments.
At that time arrangements are made for the remission of profits in
dollars. It isn't always possible to get a firm guarantee as to the avail
ability of dollars for this purpose. But in any event it has been our
experience, up to this time, that we do not accumulate enough in the
way of profits to allow for remittances to the parent company. Our
capital requirements for foreign operations have regularly been beyond
our foreign earnings. The day can be expected, however, when profit
dollars will be returned to the United States.
Given reasonable conditions and stability, United States business
- just as we and others are doing - will be prepared to use its capital,
its talents and its machinery to the benefit of the host country. De
cisions to move in are not easily made at this time. But it would seem
we are approaching the point of whether to jump now or later. This
may not be the propitious "now" but the day will come when United
States business, if it is to fully participate in the important Oceania
trade, will have to become resident in the area. We think the future
and the prospects are great - and we are betting our money on it!
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FOR MANY YEARS the most important exports of Australia and New
Zealand have been wool and wheat, dairy produce and meat, fruits,
and certain minerals such as lead. The experience of both these coun
tries shows that a high degree of dependence in international trade upon
primary products is quite consistent with the establishment, and, in
deed, with the steady improvement, of high standards of average real
income. Standards of living in Australia and New Zealand compare
very favorably with those in the most advanced industrialized countries.
Indeed, if the distribution of the working population can be taken as
a reliable criterion, Australia and New Zealand might themselves be
regarded as already fairly highly industrialized. The proportion of the
total working population that earns its income from farming and other
primary production in Australia and New Zealand is now less than 20
per cent. It is, however, mainly in relation to production of this kind
that Australia and New Zealand have the greatest comparative natural
advantages. The concentration of their export trade upon the goods
mentioned above is thus entirely in accord with the principle that the
concrete details of the trade relations between any two countries al
ways depend in the first place upon the conditions which make it ad
vantageous in each of the countries concerned to specialize in one or
another type of production. The importance of the part played by
these commodities in the economic life of Australia and New Zealand
is a natural consequence of the natural conditions of these countries their climate, soil, temperature, mineral resources and the like. And on
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the foundations thus laid by nature, the ingenuity of men has, by the
application of the results of scientific research, built a highly efficient
structure of production.
History too, however, is usually important in determining where
a country's exports shall be sold. To some extent it may be a matter
of chance where exporters first find a satisfactory market outlet for
their products. But after a trading link has once been established and
been proved to be mutually satisfactory, the mere fact of its existence
creates at least a presumption that it will be continued, whatever may
have been the original reasons for building it up. Buyers and sellers
who have become accustomed to mutually beneficial commercial re
l ations are not likely suddenly to change their habits. The exports of
Australia and New Zealand will obviously most easily find a market in
countries whose consumption habits and standards of living create a
brisk demand for them. But which of these countries actually pro
vides the best export outlet has inevitably been much influenced by
the history of Australia and New Zealand, countries which were colon
ized more than a century ago mainly by immigrants from the United
Kingdom, and accustomed at many stages of their history to being large
ly financed by capital imports from the same source. It was natural
for these immigrants to deal first with their friends in the country of
their origin, and today the United Kingdom still provides the largest
export market for both Australia and New Zealand. In recent years
around 30 to 40 per cent of Australian exports have been sold in the
United Kingdom; the corresponding ratio for New Zealand's exports has
been close to two-thirds. The habit of buying British goods is also at
least as firmly rooted in Australia and New Zealand as the habit of
buying Australian wool and New Zealand butter is in the United
Kingdom. During the last few years between 40 and 50 per cent of
Australia's imports have come from the United Kingdom, and for New
Zealand, the percentage has been around 55.
Whatever "natural" tendency there may have been for Australia
and New Zealand to cultivate close trading relations with the United
Kingdom, this tendency has been considerably strengthened by two
deliberate acts of policy. First, during the Great Depression of the
thirties, when export markets everywhere were shrinking, there was a
desperate endeavor in every part of the world to build up protective
walls around such markets as were still open. For the British Com
monwealth this endeavor took the form of the organized system of
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imperial preference embodied in the Ottawa Agreement of 1932. Both
Australia and New Zealand had already, for a number of years before
that time, granted significant tariff preferences designed to increase the
proportion of their imports that were purchased in the United Kingdom.
At Ottawa an effort was made to systematize these preferential arrange
ments, and to extend them so that Commonwealth exports would also
receive preferential tariff treatment in the United Kingdom. The drive
for the extension of imperial preference came at that time mainly
from the Dominions, which were faced with the consequences of
catastrophic falls in the prices of their staple exports. It was indeed
always doubtful whether there was not some tendency to exaggerate
the advantages likely to accrue from preferential tariff treatment for
exports such as wheat, of which the total volume produced by the
Commonwealth countries was so great that a substantial part of it had
to find a market somewhere else. It has since been more widely un
derstood that in some circumstances an apparently simple straight
forward preference may be rather delusive. It would be rash to gen
eralize confidently about the current balance of public opinion on im
perial preference. Some of the export preferences which have been
granted to the Dominions still give them significant advantages. Some
recent discussions, however, leave the impression that enthusiasm for
the maintenance of imperial preference is now more evident in the
United Kingdom, where it can be regarded as a means for maintaining
steady market outlets for some United Kingdom manufactures.
Since the outbreak of World War II a second important influence
'has affected the geographical distribution of Australian and New Zea
land trade. During the war it was an urgent necessity for all the mem
bers of the British Commonwealth that demands for goods that had to
be paid for in currencies other than sterling did not exceed the limited
supplies of these currencies, and in particular of United States dollars,
that were then available. All the members of the sterling area ac
cordingly agreed that during the war they would apply similar measures
of exchange control so that the foreign exchange available at any time
to the sterling area should be spent in the most efficient way. These
sterling area arrangements were maintained after the end of the war,
when earnings of foreign currencies, and in particular of United States
dollars, were still far from sufficient to pay for all the imports that
otherwise might have been thought desirable. The same basic exchange
controls are still in operation today, though, as world trading condi20
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tions have improved, their rigor has been much relaxed and there is no
longer the sharp distinction that once existed between the restrictions
imposed on imports from dollar countries and those imposed on other
imports. The general effect of these controls has been to limit in vary
ing degrees the freedom of importers to do business with the United
States and other parts of the dollar area, while trade with countries in
the sterling area and with other parts of the world where payment in
sterling is acceptable has been much freer.
This is the general background within which the development of
United States trade with Australia and New Zealand should be examined.
Even for a dynamic growing economy it is obviously important to
avoid, if possible, any sudden collapse of old traditional trade channels.
The trade problems that are really important for such an economy.
however, if its growth is to be rapid and effective, are those which are
directly related to the conditions under which relatively new trade con
nections might be developed. The actual marginal trade expansion,
upon which economic growth largely depends, may not be very large
in comparison with the total which includes the old reliable stand-bys,
the continuance of most of which can be taken for granted. Its real
significance, however, is not adequately indicated by its size. What
happens at the margin of expansion will to a substantial extent deter
mine the health of the economy as a whole. Neither Australia nor
New Zealand has lost interest in the possibility of further expansion
of their United Kingdom trade, and it would obviously be very foolish
for them to do so. At the moment, one of New Zealand's most press
ing concerns is the current threat to the maintenance of its dairy prod
uce exports to the United Kingdom. On any long-run view of eco
nomic development, however, steadily increasing attention should be
paid to the development of the trade of the two countries with the rest
of the world outside the British Commonwealth. There has been grow
ing interest in the expansion of markets on the continent of Europe and
in Asia, and, as both Australia and New Zealand still find that dollars
are harder to earn than sterling, their trading relations with the United
States necessarily have special importance in this development.
When we seek to examine the influences which have hampered
and still hamper expansion of trade with the United States, we shall
find that we are also in fact probing into the problems raised by the
criticisms frequently made in this country both of the sterling area as it
operates today and of the policy of imperial preference. At least in
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broad outline United States policy has as a major objective the restora
tion over as wide a field as possible of a freely functioning multilateral
system of international trade. The sterling area and imperial preference
have often been regarded as obstacles to the attainment of this ob
jective. Many people in Australia and New Zealand would agree that
a multilateral trading system is a proper objective for international
policy. The adjustments that would be necessary in the world as it
exists today if the attempt were made to adapt policy to the requirements
of a pure multilateral system would, however, in their view be much
too disturbing to be contemplated in any immediate future. It is im
portant to understand the facts that are held to justify this attitude.
There has, of course, always been a significant volume of trade be
tween the United States on the one side and Australia and New Zealand
on the other. There has often also been a tendency for the volume of
United States exports to these countries to exceed substantially the
volume of their exports to the United States. Australian exports to the
United States have recently averaged around $126 million per annum,
nearly 7 per cent of Australia's total exports, and imports from the
United States have averaged around $200 million, or some 12 per cent
of Australia's total imports. The trend in New Zealand has been more
irregular, with exports to the United States in some years well above
New Zealand's imports from that country. During the five-year period
1952-56 New Zealand's exports to the United States averaged about
$50 million per annum, rather more than 7 per cent of total exports,
and slightly exceeded the average annual value of New Zealand's im. ports from the United States. But, in neither Australia nor New Zea
land is the volume of imports from the United States as great as it
would be if purchases could be made freely, unimpeded by trade bar
riers and import restrictions of various kinds. Some of these barriers
and restrictions have been erected on the Australian and New Zealand
side. These will be examined in another part of our discussion. They
are not unimportant, but it is not unfair to direct attention particularly
to the barriers on the United States side. In the present state of world
economy, the ability of Australia and New Zealand to increase their
purchases in the United States depends very much on their success in
selling an increasing volume of their export products in countries which
pay United States dollars for them. And far and away the most im
portant of the markets in which dollars are paid for imports is the
market in the United States itself.
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In considering the directions in which outlets might be sought for
the expansion of their international trade, Australia and New Zealand
have already been giving increasingly serious attention to exports of
certain manufactured goods. Australia is pressing in this direction in
its trade with some of the Asian countries, and New Zealand has am
bitions, for which there is a good foundation, ultimately to become an
important exporter of woodpulp and woodpulp products. However
important these trends may be for long-run general economic develop
ment, they have little significance in relation to the expansion of trade
with the United States, where in nearly every kind of manufacturing
activity the domestic producer has very great competitive advantages.
If Australian and New Zealand exports to the United States are to be
expanded, they will certainly for many years be in the form of primary
products. The exporter must always be alert to the necessity of adapt
ing his product to the changing requirements of his market. It may be
that the kind of product that is suitable for the United States market
is not precisely the same as Australian and New Zealand exporters
have been in the habit of sending abroad, but when all the necessary
adjustments have been made, most of any expansion that may take place
during the next few years in their exports to the United States will
probably be in exports of the same staple items as have dominated the
trade of these countries in the past.
It is obviously in the interests of Australia and New Zealand to
increase their dollar earnings, and thus make it easier to increase their
dollar imports and at the same time to diminish and eventually to eli
minate the discrimination against dollar imports that is at present be
lieved to be unavoidable. There is nothing mysterious or esoteric about
the impediments which, according to Australian and New Zealand
views, are slowing down the desirable trend. The two sore points
which invariably arise in discussions of this question are the United
States tariff and the United States policy of agricultural surplus disposal.
The concern frequently expressed about the tariff is not confined to
actual tariff rates or to details of tariff administration. Several of the
customs duties payable on some of the most important exports from
Australia and New Zealand are at present of no great importance. There
is, however, often a fear, which a careful reading of current United
States tariff history does nothing to allay, that it may be risky for an
exporter to be highly successful. If he penetrates too deeply into the
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United States market, the pressure to exclude him by raising the tariff
against him may become irresistible.
The wide variety of problems which have to be faced in expand
ing Australian and New Zealand trade with the United States may be
conveniently illustrated by brief comments on the position of wool, of
dai ry produce, of meat and of lead. We shall conclude with a reference
to agricultural surplus disposal which affects mainly wheat for Australia
and dai ry produce for New Zealand.
For both Australia and New Zealand, wool is much the most im
portant export. In recent years it has accounted for about half the
total value of Australian exports. In New Zealand, the proportion has
been about one-third. The great long-term question for wool producers
is the relation of their product to synthetic substitutes. There has been
a good deal of intelligent adaptation to the problems created by the
invention of substitutes, and in some postwar years wool growers have
done very well. In contrast with some other primary products, the
marketing of wool is still organized on strictly competitive lines, most
of the output being disposed of at auctions in Australia and New Zea
land to which buyers come from all parts of the world. The reports of
these auctions make frequent references to the activities and influence
of United States buyers, and wool has often accounted for more than
90 per cent qf the total value of Australian exports to the United States.
United States demand for wool is, however, obviously always to some
extent influenced by the United States tariff on imports of wool. In
1947, the United States duty on finer wools was reduced by 25 per
· cent, from 34 cents per pound, established in the Hawley-Smoot tariff
in 1930, to 25 .50 cents. A substantial stream of trade flows over this
barrier; it does not, however, for that reason cease to be a barrier.
For New Zealand, exports of dai ry produce, and particularly of
butter and cheese, are only slightly less important than exports of wool.
They constitute about 30 per cent of the total. For Australia, the ratio
has been around 6 per cent. Here, straightforward customs duties are
for the most part low and of no great importance. Much more signi
ficant and effective as a check upon any increase of sales in the United
States market has been the imposition of import quotas, the purpose
of which is to prevent the entry into the United States of imports that
might endanger the support prices that have been accorded to pro
ducers of dai ry products. The quotas are generally related to the
volume of imports in some standard period, which may mean a period
24
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back in the thirties. The quotas have to be arbitrarily fixed when they
are to be applied to a new product for which no standard reference
period can be found in the past. The allocation of quotas, combined
with a vigorous marketing policy, has given New Zealand a substantial
fraction of the permitted United States imports of dairy produce. The
quantities involved are, however, quite small in comparison with either
total United States consumption of dairy products, or with New Zea
land's exports to other countries. The system, moreover, comes pretty
close to imposing a complete ban on the further expansion of trade,
including the development of market possibilities for new and improved
products.
Meat accounts for nearly one-quarter of New Zealand's exports�
For Australia, the proportion is about 7 per cent. As for dairy produce,
customs duties are not at present a serious problem. There has been
more trouble in adapting the New Zealand and Australian products to
the requirements of the United States sanitary and health regulations,
to which both imported and domestically produced meat are required
to conform. There is obviously every reason for exporters to make
themselves thoroughly familiar with the regulations imposed in the
country where they hope to sell their exports. So long as there is no
reason for suspecting that the real motive behind sanitary or health
regulations is protective, there can indeed be no serious criticism of
them. In the last resort, the customer is entitled to decide what he
wants, and in this case he makes his decision through the medium of
sanitary and health regulations enforced by law. In relation to such
a commodity as meat, however, a good deal of discretion is necessarily
left to the inspectors, and this may mean that trade seems to be sub
jected to arbitrary and unpredictable decisions. Difficulties that seemed
acute some time ago are, however, being gradually overcome. Sub
ject to the penalties to which too successful exporters may expose them
selves, the current prospects for trade in meat are reported to be
encouraging.
Australia's exports of base metals amount to rather more than 5
per cent of her total exports. Of these, lead is the second most im
portant dollar earner, bringing in recently around $20 million a year.
The claims which are currently being pressed upon the United States
administration for an increase in the import duty on lead have an ob
vious relevance for forecasts of Australia's capacity to increase its
dollar earnings.
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It is not at all easy to make practical suggestions about what might
or ought to be done to deal with these problems, and perhaps in any
event this is not the place to make any such attempt. Even where
changes in commercial policy receive serious attention, the fashion
these days favors nothing more radical than piecemeal amendments of
the current practice, the effects of which are nearly always difficult to
summarize in a crisp, brief statement. For the purposes of the present
discussion, it is sufficient to outline the facts as they are at the present
time.
Finally, something should be said about the problem of agricul
tural surplus disposal. This problem has little bearing upon any direct
trading relations between the United States and Australia and New
Zealand. It may have, however, a very important bearing upon the
trading relations of Australia and New Zealand with third countries,
and therefore with the prospects for rebuilding a sound structure of
multilateral trade. There has developed in the United States a sub
stantial surplus of agricultural produce which cannot be sold here at
the prices guaranteed to producers by the government. Various means
have therefore been sought to dispose of these surpluses elsewhere on
more or less favorable terms. These disposal efforts may constitute an
alarming threat to other potential competitors who would like them
selves to operate in the same markets and are eager to do so on strictly
competitive terms. The problem is certainly not an exclusively United
States problem. Today there are few, if any, countries prepared to al
low their agricultural production to develop on strictly competitive
lines. Everywhere the interests of some sections of the farming popu
lation have been protected by devices of one kind or another, and the
emergence of surplus production is merely one symptom of this phi
losophy. Criticisms of United States policy should, moreover, be tem
pered by the recollection that to some extent the growth of agricultural
surpluses in the United States was a consequence of the strenuous ef
forts made to solve the special problems of widespread war and postwar
food shortages. If these efforts had not been made, the course of world
recovery from the dislocations inflicted by the war would have been
much less satisfactory. Even today there are still many countries
where the standards of food consumption are deplorably low, and
humanitarian sentiment can scarcely withhold approval from action
taken to relieve famine and malnutrition. However, it cannot be
seriously maintained that such considerations as this today constitute
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the most important force behind the surplus disposal program. The
program is, in fact, a direct result of measures taken primarily to pro
tect the interests of domestic farmers. Such protection may be a
legitimate objective of public policy, but the steps taken to implement
it naturally cause concern in other countries where it is felt that some
of the benefits which normally they might have expected to enjoy as
a result of productive activity based on strict attention to efficiency
may be frustrated by the unpredictable gifts or near-gifts of a surplus
disposal program. If the United States sells wheat or dairy produce
on favorable terms in countries where the Australian or New Zealand
exporter is trying to build up a market on a sound competitive basis, the
effects upon Australian and New Zealand trade as a whole may be not
unlike the direct effects of a high United States tariff or a prohibitive
import quota. A thorough discussion of this problem would carry us
far beyond the reasonable limits of this paper. It should be sufficient
here to register the fact that it is a real problem, and that the per
sistence of Australian and New Zealand criticisms of the policy adopted
by the United States should not be interpreted as implying any in
sensitivity to the urgency of the needs of the poorer countries which
are sometimes in part satisfied by surplus disposal transactions.
The essence of the situation, from the standpoint of Australia and
New Zealand, may be summed up as follows. The United States is
often concerned to proclaim to the rest of the world the virtues of free
enterprise. It preaches the gospel of efficiency. If the tenets of this
gospel are thoroughly digested and applied, it is implied, all other
things will be added unto you, and your international trade troubles
will disappear. Australia and New Zealand find, however, that when
it comes to detailed questions of trade with the United States, their
efforts to apply the gospel of efficiency do not receive an unqualified
welcome. No one can reasonably expect a sudden reversal of policy
trends which have now been powerful for many years, but it is not
unreasonable to press for a gradual movement away from the hamper
ing limitations that in the United States have been placed on effective
market responses to efficient production elsewhere.
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COMMONWEAL TH East Asia comprises six distinct political entities
- the sovereign Federation of Malaya, the British protected state of
Brunei and the Crown colonies of Hong Kong, North Borneo, Sarawak
and Singapore. As we survey the over-all problem of American trade
with Asia, the $3 million worth of trade which, for example, North
Borneo had with the United States in 1956 might hardly seem worth
discussion. 1 Yet each of these territories is a potentially expanding
�rket, each has its own economic hopes, its plans, and its problems
and in each American trade and investment may play a role which, to
the territory itself, could well be vital.
Commonwealth East Asia has a tradition, inspired by the British,
of free enterprise. The fulfillment of the peoples' desire to modernize,
to industrialize and to enjoy the high standards of living which such
progress promises has been planned within the context of this demo
cratic and liberal economic philosophy. The nationalism which has
inspired the Federation's course to independence or Merdeka, which is
causing unrest in Singapore, and which is awakening even in the more
undeveloped areas of Borneo, is not essentially unfriendly to Western
enterprise nor fanatically exclusive. American investors and traders
have been invited to play a role in the economic development of this

The author wishes to acknowledge the facilities made available to him through
his association with the Center for East Asian Studies, Harvard University.
In preparing this paper he has been kindly assisted by last minute observa
tions from the governments concerned and also from the Bureau of Foreign
Commerce of the U.S. Department of Commerce.
1 Figures in this paper have been rounded for ease of presentation. More ac
curate statistics are available in the statistical sources cited in the bibliogra
phy. All figures are from government sources, the United Nations' ECAFE
Economic Survey or from U.S. Department of Commerce publications.
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area, and they will surely gain, as will all the world, from the higher
standards of living which the people of Commonwealth East Asia
eventually achieve.
I shall devote the major part of my paper to the Federation of
Malaya, and, secondly, to Singapore. I shall group the three Borneo
territories next and, finally, discuss the economically important city
state of Hong Kong with its flourishing industries and entrepot trade.
I
The basis of the Federation of Malaya's economic prosperity and
growth is to be found in her current five-year plan, which calls for a
total capital expenditure of $376 million, including $43 million for
defense and unallocated reserves, and a consequent recurrent expendi
ture of $30 million by 1960. This plan is typical of those of the other
Commonwealth territories in that it is designed to provide the economic
and social overheads without which, under present world conditions,
rapid economic development would be unlikely and private investment
would be unprofitable. 2
The development plan allocates $333 million to economic and
social development of which 58 per cent is for the economic sector,
with priority for those primary industries which are responsible for
the country's relatively high income. Rubber replanting schemes re
ceive the largest single allocation. Replanting with improved stock
and new planting of rubber are projects designed to increase national
income; but stability through diversification is also a goal, and re
planting includes the use of alternative crops including cacao, coconuts,
coffee, oil palms, hemp, paddy, pepper, pineapples, ramie and tea. The
government also intends to encourage stability by reorganizing the rub
ber market to prevent unnecessary speculation, while research by the
industry should continue the series of improvements both in quantity
and quality with the expectation that the market for the natural product

2

Hong Kong does not have a development plan as such, but it has a program of
rural improvement and a series of individual public works projects which
are, in fact, a development scheme. The government of Hong Kong appears
to dislike the term "plan," but an economist cannot help but question
whether the colony's present prosperity was not in some sense planned, even
though the role of private enterprise was basic and vital. For details of the
plans see The Colombo Plan (Sixth annual report), Cmnd 315, (H.M.S.O.,
1957) and the Report on Economic Planning in the Federation of Malaya,
(Kuala Lumpur, 1957).
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will consequently improve while costs are kept competitive. 3 The tin in
dustry has been hampered by the activities of Communist terrorists but
conditions are rapidly improving. Production, however, is regulated by
Malaya's adherence to the International Tin Agreement.
The government also plans improvements in drainage and irriga
tion, in the road and railroad network, in port improvement and tele
communciations. A hydroelectric scheme to generate up to 85,000 kw
is dependent upon current negotiations with the International Bank. 4
Of the $106 million allocated to the social sector, 32 per cent is for
improvements in education, housing and health, with $32 million going
to education alone, a basic prerequisite for an industrial labor force.
How does this ambitious program affect the United States?
The investment policy of the Federation has been stated as follows:
To encourage and safeguard the investment and re-investment of
local and overseas capital required to promote this expansion not
only of secondary industries but also of primary export industries
on which the general prosperity of the country depends. The gov
ernment will welcome the assistance of overseas capital in such
development, particularly in fields of industry in which local
capital an� technical knowledge are at present insufficient. The
governinent will especially welcome industrial projects in which
overseas capital is associated with local capital. 5
This policy statement should be read in conjunction with the De
velopment Plan and with the other concrete steps the Federation is
taking to encourage investment. The Colombo Plan is providing an
3

Rubber output is already reported as increasing due to the production of higher
yielding trees. "Malayan Business Uptrend Retarded," Foreign Commerce
Weekly, January 13, 1958. Some 1.5 million acres have been earmarked
for new planting under the five-year plan, but as noted in the text some
former rubber areas may be replanted with other crops to implement the
diversification program.
4 In 1956 total Federation production of electricity, including purchases from
Singapore, was 82 million kw hours. Singapore production was 36 million
kw hours. For details on Federation loans, see Foreign Commerce Weekly,
January 13, 1958.
5 A statement by H. E. Dr. Ismail bin Dato Abdul Rahman, Malayan ambassa
dor to the United States, when he was minister for commerce and industry,
quoted in Foreign Commerce Weekly, August 26, 1957.
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Industrial Development Advisor. 0 The federal government will co
operate with the state governments in the planning of industrial estates
and factory sites. 7 They will promote research facilities and are now
establishing an Industrial Development Finance Corporation with an
initial capital of $5 million to provide medium and long term loans to
new industry. 8 Tax exemption on the income and dividends of certain
new industries for five years, exchange provision for the remission of
profits and the repatriation of capital are additional financial induce
rnents. 9 And, with a wider view, the prime minister of the Federation
has proposed that undeveloped Asian nations draw up a joint charter
guaranteeing "justice, rights and interests" for private foreign investors. 10
The trade statistics of the Federation of Malaya include those for
the Crown colony of Singapore. Total Malayan exports for 1957 were
$1.39 billion; imports totaled $1.46 billion, an unfavorable balance more
than covered by the income from invisibles.n The United States share
of this trade in 1957 was 4 per cent of the imports or $55 million and
5 per cent of the exports or $64 million. Our share in Malaya's im
port trade has been fairly stable over the past few years, but the value
of her exports depends upon the prices of tin and rubber. The most
important items of our export trade to Malaya appear to be: petroleum
6

The Colombo Plan for Co-operative Economic Development in South and
Southeast Asia is not a development plan in the sense usually understood,
but rather a coordinating concept through which member nations can discuss
their national plans, receive from other members economic and technical
assistance, and consider common problems. By June 30th, 1957 the United
States had given assistance to Colombo Plan nations of over $3 billion, none
of which was allocated to the nations discussed in this paper. Now that the
Federation is sovereign, it may seek aid outside the Commonwealth.
7 Under the federal constitution, land is a subject reserved for state legislation.
However, there is a National Land Council and there are other constitu
tional provisions to allow the federal government sufficient power to acquire
land for approved development schemes.
8 Malayan Bulletin, February 25, 1958. The capital is mainly supplied from
non-government sources.
9 Cf. Interim Statement of Industrial Development Policy, No. 30, 1957. See
also the Pioneer Industries (Encouragement) Ordinance, No. 13, 1957 for
the Colony of Sarawak.
10 Report in the Christian Science Monitor.
H. E. Dr. Ismail bin Dato Abdul
Rahman's paper printed in this collection, provides the latest and most
authoritative position of the federation government on foreign investment.
11 Balance of payments data are not available for any of the territories involved.
However, estimates for Malaya were made by the International Bank Mis
sion in their The Economic Development of Malaya (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1955).
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products, $4.6 million; fabrics, both cotton and synthetic, $4.3 million;
tractors and tractor parts, $3.7 million; cigarettes, $3.4 million; and
oranges, waste paper, paperboard and old newspapers, detergents, parts
for construction, hoisting, conveying and mining machinery, air condi
tioning units, refrigerators, fountain pens, and other metal manufac
tures. We are also successful in selling excavating and levelling ma
chinery, accounting and calculating machinery, tin plate waste and sci
entific equipment.
The direction of Malaya's trade has shown no important changes
in the past five years. Eighteen per cent of Malaya's imports come from
the United Kingdom and 38 per cent from Sterling Area countries. Some
60 per cent originate in Asia and the Far East. China accounts for 4
per cent; Japan, for 6 per cent. Malaya's economic connections with
the United Kingdom, including direct British investment in the country
and the sterling basis of the currency, explain in part the important
role played by the United Kingdom in her trade. There is no reason
to suppose that this pattern will change solely for political reasons.
Malaya's import trade with China is mainly in foodstuffs, but
manufactured goods from the mainland, selling far below cost, are
finding their way into the markets of Southeast Asia. For example, in
1957 China shipped $125 thousand worth of sewing machines into
Malaya. These· goods have an initial fascination for the Chinese con
sumer, who, regardless of his political affiliations or his loyalties to
Malaya, is quite naturally proud of the achievements of fellow-Chinese
on the mainland. Thus far, however, the shipments have more political
· than economic significance and do not as yet appear to constitute a
threat to America's Malayan trade.12
Japan's exports of fabrics to Malaya totalled $36 million in 1957
compared with $4 million from the United States and $3 million from
China. Galvanized sheets worth $7 million and sewing machines worth
$2 million were imported from Japan. There is competition in East
12 As noted below in the section on Hong Kong, China is exporting not only for
prestige but also for foreign exchange. However, the initial attraction of her
products rests in part upon nationalistic sentiments, on pride in the fact
that China is at last competing with the industrial nations. Recently China
and the Soviet Union bought up Malaya's growing rubber stocks (Foreign
Commerce Weekly, January 13, 1958), and the United States may expect to
see Malaya's trade with mainland China expanding, although lack of foreign
exchange will limit China's ability to continue her rubber purchases unless
political factors dominate her policy.
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Asia between the United States and Japan for certain types of capital
equipment, but Japan is unable to supply all needs, and Japanese in
vestment in Malayan development may even mean an increased demand
for American goods.
Singapore and Penang are free ports, but the Federation levies
duties the intensity of which for 1956 imports was 16 per cent. At
present the tariff, which may be increased, is for revenue only, but the
government is considering tariff protection for local industries.13
Although administered separately, Singapore has always been in
tegrated economically with the Federation. To a great extent this is
still the situation, but the Federation is now sovereign and it is ap
parent that certain readjustments in the economic relations of the two
terriories will be attemped. Singapore, however, must continue as an
important port for the Federation, since the new port developments
the re are only sufficient to keep up with the normal increase in trade. 14
The role of Singapore as a banking center for Malaya and the future
of the now uniform monetary system will depend upon decisions soon
to be taken relative to the founding of a Malayan central bank or
banks. 15
1a American investors and traders should also know that income tax is at 40 per
cent for incomes of $11,700 or over. See (Foreign Commerce Weekly,
November 20, 1956). Tax policy in the past been generally pan-Malayan,
because of the free communication between the Federation and Singapore.
If regulations restrictive of Singapore-Federation commercial relations
should be increased, however, the Federation would be freer to pursue its
own tax policy.
u Singapore has traditionally served as the wholesale distributing center for
Johore and certain other southern Malayan districts. For example, the
currency note requirements of Iohore banks were met from Singapore
rather than Kuala Lumpur. If taxes and immigration restrictions are in
creased, however, this pattern may be changed, and Iohore Bahru itself may
become more important as a commercial center. Already industrial expan
sion has been reported; see note 19 below.
15 For additional information on this subject, see G. M. Watson and Sir Sidney
Caine, Report on the Establishment of a Central Bank in Malaya (Kuala
Lumpur, 1956); P. W. Sherwood, "The Watson-Caine Report on the Estab
lishment of a Central Bank in Malaya," The Malayan Economic Review,
II, 1 (April, 1957) and my "Notes on Malayan Monetary Problems," ibid,
III, 1 (April, 1958). Although different currencies would be unnecessarily
costly and confusing, there is no reason why their basic soundness should be
destroyed or why they could not be kept at a relationship which varied
within the limits now set by the cost of internal transfers. No concrete
steps have been taken to implement this report; the Federation's Central
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Singapore trade has already been considered in pan-Malayan terms.
Focussing now on local problems of the colony's economy, it is ap
parent that the small size of the territory and the peculiar political
problems make sound development essential. Yet the future is un
certain. Her entrepot trade is dependent in large measure on political
considerations, and many of the new nations of Southeast Asia would
prefer to keep their trade out of the hands of the Singapore middle
man. The prohibition of the Indonesian barter trade alone is said to
be costing the port some $10 million in trade this year. 16 Unless un
reasoning nationalism is absolute, however, the economically strategic
position of Singapore combined with her financial and other commercial
facilities, including extensive harbor improvement schemes, insures that
the colony will continue as an important entrepot port and that large
shipments to Southeast Asia will be broken down there for distribution
to the secondary ports of the Federation, to British Borneo, Vietnam
and Cambodia, Thailand, Indonesia and Burma.17
The Singapore government's development plan has not been pub
lished in the same detail as has that of the Federation. However, its
spirit is the same, and it includes such projects as improvement of the
harbor and the Singapore river, the expansion of electricity, water, gas,
telephone, sewagl? disposal and flood prevention facilities, low cost
housing, building and improvement of roads, the building of schools
and hospitals, and agricultural and industrial research and training.
The stage, at least, is being set for economic expansion and industrial
Banking advisor (Mr. Willcock, formerly of the Commonwealth Bank of
Australia) has only recently been appointed.
1a This estimate is given in the Malayan Bulletin, January 25, 1958. Presumably,
it assumes that the order will be enforced.
17 Singapore-Indonesian relations have not been good, and Indonesia has been
reported to be buying from, e.g. African suppliers, goods which were in
Singapore and which were shipped to Indonesia via an African port. The
origin of the goods was not realized! However, this antipathy to the mid•
dleman is not confined to Indonesia; in fact, it is one basis of the antagon
ism between the Federation and Singapore. It is a manifestation of the old
conflict between city and country. Many Federation politicians would like
to see the head offices of companies dealing with Malaya moved from
Singapore to the Federation, and all shipments diverted to Federation
ports. They would prefer to have a Federation central bank and currency,
and a wholly Federation tax system. Many of these moves would be costly
not only to Singapore but also to the Federation, and, in many cases, practi
cal considerations will prevent their implementation. But the trend should
be noted and watched.
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development. But it is in the field of industrial development that
Singapore faces further difficulties. Labor unrest has discouraged long
term investment and capital has moved to Hong Kong.18 The political
trend is not encouraging for the private sector, and the possibility of
Federation protective tariffs account for a tendency to consider indus
trial expansion in the Federation rather than in Singapore, despite the
latter's cheaper access to overseas markets. 19 These negative factors
must, however, be weighed against the many positive features of the
colony's economy
its capital resources, the availability of its labor
force, its commercial connections and the proved success of several new
industrial enterprises.
Based upon this general survey of the Malayan economy, I shall
now make several comments on specific problems which appear to be
of interest to American investors and traders.
Although Malayan development programs are based on a liberal
economic philosophy and upon the concrete heritage of such British
accomplishments as rule of law at one extreme and good railways at
the other, the peninsula has also inherited an economy heavily de
pendent upon the fortunes of natural rubber and tin. In this sense it
is economically unbalanced. With the exception of Malay peasant hold
ings, the domestically-owned economy is largely, although not ex
clusively, in the hands of the Chinese; in this sense it is communally
unbalanced.2-0 The development plan of the Federation goes far to
correct the extreme hazards of the former, but the communal problem
is not so easily solved. The Federation has so far avoided the arbi
trary and excessive communal legislation of some other Southeastern
Asian nations, although there are provisions both in the constitution

--

1s Labor unions in Singapore have become to a large extent the tools of political
parties. This is especially true of the so-called middle road unions domi
nated by the Peoples Action Party. The unions affiliated with the Singapore
Trade Union Council support the less radical government party, the Labour
Front, and their activities have been more related to the problems of
industrial relations. However, officials of the International Council of Free
Trade Unions in Singapore have charged that the die-hard opposition of
some foreign firms to labor unionism or to the reasonable demands of
moderate unions have forced labor into the hands of more radical unions
which may be Communist infiltrated.
19 For example, a $700,000 power-operated textile mill and a foam rubber factory
have recently been established in Johore. Malayan Bulletin, January 25,
1958.
2° For a discussion of communal problems in the economy, see my The New
Malayan Nation (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1957).
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and in statute which are designed to insure that the imbalance does not
grow. Thus the question is whether the Chinese will accept the po
litical and economic compromises of the constitution, whether the
course of Federation politics will be dominated by the present con
servative politicians and whether the growing political and economic
power of labor will be used to win concessions within the framework
of a free enterprise system.
A newly sovereign nation might have been expected to react
against the former imperial power thus presenting a trade opportunity
for other nations. This has not been the case, and American business
men will have to base their competition on the usual economic propo
sitions of price, quality and delivery. As a sovereign nation, the
Federation's bargaining position relative to the allocation of dollars
from the sterling area pool should be much stronger, especially since
Malaya continues to be the area's largest dollar earner. However, this
will not in itself mean an expansion of American trade since Common
wealth East Asia has already been able to buy almost all the dollar
area goods it desired, either directly through normal dollar permits, or
indirectly through Hong Kong, where the payments were made in ster
ling and the imports financed in the Hong Kong open-dollar market. 21
In 1957 almost one-half of Malaya's United States imports were shipped
through Hong Kong. The procedure adds from 5 per cent to 20 per
cent to shipping charges,22 and, therefore, to this e?(tent, an increased
dollar allocation would allow a larger percentage of American imports
to be shipped directly and offered at lower prices. This is one potential
source of trade increase. Another is to be found in the requirements
of the development plan itself, and the ending of the government's tie
with the Crown purchasing agents in London.
Yet this is a time of change in Malaya and, therefore, an op
portunity for reassessment of individual trade and investment relations.
A distinction must be made between securing new and sound com
mercial relations with the area and expecting an immediate increase in
the sale of a particular product.
Malaya's foreign trade has traditionally been conducted through
agency houses, commercial firms with local knowledge which handle
many types of goods varying from automobiles to marine insurance,
For commercials details, see the International Trade Reporter, Import Export
Controls Manual, Singapore section.
22 Ibid.
21

38

American Trade with Asia and the Far East

from rubber to shipping. The general criticisms, sometimes uninformed
and unfair, have been that the larger of these houses rest on the profits
of a few famous products and do not push all their lines and that their
mark-ups are excessive. An American manufacturer should be careful,
therefore, to select his local agents not only on the basis of the fame
of their name, a fame which may have been achieved in other fields.
Small but enterprising Chinese or Malay firms may be more capable
of establishing a market for some new product than the older houses,
and growing nationalism may suggest that this is wise for other than
the normal business reasons. 23 Local agents may also be aided by
manufacturer's representatives, especially where technical advice is re
quired by consumers. And, finally, since price rather than quality is
often a decisive factor in competition with, for example, Japanese
products, the policy of burdening agents with costly inventories and
parts should be reviewed. A centrally located Asian supply depot, in
Hong Kong or in Singapore, maintained at the producer's expense or
shared by all Asian agents can in these days of rapid transportation
provide a substitute which the American businessman may wish to
consider.
Although nationalism has not aroused such intense sentiments in
the Federation of Malaya as elsewhere in the non-Western world, it
would be wrong and even unfair to underestimate it. Federation policy
statements indicate that the government welcomes foreign investment
but makes it clear that the government expects foreign business to
associate as much as possible with local capital and local labor. The
use of local employees in only minor clerical positions will not long be
tolerated whatever the declared policy, and American business must
be prepared to employ local citizens in executive positions. This re
quires a new outlook, the elimination of old-style managers who think
in "treaty-port terms"; it makes a sound personnel policy the basis of
business success. But even the company wishing to employ local
executives will have difficulty. First, there is no pool of trained per
sonnel, and not all companies can institute training programs, especially
23 Size is obviously not a sound criterion. Many of the larger Agency Houses
either have specialists most capable of handling a particular line or sub
sidiaries which are designed to service a particular type of product. How
ever, these specialists are not always available in the smaller branch offices
of the Agency Houses where sales may well be increased. The important
point is that thorough investigation of all possibilities should be made rather
than relying on names and past reputations.
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since graduates may leave for competitive positions. :Secondly, the
practice of paying local personnel lower wages for the same job under
whatever guise - for example, housing provisions, expatriation al
lowances - is no longer sound. It is bound to create two classes of
t:mployees based not on ability or work performed but on nationality.
Such distinctions can lead to nothing but trouble for foreign business.
A serious political problem in democratic Asia today is the lag
between the supply of and demand for young men partially trained in
modern-type occupations. Their opportunities in government are li
mited; the economies are not as yet sufficiently developed to absorb
them all in modem enterprise. They naturally resent their exclusion
from foreign companies which often, in the first stages of development,
form an important part of the private sector of the economy. And
these are the politically articulate young men.
In conclusion to this section on Malaya, it appears that the long
run prospects are good, though continual reinterpretation of the political
trends is always necessary. But as the U. S. Department of Commerce
reports:
The outlook for U.S.-Malayan trade and investment relations in
the near future is somewhat less favorable than the long-run pros
pects. At present, lower rubber prices and cutbacks in tin produc
tion are causing an economic slowdown. Recently private pur
chasing power and Government revenues have declined, and the
Federation Government has decided to curtail proposed 1958
expenditures under the 5-year Development plan. 24
The Malayan economy is subject to such changes, however, and Ameri
cans should not be deterred from taking this opportunity in the im
mediate post-merdeka period to review our trade and investment re
lations with the area.

II

Political changes may soon be expected in the three territories of
British Borneo. At present administered separately, they may be
joined in a loose federal union of very limited powers with a single
governor general or high commissioner ruling in the Queen's name
with three sets of advisors. He would be responsible for certain inter2• Paul A. Mayer, "Malaya," Foreign Commerce Weekly, April 7, 1958, p. S-14.
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territorial activities such as defense and external relations, internal se
curity, communications, civil aviation and meterology, posts and tele
communications and, as they are already combined, the judiciary and
the geological survey. Later perhaps, trade and customs, banking and
currency, and certain specialist services would be federalized. 23
The most important single problem is the uneven distribution
of wealth. Throughout the last century Sarawak and North Borneo ap
propriated the territory of the once powerful Sultanate of Brunei leav
ing it an area of only 2,226 square miles and, as it turned out later,
oil, production of which in 1956 was valued at $103 million. Total
revenue for the state in 1956 was estimated at $39.0 million compared
with $8.9 million for North Borneo and $15.3 million for Sarawak.
Therefore, it is likely that, unless oil is discovered in the two adjacent
colonies - and explorations there continue - the three territories will
each control their own revenue and be independent governments.
The development plans of these territories call for the opening up
of virgin territory and the improvement of communications and trans
port, the building of air strips, and improvement in agriculture as well
as for the social overheads so essential in this sometimes primitive
area. American exports can and do play an important role in supplying
the development needs of these territories but American trade is pri
marily affected by exchange difficulties. 26 Like other sterling area
countries they are restricted in the volume of dollar goods which can
be bought and, except for goods imported via Hong Kong, they are
limited to the essentials required for the execution of the development
plans. These include equipment in the field of bauxite mining, trans
port and road construction, and outboard engines for the movement of
goods and passengers over the river networks of Brunei and Sarawak.
American manufacturers are urged that such equipment requires pro
fessional and technical advice and that local agents or representatives
25 A Monthly Survey of Commonwealth and Colonial Affairs, No. 56 (February,
1958), pp. 7-8. Published by the Conservative Research Department,
London. One possible capital for such a federation would be the free-port
island of Labuan, strategically located with access to both Brunei and North
Borneo, although a little remote from Kuching. Once a separate Crown
colony, it became part of the Straits Settlements until 1946 when it was
joined with North Borneo. But so far this is speculation.
26 For many of the comments on American trade with Borneo, I rely on cor
respondence from the governments concerned. There is very little pub
lished information available.
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capable of handling such matters should be appointed. For consumer
goods, agents in Singapore may suffice, although, in view of the in
creasing volume of direct shipment from Hong Kong, agents there
should watch the Borneo market.
Direct investment in Brunei is bound by the very strict immigra
tion laws in effect, but then Brunei is not short of capital and rather
requires more local private enterprise to onset the necessary role which
the state must play in the development of such an economy. In North
Borneo and Sarawak, legislation is in effect giving certain tax and ex
change privileges to pioneer industries, for these territories are, like the
Federation, too dependent upon the fluctuations of primary exports for example, rubber, pepper and timber.
Thus the future of American trade and investment in British
Borneo is one of expansion limited by exchange problems and by the
rate of development. Although not dramatic in view of the overall
problem, any American trading with Southeast Asia should be careful
to cover the Borneo market, for its potentials, especially in certain
specified fields, are improving. 27

III

Hong Kong with an area of a little less than 400 square miles and
a population of nearly two and a half million has witnessed an indus
trial revolution unparalleled in Asia. When United Nations and United
States embargoes against China threatened her traditional entrepot
trade, Hong Kong mobilized her assets, and changed not only the
direction of her trade but also the emphasis of her economy. Her
assets were, first, her traditional banking and port facilities, secondly,
the thousands of refugees - many of whom brought both industrial
skills and capital with them from China and especially from Shanghai
- and, thirdly, a sensible government which placed economic prob
lems first on its priority list.
Today, Hong Kong may have the highest per capita income in
Asia, despite the conditions in which thousands of refugees must still
live. 28 Hong Kong has become an important source of low-priced
27 This very brief survey has hardly done even comparative justice to the Borneo
territories. Reference is made to the annua l reports of the three territories
which are available through H.M.S.O. in London or the British Information
Services in New York. The Colombo Plan report also gives details of the
economies.
28 National income statistics for Malaya and Hong Kong, both contenders for
first position, are not complete and some speculation is involved in their
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consumer goods and a market for both consumer goods as local incomes
rise and for capital goods as industry expands. With 3,000 factories
employing 150,000 workers and an additional 200,000 workers in cot
tage industries, Hong Kong's industry may now be supporting some
50 per cent of the population. 29 In addition, of course, her entrepot
trade continues to grow, although its direction has changed to include
all the countries of Free Asia. Hong Kong is a capitalist state and an
example not only to the Communist economies but also to those neo
capitalist countries whose businessmen look continually to government
for assistance.
The total of Hong Kong's import trade in 1957 was $888 million;
its export trade $520 million - the difference being easily accounted
for on invisible account. Some 40 per cent of her export trade con
sisted of locally produced manufactures including in their order of
1957 importance: textile products, enamelled household utensils, foot
wear, electric flashlights, lacquers, varnished and prepared paints, linen,
metal lanterns, preserved fruits, plastic articles, iron and steel, aluminum
ware, vacuum flasks and cement. Export to the United States of lo
cally manufactured goods, especially of clothing and a great variety of
miscellaneous manufactured articles of a kind that used to be imported
from mainland China, has steadily increased. Since Hong Kong's
typical industries are small concerns lacking an export department, it
has often proved easier to deal with a Hong Kong merchant house
familiar with the market. 30
calculation. In addition, the concept of national income in an economy
where foreign owned mines and plantations predominate is subject to
question when it is used in comparison with economies of a different nature.
But see Ronald A. Ma and Edward F. Szczepanik, The National Income of
Hong Kong, 1947-50 (Hong Kong and London: 1955); F. Benham, The
National Income of Malaya, 1947-49 (Singapore: 1951) and the Inter
national Bank Mission, The Economic Development of Malaya.
29 P. Y. Tang, "This is Hong Kong." Trade Bulletin of the Hong Kong Depart
ment of Commerce and Industry (February, 1958), pp. 58-60. Mr. Tang
is the governing director of the South Sea Textile Manufacturing Co. Ltd.
and Mayfair Industries Co. Ltd.
3 ° For detailed information on trade with Hong Kong, including exchange regu
lations, certification of origin, Hong Kong trade names, shipping, etc., see
the authoritative Commerce Industry and Finance Directory of the Hong
Kong Department of Commerce and Industry. Hong Kong maintains trade
representatives in Tokyo and London and further information can be ob
tained by writing the Department of Commerce and Industry or the various
chambers of commerce, including the Hong Kong Junior Chamber of
Commerce.

43

United States trade with Hong Kong and participation in this
great industrial growth has been hampered by American trade restric
tions on business with China. These restrictions included Hong Kong,
since onward shipment to the mainland was difficult to control. At the
same time the sale of Hong Kong products in the United States was
hampered by treasury presumption of the China origin of certain
goods. Our exports to Hong Kong slumped to less than $40 million in
1952. They have been rising since then, reaching approximately $90
million in 1957, with total trade at $127 million. This increase has
been made possible by the improvement of trade controls under which
the illegal trading of American goods with the mainland has been
checked.
Hong Kong has never been so British-oriented in its trade con
cepts as have Singapore and the Federation. This is partly because of
the long tradition of American trade with China through Hong Kong
and the larger percentage of Chinese merchants and industrialists in
Hong Kong having personal contacts with the United States. Since the
war, there has been the additional factor of the absence of the usual
sterling-exchange restrictions on American imports, providing, of course,
they were financed at the open-market rate which usually ran at least
1 per cent above the official rate.
However, the 1957 trade statistics show that Hong Kong obtained
22 per cent of its imports from China, 15 per cent from Japan, 13 per
cent from the United Kingdom, and only 10 per cent from the United
States. (The percentage of our share of the Malayan import trade for
1957 was 4 per cent.) The dominant position of China is due to the
large exports of food to Hong Kong, but there is an increasing export
of Chinese manufactured goods, partly for prestige purposes but also to
earn foreign exchange, and the importance of these exports which are
in part re-exported to countries of Southeast Asia may be increasing.
In 1957 the United States ranked fourth as a source for Hong
Kong's imports, fifth as a market for her total exports, and fourth as
a market for her locally manufactured exports. 31 But the United States
still finds Japanese competition severe, especially in textiles, certain
31

This is based on figures given in the Trade Bulletin (February, 1958). The
Foreign Commerce Weekly states that the United States ranked third
(rather than fourth) as a source of Hong Kong imports, but the figures
given by the Hong Kong Government do not support this. See F. Dubas,
"Hong Kong," Foreign Commerce Weekly, April 7, 1958, p. S-12.
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building materials and a wide rnnge of other industrial and consumer
items. The United States is able to compete in such items as sewing
machines, air-conditioning equipment, refrigerators, various appliances,
office equipment, certain chemicals and plastics materials, lubricants,
some lines of building equipment, pharmaceuticals, processed foods,
artificial fabrics and yarns, ,ind certain finished textile items. The Hong
Kong market is highly competitive; there are no tariff barriers on most
imports, and exchange controls, as applied, permit the Hong Kong
customer to make the world his shopping place. To sell Hong Kong
one must have the right product quoted at the right price at the right
time.
The stakes are high. however, for !·long Kong is a re-export center
through which the American trader may reach certain dollar-short
countries. 32 We have already seen how some 50 per cent of Malayan
imports from the United States have been transshipped through Hong
Kong for exchange reasons. And although the rate of industrial growth
may fall somewhat in 1958, American direct investment in Hong Kong
is still possible and its potentialities should be fully considered, for in
a sense, Hong Kong is the key to the trade doors of Free Asia.
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discuss some of the determinants of the exports of
the United States to Australia and New Zealand.' First the growth of
the market as a whole will be examined and then the composition of
imports will be cursorily described. Finally, and mainly, an analysis
of the determinants of the share - past and present- of the United
States in this market will be presented.

THIS PAPER WILL

I. THE SIZE OF THE MARKET

There are considerable similarities in the experience of Australasia
and of North America in matters concerning natural population growth.
Their birth rates at present rank somewhere between the very low
ones of western Europe, and those of most underdeveloped countries,
where they are very high2 ( see table 1, p. 62), while their death rates
are among the lowest in the world.
But while the natural growth rate has been close to that of the
North American countries,3 the actual rate has been consistently higher,
and the difference between the actual rates of the two areas has grown
1 The term "Australasia" will be used synonymously with the addition of these
two countries, a mistake perhaps forgivable in a symposium entitled "Amer
ican Trade with Asia and the Far East."
2 The statement is obviously an oversimplification, (a) because the birth rate
in India, for example, is, in fact, lower than in Canada, and (b) because
there are significant differences in the rates of different underdeveloped
countries.
3 United States and Canada.
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considerably in the postwar decade ( see table 2, p. 62) . The difference
between natural and actual rates, besides discrepancies in measurement
and computation, stems from the appreciable migration into Australasia,
especially Australia, since the war. 4
This migration has had profound impacts on the region in many
respects. The inflationary pressures of the postwar period can in part
- only in part - be explained by it. The requirements for investment
in housing, public utilities and capital goods of all types which were
needed for the immigrants, found expression in high levels of demand
in the private sector and in government policies - especially fiscal
policies - which added to rather than offset these pressures. There
were also more subtle changes which, although they are less easily
quantified and demonstrated, may have greater long-term significance.
Although the largest single group among the immigrants was that of
British origin, it was considerably less than one-half of the total in the
case of Australia and, in the case of both countries, considerably less
than the proportion of the persons of British descent to the population
as a whole. The net effect was therefore to make the populations more
heterogeneous in culture, religion, consumption standards, labor habits,
skills, entrepreneurial talent, etc. than they had been hitherto.5
It is difficult to predict the future course of population growth
with tolerable accuracy even under favorable circumstances; when a
major factor in it is immigration, it becomes next to impossible. It
seems a definite part of Australian policy to stimulate immigration from
Europe and North America. But while in the past it has been possible
to absorb this inflow, and while on the long-run it will continue to be
• According to the 1954 census of Australia, out of a population of 9 million,
1.3 million were born outside Australia and out of these over 0.5 million
had come within the last five years while almost 0.6 million had been there
for over fifteen years. The arrivals during 1950-54, at an annual rate of
100,000, therefore represented an addition of about 1.1 per cent per year,
or almost as much again as the natural additions to Australia's population.
In New Zealand, 1952-54, the contribution of immigrants to total popula
tion, while less spectacular, was still substantial: at about 0.75 per cent
it was half as much again as the natural rate.
5 Persons of United States descent were a minor group among the total number
of immigrants. But for what a personal judgment may be worth: it would
seem to me that their impact in setting consumption standards and affecting
the direction of demand has been out of proportion to their small number.
This might not have been so, however, had it not been for the impact of a
large number of United States servicemen during World War II, who were
stationed in the area.
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possible, situations can be envisaged in which the existence of domestic
unemployment would provoke strong resistance to such a policy es
pecially from labor. Traditionally the outflow of migrants from the
United Kingdom has occurred in waves directly related to cyclical de
clines in business activity there, and has served, in fact, as an im
portant factor in bringing them to a halt. 6 But there is little likelihood
nowadays of anything but a rapid transmittal of depressions from the
United Kingdom to Australasia, so that potential immigrants may be
most willing to move when there is least willingness to receive them,
and vice versa. This argument does not apply with the same force to
migration from continental Europe but even there the desire to emigrate
may continue to fall as the memory and the effects of World War II
recede. In New Zealand, where the unexploited natural resources per
head are considerably less than in Australia, it is difficult to see how a
long-term continuation of the past rate of immigration can be main
tained without reducing appreciably the rate of growth of real income
per head. 7
The rapid postwar population growth was accompanied by an even
more rapid expansion of output. In 1956 the real national income of
Australia was 22 per cent and that of New Zealand 41 per cent above
the 1948 level. In the United States, in the same period, it rose by
32 per cent. ,Bui again it is difficult to speculate about the continuation
of this trend. On the one hand, it is of course linked to the future of
population growth itself. On the other hand, since both countries have
extremely high proportions of their national income deriving from
'foreign trade, to make a prediction about the course of income growth
involves forecasting the future terms of trade among other things. It
is well known that the experts in this field differ widely; we have on
one hand Dr. Prebisch's theory of a persistent tendency of primary
commodity prices to deteriorate vis-a-vis industrial products and, on the
other, Mr. Colin Clark's forecast of a long-term improvement of the
terms of trade of primary commodities. For our purposes, more li
mited speculations are appropriate: wool and butter are not likely to
share fully in such an improvement even if it came about, since they
will probably be under pressure from man-made substitutes for a long
See Brinley Thomas, Migration and Economic Growth (Cambridge: Cam
bridge University Press, 1954).
7
Cf. Horace Belshaw, Population Growth and Levels of Consumption (New
York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1956).

6

52

American Trade with Asia and the Far East

time. Wheat, on the other hand, ought to be in a less vulnerable po
sition if the growth of income and population in the poorer countries
continues anywhere near its postwar rate. In any case, as long as
foreign trade continues to loom as large as it has traditionally in the
national incomes of both countries, their income growth rates will be
strongly affected by those of their trading partners, namely the indus
trial countries.
Contrary to what happened in the United States, imports in Aus
tralia and New Zealand in the postwar period rose at a somewhat
faster rate than did real national income. But while this in itself might
promise a continued rapid rise in the demand for imports, it also has
less promising implications for the suppliers of imports inasmuch as it
may imply more spectacular declines in the volume of imports in times
of falling incomes. The empirical evidence is far from satisfactory, but
some estimates indicate price and income elasticities in the neighbor
hood of unity for New Zealand. 8 The true form of the import demand
function may be considerably more complicated, being closer to a
Duesenberry-Modigliani "ratchet" function, but this could only operate
downward, in the absence of exchange reserve constraints. For mem
bers of the sterling area such constraints are likely to remain operative
for a long time, so that the "simple" income-import relation may be
more realistic, although it may not be the one that describes best what
would happen in a free market without public intervention.
II. THE COMPOSITION OF TRADE

Broadly speaking, the structures of trade of Australia and New
Zealand are similar. In 1956, exports of food and crude materials
accounted for over 85 per cent of total exports in both countries while
imports of manufactured goods and machinery represented around 60
per cent of total imports (see table 3, p. 63). In both cases the New
Zealand figure is the higher one, representing the less diversified--and
diversifiable - character of the New Zealand economy, i.e., the fact
that its natural resource endowment puts a more restrictive absolute
limitation on the extent of possible industrialization.9
See A. Harberger, "Some Evidence on the Price Mechanism in International
Trade," Journal of Political Economy, (December, 1957); and my "Eco
nomic Policy for A Dependent Economy," Southern Economic Journal,
(July 1956).
9 New Zealand is roughly self-sufficient in coal but has only insignificant other
mineral resources, so that a considerable part of its industry represents

8
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Australia's export structure is somewhat more diversified, but both
countries depend on the export of wool, meat and dairy products, with
wheat and sugar added in Australia. On the import side, besides the
two major categories mentioned, both depend on foreign petroleum and
its derivatives, although some promising strikes of oil have been made
in Western Australia. The primary sources of these imported fuels are
Indonesia and the Middle East.
In both countries electrical machinery, appliances and transport
equipment constitute about 60 per cent of the imports of this group,
while machinery, especially power generating equipment, makes up
the rest (see table 4, p. 64). As for other manufactured goods, a sur
prisingly large proportion is made up of textiles, especially cotton fab
rics10 ( see table 5, p. 65). Beyond this, iron and steel in various forms
of semimanufacture, especially girders, bars, plates and sheets are of
considerable importance.
In their geographic structure of trade, both countries show con
siderable concentration, although Australia less so than New Zealand
( see table 6, p. 66). In both countries the United States is a relatively
marginal supplier and customer, for reasons that will be discussed in
section III. In both countries the United Kingdom is the chief source of
imports and purchaser of exports, but in New Zealand its role as cus
tomer is, proportionally, twice as large as in Australia.
III. THE SHARE OF THE UNITED STATES

What accounts for the low share of the United States in the
Australasian market? At first glance the question may seem naive,
-since a number of obvious explanations come to mind, but it is just the
multiplicity of such "obvious" explanations, that creates considerable
difficulty. For, although they are not necessarily mutually exclusive,
it would seem desirable to attempt to assess them individually and, if
pertinent, at least rank them in order of importance.
(1) American Restrictive Practices
It is tempting to explain away the low level of Australasian imports
from the United States by the inability of these countries to sell their
assembly, rather than manufacture. Australia, on the other hand, has a
steel industry using domestic coal and iron.
10 Surprising in the sense that the textile industry is typically one of the first
to develop in primary exporting areas. See Processes and Problems of
Industrialization in Under-developed Countries, Department of Economic
Affairs, United Nations, 1955.
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products in the United States: wool, dairy products and meat are all so
heavily protected in the United States that ( comparative costs to the
contrary notwithstanding) relatively little is imported from these highly
efficient producers.
But Australia and New Zealand are members of the sterling area
and it is not necessary for any one count ry to balance its accounts with
each individual trading partner. It would, in principle, be quite pos
sible - and was in fact quite normal in the past - for a group of
countries to run permanent trade deficits with a given currency, pro
vided these deficits could be financed out of the surpluses earned else
where.11 The ability of Australia and New Zealand to buy in the United
States, according to this reasoning, is therefore not limited by their
sales to this country, but rather by the total amount of dollars which
the rest of the sterling area is willing and able to let them have for the
purpose. American trade restrictions, the argument would run further,
cannot be blamed therefore for the low volume of sales to this particular
area except inasmuch as they limit the total dollar earnings of the rest
of the world, or in a world of limited convertibility, of the sterling area.
The argument seems to me convincing as far as it goes but there
is a major qualification to it which much reduces its relevance. The
geographic location of Australia and New Zealand tends to make them
terminal points for transportation services. Thus, if they were to sell
a great deal less to the United States than they bought, it would imply
that ships would have to return empty from there, with the correspond
ing rise in over-all transport costs, since freight charges for shipments
from the United States to Australia would have to be high enough to
cover the costs of a round-trip rather than a one-way voyage. The
price disadvantage to which this would put American goods might be
appreciable on many items. One need not press this argument too far
( after all, Australasian exports are far bulkier per dollar of commodi
ties transported than Australasian imports) but that it is of some
relevance is evident from the relative lack of shipping ties. In fact,
transportation is only one - albeit the most important - item in this
argument. The whole structure of service industries that are ancillary
to foreign trade, is very much oriented to trade with the United King
dom than with the United States: banking, insurance, brokerage, etc.,
11

See League of Nations, The Network of World Trade (Geneva: 1942), for
an account of the traditional pattern.
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are all in the hands of houses that are able to spread theu overnead by
servicing two-way trade. And while again important other reasons
exist for this, it does not seem unreasonable to suggest that the lack of
Australasian sales to the United States contributes its share.

(2) The Dollar Shortage

As was stated above, the over-all lack of dollars in the sterling
area is a major limiting factor on purchases from the area and the oc
casional statements of intent of the Annual Conference of Common
wealth Prime Ministers are eloquent testimony to the fact that import
control policy has been handled with this in mind. In other words,
when some members of the sterling area were net dollar earners and
others net dollar spenders, ( since the dollar reserves of all are under
pressure) administrative policy in all countries was expected to restrain
dollar imports. As far as the postwar shares of the United States in
Australasia's imports are concerned, it is therefore entirely reasonable
- on logical grounds - to think that they might have been higher if
the sterling area as a whole had been in a stronger position.
But to throw the whole burden of causation on this factor will
clearly not do since it would assume a number of unacceptable premises:
a) First, it would assume that the United States share in the area's
imports was very much larger in times of no noticeable dollar shortage
for the sterling area. Reference to tables 7, 8 and 9 (pp. 67-69) will
show that this was not so, if 1937 is taken as an acceptable comparison.
In Australia, the United States share was 16 per cent, while in 1956 it
was 13 per cent. In New Zealand the relevant figures were 12 and 8
per cent. While a decline did occur, the prewar figures were not high
enough not to raise precisely the same question for that period as that
under discussion for the present: what accounts for the low American
share?
b) Furthermore, to take the postwar dollar shortage as the only
or even the principal causal variable would imply that in its absence
the United States share would be very much higher, but it tells us
nothing as to the approximate actual proportion. This we could only
know if we had information on two further unknowns: the total de
mand of Australasia for each of the major commodity groups and the
relative advantage or disadvantage of the United States ( over Great
Britain, we may say for simplicity's sake) in each of these same com
modity groups. Only then would it become possible to estimate what
the "proper" share of the United States would be under conditions of
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free currency convertibility and non-discriminatory import policies in
Australasia.
(3) Empire Preferenee
The last set of considerations mentioned above suggests a further
line of inquiry. To what extent is the low share of the United States
merely a consequence of preferential treatment of goods of British
origin in the importing countries?
Both countries have granted preferential tariff treatment to goods
produced in the British Commonwealth for a long time. 12 But it was
the 1932 Ottawa Agreement that made the margins of preference sig
nificant and firmly established the principle of Imperial Preference and
Reciprocity. While it was a depression phenomenon it has continued
to exist after the war, perhaps partly because opinion on both sides
was that sooner or later depression conditions would reappear.
Both Australia and New Zealand are signatories of the General
Agreement on Tarifis and Trade and as such accord the United States,
another signatory, most favored nation treatment. But "most favored"
refers to countries other than members of the Empire.
It is impossible to give a perfect estimate of the over-all degree of
preference without weighing each rate by the value of the goods im
ported under it - an experiment of manifest impracticality in this
context. An acceptable alternative would be to take the total duties
collected on imports from the United States as a proportion of total
imports from this country and compare the result with the same ratio
for imports from the British Empire. The result would be an approxi
mate measure of the degree of preference. But even for this the
necessary data are not readily available.
It is however possible to take selected duties on important com
modities so as to gain a rough impression of the degree of preference
( see table 10, p. 70). The rates chosen seemed fairly representative of
most others in their relations to each other and, in the event, cover
rather important categories. The impression one gains from them is that
the degree of preference on many commodities was significant enough
to turn the price advantage to British goods, but at the same time was
not important enough to overcome really overwhelming differences in
the relative costs of production or in the qualities of products. It does,
12 In New Zealand the Preferential and Reciprocal Trade Act was introduced in
1903.
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however, seem a safe inference that the preference system is a more
important factor than the dollar shortage in the list of possible ex
planations of the low share of United States goods in the Australasian
market.
(4) Costs and Demand
As was suggested earlier, another possible chain of events might
exist which, if observable, could account for the phenomenon under
discussion. If it were to be shown that the structure of demand in the
importing countries happens to be such that most of their expendi
tures on imports happens to be made on commodity groups in which
the United States is not well able to compete, this in itself would give
an explanation - the most satisfactory one for an economist - of the
low relative level of United States exports to the area.
To make this term "not well able to compete" operational it would
at least have to mean "where the c.i.f. price is higher for the American
product than for all competitors who are able to deliver the necessary
quantities." Preferably it should mean more than this, namely, a
statement about the relations of labor productivity and wages plus a
statement of capital efficiency relations and the cost of capital in the
United States and its competitors. Ideally, in other words, money price
ought to be analyzed by components in terms of individual factor pro
ductiveness and factor prices. No usable data of the latter kind exists
although a judicious use of input-output tables ought to be capable of
producing approximations to it.
There are, however, some data on relative labor costs and
productivities in some industries for Great Britain and the United
States, and in view of the overwhelming importance of the former in
this market, there seems little objection to using such information. The
data are prewar and cover only certain industries, so that only tentative
answers can be expected from such an approach.
The industries in which the United States seemed to have a clear
advantage in 1937 over the United Kingdom, inasmuch as the output
per worker was decidedly more than double that of the United King
dom ( the premise being that money wages in the United Kingdom
were about one-half of those in the United States at existing exchange
rates), included radio and valves, pig iron, automobiles, glass containers,
tin cans, machinery, paper, electric lamps, rubber tires, soap, biscuits
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and matches.is In a world of no product differentiation and, less un
reasonably in view of the small Australasian market, constant marginal
costs, the United States in 1937 ought to have supplied all of Austral
asia's requirements in these products. If it had no advantages in any
other industry the United States should have supplied nothing more.
The proportion of actual imports of such products to total imports
would then give the "correct" United States share, if no other in
fluences had been at work. A generous estimate of these proportions
yields about one-third for Australia in 1937-38 and the same figure
for New Zealand in 1937. The rather surprising conclusion emerges
that even without any other factors interfering with the flow of trade,
the share of the United States would not have been even one-half of
total imports into the area.
The oversimplification of this argument is perhaps too obvious to
be spelled out in detail. For one thing, only manufactured goods are
included in the study, so that the advantage of American tobacco, to
take one example, is suppressed. For another, the trade statistics are
not comparable enough with the industrial statistics to give more than
the merest indications of orders of magnitude. Again, product dif
ferentiation is vital in some industries: automobiles are the most ob
vious example. Other theoretical objections could also be cited.
Nevertheless I believe that the conclusion is warranted, that even
under non-discriminatory trade policies the British share in this area
would have been larger than the American one, simply because the
area happens to want so many commodities in which British prices
were lower, i.e., British disadvantages in labor productivity were not
great enough to offset lower wage rates.
(5) Historical Factors
There is another set of factors, the least tractable to quantitative
appraisal, that needs consideration. They might be called historical or
institutional factors and are, in my opinion, of more than slight im
portance. Some have already been noted, and some more may now
be mentioned.
13 See G. D. A. MacDougall, "British and American Exports, A Study Suggested
by the Theory of Comparative Costs," Economic Journal, (December
1951), using data from L. Rostas, Comparative Productivity in British
and American Industry, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1948).
The industries covered accounted for about one-half of total British exports.
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The ties between Great Britain and this area have historically
been so close that the flow of trade is to a considerable extent deter
mined by the past rather than the present. The fact that it was British
capital that installed much of the existing fixed capital equipment im
plies that spares and replacements for many items must be bought in
the United Kingdom because of questions of size and other specifica
tions. The railroads are narrow gauge. Electric appliances run on a
different voltage than the American ones. Houses, typically not cen
trally heated, require many room heaters of types not common in the
United States. In many instances, in other words, the past installations
simply predetermine where purchases for replacement are made.
The links with the United Kingdom furthermore have built up
national preferences so that often among identically priced products,
the British one will be preferred. It is possible for a toothpaste to
advertise "Buy X toothpaste and be British to the teeth," because it
does thereby appeal to a socially accepted value. British magazines
and newspapers arc read more than American ones, hence British ad
vertising is, on an equal expenditure basis, more visible.
All these factors are important. But they ought not to be over
stressed. Product differentiation also works in another direction.
American automobiles have, I think, in the consumer's eye an advan
tage which is,. at •the very least, no smaller than their true excess value
over British ones when one views automobiles as mean of locomotion
rather than expressions ·of one-upmanship. American films, provided
they conform to a certain stereotype, seem to be assured of a good
market, regardless of critical dispraise. Other examples can easily be
found of instances where consumers' product differentiation favors the
American rather than the British product, although on balance no doubt
the reverse is true.
The generalization might be ventured that the competitive dis
advantage of American products in the eyes of the consumer tends to
be least in relatively new industries in which no strong tradition of
trade with the United Kingdom yet exists. These traditions, as was
mentioned earlier, are supply as well as demand traditions. Where
there is no well established structure of import houses, often branches
of British firms, with traditional links to British suppliers, insurers,
brokers, etc., American products are more likely to compete success
fully. One inference from this would be that the tie to Great Britain,
as far as institutional preference is concerned, is bound to weaken
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gradually. How much this will tend to increase the American share in
the market however is, I think, determined by the other factors, men
tioned earlier.
(6) Conclusions
Of all the factors mentioned, I therefore conclude that the single
most important one is the structure of demand in the importing
countries combined with the structure of costs in Great Britain and the
United States. This alone would, in the prewar days, have accounted
for a United States share of less than one-half and perhaps no more
than one-third. The divergence between these figures and the actual
shares appears to have been caused primarily by Empire preference
and what have been called historical and institutional reasons. Ameri
can import restrictions on the exports of this area have probably played
a smaller role than the other factors mentioned. The postwar dollar
shortage is probably the main factor responsible for the further decline
of the American share after the war, 14 but this decline itself could not
be so very large simply because the United States share was already
rather low before the war. Before these conclusions could be more
firmly established or refined by assigning quantitative weights to each
of the factors mentioned - as opposed to a mere ranking - much
further research would be necessary.

14 The assumption being that the more rapid rise of American productivity during
the war was roughly offset by more rapidly rising United States wages and
by the devaluation of sterling.
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1. Natural Rate of Population Growth and
Components, Selected Countries, 1956

TABLE

Natural
Death
growth rate
rate
(Per thousand of population)
9.1
22.5
13.4
9.0
24.7
15.7
19.8
28.0
8.2
15.5
9.4
24.9
6.0
18.5
12.5
16.1
4.4
11.7
15.8
11.6
27.4
34.2
11.3
45.5
23.3
11.9
35.4
32.5
13.7
46.2
18.0
16.0
34.0

Birth
rate

Australia
New Zealand
Canada
United States
France
United Kingdom
India
Malaya
Chile
Mexico
World*

Source: United Nations, Demographic Yearbook, 1956, and Monthly
Bulletin of Statistics, February 1958.
*Average 1951-55.

TABLE

2. Selected Rates of Population Growth

Australasia
Australia
New Zealand
North America
Canada
United States
India
World

(Per cent per year)
1930-40
0.9
0.9
0.9
0.7
1.1
0.7
1.3
1.1

1945-56
2.3
2.2
2.3
1.7
2.3
1.7
1.3*
1.2***

Source: United Nations, Demographic Yearbook, 1956.
* 1945-55.
*"'1930-55.
0 *1940-55.
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1930-56
1.5
1.5
1.5
1.2
1.6
1.2
1.3**
1.2**

TABLE 3. Australasia: Trade by Major SITC

Commodity Groups, 1956

Australia
Value Proportion
(£A
million)
(per cent)
833.5
Exports: total
Food
275.6
33.1
Beverages and tobacco 2.3
0.3
Crude materials, inedible (except fuel) 434.7
52.2
Mineral fuels, lubricants, etc.
1.3
10.9
Animal and vegetable
0.7
oils and fats
5.9
1.0
Chemicals
8.2
8.3
Manufactured goods 68.9
Machinery and trans18.8
2.3
port equipment
743.9
Imports: total
4.1
Food
30.8
Beverages and tobacco 14.5
1.9
Crude materials, in8.9
edible (except fuel) 66.4
Mineral fuels, lubri12.5
92.9
cants, etc.
Animal and vegetable
0.6
4.7
oils and fats
5.9
43.7
Chemicals
27.6
Manufactured goods 205.6
Machinery and trans31.7
236.1
port equipment

New Zealand
Value
Proportion
(£NZ
(per cent)
million)
272.5
156.9
57.5
0.1
107.7

39.5

2.2
2.2
2.4

0.8
0.8
0.9

0.4
235.4
19.9
5.4

0.1

9.4

4.0

18.8

8.0

0.6
15.5
77.7

0.3
6.6
33.3

67.3

28.8

8.5
2.3

Source: United Nations, Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, 1956.
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TABLE 4. Australia and New Zealand: Composition of
Imports of Machinery and Transport Equipment, 1956

A ustralia New Zealand
SITC
(percentage)
Code
7
Machinery and transport equipment
100
100
71
Machinery other than electric
42.3
41.9
711
Power g enerating equipment
21.8
712
Agricultural machinery
5.1
Tractors other than steam
713
6.7
Office machinery
2.5
714
715
Metal-working machinery
5.5
(3.0)
Cutting tools
715 01
(2.5)
715 02
Others
716
Machinery n.e.s.
15.3
716 03
Construction and mining
(3.6)
72
17.9
Electric machinery and appliances
20.7
721 01
Generators, motors,
transformers (7.5)
73
Transport equipment
38.6
37.3
731
2.6
Railway vehicles
732
Road motor vehicles
30.0
3.5
Aircraft
734
Ships and boats
735
2.5.
Source: United Nations, Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, 1956.
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TABLE

5. Australia and New Zealand: Composition of
Imports of Manufactured Goods

Australia New Zealand
SITC
(percentage)
Code
Manufactured goods classified by material 100
100
6
12.2
8.0
Paper,
paperboard
and
manufactures
64
Newsprint
(5.8)
641 01
38.1
Textile yarn, fabrics, etc.
45.1
65
6.8
Yarn and thread
651
16.0
Cotton fabrics
652
9.2
Miscellaneous fabrics
653
Synthetic and spun
653 05
glass fabrics (5.0)
(4.6)
Bags
and
sacks
for packing
656 01
6.0
6.8
Non-metallic mineral manufactures
66
2.1
Glass
664
1.9
Pottery, household
666
26.2
22.4
Base metals
68
17.9
Iron and steel
681
(4.5)
Girders, bars, etc.
681 04
Universals,
plates,
sheets,
681 05
uncoated (2.4)
15.8
10
Manufactures of metals
69
Source: United Nations, Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, 1956.
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TABLE

6. Australia and New Zealand: Geographical

Trade ...._ Trade
...._ of
with

Structure of Trade, 1956

Exports
Australia New Zealand
United Kingdom
33
65
Canada
1
1
Australia
3
5
New Zealand
Malaya
Hong Kong
2
6
India
2
Ceylon
1

Imports
Australia New Zealand
43
54
3
3
14
1
1
2
3
1

1
1

75

53

74

2
6
4
2

1
2
4
1

2

2

1
1
3
1
1

16

10

7

7

1
7

3
13

1
7

Total,
countries shown 82

99

78

90

Sub-total, principal
Commonwealth 44
Belgium-Luxemburg
France
Western Germany
Italy
Netherlands

3
9
5
4
1

Sub-total, principal
continental
Western Europe 22
Japan
United States

11

Source: United Natiorui, Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, 1956,
vol. 1.
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7. Australia and New Zealand: Prewar Proportions
of Imports of United States Origin to Total Imports

TABLE

Electrical machinery
Agricultural machinery
Metal working machinery
Iron and steel plate and sheet
Automobile chassis
Automobile bodies and parts
Textile piece goods
Gasoline
Kerosene
Lubricating oil
Total
book.

Australia
New Zealand
19 37-38 (Percentages) 1 937
15
17
27
45
24
45
50
5
4
18
3
12
18
1
19
33
20
73
92
16
12

--

Source: United States Department of Commerce, Foreign Commerce Year•

67

TABLE 8. Australia: Imports from the United States and All

Areas, Selected Commodity Groups, 1956

From United
Percentage
Total
States
(Millions of dollars)
0.9
27.3
20.3
74.4
33.8
6.7
19.8

SITC
Code
074
Tea and mate
121
Tobacco, unmanufactured
231
Crude rubber, etc.
312
Petroleum, crude and
partly refined 117.8
313 . Petroleum products
90.1
512
Organic chemicals
26.0
641
Paper and paperboard
55.7
651 .Textile yarn and thread
31.4
652
Cotton fabrics
73.8
653 Miscellaneous fabrics
42.0
Made up textiles, n.e.s.
656
24.9
Iron and steel
681
82.2
699
Manufactures of metals, n.e.s. 41.9
711
48.9
Power generating machinery
713
35.3
Tractors, other than steam
715
Metal working machinery
28.9
716
Machinery, n.e.s.
81.2
721 Electric machinery
94.7
732
Road motor vehicles
157.4
734
Aircraft
26.5
899 Manufactures, n.e.s.
24.5
68.7 per cent of total
imports in Australia
Total imports, f.o.b.

1,145.0
1,666.2

14.4
2.2
1.0
0.2
0.2
0.5
0.1
10.2
3.3
11.8
16.1
9.4
22.5
10.0
18.3
9.4
2.8

16.0
8.4
1.8
0.6
0.3
1.1
0.4
12.4
7.9
24.1
45.6
32.5
27.7
10.6
11.6
35.5
11.4

159.4
221.3

13.9
13.3

Source: United Nations, Commodity Trade Statistics, January-December,
1956 (Series D, vol. VI, No. 4).
Note: Imports chosen were those accounting for more than £ A 10 million
( 1.3 per cent of total exports).
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9. New Zealand: Imports from the United States and
All Areas, Selected Commodity Groups, 1955
Total
From United States Percentage
( Thousand £NZ)
4,920
Wheat
4,021
Raw sugar
2,684
Tea
2,332
Be verage spirits
Tobacco, unrnanufactured 2,087
2,053
98
Woven cotton piece goods 7,489
206
3
4,026
Rayon piece goods
4
155
Woolen piece goods
3,747
Woolen carpets
2,166
Motor and aviation spirit
4
384
9,888
Diesel and fuel oils
1
4,055
21
Iron and steel:
Pipes, tubes, fittings
13
2,459
l
Plate, sheet, hoop, strip 7,907
203
3
1
16
2,620
Wire
4
Bar, rod, billet, bloom. pig 3,262
128
2,329
2
Copper
49
2
Electric motors and parts 2,575
2,706
1
Insulated cable and wire
4
78
Elec. switchboards, switches 2,152
26
Radio and radar apparatus 2,365
1
4,724
1,751
Tractors and parts
37
58
3
Raw,synth.,reclaimedrubber 2,240
2,451
Newsprint
Books, magazines,
8
228
2,887
newspapers, music
4
622
16,106
Motor cars
4
141
Commercial motor vehicles 3,637
Railway and tramway
50
1,628
3,244
vehicles and parts
TABLE

-,-- 45 per cent of
total imports
Total imports

111,085
250,661

7,763
21,305

7.0
8.3

Source: New Zealand Yearbook.
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TABLE

10. New Zealand: Selected Tariff Rates under Empire
Preference and Most Favored Nation Agreements

Motor vehicles, c.k.d.
Motor vehicles, assembled
Cultivators, harrows, plows, drills
Reapers, binders, harvesters, mowers
Other agricultural implements
Dairying: chums
Dairying: others
Electric batteries
Electric appliances for electro-plating,
electro-chemistry, etc.
Rails
Iron (angle, bolt, rod, rolled girders, etc.)
Iron (sheet, plate)
Wire, plain or barbed

EP
5%
15%
10%
3%
3%
3%
3%
15%

MFN
40%
50%
35%
3%
25%
25%
3%
35%

Free
Free
Free
Free
Free

15%
20%
20%
20%
10%

Source: Customs Department, The Customs Tariff of New Zealand, Well•

ington, 1949.
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A new government
looks at American investment
His Excelleno/ Dr. Ismail bin Dato' Abdul Rahman
His Malayan Majesty's Ambassador
to the United States of America

71

As

THE REPRESENTATIVE of the Government of the Federation of
Malaya, I am very glad to have this opportunity of presenting the
attitude of my government toward American investment. I would like
first of all to describe to you briefly the economic and financial position
of the Federation of Malaya before the country became independent
and the problems that the newly independent country faces in the field
of economic development.
Before August"31, 1957, the Federation of Malaya, as a dependent
territory of Britain, was probably a classic example of the working of
the colonial economic system. The country's chief function was to
play a complementary part to the larger and dominant economy of
Britain. It produced the raw materials which the manufacturing in
dustries of Britain needed. Large tracts of land were alienated on at
tractive terms for the production of rubber, palm oil and copra and the
mining of tin, iron ore, a little of coal and gold. The development of
the basic services - roads, railways, electricity, drainage, telecommuni
cations, harbor and port facilities - was undertaken primarily to
facilitate the production of these raw materials for export. As a mar
ket for the manufactured goods of foreign countries, particularly Bri
tain, the country offered a constantly expanding market for machinery
and equipment, textiles, tinned foodstuffs and other consumer goods
which a country needs, dependent as it was on imports for its food
supplies. Preferential rates of import duties for goods from the British
Commonwealth encouraged these imports. Foreign import houses,
particularly British, had a virtual monopoly of the import trade, as
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well as the export trade, functioning in association with Asian traders
only for the wholesale and retail distribution of the imported goods.
The financing of the import and export trade, until quite recently, was
in the hands of foreign, mainly British, banking houses with their local
managers and executive staff being all European.
The monetary system was again a classic example of the auto
matic working of the colonial financial machinery. The local currency
was fully backed in cash and other Sterling investments purchased over
the years from the revenue of the country and deposited in London.
These assets, used as 100 per cent cover for the currency, were con
siderable. All other funds of the government, such as the deposits of
the country's Post Office Savings Banks, are invested in London and
it is only quite recently that the legislation concerning these was
amended to permit the investment of a part of these funds locally in
the country.
The budgetary system was also typical of the financial practice of
the colonial system. The balanced budget was almost an article of
faith with the colonial financial officers. Revenue was mainly from
indirect taxes and it was only quite recently that income tax was in
troduced into the country. If revenue was insufficient to meet essential
social services, such as schools and hospitals, and the development of
basic public services, the colonial power would meet the deficits in the
budget by means of grants or loans, through such forms as the Colonial
Development and Welfare Acts of the British government. And de
pendent as the country was on a few export products, whose prices on
the world markets are subject to wide fluctuations, revenue was also
subject to its ups and downs.
There was no economic planning as we know it today, and in fact,
far from having a department of statistics, the services of qualified
statisticians were until very recently considered a luxury by the colonial
treasury officials of the government. And it was not until the end of
1950 that the government employed as economic advisor an official
who has fully adequate economic and financial qualifications. Even in
the case of rubber production, for example, the major industry on which
the economy of the country depended, planning to improve its efficiency
was not undertaken or a major replanting project started until this
decade.
That briefly is the broad economic and financial picture of the
Federation of Malaya before independence. The general problem faced
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by the country when it became independent was one of reorientation,
from a colonial economy to that of a fully sovereign and independent
entity. Our population is a growing one, at a rate as high as 3 per
cent a year with a high proportion of the lower age groups. Between
two-thirds and three-fourths of the country remain undeveloped, mostly
under jungles, and while it might be economically and politically ex
pedient for the former colonial power to develop only the accessible
western part of the country, it is no longer so for the new independent
elected government which is answerable to the electorate. Economic
and social development, moreover, has to be more evenly spread
,,throughout the country instead of being largely concentrated in the
urban areas of the country. Roads, electric power, postal facilities,
schools and hospitals have to go into these rural regions and must not
remain, even in magnificence and splendor, only in the urban areas.
This is particularly so when the population has become far more
settled than it was some years ago. Some diversification of the eco
nomy has to be undertaken in order to provide employment for the
growing population and to lessen the dependence of the economy on
too few export products.
To undertake the economic development of the country in keep
ing with its changed status as an independent country, the financial
resources of the country are, of course, not unlimited, so that a system
of priorities has to be established. But first there would have to be a
review of needs and potentialities and studies have to be undertaken.
To a certain extent this was accomplished and the report of the mission
from the World Bank three or four years ago was invaluable to us.
I should mention that it was not without opposition and much difficulty
that we were able to have a visit from the World Bank mission. Next,
a system of priorities calls for planning in the economic and financial
field. This in turn requires certain tools. After some difficulty, we are
enlarging and modernizing our department of statistics. A population
census was undertaken last year and a survey on the cost of living,
both in the urban and rural areas, has recently been completed.
At the same time, the financial mechanism which has worked for
nearly two centuries and which has now outlived its usefulness, needs
to be overhauled. It is no longer possible for us to have a monetary
system which is purely automatic in its working. It is no longer pos
sible for the independent government to have abosolutely no control
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over the volume and character of credit in the country, particularly
when it has to undertake economic development of the country on a
considerable scale. We have to have a central banking machinery to
control and regulate the currency and to function as the bankers' bank.
The difficulties of setting up a Central Bank are apparently immense,
particularly in view of the fact that we have a common currency with
Singapore which is a separate government and remains a British colony.
We have decided out of our own free will to remain in the Com
monwealth of Nations and in the sterling area. The great bulk of our
foreign trade is with countries in the Commonwealth of Nations, par
ticularly Singapore which takes about 40 per cent of our total trade
and the United Kingdom which takes 15 per cent. Our trade with the
United States and Canada accounts only for about 10 per cent of our
total trade. Although Malaya has a persistently favorable balance of
trade with the dollar and European currency areas, she has an uncer
tain balance with other countries, particularly Indonesia and Japan.
Malaya has played a vital part in the postwar history of the sterling
area and her contributions to the overseas earnings of that area, in the
sale of rubber and tin to the dollar and other non-sterling areas, have
been greater than those of any other single member of the sterling area.
Our country, together with Singapore, has had a substantial overall sur
plus on our balance of payments for several years past. Our surpluses
with America and Europe have been converted into sterling and have
not merely paid off our deficits with softer currency areas, such as
Indonesia and Japan, but have released a large surplus of dollars for
use by other members of the sterling area. Technically speaking,
Malaya could establish the Malayan dollar as an independent currency.
Since all our reserves are held in sterling, an independent Malayan
dollar would have to be closely linked to Sterling, at least until adequate
reserves could be built up in the dollar area. This, however, would
take many years and it would depend also on the prices of our rubber
and tin as well as on the extent to which other countries, such as
Indonesia, with which Malaya has adverse trade balances, demand set
tlement of these balances in dollars. If Malaya left the sterling area,
she would no longer be able to have, as she now has, the advantage of
the convertibility of the Malayan dollar with all currencies except those
of the dollar area. Those countries with which Malaya has trading
surpluses would no longer automatically allow her to convert those sur
pluses into sterling for spending elsewhere as they do at present, while
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the countries with which Malaya has deficits, would press for settle
ment of these deficits in American or Canadian dollars. All this would
not only impose a serious burden on the machinery of government, it
would also be bound to lead to some interruption in the free flow of
trade. Dependent as we are on the export of rubber and tin for our
dollar earnings and because of our need to import a great deal of capital
equipment for the economic development of the country, the risk in
volved in leaving the sterling area is too great for us to take, however
strong we are at present in our payments positions with other countries,
particularly the dollar area. Indeed, because of this strong position,
we are able to import direct from the dollar area any goods which we
consider essential and indirectly through Hong Kong any other goods
from the United States or Canada. To remain in the sterling area,
therefore, is to enjoy an important measure of economic security and
freedom in trading relationships with other countries in the sterling and
the European areas, at the expense of accepting some limitations in our
relationship with the dollar area.
Our decision to remain in the sterling area does not mean that we
wish to preserve the previous pattern of our foreign trade. We have
now become a contracting party to the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade and we are beginning a series of trade negotiations with a
number of c;ountries, starting with Australia. We have informed other
Commonwealth countries that we wish to review the existing system
of Commonwealth tariff preferences which have· not worked to our
advantage. In some respects, the preferential treatment given to im
ports from Commonwealth countries adversely affects our revenue,
handicaps local industry and places undue barriers to our trade with
such countries as Japan and the United States.
Our decision to remain in the Sterling Area also does not mean
that we wish to preserve the traditional sources of our private and
public capital and to limit the inflow of investment from the United
States, the largest source of capital in the free world today. As I have
mentioned, our population is growing rapidly and a large part of th�
country remains undeveloped. We badly need a large amount of
capital to undertake the economic development of the country, capital
which the local sources are unable to provide in sufficient quantities.
It is the policy of my government to encourage foreign investment in
the Federation of Malaya, particularly for industrial development.
Legislation is now being prepared to attract pioneer industries by giving
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tax-free holidays to such industries up to a period of five years. Re
mittances of profits and repatriation of capital are assured and my
government has agreed to enter into agreement with foreign govern
ments, including the United States, to guarantee foreign private in
vestments in the country. On the other hand, we would like to see
that forei gn investment is associated as much as possible with local
interests and that our own nationals are trained and absorbed into the
management of industrial ventures in the country.
The government itself for its part has embarked upon a program
of basic development which is essential if we are to attract foreign
investment in the industrial development of the country. In its de
velopment plan, the government has decided that its capital expendi
ture should be allocated in the proportion of 60 per cent to the eco
nomic sector for the increase of productive capital, the stimulation of
output and other productive activities; 30 per cent to the social sector
for the development of health, education, housing and other social
services; and 10 per cent to the government sector for the building
and improvement of offices, government housing, houses for our labor,
etc. In our objectives for the economic development of the country,
first priority is given toward improving the efficiency of the rubber and
tin industries, which are the twin pillars of our economy, the con
struction of an adequate port near Port Swettenham, the nearest port
to Kuala Lumpur, our capital, and the encouragement of industrial
development. Under the latter, negotiations have been going on for the
setting up of an Industrial Development (Finance) Corporation to pro
vide financial facilities for the industrial development of the country.
As far as the economic development of the country is concerned,
the present government of the Federation of Malaya, which is the first
elected government of the country, has embarked on a policy of free
enterprise. In spite of the examples in the independent countries
around us in South-East Asia, we consider that we should give private
enterprise the opportunity to develop the country. We have large num
bers of small enterprises in the country; almost half of the acreage
devoted to rubber-growing, for example, which is the biggest primary
producing industry, is small holdings of less than 25 acres owned by the
small farmer. The spirit of free and private enterprise has even per
meated some of our labor plantation workers. Moreover, our own
people, particularly those of us who are of the Chinese race which is
the dominant trading influence in the country, are essentially of an
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individualist character, like the American people. lt 1s in ms narure
to use his individual ingenuity and skill to venture into the commerce
and industry of the country, beginning in a small way and perhaps
succeeding through his own efforts in an atmosphere of free com
petition.
I should mention, however, that although the commerce and in
dustry of my country have been successfully developed, largely through
British capital and under the previous British regime, we would wish to
see that private capital change its character. Under the previous
colonial rule, private capital has prospered because of its methods
which the colonial system permitted. It was in certain respects re
strictive in character; the import and export trade, for example, was
almost entirely the monopoly of a small group of foreign companies.
Now that the country has become independent, private capital has to
change its character and to adapt itself to the changing circumstances
in the country if it is to survive.
It is for the reason that American private capital has all the in
herent characteristics of being modern and adaptable that we would
welcome American investment in the Federation of Malaya. Free
competition, for example, is the basic concept of your industrial and
trading economy. Your government frowns on trusts, rings and cartels.
Your large industrial enterprises readily accept their obligations to their
labor employees. I understand also that American companies, having
branches and agencies in foreign lands, prefer to have the nationals of
these countries as their representatives as a matter of policy. In my
· country, it is only very recently that foreign firms are beginning to take
in our own nationals into their executive levels. Moreover, and this
is becoming quite important to us as an independent nation, we wish
to diversify the sources of our foreign capital. The main traditional
source of foreign capital has been the United Kingdom and we feel
it would be much safer if we are not too dependent on one principal
source. The United States as the biggest source of capital would, there
fore, be an obvious one to which we should tum.
I would end by saying that as a newly independent country we
have many problems to solve; one of our chief problems is the private
financing of our economic development, particularly in the industrial
field. We would very much welcome American investment in the
Federation of Malaya and we feel sure that the private investment of
your capital in my country would be to our mutual advantage.
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Changing trade patterns
as underdeveloped areas
become developed
V. S. de Beausset
Former Resident Project Manager on Taiwan,
Manager, Process Division,
The J. G. White Engineering Corporation
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ALTHOUGH MANY people may visualize Taiwan (Formosa) as a
very small island in the Pacific, by population this province of China
is comparable to a number of the countries in Asia. Taiwan has a
population of about 11,000,000 people. It has all the problems, and
more, when compared to the other countries in Asia. It has limited
resources, a tremendous annual population increase - 3 per cent and very few sources of capital other than United States aid. It is a
rugged country ·with 60 per cent of the land consisting of a mountain
range running its entire length with peaks up to 14,000 ft. This
mountainous area is relatively unpopulated. It is a land of earth
quakes and typhoons, beautiful scenery and, most fortunate of all, a
· very industrious people. More importantly, Taiwan is the seat of the
Central Government of the Republic of China, whose aim is to ulti
mately retake the mainland from the Communists. As a result, military
expenditure totals 70 to 80 per cent of the entire central govern
ment budget. When comparing the problem of the development of
Taiwan with other countries, therefore, it is found that the difficulties
are equal to, if not greater than, the others. In the discussion of the
industrial development of Taiwan which follows, the problems of the
supply and fmancing of direct military items, will not be taken into
consideration.
It is my opinion that, if it were not for this extraordinary military
burden, Taiwan could be considered as having become a developed
rather than underdeveloped area by the end of 1957. By this, it is meant
The cooperation of the J. G. White Engineering Corporation in making Mr.
de Beausset's contribution possible is gratefully acknowledged.
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that all types of basic and consumer industries have been established or
started, that agriculture has been well developed to supply the island's
needs, universal education is well established and the group diseases
have been suppressed. Continued growth and improvement is, of course,
required, which is true of any area. In 1949-1950, however, Taiwan was
truly underdeveloped. Let us look, therefore, at conditions and trade
at that time to understand the subsequent changes that have occurred.
The Japanese had done considerable development there prior to
during
the initial period of World War II, particularly in agricul
and
ture, including irrigation, communications, and some industries like
aluminum and magnesium. Most of these efforts were destroyed by
bombing, typhoons and general lack of maintenance during and im
mediately after the war. From 1945 to 1949, the Government of the
Republic of Chnia was preoccupied with rehabilitation and Communist
revolution on the mainland, thus very little was done on Taiwan. Its
development really began in 1949, when Chen Cheng, the present Vice
President and Premier, was sent there as its Governor.
Prior to the war this area was an exporter of agricultural products,
mostly to Japan, but after the war it was short of food. For the food
it exported to Japan, it used to get textiles, manufactured goods and
consumer items in return. From 1945 to 1949, practically nothing
was traded with Japan or any other country. By 1949, the estimated
value of total imports was $34,900,000 and the exports was $33,900,000. These are Bank of Taiwan figures but they do not show the true
picture since there were a great many supplies brought in from the
mainland by evacuees and others. An estimate of the actual minimum
import needs made a year later was about $200,000,000 per year.
This was estimated on the basis of a minimum standard of living for
the populace. The deficiency was made up through United States
economic aid. The government had established a strict austerity pro
gram, prohibiting all imports of semi-luxury items and limiting imports
on others. For example, the tax on new automobiles, sedans, was
about $800 per year. In looking around in 1949, most of the people
didn't have leather shoes, and winter jackets were made from gunny
bags for almost all workers and farmers. In 1949, I saw the One
Hundred and Second Regiment, after being retrained, head off to de
fend Quemoy Island, just off the mainland. Their clothing consisted
of T-shirts, shorts, straw hats and straw sandals. In other words, here
was an economy at an extremely low level.
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What was the trade picture at this time? What was imported and
what was exported? The major imports were textiles and chemical
fertilizers, plus a small amount of machinery to rebuild and build up
some of the key industries and services. Realizing the importance of
development, the Chinese Government had started their policy of in
dustrialization in 1949. The textiles came from Japan and the chemical
fertilizers mostly from the United States. By 1950, out of a total
import figure of $123,000,000, food and fertilizer were valued at
about $30,000,000, textiles and related products at about $35,000,000,
machinery, industrial products and vehicles about $14,000,000 and
crude oil and gasoline products at about $5,000,000. As stated before,
the major imports were food and clothing. By 1950, rehabilitation
efforts began to improve agricultural conditions, particularly sugar, and
this export was about $70,000,000, with rice, tea, salt, citronella oil
and bananas making up most of the balance. All this was not a very
impressive trade picture but is one that I feel is generally representative
of an underdeveloped country (usually one or two main exports).
Were it not for United States aid, the only trading with such an area
would be textiles, fertilizers (or food) and little of anything else, or
hope for anything else, since that was all the money they had.
Taiwan could not support itself, but the government was anxious
to develop the area, so that it could do so in the future. How does a
government develop its country? Where does it start? How does it
keep such development within bounds of available exchange, etc?
What would be the effect on trade?
The methods and the route taken in Taiwan, with variations,
shouldn't be too different from those to be followed, or being followed,
in other areas with limited arable land and a rapidly increasing popula
tion. Through studies made by the Chinese and the J. G. White En
gineering Corporation, who are their consultants, it was decided that
some degree of industrial development was the answer.
The first steps were to determine the availability of capital, of
skills, training capability for additional skills and the determination of
the effects on the economy, such as inflation. After some study and by
trial and error, the investment in development in Taiwan was set at
$40,000,000 to $60,000,000 per year, about half of which was in local
currency. During the first few years this was found to be a limiting
amount in many ways. Some people there (industrialists and builders)
will argue that it was too small and others (economists and bankers
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worried about inflation) thought it too large. This capital came from
earnings of traders and from existing industries, from overseas Chinese,
from landlords, and from the government, but the major portion from
United States aid. The development did not start with those amounts,
in the first years it was much less, but gradually grew to those amounts
and more or less stabilized there in the last four years.
Once the policy was set and limited capital became available,
there was the question of what to do with it. The first thing was to
avoid, or at least reduce, the prestige projects at the initial stages.
Projects, such as huge hydro-electric schemes, integrated steel mills,
and automobile plants, take too much out of a small country in the
initial development phases; the beneficial effects don't reach the people
and the general economy soon enough. In Taiwan the Chinese got
down to the root of the problem and began to develop the textile and
fertilizer industries in order to supply food and clothing for the local
market. This initial concentration on major needs for the local market
is what we believe to be a natural development. In other words, here
is an assured market, so this could be the pattern used in other areas
also.
In 1949 our company estimated that the populace needed about
$45,000,000 worth of textiles per year. This was figured at very low
living standards, one pair of pants, and shorts at that, per year, plus
the other needs. You can see from their foreign exchange earnings in
1949 that the $34,000,000 would not go very far in the supply of this
one item alone. In order to get enough food, the agriculturalists esti
mated that $25,000,000 worth of chemical fertilizers had to be im
ported. To develop production of chemical fertilizers is complicated
and takes much capital, but textiles are relatively easy and quick. The
Chinese had the skills for this and some machinery had been brought
over from the mainland. Some United States aid cotton diverted from
the mainland was also available. We estimated that 150,000 spindles
could supply the initial needs. The Chinese Government appointed a
special committee to direct the development, and work started. With
relatively no foreign exchange to buy imported textiles, material that
did get into the country was sold at a very high price. Very high
profits were assured for those companies that got set up first. Work
proceeded rapidly and in two years a number of factories were built,
totalling about 150,000 spindles.
How does the development of the textile industry, as the initial
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step, affect trade patterns with the United States? Taiwan became an
importer of raw cotton. As other countries repeat this process and
their living standards increase, they will use more textiles and the de
mand for cotton will increase all over the world. You might ask
"What about textile machinery?" There was not much business here
initially for the United States manufacturer. American machines are
designed for production of high grade textiles and for as complete an
automatic operation as possible. Compared to non-automatic ma
chines, say from Japan, we found at that time that they cost about
three times as much. Labor in countries like Taiwan is readily avail
able, but capital is scarce and high grade textiles (fine counts) were
not initially required. Japan, in this case, controlled the textile ma
chinery exports to Taiwan. Another big advantage of the textile in
dustry as the first development in countries where foreign exchange of
any type is really short, is the large and quick capital return possible
on the investment. For this industry, raw material is a major cost and
it is easier to arrange short term financing for raw material than for
capital equipment. The consequent large capital return to the textile
manufacturers in Taiwan was used by them for further industrial de
velopment and tended to broaden the development base. So, in a few
years, good textiles became available at stable and low prices and had
a pronounced effe�t on improving the living conditions and stabilizing
the economy.
As the textile industry was developing, the government then turned
toward the production of chemical fertilizers. During the early stages
of World War II, the Japanese had set up some carbide furnaces on
Taiwan, evidently to be used to produce acetylene for synthetic fuel.
In one area they had a production of 11,000 tons per year of calcium
cyanamid fertilizer. Also, they had two small superphosphate factories.
These were what we would have called completely destroyed by bomb
ing, but the Chinese engineers remelted and rebuilt the machinery and
put it back into operation. The fertilizer needs for the island were
estimated at 90,000 tons of nitrogen per year and 36,000 tons of
phosphate. The island produced 2,000 tons of N and 5,000 tons of
P2 05 in 1948. To make up this differential becomes quite an under
taking when you consider that it costs about $300 to $600 to build a
plant for each one annual ton of fixed nitrogen, but the Chinese started
in. They kept costs down by initially building two cyanamid plants
before they went into the regular ammonia plants, again plowing back
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earnings from the lower cost units and building bigger, more modern
units later.
During the years from 1949 to 1957, other industries, primarily
with a short range effect, also were developed. This balancing step was
important to broaden the industrial base and reduce inflation pressure
as a major long range industry was being built. It is my opinion that
each type of industry or plant shown in the listing below as having
been developed on Taiwan in these years should be similar to that
which could be undertaken in other countries with only a slight variation
due to different raw materials and crops.
The big export industry for Taiwan was sugar which was de
veloped specifically for the Japanese market by the Japanese prior to
the war. To compete on the world market, the yield per acre had to
be doubled. Only the profitable mills were kept in operation and
improved and, finally, extensive by-product development from sugar
and sugar materials was undertaken. These products included protein
yeast, hog and chicken feed, celotex board, resin wood substitute, all
types of paper and paper board, fuels, etc. These improvements en
abled the country to produce some of the world's lowest priced sugar.
Mining was developed, concentrating principally on coal, but
gold, silver and copper mining was expanded, principally for export. The
solar salt fields were improved. More drilling was undertaken for oil
and natural gas, but little additional supplies were found. Pyrite and
sulfur deposits were opened up, even if small and of low grade, pri
marily as raw material for the fertilizer industry.
The small topping unit at the oil refinery was expanded into
modern facilities, including hydroforming and cat cracking to supply
civilian and military needs, mostly from imported crude.
The chemical and paper industries were improved and greatly
expanded. The food processing industry, such as pineapple, beers and
wines, vegetable oil, fish canning and vegetable dehydration, were
well established.
The rebuilt aluminum factory was expanded to make all types of
finished aluminum products. Old cement mills were improved and
new ones built. The small steel bar plants were expanded, cast iron
pipe was made, shipbuilding was undertaken, and numerous small
items of machinery, instruments, toys, automotive parts, plastics, bi
cycles, tires, tubes, shoes, glass, insecticides and handicraft items were
manufactured.
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To provide power to all these factories, transportation and com
munications had to be expanded to meet requirements and this was a
major portion of the development on Taiwan. Power alone took up
30 to 50 per cent of the yearly development funds available. For the en
tire island, about 70 per cent of all power generated went to industries,
a very high ratio showing the extent of the development taking place.
At all times, careful limitation of total expenditures for these serv
ices had to be maintained since these facilities by themselves did not
add productive units to the economy. Only as these were utilized by
manufacturing plants and personnel, did they contribute to the eco
nomy. When these services are in short supply or limited, it is a
great temptation to expand them to meet requirements 100 per cent,
plus adequate reserve capacity, which would upset the balance on the
use of available funds.
All these manufactured items were primarily aimed at local de
mand; rapid development was most important in order to supply this
demand for a sufficiently large portion of the average necessities or
wants of the population. By this method, along with sharply limited
imports, inflation was more or less controlled. Every effort was made
by the government in putting whatever capital was available into those
industries that wou!d result in an overall balanced development. Along
with heavy industry, such as fertilizers and chemicals, light industry was
expanded. The rather quick return on capital from these light industries
was reinvested and, during the long period of construction of the heavy
in?ustry, supplies were available to absorb the increased purchasing
power. This procedure was quite different from the method of indus
trialization used by Communist countries and even countries like India.
Nehru told the Indian National Development Council on January 21,
1956:
If you want India to industrialize and go ahead, you must in
dustrialize and not bother with adding little factories producing
hair oil and the like. You must go to the root and the base on
which you will build the structure of an industrial India. There
fore, it is heavy industry that counts.
We think that the balanced development, not just heavy industry, was
a major factor in the successful industrialization of Taiwan.
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By 1956 and 1957, the results of the development that had taken
place began to show up as changes in the trade pattern. In 1957, ex
ports were valued at $170,000,000, quite different from the $34,000000 of 1949. Imports totaled $252,000,000 with United States aid sup
plying $99,000,000 of the total value of the imports. The major items
of import and export and their variation by 1957 was as follows:
IMPORTS

I. Soya Beans From 1950 to 1954, imports increased rapidly
from about $5,000,000 per year to $15,000,000, but in subse
quent years, as varieties suitable for local growing conditions were
developed, this dropped to $10,000,000 by 1957. That figure
could possibly keep decreasing as local production of beans and
substitutes increases.
2. Wheat Importation of wheat also increased rapidly until 1954,
then began to decrease. The import value was about $16,000,000
in 1954 and about $11,000,000 in 1957. As population grows,
local production of food may decrease this figure in the immediate
future, but after that it will probably increase.
3. Raw Cotton In 1949, this import was negligible, since finished
textiles were imported. By 1957, the cotton imports totalled $18,000,000. We estimate this will continue to increase in the immedi
ate future and then slow down as synthetics are developed locally.
4. Fertilizers Even with some local production coming on the line
in increasing quantities each year, the annual imports were about
$20,000,000 per year from 1950 to 1956. In 1957, they began
to drop and as the big units being built come on the line in 1958
and after, these imports will be sharply curtailed.
5. Medicine, Drugs, etc. As living standards increased, these im
ports increased rapidly till they reached a figure of over $6,000,000
in 1952. As local repacking units and some production came on
the line, this remained at about that figure even though local
consumption increased.
6. Chemicals This reached a figure of $5,000,000 in 1957, and,
even though local production increases steadily, this import item
will probably continue to increase.
7. Galvanized Sheets and Wires This reached a peak in 1952 with
total imports at about $3,000,000 and then decreased as local pro
duction met local needs.
8. Textile Machinery and Parts These imports reached a peak of
87

about $4,000,000 in 1953, when the industry was being estab
lished. Imports decreased thereafter, totalling only about $2,000,000 in 1957.
9. Machinery and Parts This will be a big and continually grow
ing item, even as local production takes over the manufacture of
certain items. In 1950, the imports totaled about $2,000,000 but
were $15,000,000 in 1957.
10. Vehicles and Vessels These imports totaled about $7,000,000
or $8,000,000 each year since 1950. Local production of jeeps
and scooters as well as vessels, plus the strict import control on
such items, have kept the total from increasing even though the
demand is there.
l l. Crude Oil and Diesel Fuel This steadily increases, primarily
for military purposes. Imports were over $2,000,000 in 1950 and
over $20,000,000 in 1957.
12. Remaining Import Items These are quite varied and usually
small in any one category. In 1950, the figure was about $50,000,000, and in 1957 it was $65,000,000.
EXPORTS

13. Sugar In 1950, the exports were about $55,000,000 and in
1957 this increased to over $100,000,000.
14. Rice The.se exports vary in the $15,000,000 to $20,000,000
range each year.
15. Others These consist of tea, citronella oil, cement, coal, salt,
bananas, canned pineapples, cotton piece goods, ores, metals and
some metal products. By 1957, coal exports were stopped since
it was needed locally, but the other items are generally increasing
each year.
This is the general picture of how the trade patterns changed in
this initial development period on Taiwan. As the development con
tinues, the changes will be more pronounced on machinery imports and
the exports of processed products. Exports are a major problem since
they must be increased to balance the foreign exchange shortage now
made by United States aid. The living standards could be decreased
to live within present earnings, but already they are very low. There
fore, considerable thought has been given to increasing exports from
Taiwan. I feel that this could best be developed by concentrating on
higher cost items requiring a lot of labor. For example, the Aluminum
Company used to make only ingots and costs were high. This was
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changed to include the manufacture and export of fabricated aluminum
products and the company operated much more profitably and export
earnings increased. Also, many of these countries that want to grow
don't mind doing unpleasant work. In this category, I think of gal
vanizing, which requires work around the hot and fuming dip tanks.
Steel for Taiwan and even areas in the vicinity could stop off and be
galvanized there. In Taiwan, because of the raw material situation, the
chemical industry will perhaps develop into the major heavy industry
on the island. Another possibility that I think has a lot of merit is
research. The Chinese engineers and scientists have a special aptitude
for this work. I believe that the research efforts of many Western in
dustries can be economically and efficiently supplemented by research
staffs on Taiwan. Many of the interesting side leads that arc un
covered by United States researchers and developers that are dropped
in order to follow the main objective could be picked up and economic
ally carried forward in countries like Taiwan. Although the initial de
velopment of Taiwan has been well accomplished and could serve as
an excellent pattern for other areas, continued development is still re
quired. After the major imports are manufactured locally, the next
step, exports, is quite difficult, since the competition is not only local but
world wide. We feel, however, it can be accomplished.
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H�RE ARE THREE elementary points with which I like to preface
any discussion of Japanese trade and exchange problems.
The first point is that, contrary to most American opinion, many
Japanese, including most urban Japanese, feel themselves worse off
than they were before World War II. The index of industrial produc
tion reached 255 per cent of its 1934-36 average in November of last
year for a popµlation only 120 per cent of its 1934-36 level. Agricul
ture has lagged, however, and much of the industrial output serves as
a substitute for imports which are no longer available, or which Japan
can no longer squeeze from the Empire at bargain prices. Aggregate
income per capita is slightly above the best prewar year (1937), but
this slight aggregate increase is compounded of a substantial rise in the
rural areas and a somewhat smaller fall in the cities. Welfare, more
over, is not entirely a matter of current income; Japan suffered capital
losses from wartime destruction and loss of her overseas Empire
amounting to 40 per cent of her total capital, and these losses have
been restored only partially.
My second point relates to the reason Japan needs to export.
One hears a great deal of loose talk that Japan must export because
Japanese workers' and farmers' incomes are too low to buy back the
products Japan produces. This is convenient doctrine for those who
want to exclude Japanese competition from American markets; we
may expect to hear it occasionally as long as we live. It has, how
ever, the minor disadvantage of being almost 100 per cent false. The
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reason Japan must export is that she must import some 20 per cent
of her staple food supply, plus most of the raw materials for all her
principal exports ( except silk, fish and pottery products) , and needs
exports to pay for these imports. For those not repelled by statistics,
a few specific commodity percentages may be interesting. Japan im
ports about 11 per cent of her rice, 46 per cent of her wheat, 88 per
cent of her iron ore, 28 per cent of her coking coal, 97 per cent of her
petroleum, 61 per cent of her soy beans and 79 per cent of her salt.
Japan is, like Great Britain, minus coal and iron; her basic assets are
almost limited to man power and electricity. The essential nature of
her imports and exports makes the price elasticity of both her import
demand and her export supply much less than they would otherwise be.
My third preliminary point follows at once. Any increase in
Japan's standard of life makes Japan's foreign exchange problem not
less but more acute. It increases Japan's demand for imports, es
pecially food and textile fibers, as the Japanese eat and dress better.
At the same time it decreases Japan's supply of exports of almost every
kind, because the Japanese themselves buy more of these things. The
better Japan lives, the more trouble she has in paying for imports.
Japan's limmu Keiki ("biggest boom in history") foundered in just
this way in 1956-57. Let me give you a running quotation from the
London Economist (March 8, 1958) on this precise point.
As the hectic boom progressed, the swollen demands of industry
for imported raw materials came up headlong against Japan's in
ability to pay for them by selling enough exports. As the re
serves of foreign exchange fell, the government was forced to
slow the economy down.
This experience was a sample of the dilemma Japan faces. The
nation's industry can give the Japanese a steadily improving
standard of life - if Japan can pay for enough raw material from
abroad. If it cannot, the same process may occur again and
again; first an acceleration of investment and production, to keep
pace with the population statistics, and then a painful thud as the
balance of payments runs into trouble.
If you look at the figures for recent years, Japan's balance of pay
ments does not look particularly precarious. After losing $194 million
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of foreign exchange with the end of the Korean War m 1y.:,:.;, she ac
cumulated $887 million in the next three years. These figures conceal
one major difficulty, namely Japan's dependence on "special dollar
receipts," arising almost entirely from the presence in Japan of United
States forces which are now being reduced in partial accordance with
Japan's desires. If it were not for these special dollar receipts, which
represent "thirty pieces of silver" to many Japanese, the price of re
duced independence, the balance of payments figures for 1953-56 in
clusive would have shown Japan losing a total of $2,874 million of
foreign exchange. Japan hopes to eliminate them by 1960. Much of
the expansion of Sino-Soviet bloc trade is intended to finance their
elimination, chiefly by replacing imports from America by cheaper
Chinese produce.
Given this unhappy situation, can it in any way be remedied by
exchange rate manipulations? The yen-dollar rate, keystone of Japan's
foreign exchange system, was set at 360 yen to the dollar in April 1949,
following nearly three years of inflationary chaos. There has been no
depreciation since, despite the devaluation of most competing Com
monwealth and European currencies at least once during the period
under review.
There has been a certain amount of sentiment in Japan in favor
of devaluation ·of the yen, to permit Japan to increase exports by cutting
their dollar prices. There have occasionally been sQggestions that up
ward revaluation might be in order, to decrease import costs by lower
ing their yen prices. But since devaluation would raise import prices
in yen, while upward revaluation would raise export prices in dollars,
the advantages and disadvantages of these two proposals have can
celled each other out and nothing has been done along either line.
Rather, some export industries have been favored by a number of
special ad hoc devices: specially low interest rates, preferential access
to credit, special tax treatment, preferential award of profitable import
licenses for unrelated products, and so on.
I am not a specialist in international trade and finance, but let
me try to take you part way into the complex theory of the relations
between exchange rates and balances of payments. The most important
variable in this case, I think, is the foreign or dollar demand for yen,
relative to the price of yen in terms of dollars, i.e. the reciprocal of
the yen-dollar rate. If this demand can be expressed as a curve, as
in the two parts of Figure I, the total amount of dollars obtained at any
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exchange rate is the rectangular area under the curve. If the dollar
price of the yen is 1/360, as at P, total dollar receipts are (OP x 00).
If, as in Figure I-a, the demand function for yen (meaning Jap
anese goods) is elaslic in dollar terms, a fall in the dollar price of the
yen, say to 1/400, or P', will increase total Japanese dollar receipts,
since (OP' x OQ') is an area larger than (OP x OQ). This is the nub
of the case for devaluation when, as in the Japanese case, her export
supply and import demand are both inelastic, so that we need not
concern ourselves with them to a first approximation. But if. as in
Figure 1-b, the foreign demand for yen (meaning Japanese goods) in
dollar terms is inelastic, dollar receipts can be increased by an upward
revaluation of the yen, say to l /300 or P", since (OP" x OQ") is an
area larger than ( OP x OQ). This is the nub of the case for upward
revaluation under the same conditions.
Excha"8"
Rate

P' r------1----""'!-.

Japanese
Export'>

O �- ------'-0-----'0-- (y<n)
Figure 1 � a

O �-----Q_,___,_0-

Japanese
E.l:porb
-(:,en)

Figure I� b

My diagnosis of the Japanese difficulty, the reason why Japan
has hesitated to tamper with the exchange rate, is drawn as Figure IL
If Japan devalues, the yen prices of imported raw materials will rise.
The yen prices of imported foodstuffs will also rise, and yen wage
rates will rise with them. The result is that the dollar prices of
Japanese exports will fall little if at all after these adjustments take
place, little more will be taken in the world market, and accordingly,
the demand curve will be inelastic below OP. In the diagram, (OP' x
OQ') is less than ( OP x OQ), and nothing is accomplished.
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Now consider an upward revaluation, to lower the yen prices of
imported food and raw materials. The trouble here is that yen prices
of Japanese exports will probably not fall. Money wages in most
export trades are held up by powerful trade unions, and money prices
of many export products are likewise administered by monopolistic
or cartel arrangements of various kinds. If the yen prices of Japanese
exports do not fall, their world or dollar prices will rise when the yen
is revalued upward. If the dollar prices of Japanese exports rise, the

Exchange
Rate

P"

.0

I_

1-----=.,..._�

'-----'0'-,.----�0�0-,

Japanese
Exports
_(yen)

Figure JI

quantity sold with fall off drastically, since most of these exports are
highly competitive with British, German, Indian, or American products,
not only in these countries themselves but all over the world. On the
diagram (Figure II), the demand function for yen is therefore drawn
as elastic when the yen is priced above OP. There is a kind of kink
or comer in the neighborhood of the existing exchange rate. (OP" x
OQ"), like (OP' x OQ'), is less than the initial receipts (OP x OQ).
There is little scope for overall exchange rate manipulation.
This sort of situation is probably not unusual. It is commonly
dealt with by economists interested in oligopoly problems, but is not
often considered in treatments of international exchanges. It has, I
suspect, played its part in inspiring many experiments with direct im
port controls, with exchange controls and with multiple exchange rates.
It is the last of these alternatives, namely a simple double exchange
rate, which I should like to consider for Japan - not the Japan of
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1958 perhaps, but for the Japan of 1960 if "special dollar receipts"
decline and trade with the Soviet-Chinese bloc proves a disappointing
substitute.
Specifically, consider two proposals. Proposal 1: Pay all exporters
a generalized export subsidy of, say, 40 yen for each dollar of exports,
either anywhere in the world or specifically to convertible-currency
areas. This would give these exporters the advantage of a 400-to-1
exchange rate in permitting them to cut dollar prices while maintaining
yen prices. It would not entail any offsetting rise in the prices of im
ported staple food and industrial raw materials. Or as an alternative,
Proposal 2: Pay all importers of the major industrial raw materials
(and possibly also some staple foods but definitely not other con
sumption goods) a subsidy of, say, 40 yen for each dollar of imports.
This would provide to Japanese exporters the advantage of a 320-to-1
exchange rate in cheaper raw materials. It might also provide Japanese
workers the advantage of cheaper food and higher real wages, without
the disadvantages of a cheaper yen in international markets.
Of these two double-rate proposals, the first, or generalized ex
port subsidy, seems somewhat preferable on balance. The government
gets more for its money, focussing the subsidy directly on exports,
whereas import subsidies also assist imports which get into the domestic
market. Conflict is avoided with the downward rigidity of yen cost
prices and wage rates, which we have said might be maintained despite
import subsidies. Conflict is also avoided with the Japanese farm and
mining blocs, which are interested in high food and mineral prices to
build up domestic products. Of course, an export subsidy discommodes
domestic consumers by diverting production to exports rather than
domestic sales. Furthermore, the export-subsidy plan is clearly a type
of "exchange dumping" which would arouse a greater volume and
vehemence of foreign denunciation than import subsidies, which,
strictly speaking, are not dumping at all. Urban support for the
taxation necessary for a subsidy would also be easier to obtain if, as
in the import subsidy case, it could be linked with lower food prices.
Finally, an import subsidy would cost less, since only selected imports
rather than total exports would receive it.
Like any other subsidy, this one must be paid for. In many such
cases, financing might be by taxes on luxuries, especially imported
ones. Economists give the name "selective depreciation" to policies of
subsidizing some exports or imports by taxes on others. Selective de97

preciation is, however, impractical in Japan because taxes on such
imports are extremely high already. Most of the financing must be by
considerably broader-based methods - either tax increases, or open
inflation, or suppressed inflation with direct controls, or some combina
tion of the three. This is true even though its net cost may fall short
of the gross by making possible the elimination of some of the special
gadgets and favors to particular export industries which we have men
tioned before. How the Japanese might choose to divide the cost of
an export or an import subsidy between taxation, inflation, and con
trols I have no idea - but taxation to rescue the balance of payments
should be easier to sell the Japanese, dependent as they are on inter
national trade, than it would be to a more self-sufficient country like
the United States.
The International Monetary Fund, I have been assured informally
and anonymously by a high ranking member of the Fund bureaucracy
( not Dr. Liang or Professor Fisher), would look with extreme disfavor
on either of these types of exchange rate at the present time. (It is not
entirely clear how this disapproval would be translated into effective
sanctions.) But when and if the reduction of Japan's special dollar
receipts brings into the light of day a "fundamental disequilibrium" in
Japan's balance of. payments, modification of the Fund's attitude may
be anticipated with a good deal of confidence, barring better solutions
along more conventional lines.
The main arguments of this paper usually provoke a crucial ques
ti\:m. It may be phrased somewhat as follows: "What do your pro
posals, either or both of them, accomplish which cannot be accom
plished by economic pressure on Japanese wage and profit rates (which
are higher in many export industries than in the rest of the economy)
or on Japanese practices of hiring surplus labor?" To which I must
answer, nothing and yet everything. On paper, nothing; in fact the
deflationary orthodox proposals are simpler and neater. In practice,
everything. These proposals preserve what has been called the "social
equilibrium" of Japanese society. They resolve conflicts particularly
between the wage rates and labor practices necessary for Japanese in
ternational equilibrium and the wage rates and labor practices necessary
to conform to Japanese ethical notions of industrial fair dealing. As
a result, they may preserve Japanese capitalism under circumstances
where orthodox proposals require revolution from the Right to avoid
revolution from the Left if they should be attempted in the near future.
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the three countries of China (Taiwan), Japan and
Korea (South) with the United States has both common features and
divergent trends. Taking the three countries as a whole, one outstand
ing fact is that they occupy a very insignificant place in the supply of
United States imports. During the six year period from 1951 to 1956
for which complete and consistent trade data are available, their total
exports to the Unfred States amounted to only 3.4 per cent of total
United States import (see Table 1). Comparative data for the prewar
trade of Taiwan and South Korea are not available. It is known, how
ever, that Japan by itself provided 6.6 per cent of total United States
prewar (1937-38) import. With regard to United States exports, the
share of these three countries for the recent six year period amounted
to 5.4 per cent, not counting United States exports under the aid pro
gram for which a country classification is not available. While the
true United States export situation with respect to these three countries
is somewhat obscured by the aid program, the obvious fact remains that
they are more important to the United States as markets than as sources
of supply.
The small volume of exports from this part of the Far East, and
especially of exports to the United States, is due to many special de
velopments. As is well known, Japan lost much of its prewar terri
tories after the war. Both China and Korea have suffered from the
loss of control of much of their domain. All three countries sustained
great war damage and have to support a population which is growing
THE TRADE OF
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TABLE 1. Percentage Share of China (Taiwan), Japan and Korea (South)

in the Total United States Exports and Imports*
Year
1937
1938
1937 /38 Average
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957 (Jan.-Oct.)

,...
0
,...

China (Taiwan)
Export
Import

0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.5
0.5

0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1

Japan
Export
Import
8.6
6.6
5.8
7.8
8.2
6.6
0.9
2.6
3.9
1.2
4.1
2.1
3.9
1.8
2.2
4.1
4.3
2.4
4.5
2.7
4.2
3.8
4.6
4.4
4.6
6.0

Korea (South)
Export Import

0.2
0.3
0.6
0.6
0.6
0.8
0.9
1.3

**
**

1.8
0.3
0.2
0.1
0.1

**

Total
Import
Export

4.5
5.1
5.4
5.7
5.7
6.0
7.8

1.9
4.1
2.8
3.0
4.0
4.6
4.7

*Imports include silver; export of military and economic aid are included in totals but are not included in country figures.
**Less than 0.1%.
Source: Direction of International Trade, United Nations.

rapidly as a result both of natural increases and of the repatriation or
refugees. Their progress in production techniques has lagged much
behind that of the United States. This is true not only for Taiwan and
South Korea but also for Japan, which, after the long period of war
and isolation during the first postwar years, has not been able to keep
up with current technological advances. Annual exports to the United
States from Taiwan and South Korea have been of the order of only
a few million dollars in recent years. The principal export of Taiwan
is sugar. Taiwan is one of the ranking sugar export countries of the
world, but the comparative rigidity of the United States sugar import
quota system has strictly limited Taiwan's prospects of satisfying some
of the tremendous United States demand for sugar imports. Trade
relations with South Korea have been a new postwar development for
the United States, inasmuch as before the war trade between the two
countries was negligible. United States postwar imports from Korea
have consequently been limited to a small amount of a few Korean
products such as tungsten, raw silk and bristles. The percentage share
of Japan in United States imports, which has been increasing in recent
years, reached 4.6 per cent in 1957 (Jan.-Oct.). It is still below the
prewar figure of 6.6 per cent (see Table 1). In addition to the general
influences mentioned above which have limited exports from the Far
Eastern region to the United States, Japanese exports have also been
affected by the loss of some of Japan's prewar trade advantages, such
as cheap labor and the cartelization of its foreign trade. Those exports
have also been affected by the decline in demand for Japan's principal
prewar export, raw silk, which before the war accounted for about
one-half of Japanese exports to the United States. On top of these
unfavorable developments, Japanese trade now has to face sales re
sistance against Japanese products in the United States, especially with
regard to textiles, tuna fish, porcelain, plywood and silverware. Last,
but not least, the postwar cost and price relationships in these three
countries may not always have been such as to give their export prod
ucts competitive advantages in the United States market.
The problem of United States exports to this region is much more
complicated than that of imports. In the first place, United States aid
exports cannot be accurately appraised because no data are available
to show how they have been distributed among the countries in receipt
of aid. Even excluding aid exports, the United States has increased
its exports to this region from 4.5 per cent of United States total ex102
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port in 1951 to 7.8 per cent in 1957 (Jan.-Oct.) (see Table 1). The
imports, other than aid, of these three countries from the United States
have increased much more than their exports. The result has been
large trade deficits in their commercial trade account (i.e., not includ
ing aid imports) with the United States (see Table 2). In recent years
the trade position of Japan has been m ore favorable than that of Taiwan
and South Korea; Japan's exports to the United States have neverthe
less covered only about 30 to 50 per cent of its imports from the United
States (see Table 3). In the first 10 months of 1957, Japan had a
big trade deficit with the United States of $925 million. 1 The trade
deficits of Taiwan and South Korea were offset by United States aid
while those of Japan were met by United States and United Nations
military expenditures. 2 The reasons for these large exports from the
United States to these countries are mostly the same as those mentioned
above as an explanation of the small volume of United States imports
from them. The list should however be supplemented by reference to
some additional factors. The high import demand in these countries
is partly due to their great need for both defense and development, and
they practice very little of the discrimination against dollar goods that
is common in other countries with similar payments difficulties.
It seems to follow from all these considerations, that no significant
reduction of imports by these countries from the United States is likely.
With regard to their exports, some increase appears possible and there
may therefore be some improvement in their trade balances with the
United States. To what extent this can become a reality and in what
way the volume and pattern of trade between these countries and the
United States will be affected, depends on a variety of factors. Some
of these factors are related to the policies of the United States, some
are contingent on economic development in the three countries con
cerned while still others are quite beyond their control and have their
origin in the world outside.
One of the most important of these factors is the trade policy of
the United States. It has been the firm desire of the United States
Government to help friendly countries stand on their own feet eco
nomically so that they can contribute to the full employment of the
1 This figure is from Japanese sources (Table 3) and is different from that pre
sented in Table 2 which is based on United States statistics.
2 United States investments in these countries have so far not been an important
factor in financing their trade deficits.
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41.0
60.3
82.0
94.2
107.0
104.6
87.0
6.4
7.9
6.9

5.5

6.7

5.6

6.0

324.7
467.5
416.4
597.6
621.7
670.5
679.9
647.8
894.6
1,042.2

i8s.5
239.6
264.t
62.6
81.9
182.0
205.0
235.2
263.4
279.8
43 t.9
557.8
500.0

204.2
126.7
165.4

Trade
with Japan
Export
Import

22.5
45.4
93.6
96.0
87.0
127.0
167.4
223.3

2.3
3.7
18.4
29.9
19.7
6.1
9.7
3.6

Trade with
Korea, South
Export Import

35.0
54.7
75.3
88.7
100.6
96.7
80.1

262.1
385.6
234.4
392.6
386.5
407.1
400.1
215.9
336.8
542.2

84.3
I 12.9
98.7

Trade Balance
with:
China
Korea
Japan

20.2
41.7
75.2
66.l
67.3
120.9
157.7
219.7

*Imports include silver; exports of military and economic aid are included in totals but are not included in country figures.
Source: Direction of International Trade, United Nations.

(Jan.-Oct.)

10,967.3
10,784.6
10,968.3
10,295.0
11,457.3
12,736.5
10,783.6

8,852.1

7,194.3
6,622.3
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12,650.5
12,051.0
10,275.1
15,032.0
15,191.3
15,773.6
15,106.4
15,546.7
19,066.0
17,488.6

3,083.6

2,190.9
2,522.0

Trade with
China (Taiwan)
Export Import

I I I
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Average

1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957

3,349.1
3,094.4
3,221.8

U.S.
Total Trade
Import
Export

(ln millions of United States dollars)

2. United States Trade with China (Taiwan), Japan and Korea (South)*
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1,089.9
759.0
924.5

188.1
124.0
156.1

366.0
261.1
313.5

20.6
16.2
18.6

33.6
34.4
33.9

_ 177.9
_ 137.1
_ 157.4

51.4
47.5
49.8

682.6
899.8
969.9
1,955.0
2,028.1
2,409.6
2,399.4
2,471.6
3,229.6
3,720.9

65.7
83.6
183.0
189.7
234.3
233.9
282.9
457.1
551.5
491.6

441.4
575.8
427.0
687.3
768.3
757.5
849.1
774.0
1,067.3
1,416.3

25.4
16.4
22.3
14.0
18.4
18.3
17.4
22.7
22.1
21.1

64.7
64.0
44.0
34.5
37.8
31.4
35.3
31.3
33.0
38.1

_ 375.7
_492.2
_ 244.0
_497.6
_ 534.0
_ 523.6
_ 566.2
_ 316.9
_ 515.8
_ 924.7

14.9
14.5
42.9
27.6
30.5
30.9
33.3
59.1
51.7
34.7

Source: Direction of International Trade, United Nations.

world's resources and become useful members in the councils of the
free nations. The interests of the three countries in the Far East region
have been of particular concern to the United States. Ever since 1934
the Reciprocal Trade Act, passed in that year, has been an instrument
used by the United States in order to expand world trade and to pro
mote world economic welfare. At the same time the United States has
not been too critical of the policies of protection and sometimes of
discrimination practiced by other countries when there appeared to be
legitimate reasons for such measures. Very recently, however, there
has been some change of thinking in the United States with a tendency
toward more protectionism for American industries. The "Buy Ameri
can" provision with regard to government procurement was introduced
for the reason of national defense and security. There are various kinds
of informal restrictions, particularly against certain Japanese products.
In order not to provoke any increase of import duties on Japanese
products, Japan has "voluntarily" imposed a quota on its exports of
105

textiles. A revival of protectionism in the United States would have
very unfortunate consequences. An example might be set which other
countries would follow, and in the end this might mean that the
United States would retreat from its economic leadership of the world.
There might be a setback to the trade not only of the three countries
in the Far Eastern region but of the whole world. Restrictions upon
imports from any individual country may indeed fail to produce the
expected benefits even for the United States industries most directly
affected. For the restrictions may merely intensify competition with
United States exports in third markets. This point has not always been
given sufficient attention. Let us take Japanese trade as an illustration.
Japan has succeeded in recent years in promoting a g�eater volume of
exports to Latin America, and it has also a plan to increase its exports
to Southeast Asia. United States restrictions upon Japanese imports
are likely to intensify Japan's efforts to push exports in these two
regions, and this might mean a reduction of imports by these regions
from the United States. Nor would Japan's increased export earnings
from other regions necessarily lead to an increase of Japanese imports
from the United States, because under present circumstances such
export earnings may not be in the form of convertible currencies. It is
true that Japan must import raw materials before it can export, but
Japanese demand for imports might be diverted from the United States
to some third countries. In order that the three countries in the Far
East region should absorb more imports from the United States, apart
from aid, they must first be able to earn more United States dollars.
Tlieir chief hope for achieving this lies in a liberalization of United
States imports of Far East products, such as Taiwan sugar and tea,
Korean minerals and raw silk and Japanese textiles and fishery products.
This might necessitate more than a mere extension of the Reciprocal
Trade Act by the United States.
The ability of these countries to import United States goods may
also be improved by an increase in some of their invisible earnings,
such as those from shipping. This is particularly important for Japan.
Before the war, Japan's net earnings from shipping exceeded its trade
deficit. In each year during the postwar period it has had to make
net payments on this account. In 1956, Japan's net payment for
transportation amounted to $303.2 million (see Table 4). On the
other hand, Japan has rapidly become the world's largest shipbuilding
country. The tonnage of its merchant marine has recovered to more
106
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than half the prewar peak tonnage of 8 million tons. Taiwan has also
made progress in ocean shipping. Its gross earnings from shipping
have increased from $3.1 million in 1955 to about $16 million in
1957. At the present time, there is a United States regulation which
reserves 50 per cent of any United States financed cargoes to American
bottoms. In view of the large volume of United States aid goods going
to the Far East, a liberalization of this provision would enable both
Japan and Taiwan to increase their transportation receipts.
The future volume of United States exports (including aid ex
ports) to the three countries in the Far East depends very much on
aid policy. The high value of United States exports to this region in
the past has been made possible by the large amount of aid and of
American military expenditures. From 1948 to 1957, American aid
of $871 million was authorized for Taiwan and of $1,181 million for
South Korea. Similar American aid authorized for Japan has been
small, but Japan's annual exchange receipts from foreign government
military expenditures have been very large, reaching a figure of $803.3
million in 1953. These receipts have since been on the decline, but in
1956 they still amounted to $498 million (see Table 4). In view of the
great importance of American aid in sustaining United States exports
to these countries, it must have been very gratifying to them that the
administration has urged the public to support a larger budget for the
United States aid program. A related question is the United States
program for disposal of surplus agricultural products. This program
has been subjected to unfavorable comment in certain countries. It is
interesting to note that the three countries in the Far East region are
all beneficiaries of this program. The American surplus products, such
as cotton, grains and tobacco, are their deficit items, and through the
surplus disposal program they can be obtained on a loan basis. There
will indeed be a continuing need for many of these products in all
these countries.
Many countries are very much concerned about economic fluc
tuations in the United States. The impact of such fluctuations on the
economy is different in each of the three countries with which we are
concerned. Taiwan's exports of sugar and rice are less sensitive to
world cyclical fluctuations than Korean exports of mineral products.
Japan has the advantage of a great diversification of exports with re
spect both to their destination and to their composition.
It is quite natural that the prospects of United States trade with
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TABLE

4. Certain Invisible Items in Japan's Balance of Payments, 1950 to 1956
(In Millions of United States Dollars)

Invisible
Items
Foreign Travel
Transportation
Investment Income
Government Military
Expenditures*
Total
Invisible
Items
Foreign Travel
Transportation
Investment Income
Government Military
Expenditures*
Total

Credit
21.3
16.5
0.3

1950
Debit Balance Credit
20.4
0.9
8.9
134.5 _118.0
41.0
5.9 - 5.6
1.1

153.6
191.7

141.3

153.6
50.4

1951
Debit Balance
4.5
4.4
255.7 _214.7
6.4 - 5.3
624.2
408.7

624.2
675.2

266.5

Credit
11.2
89.7
8.2

1954
Debit Balance
6.8
4.4
255.9 _166.2
47.0 _ 38.8

602.3
711.4

309.7

602.3
401.7

Credit
8.2
71.4
6.1

1952
Debit Balance
3.2
5.0
223.4 _152.0
11.0 - 4.9

787.8
873.5

239.4

Credit
14.3
127.4
14.1

1955
Debit Balance
6.2
8.1
276.0 _148.6
55.5 _ 41.4

505.2
661.0

339.6

787.8
634.1

505.2
321.4

Credit
10.0
76.6
11.8

1953
Debit Balance
7.0
3.0
247.0 _170.4
34.9 _ 23.1

803.3
901.7

288.9

Credit
16.5
209.8
27.3

1956
Debit Balance
4.2
12.3
513.0 _303.2
66.1 _ 38.8

498.0
751.6

591.4

803.3
612.8

498.0
160.2

Source: Balance of Payments Yearbook, Vol. 8 ,1950-54 and Volume 9, November 1957 issue.
*The entries cover sales of goods and services to military personnel stationed in Japan, sales to United Nations forces under the
special procurement program in connection with the Korean war, and, for 1952-54, United States expenditures for the maintenance of forces in Japan.

Japan, Taiwan and South Korea should also be affected by economic
developments within each of these three countries. The first considera
tion is their development plans. Export promotion is one of the most
prominent objectives of the Five Year Economic Plan of Japan, ef
fective from 1958. Japan's share of world total export was only 2.7
per cent in 1956 compared with 3.9 per cent in 1937. Japan has now
some idle capital equipment capable of producing more exportable
goods. The value of Japan's exports during the next five years is ex
pected to increase by l 0.5 per cent every year. Exports to the United
States are expected to increase and competition in the world market
between Japan and the United States will be intensified. In the second
Four-Year Plan of Taiwan, in effect since 1957, certain import sub
stitutes, such as fertilizer, are to be developed, and the production of
new export commodities is to be promoted. Commercial imports from
the United States may decrease somewhat. Whether Taiwan will suc
ceed in promoting more exports to the United States is difficult to
assess. Its principal export, sugar, as mentioned above, is affected by
one single factor, the American import quota system rather than by
anything else. Korea's development plan is still at the stage of de
liberation. The general thinking is that Korea will put more emphasis
on the development of mining and fishery. Any success in this direction
may create the possibility of exporting more Korean mineral and
fishery products to the United States. The mere availability of more
export goods, however, does not necessarily result in a better pay
ments position as so much depends on the cost-price relationships of
goods to be expected, which in turn hinges on the implementation of
a stabilizing fiscal and credit policy. Apart from the question of the
price level, marketing is also an important problem. Korea, strictly
speaking, is a newcomer in the postwar world market, and not many
countries have yet familiarized themselves with the export products of
Taiwan. Even in Japan, the technique of promoting exports is still
behind that of some other leading trading countries. Japan should
place more emphasis on the appeal of quality and finish than on price
cutting and should prefer the creation of distinct new designs to mere
imitation of popular patterns. However, great efforts have been made
by Japan to overcome its previous shortcomings, and great hopes cen
ter around the efforts made by the Japanese External Trade Recovery
Organization ( JETRO).
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Progress in international economic relations in certain directions
can be brought about only by the collaborative efforts of the trading
partners. Foreign investment is one of these. Promotion of foreign
investment by the United States in this region depends, on the one
hand, on the creation of a good economic atmosphere in the capital
receiving countries and, on the other hand, on the willingness of the
investing countries to take risks. The United States has increased its
foreign investment in recent years, and in 1956 total United States
direct foreign investment reached $3.6 billion. However, not much
of this has gone to the Far East region. The largest recipient of United
States investment among the three Far East countries was Japan, with
an inflow of direct investments from the United States of $16 million
in 1956. Japan and Taiwan have each enacted a foreign investment
law, the provisions of which are considered to be quite liberal with
regard to the kind of industries open to foreigners, guarantees against
expropriation, and the right to repatriate capital and transfer profits.
Legislation for encouraging foreign investment is now under study in
Korea. Japan has had large credits from the Ex-Im Bank, totaling
$693 million up to the end of 1957. China has also had loans from
the Ex-Im Bank, totaling $222 million. Korea has not yet had any
loan from this source. These loans have been effective in promoting
United States trade. Heavy purchases by Japan of United States cot
ton had much to do with several loans of $60 million granted to Japan
in previous years. Tourism is another factor of some importance in
United States-Far East economic relations. The three Far East countries
have not yet had any considerable share of the United States tourist
dollar. The chance for strengthening their invisible receipts through
the development of the tourist trade again depends on the mutual
efforts to be made by both the United States and the Far East countries.
Much work has been done by the latter to make travelling there more
attractive. If more facilities and encouragement were to be provided
to tourists on the United States side, an important contribution could
be made to the development of a better balance in the payments ac
counts of these countries with the United States.
The trade between any two countries cannot be divorced from
economic developments in the world at large. In this regard, some
recent significant events will not fail to have their impact on United
States trade with the Far East. One of these developments is the
European Economic Community which is to establish a free market
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among six European countries and a common tariff in association with
some other countries. The impact of this arrangement will fall more
on Japan than on Taiwan or South Korea, since Japan has had a sizable
volume of trade with the member countries of this common market.
If Japanese exports to these countries should be checked, export shifts
to some other markets, including the United States may become a
necessity for Japan. A second world development is the increasing
trade offensive by the Soviet bloc. The volume of East-West trade has
been on the increase in recent years. However, this does not affect
Taiwan and South Korea at all since these two countries are both dead
set against any trading with the Soviet bloc. Japanese imports from
the Sino-Soviet bloc have increased from $24 million in 1951 to $103
TABLE

5. Japanese Trade with the Sino-Soviet Bloc, 1951-57
(In millions of United States dollars)

(1) Japan's Exports
Soviet Bloc
As% of
China
Bloc
Satellites
Export
Total
Value
Imports European European U.S.S.R. Communist
Total
Year
*
.4
1,357.7
*
5.8
0
5.8
1951
*
0.8
0.2
0.2
0.6
.1
1952
1,272.9
0.1
.4
4.5
4.6
1,274.8
0.1
*
1953
5.0
19.1
1.5
1,629.3
24.1
*
1954
5.0
39.5
11.0
2.1
28.5
8.9
1955
2.0
2,010.6
5.1
2,500.6
0.8
67.4
2.9
5.9
1956
73.3
45.4
4.2
5.2
2.4
54.9**
9.4
2,320.4
1957
* Less than $50,000.
** Includes shipments to North Korea valued at $0.1 million.
(2) Japan's Imports
Soviet Bloc
As% of
Total
, Bloc
China
Total
Year
Satellites
Value Exports European European U.S.S.R. Communist
Import
1951
2,047.9
24.0*
1.2
2.2
2.2
**
21.6
2,028.8
17.9
.9
3.0
2.5
0.5
14.9
1952
2,409.6
37.8
1.6
8.1
6.0
2.1
29.7
1953
2,399.4
48.4
2.0
7.6
5.3
2.3
40.8
1954
1955
2,471.4
89.1
3.6
8.3
5.2
3.1
80.8
3,229.7
102.5*** 3.2
10.9
8.0
2.9
83.6
1956
3,720.5
97.1***
2.6
14.4
4.0
10.4
71.3
1957
* Includes imports from Outer Mongolia of $200,000.
** Less than $50,000.
*** Includes imports from Outer Mongolia, North Korea, and North Viet-Nam.
Source: International Cooperation Administration: Mutual Defense Assist
ance Control Act of 1951, 6th, 8th and 10th Report to Congress.
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million in 1956. Japanese exports to this group also increased during
the same period from $6 million to $73 million (see Table 5). It
snould be noted that the balance of Japanese trade with this bloc has
always been passive. The total import surplus for the six years from
1951 to 1957 amounted to $171 million. The bulk of Japanese im
ports from this bloc consisted of soybeans, coal and iron from Main
land China. In fact, these things can also be supplied to Japan by the
United States. The Soviet bloc has pushed its trade by means of bilat
eral trade agreements, which have proved to be an effective weapon for
attaining the objectives of Soviet policy. They permit trading to be
conducted by one single government agency, include aids and loans in
one blanket deal and obliterate the necessity for using cost and price
as a basis for trade transactions. The West, including the United
States, has yet to think out an effective means to counteract this trade
offensive. Some other countries, such as Germany and Italy, have also
had programs for aid in order to promote trade. Possibly, these pro
grams may also affect United States trade relations with countries in
the Far East. Finally, another important question in the wider field
of international finance is exchange convertibility. Much of the present
unnatural pattern of trade is due to the existence of inconvertible cur
rencies. Japan has concluded several bilateral agreements which aim
at bilateral balancing of trade with its trading partners. When more
currencies in the world become convertible, the extent of trade for
which bilateral balancing i-s sought will be reduced, and the volume
and pattern of Japanese trade with the United States may be quite
different. This may not be true for Taiwan or for South Korea which
have no bilateral payments agreements with countries outside the Far
East region.
The essential facts of the trade relations of the United States with
China (Taiwan), Japan and Korea (South) may be summarized as
follows: Because of various special postwar political and economic de
velopments, each of these countries has had a high import demand for
United States commodities, a relatively low level of exports to the
United States and consequently sizable trade deficits with the United
States. A large volume of import demand is likely to be maintained
by all three countries for some time to come, particularly in view of
their great need for defense and development. The prospects for in
creasing their exports to the United States appear favorable. Much
depends on United States trade and aid policies, the movement of
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foreign capital, the economic development plans and fiscal and credit
policies of the Far East countries, the convertibility of currencies, the
common market movements in the outside world and the trade offensive
of the Soviet bloc.
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PAKISTAN rs AT the moment g�ing through the slow and painful
process of transforming its economy in order to create the preconditions
for economic development. Some progress has already been made in
the years since independence. Various basic facilities have either been
created or expanded: railways, ports, communications, electric power,
etc. Dams are being built and various large-scale irrigation projects
are in the proc;ess· of being completed. In the private sector of the
economy, several industrial and commercial establishments have been
started and, to mention only two examples, the country is now self
sufficient in textiles and is becoming an important exporter of jute
goods.
While these achievements are of obvious importance, the economy
is still far from the state that economists describe as self-generating
growth. Per capita incomes are exceedingly low - not more than $50
on an annual basis
and, what is perhaps more important, up to the
present time they have not shown an upward rising trend. While in
dustrial output is expanding, agricultural production is lagging. As a
result, the country is going through a serious food crisis which has
retarded the execution of the first five-year plan. Partly associated with
the failure of agriculture to meet the rising demand, but also because
of financial reasons, inflationary tendencies have been rather strong in
recent years. What these tendencies reflect is a great strain on the
country's resources, a strain which poses difficult problems of adjust
ment.
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II

All of this will probably sound familiar or should I perhaps say all
too familiar. Development is not a simple and smooth process; his
torically it has always been associated with various strains and stresses.
In that respect Pakistan certainly is not an exception. At this time I
would like to single out one particular problem which will undoubtedly
be present for some years to come: Pakistan's external commercial
and financial position.
From the point of view of the development effort, the issue pre
sents itself the following way: During the next several five-year plans
the demand for imported goods for the development program can be
expected to increase. At the present time the average foreign exchange
component of the major development projects is at last 50 per cent.
As domestic industry expands, this percentage will perhaps decline
somewhat. On the other hand, and this is the more important trend,
as the growth process gains momentum and the size of the plans in
creases, a larger volume of imports of "development" goods becomes
a necessity. While the import trend clearly will be rising for these
goods, it may perhaps be argued that savings can be accomplished in
imports of nondevelopment goods. It is true that there have been
such savings in the past, especially in the imports of textiles, but further
gains on this front are bound to be of limited importance outside the
field of food imports. Imports of consumer goods are already cut to
the bone, and if anything, they can be expected to rise with increasing
population and incomes. Even more important, as the industrial base
is broadened, this will of necessity lead to a higher volume of imports
of raw materials and spare parts.
What this means, then, is that an acceleration of Pakistan's de
velopment will require a growth rate in the export sector high enough
to provide the foreign exchange for imported capital goods. Leaving
aside for the moment the question of foreign aid, the rate at which the
domestic economy can grow will clearly depend upon the extent to
which it is possible to develop export markets. Unless the export sector
can keep pace with the domestic economy, tensions and imbalances
will appear. This, I believe, will become a key issue in Pakistan's
future development.
III

How likely is it that this problem can find a satisfactory solution?
While it is by no means impossible that oil will be found, I shall leave
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this possibility out of consideration and limit myself to the situation as
it presents itself today. One element in the solution is obvious: an
energetic attack on the food problem. Because of the food crisis an
increasing proportion of aid imports consists of wheat and rice rather
than of vital raw materials and development goods. Secondly, the
country is using considerable amounts of its own foreign exchange for
food purchases abroad. Needless to say, this recent development has
upset the external balance and threatened the normal functioning of the
economy as well as the development program. If nothing else, it high
lights the importance of broadening the food base. Until that ob
jective has been securely achieved the attempt to develop the economy
will encounter constant dangers.
On the export side the prospects will, at least for some time to
come, depend upon the markets for cotton and jute, the two traditional
export products. Without going into any detailed analysis or pro
jection for these two fibers, which account for more than 70 per cent
of Pakistan's commodity exports, it is unlikely that they alone will be
able to carry the financing of the development program. It is true
that in recent years exports of both cotton goods and jute goods have
shown a sharply rising trend. The thing to keep in mind, however, is
that in both case� exports of the manufactured goods rather than the
fibers add comparatively little to total export receipts. This is so be
cause the cost of the fiber is such a high percentage. of the final value
of these products. The difference between exporting burlap bags and
�aw jute is not great.
This brief analysis of export earnings is clearly incomplete since
it does not include any mention of potential exports of other com
modities. Some so-called secondary exports, such as sports goods, have
done well in recent years. The point here is that they are starting from
a low absolute level and, at least for some years to come, their con
tribution to total export earnings will not be considerable.
To finish this part of the argument, I anticipate on the one hand
an increased demand for imported development goods and on the other,
exports which will display a slower rate of growth - still, of course,
leaving out of consideration the possibility of the discovery of oil.
IV

Since it seems unlikely that Pakistan's exports will provide a
sufficient foreign exchange margin for development, it may be asked
what other sources of external finance will be available. One such
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source is foreign private investment. However, up to now these in
vestments have not been large. Some machinery and other equipment
has been imported directly by foreign investors, especially in con
nection with drilling of gas wells and the building of pipe lines. At
the present there is also considerable scope for investments in con
nection with the exploration for oil. Even so, the official estimate
of the contribution such investments can make during the Plan period
1955-60 is quite moderate - roughly $100 million. An amount of
this magnitude will add about 5 per cent annually to Pakistan's own
export earnings.
At the moment an interesting attempt is being made to stimulate
foreign investment through tax incentives. The United States govern
ment or, more specifically, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,
is contemplating a taxation convention with Pakistan* which in one
important respect differs radically from the present arrangement. If
this new provision is approved by the Senate, it is very likely that it
will also be embodied in conventions with other nations. If for no
other reasons it deserves brief consideration.
Under the present system, which was introduced in 1918, an
American corporation receiving income from foreign sources is given
credit in the United States for income taxes paid in the country where
the income originates. Assume, for example, that the foreign income
is $100 and that the tax paid abroad on this income is $20. The
American investor will then only have to pay $32 in United States
taxes ($52-$20). His total tax burden is of course then $52, or the
same as on income earned domestically. Let me only add that the law
makes a distinction between foreign income earned by a branch and
by a subsidiary. In the former case, the income is taxed when earned,
in the latter only when the income is remitted to the United States.
For this reason the subsidiary has become the predominant form in
foreign business operations since the arrangement in fact means an
interest-free loan extended by the government to the corporation until
remittance is made.
A chief purpose of this legislation is to eliminate double taxation.
In those cases where the foreign tax is less than the United States
rate, there is no double tax or, more accurately, the total tax burden
*Ratified by the Senate July 9, 1958 with a reservation made necessary by the
intervening lapse of the Pakistan tax concession law-see below Part V,
(Ed.)
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is limited to 52 per cent, the same as the tax on domestic incom�.
On the other hand, if the foreign rate is higher than the domestic,
which is the case in Pakistan, the foreign investment is, other things
being equal, less attractive than a domestic one. While the purpose
of the tax credit system is clear enough, I would like to mention that
one of its economic implications is that the United States Treasury is,
in fact, helping or subsidizing the country in which foreign investments
are made. This is so for the simple reason that the treasury accepts as
a fact that foreign governments will collect revenues at the source
which would otherwise have been collected at home.
V

So much for the present system. What about the new proposal
in the tax treaty with Pakistan? The central idea or argument is that
in those cases where foreign governments want to make tax concessions
in order to attract foreign capital and know-how, the effect is often
nullified because the investor loses the benefit of the tax credit. In
other words, while he pays less abroad his domestic taxes will increase
correspondingly. Specifically, the government of Pakistan exempts
from its income tax for a certain period, profits up to 5 per cent of
invested capital earned by a manufacturing corporation over a certain
minimum size. ,This provision has the effect of reducing the Pakistan
tax on a United States corporation investing in Pakistan. While a
certain part of the foreign tax is "spared," our domestic rate on branch
income will go up immediately while a higher domestic tax is levied
orr subsidiaries at the time foreign earned income is remitted to the
United States.
It is this principle the treaty with Pakistan proposes to alter. It
is stated in the treaty that for the purpose of our foreign tax credit a
United States corporation shall still be treated as having paid the
Pakistan tax which was spared, that is, which was in fact not paid.
It can apply a credit for the so-called "ghost" tax against its United
States tax on income from Pakistan. As far as the present tax con
cession in Pakistan is concerned, the proposal in the treaty may imply
as much as a 14 point tax reduction. Cases are easily imaginable
where other tax concessions, in Pakistan or elsewhere, will have the
effect of reducing the United States rate to zero.
In my opinion the tax credit device, as it has functioned up to the
present time, is a sound one. In the first place it has eliminated double
taxation on corporate income earned abroad. Secondly, and this is
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perhaps not always appreciated enough, the United States government
through this device is giving substantial aid to underdeveloped countries
since the tax credit permits revenues to be collected in the foreign
country without any deterrent effect on the flow of capital to these
countries. While I fully approve of both these objectives, I have some
serious misgivings about the new provision in the proposed tax treaty
with Pakistan. 1 It represents a radical departure from the present
system which is perhaps not fully realized:
1. The tax credit as it operates today maintains the principle of
equity or nondiscrimination. It does so because it eliminates double
taxation and thus places taxation of foreign and domestic earnings on
equal footing as far as the United States income tax is concerned.
While the formula maintains the basic principle that a United States
citizen is taxable on his world-wide income, it does recognize the
right of foreign countries to tax incomes at the source. The formula
does this by striking a balance between domestic and foreign tax claims
on the American investor. The new proposal on the other hand in
troduces an element of discrimination in American taxation: if adopted
it will mean that corporate incomes earned at home will be taxed at
a higher rate than those originating abroad.
2. Not only will the proposal discriminate against domestic in
vestments, it will also have the effect of favoring those countries which
make tax concessions although their tax rates, after the concession, are
not less than those in other countries which have not offered similar
incentives, say, because their rates were already lower.
3. The proposal does not apply to all types of income earned
abroad; patent and know-how royalties are not benefitted. Here again
we have an example of unjustified discrimination.
4. The formula does not distinguish between a tax concession
made on incomes derived from new investments and those on invest
ments which have already been undertaken. By including this latter
group the proposal is providing them with a windfall profit. Available
statistics show that the beneficiaries will be a handful of large cor
porations.
1 A very penetrating criticism of the proposal has been made by Stanley S.
Surrey, professor of law, Harvard Law School. See his "Current Issues in
the Taxation of Corporate Foreign Investment," Columbia Law Review,
LVI (June 1956), 815 and his statement of August 9, 1957 before the
United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. The next few para•
graphs are greatly influenced by his argument.
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5. Up to now, tax treaties have on the whole been prepared by
technicians. There is a very real danger that the new formula, if
adopted, will result in intense lobbying activities with United States
foreign investors and tax concession countries establishing a united
front.
6. Finally, it ought to be mentioned that the proposal introduces
a new procedure in tax policy: According to the present procedure,
tax rates are, of course, determined in the course of legislative action
which includes both the House and the Senate. The implication of
what is now proposed is that tax rates on corporate income earned
abroad will be determined by treaty action rather than legislation.
VI

It may be argued that even if these various criticisms are ac
cepted as being valid, they are only of secondary importance and that
the decisive question is to make private investment in Pakistan more
attractive. While I am all in favor of stimulating such private invest
ments in underdeveloped countries, I am by no means persuaded that
tax concessions along the lines in the treaty with Pakistan will yield the
desired results. There are a great many factors deterring American in
vestments in such faraway countries as Pakistan. I shall not bother
you with a listing of all of these factors. Let me only mention one:
a general lack of knowledge among potential American investors of
investment opportunities in Pakistan. The possibilities are clearly
there; the real question is how to transmit this information to foreign
investors. While it is true that taxes do play a certain role in the
potential investor's calculations, it is, I believe, a minor one. This is at
least the way I interpret the available material on foreign investment
incentives.
VII

From my argument up to this point two conclusions can be drawn:
1. Unless oil is discovered it is unlikely that the export sector of
the Pakistan economy will show a growth rate sufficiently high to
finance an accelerated development program; and
2. Although foreign private investments may go up in the future,
it would be unrealistic to expect this source of finance to cover more
than a small part of total development requirements.
From this general argument I am hence forced to conclude that
for some time to come a substantial amount of foreign aid will be in
dispensable. There is, of course, nothing new about this situation.
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For some years now Pakistan has relied heavily on such aid. Broadly
speaking, it can be said that what limited progress has been made so
far has been financed almost exclusively through foreign aid. Apart
from the Korean boom years, foreign exchange earnings have been just
sufficient to finance normal import requirements; they have not pro
vided a margin for development. It is both in Pakistan's own interest
as well as in ours to accomplish a gradual tapering off of foreign aid.
Unfortunately the prospects for such a development are not very good,
at least not within the next decade or two.
There is one additional point I should like to make in conclusion.
The experience of a great many other countries tells us quite clearly
that self-sustaining economic growth requires an annual minimum rate
of saving and capital formation at least equal to l O to 12 per cent of
the national product. In Pakistan today the rate of saving and invest
ment is not more than one-half of this minimum requirement. With
an annual population increase of about 1 ½ per cent, it follows that
the economy is only succeeding in standing still. Development in the
sense of increasing per capita income has not as yet taken place. And
now I come to what I consider a crucial point in the present situation:
Pakistan's military establishment is year in and year out absorbing
something like 6 to 7 per cent of the national product. For a country
this poor it may well be an excessive burden to carry. If a major part
of the resources that are now being used by the military could be con
verted into development goods, it would be possible for Pakistan to
achieve an annual rate of capital formation sufficient to bring about
self-generating growth. Or put another way: the present combination
of military and economic targets is excessive in relationship to the
country's resources. One or the other program must be cut in order
to bring total requirements into line with available resources. This is
the crucial decision which Pakistan must face up to. It is not too
much to say that the economic future of the nation will depend upon
the outcome of that decision.
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As

OF THE END of 1955 the total long-term private business in
vestment in India by American firms and individuals totalled 455
million rupees ( approximately 100 million dollars). This was almost
entirely direct investment and was concentrated in two fields - manu
facturing industry and trading - with about 40 per cent in the former
and 50 per cent in the latter. The great bulk of the private investment
in manufacturing is in the oil industry with Standard-Vacuum and
Cal-Tex Companies owning refineries which will, on their completion,
represent an investment of over 60 million dollars. Although the
United States is the second largest source of foreign private business
investment in India, it is far exceeded by the United Kingdom - the
total American private investment was only about 12 per cent of the
British investment in 1955. However, this country is probably the
main potential future source of private business investment in India.
The major question an American firm must answer before de
ciding whether to make an investment in India is whether it would
pay to do so. This in turn breaks down into several other questions:
Will it pay more than if the American firm expands its foreign trade
with India? How does investment in India compare with further in
vestment in the United States, or in other countries? Is there much
difference between the short-run and long-run opportunities for gain
by foreign trade or investment?
What are the foreign trade possibilities for American firms? Under
this Second Five Year Plan, and the one that will follow it, it is hoped
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to raise the annual per capita income of 400 million Indians from
about $50 to approximately $100. While this is still a very low in
dividual figure, nevertheless the total result in an economy of so great
an absolute size will be large. At the end of the Plan periods the
Indian population will obviously consume a much greater volume of
consumer goods. There may also be some increase in the demand for
consumer goods in the development period, but this is unlikely to be
very significant. In the development period there will be a large de
mand for imports of capital goods - especially machinery, chemicals,
and industrial raw materials. However, at the end of the Plan periods
India hopes to internally produce most of its own larger requirements
of capital equipment and industrial raw materials. It also may be able
to export these to other countries.
How will this development affect American exports to India? I
think there will be a greater short-run demand for imports of American
capital equipment, but this increase will not be great. In 1955 and
1956, American machinery in India was being undersold by as much
as 25 to 50 per cent by comparable machines produced in England,
Japan, Germany, Sweden and Switzerland. This is the main reason
Indian firms are not enthusiastic over American loans that have "tied
purchase" requirements. It is possible that American-owned firms
producing machines in Europe or Japan can compete on price terms;
in such cases the price factor would be less important. However,
there are machines which countries other than the United States simply
do not produce - for example, the Barber-Coleman winding machine
for cotton textiles - and either the promised gains from their use or
the pressure of fashion leads Indian firms to import them. The demand
for this type of machinery will probably increase, but this is a
specialty product.
With respect to consumer goods, the demand prospect in the
short run is not good simply because, if the planning is effective,
imports of such goods will be kept to a minimum. After fifteen to
twenty years I expect there will be greater demand for American con
sumer goods, but I think again this will be for specialty goods such as
Cadillacs, expensive refrigerators, etc. The bulk of manufactured con
sumer goods that Indians can buy can be produced at lower price else
where; and it is doubtful that American firms will be producing the
cheaper varieties which can sell in India.
In the case of both consumer and producer goods in any case, if
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recent experience is any guide, Indian producers will be given suuug
protection either by tariffs or direct import controls. In such cases,
imports to meet demand will not be very important. This means
essentially that American firms, to maintain their present positions in
the Indian market, or to gain from the growth in the market that is to
be anticipated, will, almost of necessity, have to invest directly in
India. There may also be some advantages in setting up a plant in
India which would be able to export to other countries of Asia.
If this is so, will it still pay an American firm to invest? What are
the problems of investing? What are the profit rates in India? And
what are the tax provisions in India? I am not going to discuss Ameri
can taxes on the profits remitted here, nor am I going to attempt to
compare profit rates in different countries.
First, it is essential to discard one psychological bogey. The
Indian government has as a goal a "socialistic pattern of society." This
is essentially a welfare state idea. There has been no nationalization
of existing manufacturing industry except in the case of one manifestly
inefficient and corrupt firm; there have been nationalizations of some
banks and insurance companies, but compensation was fair, and there
were reasonable grounds. Under a treaty signed with the United
States in 1957 it is possible for an American firm to insure against
nationalization without adequate compensation. Certain industries such
as atomic power, defense and transportation are reserved to the gov
ernment, but in other industries, including steel, private firms are ex
panding; and the government has in fact withdrawn the threat of
nationalization after ten years.
The main effect of government policy in the Five Year Plans has
been to provide an increasing, and almost guaranteed, demand for
industrial capital equipment and the raw materials for industrial ex
pansion. Since 1954, the private sector has been expanding at a very
rapid rate, largely by plowing back profits. In fact, the expansion of
the private sector is contingent upon both the government continuing
to provide demand, and expansion of the government projects which
private firms cannot, for one reason or another, carry out - public
utilities, railroads, irrigation, and hydroelectric projects, and the large
government steel works. I will end this discussion of nationalization
by quoting from a report of the Federation of British Industries to
British firms on investment in India, as of 1956.
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It will be seen that for all the paternalism of its approach and its
committal to State ownership in important spheres of the economy
it is difficult to accuse the Government of India of any neglect
of measures to encourage and promote private enterprise in
industry. In the ... Ministries of the Government which are
concerned with industrialization the outlook which prevails is
markedly empirical and pragmatic and generally speaking quite
untinged by an doctrinaire preference for State action for its own
sake. The attitude of mind is rather that the job to be done is
one that is beyond the resources of privately owned industry
as it exists in India, and one that must subserve certain broad
social aims which have long since been achieved in Western in
dustrialized countries whether they are capitalist or socialist. To
the extent that private industry is willing and able to play its part
it is to be encouraged to do so, but the Government is not willing
to extend that encouragement so far as to wait upon private
industrial initiative where it considers that development is urgently
required, or to give it a completely free hand in an economy
which is admittedly a controlled one.
This quotation also indicates the main characteristic of the exist
ing economic structure in India
that is, its system of controls. For
an American businessman these are not unfamiliar, since in many
respects they resemble those in force here during the war years. There
are controls over entry, controls over expansion, controls over imports,
controls over foreign exchange use, controls over scarce raw materials,
controls over many prices and controls over labor. Many of these are
necessary; others reflect the welfare-state goal - all require dealing
with government departments for permission. Indian firms of large size
know how to operate within these controls. For a new firm there are
other problems
the requirement of "progressive manufacture of the
product within India," which means that by the end of a certain period
of time the product must be entirely produced rather than merely as
sembled in India; the natural policy of "Indianization" of the firms'
executive personnel in India, which means that there must be a pro
gram to train Indians to take responsible positions with the firm, and
that they must be given responsible positions. With respect to the lat
ter requirement in the past ten years, far more Indians have moved
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into middle-executive and scientific positions in foreign firms, while
the number of foreign personnel in top positions has remained roughly
constant. With respect to most of these controls the foreign firm deals
with the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, and the Finance Ministry.
It is important to see the responsible officials in these ministries who
can make decisions; the outlook of these officials is pragmatic. If the
government feels an investment is sufficiently desirable, there is evi
dence it will be prepared to make numerous concessions. (For example,
the three oil companies building the refineries signed contracts with
the government in 1951 under which they retained all the voting stock,
were assured of a protected market and were guaranteed against
nationalization for a period of twenty-five years.) Today with the
critical foreign exchange situation, the government is particularly will
ing to encourage private foreign investment in those areas that are
consistent with Plan goals. Finally, foreign firms are given privileges
which are unavailable to domestic firms. The most important of these
are the free convertibility of foreign exchange for repatriating both
profits and capital.
A related question is one of the type of investment in terms of
participation with Indian firms. The government strongly prefers joint
foreign-Indian in".estment, and in 1948 and 1949, policy statements
announced that it would prefer an Indian majority. This policy has
never been implemented by legislation and has in .fact been waived
very frequently in practice. There are also some advantages in a foreign
associating itself with a reliable Indian firm. The large Indian
firms have operated successfully within the network of controls and
know how to function within the system. In terms of public relations,
especially if a long-run investment is planned, it is also helpful to
have some Indian participation.
What has been the rate of return in Indian firms in the past five
years? The Reserve Bank of India has made estimates which are
based on the published balance sheets (which may understate profits)
of 750 private Indian companies. It found that profits after taxes
averaged approximately 8 per cent on a net worth from 1950 to 1955
(it was over 9 per cent in 1955). This does not include "managing
agent's commission" which is considered a "cost item" in Indian ac
counting, but is really largely a profit; if this were included, it would
raise the rate of return by about one-third. As another measure, "gross
profits before taxes" (which includes managing agent's remuneration)
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averaged 9 per cent on gross sales, and 9 per cent on total net capital
employed, from 1950 to 1955 (over 10 per cent in 1955). These
averages include both profitable and unprofitable companies, efficient
and inefficient with the rates for the profitable ones unquestionably
much higher. Also since 1955 there is every reason to believe that
profit rates in private industry have continued to increase. The rate
of growth in industrial production has increased each year since 1951,
and the investment carried out by the private organized industrial sector
in the first years of the Second Plan up to September 1957 had al
ready apparently reached two-thirds of the total projected for this
sector for the entire five years of the Plan. With a large and almost
guaranteed government demand for the output of the cement, steel,
machinery and chemical industries especially, profits may be expected
to be high for a reasonably efficient firm in these industries.
How do profit rates for foreign-owned companies compare with
those for Indian companies? The Indian Tariff Commission made a
study of prices of rubber tires and tubes in 1955. The two largest pro
ducers are foreign companies: Dunlop (an English firm), and Fire
stone. This study estimated that from 1946 to 1953 profits before
taxes (after some adjustment) for Dunlop ranged from 18 to 37 per
cent on total net capital employed; for Firestone the profits on total
net capital employed were higher, ranging from 48 to 77 per cent. The
companies concerned felt that these figures exaggerated the rate of re
turn; nevertheless, it does present an order of magnitude on foreign
investments before taxes. It also raises a problem all companies must
face - that is, the possibility of periodic investigations, if the industry
is tariff protected, and with only a few firms in it. This particular in
vestigation concluded that the profits were too high and recommended
a reduction in the selling price to a "fair" level.
While profits may be potentially high in India, it is necessary to
raise the question of taxes in that country. In any general discussion
it is only possible to say that this is a most complex field, into which
any firm planning investment must do its own investigation. Recently
the Indian National Council of Applied Economic Research published
a monograph entitled "Taxation and Foreign Investment" which sum
marized most of the relevant material. In general, the burden of
Indian taxation on both individuals and on foreign corporations work
ing in India is heavier than in many of the capital-exporting countries
and also heavier than in many other countries competing for foreign
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investment. However, there are tax exemptions on some profits for new
firms in certain desirable industries for limited time periods; there are
extra depreciation allowances; there are tax exemptions on income of
"technicians" and on perquisities. The effects of the new expenditure
and wealth taxes are very slight. The relationship of these taxes to
United States income taxes are complex and has to be explored if a
company desires to transmit profits home rather than plow them back
in India.
At present there are no restrictions on transmission of profits or
repatriation of newly invested capital beyond the normal ones of per
mission from the Reserve Bank. In fact, in one or two cases during
the past year, when there has been a serious foreign exchange crisis,
American firms have deliberately tested the government's willingness to
permit convertibility, and the government has allowed repatriation very
quickly. Under the recent treaty between India and the United States
it is also possible for an American firm to insure against suspension
of convertibility.
I conclude by summarizing what should be kept in mind:
1. The Federation of British Industries concluded that

When every allowance is made, however, for the worst that can
be foreseen, the basic fact remains that Indian industrialization has
been set in motion. Its course may be rough or smooth, slow or
fast, but it is set ... [The] assumption ...that in fifteen or twenty
years time India will have become a major industrialized country
is not an empty one. On the contrary it is the only safe working
assumption that British firms can make.
2.The Indian government's policy is to protect domestic producers,
and as industrial output expands it will be more difficult to import com
peting goods. This means that direct investment will probably be nec
essary to protect the existing market, and potentially larger market.
3. The opportunities for making money in India by new invest
ment in expanding manufacturing fields ( especially machinery and
chemicals) are good. The Indian tax rates are high, but there are spe
cial allowances and exemptions; convertibility is freely permissible.
There are serious problems of operating a business in India. Nationali
zation is not one of them, but there are numerous controls and require132
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ments which must be met. However, the Indian government does de
sire foreign investment, and there is certainly a fund of respect for
American firms. If the Indian government wishes an investment enough,
it can, it has, and it will waive some of these requirements. In many
cases it would be desirable to invest jointly with a reputable Indian firm
that has dealt successfully with the government and to whom some of
the burdens of operating in India can be shifted. The Federation of
British Industries finally concluded that India has in the past given every
evidence that it "is prepared to welcome foreign investment on terms
which are not unreasonable, have been conscientiously adhered to,
and compare well with those enforced by other underdeveloped coun
tries."
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MosT OF THE countries of Asia including India are engaged in
heroic efforts to break the vicious circle of economic and social forces
which have resulted in a chronically low level of per capita income.
Low per capita income is responsible for these countries' low level of
savings. These savings finance a relatively low amount of investment
which, given the rate of growth of population, tends to accomplish
little more than the maintenance of the per capita income level. The
problem is to raise per capita income and to promote its continued
rise at a rate comparable to that achieved in more fortunate countries.
To solve this problem, many of these countries have embarked
upon large and growing investment programs under the overall di
rection of the state and with a great deal of direct participation by the
state. Unfortunately, in many cases, the effort undertaken has been
greater than could be financed from available resources, domestic and
foreign, and inflation has set in. Miscalculations, erroneous assump
tions about the costs of the programs, or about the availability of
domestic or foreign resources, have usually been to blame, but resort
to inflation has also been to some extent deliberate in the belief that
a faster rate of development would result. In all cases, inflation has
led to international financial difficulties.
The international financial difficulties which India is facing today
can largely be explained in these terms. They illustrate vividly the
enormity of the problem of economic development when the rate of
growth of population is high and the income base is small. They de136
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serve careful consideration, not only for the lessons which may emerge
and which those interested in problems of economic development may
find useful, but also because a study of these difficulties may help
American businessmen engaged in day to day dealings with India, gov
ernment officials concerned with the formulation of United States
policy toward India, and the public at large anxious to gain increased
understanding of India.
THE RECORD,

1951-56

In India, population is growing at an estimated rate of about 1.5
per cent a year. The 1951 population was nearly 357 million and the
390 million level should be reached before the end of 1958. For the
year ended March 1956, national income in 1948-49 prices was esti
mated at 104.2 billion rupees (about $21.9 billion), giving a per capita
income of 272 rupees (about $57). In that year, consumption of
foodgrains amounted to only about 400 pounds per capita. Domestic
savings were only about 6 per cent of national income and the rate
of investment, including investments financed by foreign resources, was
only slightly higher. Unemployment and underemployment remained
tragically high.
Although the living standards of the Indian people were quite low
in 1955-56, an encouraging improvement had occurred over the pre
ceding five years. The estimate of national income in constant prices
just given was 17.7 per cent higher than in 1950-51 and the per capita
income was 10.5 per cent higher. The index of agricultural production
was about 19 per cent higher and that of industrial production about
40 per cent higher. Low though the rates of saving and investment
may have been in 1955-56, they too were higher than in 1950-51.
The momentum of the economy which these figures reveal was
partly attributable to the weather, as the droughts of 1950-52 were
followed by good monsoons in 1953-55. However, it was also the re
sult of the first five year plan, which extended from April 1951 to
March 1956. Under the plan, a deliberate effort was made to increase
production and to develop the basic facilities ( mainly power) needed
for further growth. The central and state governments spent about 15
billion rupees on public investment projects and an additional 4.6 bil
lion rupees (not labeled investment) on other activities included in
the plan. Private investment in this period totalled 16 billion rupees,
making total plan outlay 35.6 billion rupees (about $7.5 billion).
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The progress of this period was achieved under conditions of
financial stability. Wholesale prices fell in the last half of 1951 and
early in 1952 following the inflationary upsurge of the Korean war
boom. Thereafter they fluctuated narrowly, except for a steady decline
in 1954 and the first half of 1955 and an ensuing recovery. At the
end of the plan period, in March 1956, wholesale prices were no higher
than in 1949, a record matched by few other countries in the world. 1
Price stability was not purchased at the price of external imbal
ance. The balance of payments remained in approximate equilibrium
during the last four years of the plan following a large deficit in 1951
associated with the Korean inflation and its aftermath. At the same
time, import and exchange restrictions, which had been tightened as
part of the post Korean readjustment, were gradually relaxed.
This record was made possible by the fiscal and monetary policies
followed by the authorities. The budget deficits, largely occasioned by
growing developmental expenditures, were mostly financed in non
inflationary ways. Inflationary financing, such as drawing down of cash
balances and direct sale of treasury bills to the central bank, remained
moderate, at least in the first four years of the plan. Over the five
year period, it amounted to about 4 billion rupees ( about 20 per cent
of the total public outlay under the plan), of which about 1.7 billion
rupees was incurred in the last year of the plan alone. The central
bank, after withdrawing its support of the government securities mar
ket and raising the discount rate in November 1951, · undertook open
market sales of securities on a significant scale, particularly in 1953
and 1954. Under these policies, private bank credit as well as time
and savings deposits of banks rose moderately after 1953, following
the post Korean readjustment. In March 1956, money supply was
only about IO per cent higher than five years earlier.
THE SECOND .FIVE YEAR PLAN

The remarkable performance of the Indian economy during the
first five year plan led the Indian authorities to adopt a much more
ambitious investment program for the ensuing five year period (April
1956-March 1961). They decided that a total of 62 billion rupees
should be invested under the second five year plan, twice the amount
invested under the first five year plan. An additional 10 billion, not
labeled investment, was also to be spent on activities included in the
1

ln the United States, wholesale prices were about 15 per cent higher in 1956
than in 1949.
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plan, making total outlay under the plan 72 billion rupees, again about
twice the total outlay incurred under the first plan. Of the proposed
total outlay, the central and state governments together undertook to
spend 48 billion rupees, about two and a half times the amount spent
by them in the first plan. Private enterprise was to spend the re
mainder, 60 per cent more than it spent under the first plan.
The inventory of projects included in this plan differed from that
of the first plan in that emphasis shifted sharply from agriculture to
heavy industry. The relative share of the proposed total public outlay
allocated to the development of industry and mining was nearly four
times that of the first five year plan while the relative shares of all other
sectors was lower, except for a small increase in the relative share
going to transportation and communications. For all sectors, how
ever, the absolute amount to be spent was well in excess of the amount
spent during the first plan.
Only about half of the public outlay was to be financed from
taxation and by borrowing from the public. Another quarter was to
be borrowed from the Reserve Bank of India. Another 8 billion rupees
($1,680 million) represented foreign exchange requirements, and the
balance was to be raised from the profits of state owned enterprises.
Resources available to finance the private investment outlay were only
partially indicated and included a substantial dependence on bank
credit expansion. Foreign exchange requirements of the private sector
were estimated at 3 billion rupees (about $630 million). To meet the
foreign exchange requirements, it was planned to draw down foreign
exchange holdings by 2 billion rupees ( $420 million) and to obtain
the balance of 9 billion rupees ($1.9 billion) from abroad as loans or
grants from foreign governments or international organizations, and as
foreign private investment.
From the outset there were doubts as to whether the available
resources would be adequate to finance the plan. The yield expected
from taxation, borrowing from the public, and profits of state-owned
enterprises appeared to have been estimated somewhat optimistically.
The assistance required from abroad was more than three times the
amount received from this source during the first five year plan and,
as such, seemed to be well above what might reasonably be expected
to be available. It was clear that, should these doubts become realized,
borrowing from the Reserve Bank would have to be larger than
planned. Even the planned amount of such borrowing seemed certain
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to generate inflation, since it amounted to about three times the amount
of inflationary financing incurred during the first five year plan.
Moreover, the proposed total outlay was soon raised when it was
estimated that the public investment program would cost at least 7
billion rupees (about $1.5 billion) more than originally planned. This
was the result of price increases, inclusion of additional projects and
correction of certain underestimated items. Included was an upward
revision of the foreign exchange requirements by 4 billion rupees
($840 million). In spite of this revision, the foreign exchange cost of
the public investment program was estimated at only about 21.5 per
cent of the total and probably remained significantly understated. 2
Resources to finance this increase were not indicated but it seemed
clear that foreign sources were counted on to cover the rise in the
foreign exchange requirements. This would raise the total assistance
expected from abroad to 13 billion rupees (more than $2.7 billion),
a sum even more unlikely to be available than the original requirement
of 9 billion rupees. Although nothing was said to this effect, greater
reliance on borrowing from the Reserve Bank than originally planned
seemed to be implied.
While the financial feasibility of the plan appeared open to ques
tion, the objectives which it aimed to achieve seemed relatively modest.
The proposed overall outlay was expected in five years to raise national
income by 25 per cent, to increase per capita income by 16 per cent
and to create only about as many new jobs as there would probably
be new entrants to the labor force. No attempt was to be made in this
plan to reduce the large amount of unemployment and underemploy
ment which have plagued India for a long time.
It seemed reasonable enough to undertake merely to prevent any
further increase in unemployment and underemployment even though
it was known that this would call for the creation of nearly twice as
many new jobs as the first five year plan was thought to have created.
The projected rate of growth of national income also seemed reason
able in the light of the employment objective. It is true that this rate
of growth exceeded the rates achieved by the developed economies of
the West. However, since unemployment was understood to have in
creased during the first plan in spite of an increase in national income
2

The import content of development programs of underdeveloped countries
has frequently been around 50 per cent of the total cost of the program. In
some cases, it has been higher.
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of nearly 18 per cent, it was thought that the attainment of the em
ployment objective would require a more rapid rate of growth than
was achieved in the first plan. The apparent ease with which national
income was raised by 18 per cent during the first plan made it seem
as though the rate of growth projected for the second plan would be
attainable. The relatively modest nature of the objectives was given as
a justification for disregarding the warnings about the financial fea
sibility of the plan.
While these objectives might have been sought with a somewhat
smaller outlay, the Indian authorities desired to lay the basis for future
development by making a special effort to expand heavy industry.
Since this did not involve the creation of much additional employment
in relation to the outlay involved, it was decided to stress handicraft
and small scale production of consumer goods, at the expense of fac
tory production of these goods, in the belief that this would make up
the deficiency in job creation. Both of these decisions had the effect
of raising the outlay needed to bring forth the desired addition in total
output. The expansion of heavy industry required large amounts of
capital, while handicraft and small scale production of consumer goods
was relatively less efficient than factory production.
As had been feared, the attempt to carry out this plan and the
resulting boom in private investment and consumption brought on a
sharp increase in inflationary pressures. The growth of public and
private investment spending increasingly financed by Reserve Bank
advances to the government and by bank credit expansion boosted
money incomes. The resulting increase in effective demand out
stripped the rise in domestic production so that prices rose, imports
increased sharply and foreign exchange reserves began to fall rapidly.
FISCAL POLICY

The public investment program extended and intensified the
public investment activities of the first five year plan. It involved
rapidly rising public expenditures, as a result of which the budget
deficits, which had begun to grow in the latter part of the first five year
plan, grew further.
A courageous attempt was made to increase revenues through
taxation. Excise duties on cotton cloth were raised in September 1956.
A supplementary budget, adopted in December 1956, revived the
capital gains tax which had been in effect briefly after World War II
and raised the dividend tax and certain import duties. At the same
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nme, businesses were required to deposit with the Reserve Bank sums
equal to specified percentages of their depreciation and other company
reserves. The 1957-58 budget, adopted in August 1957. raised a num
ber of excise and import duties as well as certain postal rates, increased
the corporate income tax rate, cut sharply the exemption level on the
personal income tax, and introduced a new tax on railway fares, a
wealth tax and a personal expenditure tax. Including tax increases
adopted by several of the States of the Indian Union, these various
measures are estimated to yield an additional tax revenue of about
1.5 billion rupees ($315 million) per year. 3
In spite of this, the combined operations of the central and state
governments continued to yield increasingly large deficits. Although
non-inilationary means of financing (e.g. borrowing from the public
and foreign assistance) yielded growing amounts, these were not
enough to prevent a sharp rise in inflationary financing, principally
government borrowing from the Reserve Bank of India. As shown in
the following table, the inflationary impact of government activities,
which was negligible in 1953, grew sharply each year thereafter until,
in 1957, it was estimated at 4,822 million rupees ($1,013 million),
TABLE

I. Inflationary Impact of Government O[Jerations
in India Since 1953*
(In million dollars equivalent)

1953
Reserve Bank credit to
-81.5
government
Scheduled bank holdings
of govt. securities +26.9
Other bank claims
+ 1.9
on government
Government currency
circulation
-6.3
Government rupee
balances
+97.4
Net inflationary
+38.4
impact

1954

1955

1956

1957

-2.9

t--228.5

t--566.2

+904.5

+25.0

+78.1

--42.8

+143.4

+4.6

+12.2

+3.6

-28.7

--4.2

+12.6

-4.8

-5.5

+ 122.6

+14.7

-6.5

-1.0

+145.1

+346.1

+515.5 +1,012.7

Source: Reserve Bank India Bulletin (various issues)

* Change measured from figures as of last Friday of year.
s The personal expenditure tax did not become effective until April 1, 1958.
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about 96 per cent larger than in 1956, nearly three times the 1955
rate, and nearly seven times the 1954 rate.
MONETARY POLICY

At the same time, a monetary policy of controlled expansion was
adopted toward the private sector. Under this policy, credit for pro
ductive purposes along lines consistent with the five-year plan was
allowed to expand, while credit for speculative purposes was curbed.
The principal restraining instrument of the policy was a regulation ap
plying to advances against foodgrains, sugar, and, for a short time,
cotton textiles. With respect to these advances, the regulation set the
maximum percentage of the value of the collateral which banks would
be allowed to lend and fixed ceilings on the total of such loans as well
as on individual advances.
This policy of selective credit restraint, first introduced in the
spring of 1956, was reinforced, in August 1957, by a request to the
banks from the governor of the Reserve Bank that they bring down the
overall level of advance by 10 per cent by mid-October from the level
of early August. It was understood that banks which did not do so
would find it more difficult to borrow from the Reserve Bank when the
next seasonal increase in the demand for credit got underway. The
banks were told to comply without reducing credit to the productive
sector, in a continued attempt to limit the applicability of the restraining
action to speculative activity.
A further measure of restraint was introduced by moderate in
creases in the Reserve Bank lending rates to banks. There were four
such increases between March 1956 and May 1957, and the overall
result was to raise the lowest lending rate from 3 to 4 per cent. How
ever, the effect appears to have been limited. While the higher rates
brought about some tightening of the money markets, the liquidity of
the banks was never so strained as to retard significantly the growth
of advances. In part, this is because the growing recourse by the gov
ernment to borrowing from the Reserve Bank bolstered bank liquidity
at an increasing rate. But in addition, the Reserve Bank increased its
credit to the banks by 805 million rupees from March 1955 to March
1957, nearly tripling it. This provided the basis for more than 40 per
cent of the 2,839 million rupee expansion in bank credit which oc
curred in these two years.•
4

The calculation is based on these facts: for several years, about two-thirds of
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Since earzy in 1957, there has been a substantial accumuration of
rupee funds in commercial banks to the credit of the United States
Government as the Indian Government beg:m paying for United States
surplus agricultural commodities imported under a PL 480 agreement.'
The commodities so imported were put on the market, the Indian Gov
ernment being reimbursed from the proceeds, so that the transaction
resulted in a transfer of funds from the public to United States ac
counts. In the process, however, bank liquidity increased to the extent
that the public paid for the commodities with currency. In addition,
it increased even when the public paid with demand deposits, since the
United States Government placed the funds in time deposits against
which banks are not required to hold as large a minimum reserve ratio
as they are against demand deposits. As it turned out, the expansion
of bank credit was smaller in 19 57 thc:m in 1956, both in absolute
additions to money supply each year have taken the form of currency, and
about a third has been in bank deposits. For scheduled banks, each year in
the last several years, about 60 per cent of additions to bank deposits have
been in demand deposits and about 40 per cent in time deposits. Scheduled
banks are required to maintain balances at the Reserve Bank equal to 5 per
cent of demand liabilities and 2 per cent of time li.1bilitie,. Given the fi040 ratio of demand and time deposits, this means that the effective overall
reserve ratio for scheduled banks is about 3.8 per cent, (i.e., 60 per cent
at 5 per cent and 40 per cent at 2 per cent). For cooperative banks, the
effective overall reserve ratio works out at about 1.7 per cent. The rise in
Reserve Bank credit of 805 million rupees in two years may be broken
down into a 661 million rise in credit to scheduled banks and a 144 million
rise in credit to cooperative banb. Given these facts, the expansion co
efficient, A, is calculated as follows:
I
A
1-(1-R)x(l-C)
where R is the applicable reserve ratio and C is the percentage of leakage
through increased currency circulation. On this basis. the expansion
coefficient for scheduled banks is 1.465. For cooperative banks it is 1.48.
The npansion of hank credit made possible by the growth of Reserve B,mk
advances to the hanks works out at l.4fi5 X fifil + 1.48 X 144
1,187
million rupees.
5 PL 480 provides for the disposal of United States surplus agricultural com
modities. Under Title I of this law, these commodities may be sold for
foreign currencies. The United States reserves some of the proceeds of
such sales for its own uses and makes the rest available to the foreign
country. partly a1,; a loan and partly as a grant. Under a Title I agreement
signed in August 1956, the United States is providing India with agricul
tural commodities valued al $360.1 million over a three year period. Of the
rupees paid by India, $72 million equivalent is reserved for United States
uses, $234 million equivalent is to be loaned to India and the balance
given to India as a grant for development.
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terms and in relative terms, while liquidity created by continued gov
ernment borrowing from the Reserve Bank grew more rapidly. As a
result, the banks which, for a number of years before 1957, had been
net sellers of government bonds and had received increasing advances
from the Reserve Bank, were able to reverse this trend. They used
nearly half of the total increase in their deposits in 1957 to reduce
their indebtedness to the Reserve Bank and to buy government bonds.
Had the rupee funds arising from PL 480 sales been deposited in the
Reserve Bank instead of in commercial banks, it is unlikely that the
banks would have increased their holdings of government bonds or
reduced their debt to the Reserve Bank, and the expansion of bank
credit would probably have been much the same. On the other hand,
the decline in reserve bank credit to the banks by nearly 30 per cent
since March 1957, which was made possible by the decision to de
posit these funds in commercial banks, involved a weakening of the
influence of the Reserve Bank over the money market.
On balance, monetary policy toward the private sector appears
to have been more expansionary than it was restrictive. It is true that
advances against foodgrains were largely stabilized in 1957, but such
advances account for only about 5 per cent of total bank credit and
other advances continued to expand. Overall bank credit to the private
sector, which had risen by 12.5 per cent in 1954 and by 14.4 per cent
in 1955, expanded by 25.6 per cent in 1956 and by another 14.6 per
cent in 1957. At the end of 1957, the level of bank credit outstanding
was nearly double what it was four years earlier. Industry, particularly
the iron and steel, engineering, and cotton textile industries, received
about half of the additional credit granted by banks in these four years
and another large share went to traders in non-agricultural commodi
ties, especially traders in cotton textiles, and in machinery, engineering
and chemical products.
DEMAND AND SUPPLY

Money incomes rose as public and private investment spending
increased. However, part of the increase in incomes went into time
deposits, thereby mitigating somewhat the inflationary pressures. Be
tween the end of 1953 and the end of 1956, time deposits of banks
rose by 1,411 million rupees (about 38 per cent), but this was only
about 42 per cent as much as bank credit expanded in this period.
In 1957, they rose more than bank credit, but this was due to the
accumulation of PL 480 funds to the credit of the United States Gov145

ernment. Excluding this factor, they rose less, although they probably
offset bank credit expansion to a greater extent than in each of the
previous three years.
It is not known to what extent, if any, the rising money incomes
went into private hoards. Such hoards generally take the form of
precious metals, which are largely smuggled into the country since
their import is prohibited. It is also probable that the sectors of the
economy where transactions have generally been on a barter basis are
increasingly adopting money as a means of exchange. Nevertheless,
it seems clear that the increase in money incomes generated a sub
stantial rise in effective demand.
To some extent, the goods for which demand was rising could be
and were being produced domestically. Industrial production, which
had risen about 40 per cent during the first five year plan, continued to
rise. In the third quarter of 1957, it averaged about 50 per cent more
than in 1951. Its rate of growth, however, appeared to be relatively
stable at 7.5 to 8.5 per cent a year in the last four years, whereas the
growth of effective demand seemed to be gathering momentum.
At the same time, agricultural production rose less than 8 per
cent from the crop year 1953-54 to the crop year 1956-57, the bulk
of this rise being concentrated in the last year. Production of food
grains actually fell ibout 4 per cent from 1953-54 to 1954-55 and did
not recover this loss until 1956-57 when it exceeded the 1953-54 level
by barely 1 per cent. While the production of fibers and of sugar
cane rose sharply, that of tea appeared to have leveled off and that of
oilseeds held well below its peak of 1954-55.
Not only did the domestic demand-supply situation appear to be
getting out of balance, but in addition, an increasing part of the rise in
effective demand was directed toward goods that could not be pur
chased except abroad. This was particularly true of a broad list of
capital goods needed to carry out the investment program. As a re
sult, not only did prices rise sharply, but in addition the international
payments position deteriorated.
PRICE DEVELOPMENTS

Wholesale prices, which had begun to rise in May 1955 after a
steady decline over the previous twelve months, continued to increase
in 1956. In eighteen months, the rise amounted to 23 per cent and
affected all commodity groups. In November 1956, food articles were
about 30 per cent higher than in May 1955, industrial raw materials
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were about 26 per cent higher, intermediate manufactured products
were 16 per cent higher and finished manufactured goods were about
8 per cent higher. The rise of wholesale food prices reflected in part
the lower output of foodgrains in the crop years 1954-55 and 1955-56
than in the crop year 1953-54, but the fact that the upward trend of
prices affected all sectors suggests that the increase in effective demand
was largely to blame.
In 1957, wholesale prices levelled off. There was a brief spurt in
May, June and July, but this was followed by a steady decline in the
last five months of the year. The decline extended into 1958 and in
March, wholesale prices were 1 per cent lower than a year earlier, 7
per cent lower than at their peak in August 1957. Wholesale prices
of food articles, industrial raw materials and intermediate manufac
tured products, in particular, were significantly lower. In part this re
sulted from the steady arrival throughout this period of large shipments
of surplus agricultural commodities from the United States and the
recovery of foodgrain production in the crop year 1956-57 to a new
record level, but, more important, it reflected the fact that the impact
of inflationary pressures was being fully absorbed by the balance of
international payments and the reserves of foreign exchange.
THE INTERNATIONAL PAYMENTS POSITION

The balance of payments position, which had been one of ap
proximate equilibrium in 1953, 1954 and 1955, deteriorated sharply
in 19 5 6 and 19 5 7. The current account deficit grew steadily until, for
the six months ended September 30, 1957, it ran at an annual rate of
5,956 million rupees (about $1,250 million). 6 In this six month
period, the annual rate of imports was about 58 per cent higher than
in the corresponding period of 1955. At the same time, exports showed
almost no gain above the levels of 1955. As a result, the trade deficit
rose from about 650 million rupees ($137 million) in 1955 to about
2,100 million rupees ($440 million) in 1956, and to an annual rate of
about 3,485 million rupees ($732 million) in the first nine months of
1957. 7
6 Excluding the return to the United States of large amounts of lend-lease silver.
1 Based on customs figures. Since July 1956, the payments deficit on merchan•
dise account has been much larger than the trade deficit recorded by the
customs, reflecting the fact that heavy payments were being made for mer
chandise not currently being delivered. Advance payments on orders for
capital goods are known to have been substantial. Most of these advance
payments were undoubtedly required by the sellers, but some were probably
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_2. Indian Foreign Trade, 1954-57

Exports
Percentage change
Value (In
from same quarter
millions of rupees) of previous year
1,319
-.5
1,134
-5.2
1,434
+10.0
1.740
+16.9
1,628
+23.4
1,325
+16.8
1,611
+12.3
1,513
-13.0
1,645
+1.0
1,316
-.7
1,423
-11.7
1,658
+9.6
1,637
-.5
1,455*
+10.6*
1,646*
+15.7*
1,536*
-7.4*

Source: International Financial Statistics

Imports
Percentage change
Value (In
from same quarter
millions of rupees)
of previous year
1,321
-1.0
1,520
-7.9
1,595
+7.3
1,740
+40.2
1,709
+29.4
1,624
+6.8
1,581
-.9
1,815
+4.3
2,028
+18.7
1,917
+18.0
2,101
+32.9
2,101
+15.7
2,280
+12.4
2,617
+36.5
2,455
+16.8
2,182
+3.9

Trade
balance
(In millions
of rupees)
-2
-386
-161
0
-81
-299
+30
-302
-383
-601
-677
-443
-643
-1162*
-809*
-646*

* Estimated. Official figures are believed to include shipments of silver to the United
States in repayment of silver obtained from the United States during World War II under a lend-lease agreement. Adjustment
made on the basis of United States data on receipts from India under the agreement.

The increase in imports was the most spectacular manifestation
of the rise in effective demand. The bulk of it represented sharply
stepped up deliveries of machinery, metals and metal products, and the
arrival of surplus agricultural commodities from the United States be
ginning in November 1956. Imports of machinery, metals and metal
products accounted for about 86 per cent of the rise in total imports
from 1955 to 1956 and may explain as much as 40 per cent 8 of the
rise from 1956 to 1957. These imports, largely on private account,
were used primarily in the expansion of facilities and for current pro
duction. However, a significant accumulation of inventories is re
ported to have occurred in 1956 and the first half of 1957. The ship
ments of United States surplus agricultural commodities, which appear
to account for somewhat more than 50 per cent of the rise in total
imports from 1956 to 1957, 9 were originally intended to build up
stocks, but are said in fact to have been to a large extent put on the
market to fight rising food prices.
The deterioration of the trade position was largely financed by
drawing down foreign exchange reserves. Between April 1, 1956 and
the end of 1957, India's foreign exchange reserves were in fact reduced
by 4,486 million rupees ( $942 million), more than twice the amount
by which it had been planned to reduce them in the five year period
beginning April 1, 1956. In addition, India drew $200 million from
the International Monetary Fund in three installments in February,
March and June 1957. Other assistance in this 21 month period
totalled about $600 million, including $126 million drawn on Inter
national Bank loans, 10 about $136 million in the form of United States
aid and an estimated $259 million representing the value of the ship
ments of United States surplus agricultural commodities already men
tioned.
The bulk of this assistance, including the IMF drawing, 80 per
cent of the drawings on IBRD loans and practically all of the United
States agricultural surplus commodities, came in 1957. Without it,
and without the very extensive utilization of foreign exchange reinstigated by Indian buyers, partly reflecting a flight from the pound
sterling in connection with the Suez crisis. Throughout this period, India
has continued to earn a surplus on invisible account.
8 Author's estimate.
9 Author's estimate based on United States data on such shipments.
10 Repayments of $6.5 million were also made to the Bank in this period, making
net Bank assistance to India in this period $119.5 million.
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serves,11 wholesale prices would surely have continued to rise in 1957.
Foreign exchange reserves and foreign assistance thus acted as cushions
for the Indian economy. Their availability made it possible to face
the growth of domestic demand with the minimum of internal price
strains. But surely it could not be said that inflationary pressures were
absent in 1957 and early 1958. Effective demand had reached a level
at which it could be sustained only so long as the drain on foreign
exchange reserves could continue and new foreign assistance could be
obtained.
REMEDIAL MEASURES

To deal with the growing crisis, the Indian authorities began by
tightening import restrictions. Import quotas were cut January 1, 1957,
for 509 relatively nonessential items. At the same time, it was an
nounced that, in general, import licenses for capital goods would be
issued only to businessmen who either ( 1) secured foreign capital
investment at least as high as the proposed imports, or (2) obtained
credits from foreign suppliers, or ( 3) proposed to pay with the pro
ceeds of loans from foreign and international lending institutions.
Two types of supplier credits were specified; one provided that payment
before shipment should not exceed 20 per cent of the f.o.b. price, the
balance to be paid_ in seven annual installments; and the other limited
initial payment to 10 per cent, the balance to be paid after the project
had become a going concern, in installments not to exceed the net saving
or earning of foreign exchange realized through the operations of the
n�w plant.
On July 1, 1957, the open general licenses for imports were
abolished, except on certain imports from Pakistan. In addition, a
moratorium on issuing new licenses was enforced during the third
quarter of 1957, except for raw materials and for capital goods pro
cured under deferred payment arrangements. Beginning October L
1957, the import of a wide range of consumer goods was banned and
quotas for many others were cut sharply.
The effect of these restrictions was to bring about some decline in
imports beginning in the third quarter of 1957. Concurrently the de
mand for bank credit abated somewhat since importers unable to secure
licenses no longer needed funds. Inventories accumulated earlier began
to be drawn down, thereby providing a cushion thanks to which the
11

About 51 per cent of the total decline in reserves in this 21 month period
occurred in 1957.
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restrictions did not immediately bring about an upsurge in prices. Due
to the high level of outstanding licenses which remain valid, imports
may be expected to continue at a high level for some time. The bulk
of these licenses is reported to be for the import of machinery and raw
materials.
Besides tightening import restrictions, the Indian authorities un
dertook a comprehensive review of the Five Year Plan itself. They
decided to reduce the physical targets in such a way as to ensure that
the total public outlay on the plan would not exceed the original esti
mate of 48 billion rupees. They established a set of priorities for the
projects included in the plan and announced that they would concen
trate on what they called the hard core of the plan (steel, coal, railways
and certain power projects) and on such other projects as were so
close to completion that the cost of completing them was low relative
to the benefits to be derived from them. Other projects were to be
implemented only as resources permitted.
At the same time a concerted effort was made to secure increased
foreign resources to finance the uncovered foreign exchange cost of the
hard core of the plan estimated at about 7 billion rupees ($1,470
million) . So far (April 1958) additional asistance has been announced
by the United States, Western Germany and Japan. In addition, the
Indian authorities made clear their intention to devote the country's
remaining foreign exchange holdings to the support of the plan if neces
sary. The minimum reserve of foreign exchange which the law required
the Reserve Bank to hold was reduced from 4 billion rupees ($840
million) to 3 billion rupees ($630 million) in August 1957, and to
850 million rupees ($178.5 million) in November 1957. Even this
latest minimum may be eliminated altogether under procedures pro
vided for in existing statutes.
CONCLUSION

It is too early to tell whether sufficient foreign resources will become available to finance the foreign exchange cost of the reduced plan.
Even if they do, it remains to be seen whether internal inflationary
pressures will thereby be fully absorbed. The past rate of spending on
the plan suggests that public expenditures must rise sharply in the next
three years if the projected five year expenditure total is to be reached
or even approached. At the same time, there is little scope for further
increasing government revenues. Under the circumstances, the Indian
authorities may find it difficult to carry out their recent decision to
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reduce the extent to which the plan would be financed by advances
from the Reserve BanJc, unless foreign assistance well in excess of the
amount now sought is forthcoming.
If the authorities undertake to approach the projected five year
expenditure total of 48 billion rupees under the plan, internal infla
tionary pressures may be expected to continue and the need for severe
import restrictions will remain. If on the other hand the authorities
decide to bring the inflationary pressures to an end by further read
justing the plan, it may eventually be possible to relax import restric
tions. In either case, however, the level of Indian imports is likely to
be lower than it was in 1957.
India's biggest supplier is the United Kingdom. The rest of West
ern Europe considered as a unit has recently become as big a supplier
of India as is the United Kingdom, largely on the strength of a large
increase in imports from West Germany. Including the United King
dom, Western Europe supplied about 50 per cent of India's imports in
1956. The United States provided only about 12 per cent of the total.
Indian import cuts are likely to be made on a nondiscriminatory basis
since its foreign exchange shortage is a generalized shortage rather than
a shortage of any one currency. Therefore United States exports may
be affected about in proportion to the total decline in Indian imports.
United States· suppliers of machinery, vehicles and metals, the
principal United States nonagricultural exports to �ndia, have fully
shared in the increase in Indian imports. In 1956, shipments of these
products to India, representing about half of total United States exports
to· India, were valued at about $132 million, two and a third times as
much as in 1953. They accounted for nearly twice as large a percent
age of total Indian imports as in 1953, a performance almost as good
as the improvement in the overall position of Western Germany as a
supplier of India. On the basis of data for the first nine months, it ap
pears that some decline in these exports may have occurred in 1957. As
import cuts and the readjustment of the plan assume their full effect,
further declines seem inevitable, but the relative share of the Indian
market held by United States suppliers need not fall if the terms offered
to Indian buyers, including credit terms, are kept as attractive as those
offered by other suppliers. At the same time, United States foodgrain
exports to India are likely to be maintained close to the level of 1957,
as the PL 480 agreement of 1956 continues to be implemented. What
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happens thereafter will depend in part on whether or not a new PL 480
agreement is negotiated.
In the long run, however, Indian economic growth will provide
the basis for a renewed rise in imports in which United States suppliers
may share. The potential of the Indian economy is enormous and
neither the government nor the people are disposed to leave it unex
ploited. Progress may not, at first, be as rapid as they would like, but
as they solve the many problems which confront them, particularly the
population problem, and as they adopt wise policies, there is no reason
why the rate of progress cannot eventually rise so that the vicious circle
of poverty will at last be broken.
The Indians have a long, hard road to travel and they know it.
They have begun the journey with democratic institutions and with a
system of government which respects the basic freedoms of the people
and their human dignity. If they can reach a satisfactory and a sus
tainable rate of development with these institutions and this system of
government, they will probably have done more to rehabilitate demo
cracy in the eyes of other Asian countries than can be done by any
other means.
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A

MONG THE three countries of India, Pakistan and Ceylon-Ceylon
the
smallest;
but in its problems and possibilities, it invites study as a
is
model of the kinds of issues that underdeveloped countries face.
In the last several years, United States exports have been lower to
Ceylon, per capita, than to Pakistan, but considerably higher than to
India. Relatively heavy United States aid to Pakistan is one explanation
of the comparison; another is the comparatively high income level of
Ceylon, and perhaps its long pattern of net dollar earnings.
Compared to population, United States imports from Ceylon are
very large indeed-about as much as from Pakistan, with nine times
. the population; and one-seventh that of India, with some 42 times the
population. The explanation lies mainly in the United States taste for,
and ability to buy, the high quality Ceylon teas; to a much lesser extent,
it lies in United States purchases of rubber. From these two commodi
ties alone come over 90 per cent of Ceylon's foreign earnings. Our
total purchases from all three countries show much stability, though the
downswing of 1954 in the United States had its effect in a moderate
parallel downswing in imports from each country.
Economic and financial policy in each of these countries is inti
mately concerned with the amount of foreign assets. Within a country,
even a highly inflationary policy-of rising money supply and rising
money incomes--can be sustained for years without meeting any clear
block. The experience of Chile, Brazil and other Latin American
countries give example. But any such policy that involves as well rapid-
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ly falling foreign assets demands that prompt corrective measures be
undertaken for the simple reason that countries, like individuals, can
spend only so long as they have something to spend.
Hence the fall in Indian foreign assets, from Rs 7.8 billion at the
end of 1955, to Rs 4 billion last February (with a further concealed
loss due to upward revaluation of gold balances in this period), is the
clearest evidence possible of crisis in the development plan-that is, of
the need for taking some action to check the drain. Pakistan has sus
tained a more moderate drain, with foreign assets falling by only about
18 per cent between 1956 (Rs 1.7 billion) and last February (Rs 1.4
billion).
Ceylon-with which I will be concerned primarily in the rest of
this paper-has gone through remarkable experience with its foreign
assets in recent years, with corresponding effects on the volume and
types of its trade.
Like other countries, Ceylon has been spending as much as it can
on imports and other foreign charges. There is nothing reprehensible
in this; in fact, to quote one eminent economist, probably the clearest
root of economic progress lies in the persistent tendency of people to
spend more than their incomes! Ceylon's effort to spend no more than
its income is rendered difficult by the fact that its foreign earnings from
exports are highly variable. Tea and rubber provide over 90 per cent
of foreign earnings and their prices fluctuate widely. The price of tea
is nearly three and a half times higher than in 1938, that of rubber four
times higher. (At the same time the import price index is up four
times.) But the price of tea rose 42 per cent between 1947 and the
peak price of 1950; fell 9 per cent in two years; rose 30 per cent in
four years (to 1956), and fell almost 30 per cent to winter 1957. As
for rubber: its price rose nearly 250 per cent between 1947 and the
Korean War peak of 1951, and fell 60 per cent to winter 1957.
What does one do in the face of this instability? The students at
the University of Ceylon are convinced that the way out is to diversify.
But diversification carried on for its own sake means that the economy
is on the average poorer, in order to avoid the risk of occasionally
falling on bad times. The students do not phrase the issue in this
tougher and accurate way.
The problem is the greater for Ceylon, in that half of Ceylon's
staple food (rice) is imported, and so must be paid for out of foreign
earnings. The problem has been still greater in that this newly indepen157

dent democracy during the l 940's had had a rice subsidy integrated
into its budget, which at the maximum-in fiscal 1951-53-was absorb
ing one-quarter of the government's revenues. So far as our inquiries at
the time made out, this is a world's record for a consumer subsidy.
Add to this the claims of an ambitious development program,
aimed at increasing Ceylon's production at least as fast as the popula
tion is rising ( about 2. 7 per cent a year) and it is easy to understand
how Ceylon's foreign assets could fall from Rs 1185 million at the end
of 1951, to Rs 607 million at the end of 1953. (Rs 450 million had
been estimated by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Devel
opment Mission as a reasonable minimum.)
Notice the advantages with which Ceylon could meet these prob
lems of rapidly falling foreign reserves and intractable needs for food
imports for a steadily growing population. The country was reasonably
united, quite peaceful, had no serious issues with its great neighbor,
India; in addition, it had a sharp comparative advantage in tea produc
tion, and a fully competitive position in rubber. It could meet its prob
lems objectively: there was no antagonism to the British or other former
colonial powers, it had trained leaders and an effective civil service.
There was at the same time considerable Socialist sentiment among the
intellectuals in the university, and to some extent in government also.
These intellectuals had received, to a remarkable degree, their bent
from the London School of Economics and the eloquence of Harold
Laski. There was both a Stalinist Communist movement, and a Trot
skyist group of size.
In such circumstance, a Central Bank can strengthen the resolu
tion of the minister of finance, and educate the public. It can do the
latter by its monthly bulletins, annual reports and by clear essays in the
editorial pages of the newspapers. It can do the former by pressing for
more taxes, if possible, and for less spending in any case, on every pos
sible occasion. One of the main f unctions of a Central Bank, when the
government is over-spending, is to wheedle and coax and badger toward
a check to expansion-though at last resort and if commanded, it must
create money to finance government spending. This the Central Bank
did, from the conviction both that Ceylon could not continue waiting
and hoping for an improvement in its terms of trade, while its foreign
assets ran out; and also that even if the terms of trade did improve (or
if depreciation or more drastic exchange restrictions were resorted to),
the basis issue still remained that resources that should go to meet the
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needs of development were being swallowed up in consumption, that is,
tomorrow's food was being eaten up today.
Meanwhile, (and this is an illustration of how the United States
did much damage through a mistaken policy) rubber purchases in Co
lombo for the United States stockpiling program were cut sharply. (The
buying policy was to offer no higher a price in Colombo than was paid
in Singapore; but there was a long standing margin of a fraction of a
cent a pound higher price in Colombo; and so the United States policy
led to little rubber being actually sold to the United States.) Hence
United States dollar earnings dropped sharply.
Ceylon has been, and is, in the sterling area but somewhat uneasily
so. It has often been disposed to retain more dollars to its credit in
New York, out of its dollar-area-surplus, than the Bank of England was
inclined to think proper. Hence the loss of dollar earnings hurt, in
those days when sterling was less nearly convertible than now-more
than if dollars had been regularly all turned in for sterling balances.
Ceylon was rescued from its crisis by three events. The first, curi
ously enough, was an offer from Communist China. Ceylon was not in
the United Nations, having been blackballed by Russia. Hence it was
not bound by the strategic materials embargo of United Nations mem
bers against Communist China. In 1952 China offered to swap Ceylon
rubber for China rice at advantageous terms--a gain over world market
prices of about $20 million dollars a year. No democratic government,
and especially that of a poor country, would find it easy to reject such
an off.er. Ceylon accepted. The second event involved the sharp cutting
of the rice subsidy by Ceylon in 1953. The government for the time
being weathered the resulting political storm and a trial insurrection
staged under partly Communist inspiration. Some other contracting
monetary and fiscal measures were carried into effect. Finally, the
terms of trade improved: the prices of imports fell somewhat, and the
prices of tea and rubber rose. External assets doubled between the end
of 1953 and 1956 (though since they have fallen again by about one
sixth).
And so here was a trade crisis in a small and new nation, solved
by a combination of external factors (the foreign contract and world
price changes) and domestic economizing.
What is the current position and prospect? The present govern
ment, headed by Prime Minister Bandaranaike, is socialist-minded. It
came into office with the support of a surprising combination of three
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groups: (1) a nationalist (Sri Lanka) party, plus a Singalese Language
Front that has merged with the Sri Lanka party; (2) a Trotskyist par
ty; and (3) most crucially, the Buddhist priesthood. Mr.Bandaranaike
is a moderate who says, "I pray God that this country will not have a
Communist government. I want equality of justice for all.''1 His sup
porters seem to think that nationalization of foreign-owned estates is
desirable-but with compensation, and not now.
His highly vocal Minister of Agriculture, Philip Gunawardena,
holds views more alarming to private capital:
I consider myself a Leninist ...All private enterprise in Ceylon
must totaJly disappear ...The threat of the United States' trying
to grab Ceylon by force for Wall Street is a real one. Of course
I believe that.2
The consequence of such views is . that capital is being withdrawn
from Ceylon. Investors are afraid their holdings are not safe. Foreign
investors, especially, worry about discriminatory taxation and other
legislation, and they fear possible restrictions on the transfer of profit.
Capital withdrawal exists despite the fact that ministers in the present
government have .often stated that they would welcome foreign invest
ment in certain fields. The Economist estimates that $78 million (Rs
370 million) were withdrnwn in the years 1953 through 1956. Off
setting this outflow, $4.2 million (Rs 20 million) came into the country
ip the same years.3 The net loss for these four years has therefore been
about $74 million (Rs 350 million), or over one-third of Ceylon's total
current foreign assets.
The data available in this country for Ceylon's 1957 balance of
1
2
3

NEW YoRK TrMES, November 25, 1957, p. 10.

Ibid.

The Economist, (September 1957). p. 1038. Profits were excluded from this
count; provident fund and insurance premiums included.
The actual balance of payments figures in these years for net private
capital outflows are Rs 163 million, and for net capital outflows attributable
to official and banking institutions, Rs 362 million. These data are based on
exchange control records, and hence have a bias toward understating capital
outflows. The Economist's correspondent evidently thought that about half
of the Rs 362 million-that is, Rs 187 million-represent capital withdraw
als. (Sources: Annual Reports of the Central Bank of Ceylon, and various
Central Bank Bulletins.)
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payments suggest a checking of the capital outflow. 4 On the other hand
the outlook for private capital investment does not seem to have im
proved: in the fall of 1957 two Canadian insurance companies with
large ventures in Ceylon decided not to undertake new ventures there.
Suppose Mr. Gunawardena and other left politicians could have
anticipated the results of their publicized statements in losing for Cey
lon so much of the foreign assets that might have gone into economic
development. Would they nevertheless have persisted in them? It is a
curious question of politics and national interest.
The Ceylon Government have sometimes seemed rather to favor
the selling off of British tea estates, and of British-owned shares, to
Ceylonese. But this trend does draw down foreign assets that otherwise
would be available for putting into economic development. The gov
ernment recently embargoed the sending to London of money that had
been received from the sale of British-owned estates. Such a policy
diminishes, in the short run, a burdensome symptom of the disease of
lack of investor confidence, at the expense of aggravating both the
symptom and the disease in the longer run.
Where does Ceylon go from here?
One policy is to give up reliance on private investment, foreign
and perhaps domestic, to try to insulate the economy completely against
capital outflows, and to press forward rapidly with socialization mea
sures for the tea and rubber estates and other businesses. One argu
ment for such a policy is that the efficiency of government administra
tion is greater than that in most underdeveloped countries. But my own
estimate of the result is that, at the best, there would be ahead for
Ceylon many years of sharply lower average incomes. For the efficiency
of well-trained private estate managers, and the effectiveness of the
judgment of private investors, are not to be underestimated.
The other policy is for the government to assure foreign and do
mestic investors indisputably that their investments will be secure. This
policy could be the more effective since Ceylon is well removed from
the borders of Communist states-in contrast with, say, Vietnam, Bur
ma and South Korea. The result would be a reversal of the capital
4

The most recent Central Bank Bulletin, that for February, 1958, carries tenta
tive balance of payments estimates through the first three quarters of 1957.
The totals that far, for private capital outflow, are Rs 37 million; and for
"official and banking institutions" capital inflow, Rs 143 million.
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flow-and not only more capital, but also more technical skills for
Ceylon-with prompt beneficial effects on Ceylon's real income.
The present ambivalent government measures and sentiments bid
fair to make the worst of both worlds.
Aside from this issue of confidence and capital flows and produc
tive skills, Ceylon will continue to spend abroad as much as its foreign
earnings will permit. Some one-third of Ceylon's gross national income
originates in exports, matched by an equal flow of imports.
The Ceylonese must decide on and work for their own future.
Their essential problems lie in their rapid population increase and their
need for rapidly increasing efficiency in agriculture. Such increased
efficiency is technically very possible, and implies among other things, a
major effort in public education.
Aid is once again being provided by the United States, after an
embargo of several years' duration under the Battle Act, caused by
Ceylon's shipment of the "strategic good," rubber, to China. Such aid
gives the Ceylon government more chance to experiment and to im
prove policies, and so to increase efficiency in planning and executing
economic development measures.
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South and South East Asia, with the exception
of Thailand, all have development plans or programs of one sort or
another. This is surely a significant phenomenon considering that these
14 countries range in their political and economic philosophy from the
extreme left of Communist Mainland China through the moderate left of
Social-Democratic �ndia or Burma through the moderate right of Pakis
tan or Japan to the conservative philosophies of the Philippines or
Taiwan. The first fact to notice therefore is that development planning
is universal, and that it is not a matter of political or economic philoso
phy.
What would a Western observer make of this phenomenon? It
would be easy to make light of iL It could be called a fashion, or a
demonstration of "keeping up with the Joneses," or a symbol of nation
alism, or a meaningless ritual, etc. It would not even be too difficult to
support such views with quotations from the development plans them
selves since these are sometimes somewhat naive or primitive; lack
essential statistics or other information or are based on somewhat hope
ful assumptions.
Yet such an attitude would be neither farsighted nor sensible. It is
better to take the development plans seriously, and treat them as the
expression of something new and significant. They express an accept
ance by the Asian countries of two fundamental propositions: ( 1) that
the progress of the economy can be a matter of research, analysis, hu
man action based on reasoning, rather than of preordained events or
HE COUNTRIES OF
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revealed philosophical or religious patterns, and (2) that by looking at
the economic environment as a whole, by looking at both policies and
at investment projects as a whole, one can improve their total efficiency
by forming consistent and complementary patterns or "packages" of
such policies and projects.
Both these ideas are essentially Western ideas: the belief that hu
man action based on reason can mold the social environment and gain
command over niggardly nature, as well as the belief in the complemen
tarity and integration of dispersed action in social life. The difference
is that in North America or Europe, with our developed economies, we
are taking automatic economic progress, an increased capacity of over
coming nature's scarcities by human action, and the formation of
broadly based complementary patterns of investment and policies so
much for granted that we do not, as a rule, consider it necessary to
embody such aspirations in a deliberate program. Note, however, that
when it comes to questions of individual policy decisions, whether re
lating to private business decisions or to the preparation of public
policy measures, we do go through exactly the same process of pre
paring a complete conspectus, perhaps a market survey or a sales bud
get or a production or development program for the business unit
concerned, or hearings designed to bring to light in one single focus the
possible repercussions of contemplated measures.
A short review of the main advantages and benefits which the
technique of development programming can bring also amounts to a
review of the reasons why underdeveloped countries have been en
couraged by such organizations as the United Nations, the International
Bank, or the Colombo Plan to evolve development programs.
In the first place, a development program forces a government and
a country to make some sort of choice between a number of objec
tives: Is the objective to create employment opportunities for a rapidly
growing population? Is it to mitigate or abolish mass poverty in its
worst form? Is it to diversify away from the heavy preponderance of
agriculture? Is it to reconstruct a war-disrupted economy? Is it to make
a new economy viable, as for instance in the cases of Korea or Vietnam,
Laos, Cambodia or Taiwan or even Pakistan? Is it to deal with a
chronic problem of instability, either external or internal? Is it to
raise consumption in the near future? Is it to lay the foundations of
long-term growth, by creating the essential economic infra-structure
of transport, power, etc.? Is it to improve welfare by better health or
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education? Is it to industrialize as fast as possible? Is it to solve a
foreign exchange crisis, or to utilize existing assets or perhaps repara
tions from Japan? Is it to reduce internal differences between different
income classes or social groups or different regions of the country?
This is a long list but by no means complete. A development program
confronts a country with the need to make a choice, and the different
Asian countries have made characteristically different choices. But the
very process of making a choice is important. A country should know,
and the outside world should know, what it is that is wanted, and what
it is that a country is prepared to give up, at least for the time being.
The development program should force a country to think in terms
of a balance between available resources-which may, of course, in
clude prospective foreign aid-and national ambitions. This confron
tation of limited resources and unlimited ambitions admittedly is often
evaded in development programs, but the very exercise of such a con
frontation can be valuable. The idea of budgeting is basic to develop
ment programming-the more familiar fiscal budget is part of it, but so
is the idea of national income, of savings-investment budgets, of foreign
exchange budgets, and of commodity balances for such strategic items
as food, clothing, steel, coal, fertilizers, etc. The habit of formulating
programs has already had an effect in drawing attention most forcibly
to the great need in Asia for exploring, surveying, testing and mapping
out the sources of raw materials as well as of energy and of the soil
itself.
The savings-investment balance is perhaps the most crucial of all.
With the exception of Japan, and perhaps Burma, all the countries have
a low savings ratio, both private and public. Economists have charac
teristically differed on the reasons: overconsumption, low incomes, lack
of institutions, lack of incentives--all have their champions. Others
pin their hopes on public saving, an increase in taxation-but here
again the difficulties are formidable; the nature of subsistence farming,
problems of administration, the question of incentives (tax holidays),
the incidence on savings.
The best hope lies perhaps in a high marginal rate of savings and
taxation-but this is a somewhat question-begging road to economic
development, in the sense that if you could get your development first
then you could finance it without inflation-a sort of aggregative pump
priming. Unfortunately, the first step of increasing real supplies and
real income is the great barrier, and pump-priming of the normal kind
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is peculiarly ineffective and even dangerous in underdeveloped coun
tries.
As against these limited resources there stand the multiple claims
of which the countries of Asia are all too conscious: (a) to produce the
structural change which they desire, away from an 80 per cent agricul
tural economy, in the name of "industrialization," and the creation of
an economic framework corresponding to this change; (b) to expand
agriculture, to supply food, raw materials, exports to the new industries;
( c) to solve their marketing deadlock by a simultaneous advance in
different directions, through investment "packages" and "balanced
growth"; (d) to build up foreign exchange reserves, and invest in im
port substitutes; ( e) to raise consumption levels as a political, social
and humanitarian requirement.
These formidable claims have to be reconciled with the scarce
resources. If they are not, either inflation or a foreign exchange crisis
or both will result, and in either of these two cases the efficiency of
investment is reduced-probably below what it would have been with
out the attempted "development."
A development program, then, is an essential reminder of the
needs of proper administration. The individual investment projects
hatched by individual government departments and individual business
sectors may form an aggregate which may be either too large or too
small for the total available resources or which may be in need of some
fitting together, like the pieces of a jigsaw puzzle. Similarly, the bits
and scraps of policy proposals which come from this source or that
need to be looked at together, and in their impact on each other. In
doing this it should often become apparent that the summation of indi
vidual projects is likely to vastly exceed the available resources, and it
is also likely to be reduced in efficiency by unnecessary overlapping,
competition for scarce resources and isolation. The very need to justify
projects or policies by their favorable impact on the economy as a
whole can have beneficial effects. In the process of development plann
ing, groups or committees have arisen in the Asian countries whose
job it is to think about the aggregate effect of what is proposed, and
develop methods of cutting the coat according to the cloth by methods
other than the blunt instruments of across-the-board slashing or the
worse than blunt instrument of galloping inflation. Admittedly, again,
the process of combining and cutting down policies and projects is often
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either avoided or very crude-but no development program of any
degree of realism can fail to impress at least the need for such processes.
A development program-provided that it is realistic, and that
people trust the government to carry it out--can give a whole economy
a sense of moving forward. Such a sense of moving forward may be of
crucial importance in an economy where people's expectations may
have been shaped by a long history of stagnation and low-level equili
brium. Unless there is some knowledge that other business projects
are also going forward, that purchasing power is expanding, that essen
tial public services are improved or going to be provided, many promis
ing investment projects which otherwise could be undertaken even with
in available resources may appear to be too risky or unprofitable, and
the resources may instead be frittered away in speculation, monuments,
or in building up bank accounts abroad. For this purpose of creating
a sense of moving forward, it is not sufficient that a development pro
gram exists, it must also be communicated to and underwritten by the
general population. It is perhaps no accident that India ( where this
process of communication and grass roots participation has perhaps
gone furthest) is also the country where there has recently been a tre
mendous and largely unforseen private investment boom. Even though
this present investment boom has been quite unforeseen in the second
Five-Year-Plan, and though it has led to great foreign exchange difficul
ties and threatens to upset the apple cart, let there b� no mistake about
the essentially desirable and healthy feature of this boom. It is a vote
of confidence in the Indian economy and the Indian government based
on the fairly successful conclusion of the first development plan. Once
this sense of moving forward is created, the inherent high productivity
of investment in the capital-short economies of Asia comes into its
own-but so does the constraint of scarce resources, especially in
foreign exchange. It should be noted, however, that while such a pri
vate investment boom can create immediate foreign exchange difficul
ties, it would also seem to offer much better assurance that external
assistance, if it does come forward, will be more effectively used than is
the case in a stagnation-ridden economy where this sense of moving for
ward has not been created.
This takes me to my next point in describing the potential benefits
from a sound development program. By laying open the intentions and
ambitions of a country, by describing the investment opportunities in
relation to available resources, by indicating the methods by which
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development is to be financed and the extent to which domestic re
sources can be mobilized, a development program can give to foreign
investors in the economy, whether they be aiding or loaning govern
ments, private investors or the International Bank, a degree of assur
ance of constructive use for any assistance given such as would not be
available merely from an examination of individual projects. To give
assistance merely on the basis of individual projects suffers from a fatal
weakness: the soundness of a project is largely a function of the sound
ness of the economy as a whole; and in any case, external assistance
never helps with the sound high-priority project to which it may be
ostensibly tied. Rather, it is the marginal project which is really in
volved and the soundness of the assistance depends upon the sound
ness of the marginal project. If a man comes to you and wants your
assistance to educate his brilliant son and tells you that this is the most
important thing in life to him, you will be rightly suspicious of him. If
this is so important to him, would he not find the money himself and
economize elsewhere? Perhaps what you really finance is this man's
drinking and gambling which he otherwise would be forced to give up.
Hence, any banker will want to look at a man's total expenditure pat
tern. It is not different with countries, and a proper development pro
gram provides the only sensible basis for such a banker's examination.
This does not mean that tying assistance to sound projects is useless.
On the contrary, it can have great practical and educational value.
Of course, the habit of development planning also has its dangers,
and these have perhaps been more publicized than the advantages. In
development plans, there is often a somewhat unreal distinction be
tween development and growth. The very fact of defining a segment of
government activity as "developmental," and therefore implicitly an
other segment as "nondevelopmental," is misleading. Government ac
tivities designed to maintain law and order are just as important to de
velopment as building a dam or railway; the construction of a fence or
drainage ditch by a small farmer on his own land in his spare time is
as much development as the installation of generators or turbines; an
improvement in people's literacy or schooling or skill or health is as
essential for development as new installations. Yet, development plans
tend to concentrate on capital formation as against increases in produc
tivity, on tangible things as against intangible things, on measurable
things as against unmeasurable things. Furthermore, as I have already
mentioned, the development plan - that visible expression of "the
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revolution of rising expectations" - may all too easily become a shop
ping list of everything that is desirable, including the kitchen sink.
Development plans, since they are the product of a government
which normally has to justify itself to be re-elected, may be too short
term in their orientation. You remember what Keynes said: "In the
long run we are all dead." That is certainly true of governments, and
not such a long run either. Hence, a tendency to neglect the import
ance of building up the foundations of economic growth which may
make the economy more flexible and elastic in the future; hence, also,
a tendency to spread investment too wide and too thin in order to give
something to every social group, to every region, to every shade of
opinion with electoral pull. Hence, the tendency for showy, impressive,
monumental things. Politics and economics are uneasy bedfellows.
Development plans may tempt governments to neglect things which
are beyond their range of planning, and must be taken as given, like
the monsoons and hurricanes. I refer here to the unpredictable ups
and downs of world markets and world prices for the primary com
modities on which most of the Asian countries depend for their export
earnings - those economic monsoons and hurricanes sweeping over
Asia.
One could add to this list of weaknesses in present development
plans, but I do not wish to conclude on this note. The weaknesses can
be remedied. The Asian countries, under the auspices of the United
Nations Regional Commission in Bangkok (ECAFE) as well as under
the auspices of the Colombo Plan, are getting together to exchange
their experiences, regarding the best way of setting about the business
of drawing up and carrying out development plans, to avoid the more
obvious incompatibilities in their respective plans, and to learn from
their mistakes. We can do much to help in these efforts to make this
approach (which in any case has come to stay) as constructive as pos
sible. We have all reason to help. In the last resort, we have special
moral responsibilities, quite apart from our general humanitarian as
well as commercial motives. We have brought to Asian countries dis
ease control and death control. This has certainly contributed im
mensely to human welfare but the resulting explosion in the rate of
population growth also has faced Asian countries with new economic
problems and forced them out of their economic traditionalism. Their
development plans are the expression of a "revolution of rising popu
lations as much as a revolution of rising expectations." Having forced
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them to run to keep in the same place, it seems a natural duty to help
them in developing their capacity to run. We are giving to Asia the
benefit of our technological development but this also is a double-edged
gift. The technological development of the West has become increas
ingly capital-intensive or mechanized; it is not ideal for the needs of
poor overpopulated agricultural countries with rapidly increasing popu
lations. We should help to adjust technologies to the specific needs and
resource endowments of Asia.
Thirdly, we have done next to nothing to help the underdeveloped
countries to weather those economic monsoons and hurricanes which
I mentioned earlier, of sharply fluctuating world markets and prices of
their primary commodities on which they depend for their foreign ex
change. Over the past year, we have seen once again the spectacle of
falling commodity prices, and it is not unreasonable to consider this
fall partly at least a reflection of our attempts in the West to preserve
internal stability and combat inflation. Let us realize what this means
to the underdeveloped economies of Asia. It is not easy to plan when
you sit in a rickety boat tossed about by heaving waves.
We thus have good reasons to encourage the movement of na
tional economic self-expression through better development programs,
to build upon their constructive features, to try to remedy their weak
nesses and thus to help in making them a success.
The world economy is not a game of poker, nor of musical chairs.
It is much more like a party of mountaineers, roped together on their
way to higher peaks.
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THE PHILIPPINES 1s the one Asian country with which the United
States has something akin to a blood relationship. From 189 8 to I 946,
the seven thousand odd islands making up the Philippine archipelago
were an American possession, acquired from the Spanish as spoils of
war. American embarrassment at acquiring new territory in this way
was reflected in the oft-forgotten fact that we paid $20 million, a fifth
of the askin� price, to the defeated Spanish as compensation for the
Philippines.
The Filipinos did not exactly welcome the new colonial power
with open arms. We had to fight for two years to subdue Filipino
. opposition before American dominion could be firmly established
throughout the islands. At the same time a most heated debate raged
in this country over the desirability of our moving into Asia as a
colonial power. Some American business interests aggressively favored
the move, regarding the Philippines both as a profitable market and
as a possible base for tapping the even larger market of neighboring
China. The opposition was mainly based on moral grounds, many
feeling that colonialism was inconsistent with American principles and
that territorial aggrandizement by conquest was morally indefensible.
The appeal of empire won out, and American enterprise and in
vestment, combined with the introduction of reciprocal free trade be
tween the United States and the Philippines in 1909, produced a re
markable expansion of production and economic activity in the islands.
It has been claimed that the Philippines made greater economic
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progress under three decades of United States rule than under three
centuries of Spanish domination. Philippine exports rose from an an
nual average of $12.7 million in the decade from 1880 to 1889 under
the Spanish regime to $128 million during the years preceding World
War II, a ten fold increase. Comparing the same periods, imports rose
from $10.6 million to $120 million. 1
The increase in trade reflected an increase in investment, produc
tion and incomes. With American capital and enterprise leading the
way, the sugar industry was modernized, and by the 1930's the volume
of sugar exports was more than triple the peak reached under the
Spanish. The export of coconut products was insignificant under the
Spanish, but it was developed into the second largest export before
the war and has since become the largest. The main export during
the Spanish era, abaca, was passed by both sugar and copra, but ex
ports were expanded, and in the decade before World War II reached
a level two and a half times as great as in the last decade of Spanish
rule. 2
The expansion in production and trade brought a rising standard
of living for the Philippine people. Unlike Korea, which under the
first twenty years of Japanese domination experienced a sharp reduc
tion in per capita consumption of the preferred staple food-rice, the
Philippines enjoyed an increase in per capita rice consumption. (Rice
is the staple food for 75 per cent of the population.) The larger volume
of imports consisted in large part of consumer goods. In 1939, at least
half of the total imports by value could be so classified. 3
ln addition to becoming an important supplier of food and raw
materials for other countries, mainly the United States, the Philippines
developed into an important market for the products of other coun
tries, again mainly the United States. In 1939, nearly 70 per cent
of the imports into the Philippines came from this country and we
took three-quarters of the Philippine exports. The biggest import items
were cotton textiles, iron and steel manufactures, petroleum products,
machinery and parts, tobacco and foodstuffs. The Philippines was,
after Japan, our largest customer in Asia, buying more from us than
1 "American Philippine Trade Relations," Report of the Technical Committee
to the President of the Philippines, Washington, 1944, pp. 5, 22.
2 Ibid. pp. 38-40, 70 90.
,
3 Mary A. Pu gh Preliminary Economic Survey of the Philippines (Washington,
,
D. C.: United States Department of Commerce, 1943), p. 57.
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China, whose tempting markets had been one of the chief factors luring
us into our colonial venture in the Far East.
Despite the undoubted benefits which accrued to both sides from
this trade, the Filipinos waged an unceasing campaign for independence.
Until the late 1920's the independence movement appeared to have
little hope of immediate success, but the depression of agricultural
prices that followed World War I brought demands from the American
farm bloc for protection from Philippine competition. The most vocal
interests in this campaign were the sugar growers, the producers of fats
and oils and the dairy industry. When efforts to secure tariff protection
from Philippine commodities failed, the farm bloc shifted its attack and
demanded independence for the Philippines, with the object of eliminat
ing the trading advantages enjoyed by the Philippines as a United States
possession.
This campaign met with success, since it harmonized with the ex
pressed desire of the Filipinos for independence. The first independence
bill was enacted in 1933 over the veto of President Hoover. Its pro
visions were dictated chiefly by American rather than Philippine inter
ests and it was less than enthusiastically welcomed by the Filipinos.
They were successful in securing the consent of the United States to
some slight cha�ges and the bill as modified was reenacted as the Tyd
ings-McDuffie Act of 1934.
This legislation provided for the establishment of a transitional
government, with full independence to be granted on July 4, 1946. A
. five year transition period from free trade to complete elimination of
preferences was decreed. This was rather one sided. It provided for
gradual imposition of export duties on Philippine exports to the United
States during this period but gave the Philippines no right to charge any
duty on United States imports until independence was achieved. Ad
ditional immediate quota restrictions on Philippine imports into the
United States were applied under the Jones-Costigan Act and the Agri
cultural Adjustment Act of 1934.•
It has been charged that our colonialist policy distorted Philippine
economic development, retarding industry and leaving the Philippines
ill-prepared for independence. The Philippine leaders had opposed the
introduction of free trade with the United States from the beginning
4

Grayson L. Kirk, Philippine Independence (New York: Farrar and Rinehart,
1936), pp. 73-135.
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because they feared that it would result in the country's becoming so
closely linked with the United States economy that independence would
be harder to achieve. There is some sense and a good deal of nonsense
in these arguments. It is probably true that it would have been difficult
for the Philippines to accept independence if this had involved imme
diate and complete loss of the rights and privileges enjoyed in the
American market. This, however, has never been contemplated, even
under the prewar independence legislation. Both that legislation and
the Bell Trade Act which replaced it following World War II provided
for a transitional period to ease the shock of the loss of free entry into
the American market.
The deterrent to industrial development in the Philippines did not
consist of any prohibitions laid down in Washington similar to the pro
hibitions that the British had once imposed on the North American
colonies. Anyone was free to develop whatever enterprise suited his
fancy in the Philippines. All that was required was the capital, the
know-how and confidence that the product could successfully compete
with imported goods. The fact that the Philippines produced sugar
and copra rather than cotton textiles or iron and steel was because
entrepreneurs believed the economic returns were greater in these lines.
The fact that fish caught in Philippine waters were far more expensive
than fish transported thousands of miles across the ocean to Manila
reflected the fact that labor and capital could not be as efficiently em
ployed in fisheries in this area as they could in agricultural pursuits.
The fact that this relationship was partially the result of preferences
enjoyed by some Philippine agricultural commodities in American mar
kets means only that these preferences tended to raise the level of
Philippine incomes above what would otherwise have been possible.
That the Filipinos have been most anxious to postpone the termination
of these preferences is additional proof of this fact.
What the Filipinos have been most anxious to eliminate has been
the other side of the free trade coin-the exemption from tariffs enjoyed
by United States exports to the Philippines. It might be said that what
was wanted was the right of every sovereign nation to establish tariff
barriers to divert resources into less economic uses. This has for so
many years been cited by Filipinos as a panacea for all their problems,
that the Philippines is today one of the most protectionist minded
countries in Asia.
The Filipino leaders are intent upon effecting a change in the eco-
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nomic pattern of the country. They are dissatisfied with dependence
upon the traditional exports, sugar, copra, and abaca and the commodi
ties that have gained greatly in importance in the postwar period,
minerals and logs and lumber. They hope to develop new industries
in the Philippines that will either replace imports or provide new ex
ports. They have chosen to use the weapons of protection and subsidy
to hasten the realization of these dreams.
The failure of the Philippine economy to achieve a firm footing in
the postwar period led the Philippine leaders to begin to press for a
revision of the Bell Trade Act in 1952, two years before the scheduled
termination of the free trade period. What was desired was the right
to introduce a greater degree of protection against American goods
together with prolongation of the free access of Philippine exports to
the American market. New negotiations were held which resulted in
the Revised Trade Agreement, adopted in 1955.
This agreement now governs Philippine-American trade relation
ships. It provided substantial concessions to the Philippines in stepping
up the rate at which American goods would become subject to Philip
pine tariff duties and slowing down the application of United States
duties to Philippine products. From the beginning of 1956 until the
end of 1958 the Philippines were entitled to impose a duty on United
States imports equal to 25 per cent of the duty applicable to imports
from other countries. Beginning in 1959 this will rise to 50 per cent,
in 1962 to 75 per cent, in 1965 to 90 per cent, and after January 1,
1974 the full Philippine tariff will apply to American goods. The era
of preferences will have been terminated.
The progression in the percentage of United States duties ap
plicable to Philippine goods is much more gradual. Through 1958
5 per cent of the full duty was chargeable and from 1959 only 10
per cent will be chargeable. In 1965, when the Philippines will be
levying 90 per cent of the full duty against United States goods, this
country will be imposing only 40 per cent of our full duty on imports
from the Philippines. However, this rises to 60 per cent in 1968, 80
per cent in 1971 and 100 per cent in 1974.
The Revised Trade Agreement also provided for the elimination
of the 17 per cent tax on foreign exchange adopted in 1950. The latter
was replaced by a 25 per cent import tax which applied to imports
from the United States as well as other countries. It was provided
that this tax would be reduced by 10 per cent annually as revenues
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from duties charged on imports from the United States rose. The rate
of the import tax now stands at 13.6 per cent and it will be eliminated
by 1966.
American exporters still enjoy a substantial preference in the
Philippine market, but it is going to disappear at a fairly rapid rate.
Since the shipping cost for a ton of general cargo from an East Coast
port to Manila is about four times the rate from Yokohama, Japan,
the tariff preference will not in many cases offset the higher shipping
cost, even now. The fact that the Philippines last year adopted new
legislation imposing higher duties means that the margin enjoyed by
American goods is somewhat greater than formerly, but our future
trade will depend very largely upon the effort that American business
men are willing to make to retain a major share of the Philippine market.
They will start with certain advantages-Philippine familiarity
with American goods, brands and specifications being perhaps the most
important of these. However, this alone will not save the market. Ag
gressive salesmanship and strong price competition can be expected
from other countries, including Japan, Hong Kong and European lands.
The appeal of Japanese goods has already been demonstrated by the
fact that Japan's share of the Philippine market has risen from 6 per
cent in 1954 to 12 per cent in the first nine months of 1957, despite
the handicaps imposed by the preferential treatment accorded American
goods and Philippine reluctance to permit Japanese businessmen into
the country.
It is very doubtful that the United States can long continue to
supply as high a percentage of Philippine imports as was the case in
the past. Indeed the percentage has already begun to slip, falling from
68 per cent in 1954 to 55.5 per cent in the first nine months of 1957.
However, the Philippines is a country with great potential for growth,
and the coming decades may well see a considerable expansion of total
imports as well as a switch in the pattern of trade. It is quite possible
that in the long run while the percentage share of the United States in
the Philippine market declines, the total volume of our exports will
rise.
Whether this happens will depend in part upon the attitude of
American businessmen toward working and investing in this area. This
in turn will depend in large part upon the economic policies of the
Philippine government. The climate in the Philippines has never been
as attractive to foreign investors as might be desired. Even when the
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islands were an American possession without any problems of stability
or exchange control, the Philippines were not looked upon as a par
ticularly good field for investment in spite of the undoubted natural
wealth to be found there. American capital, for example, found em
ployment on a much larger scale in areas as similar to the Philippines
as Cuba and Hawaii.
Total American investment in the Philippines in 1940 was esti
mated at $258.6 million, 60 per cent of total foreign investment in
the Philippines. This represented only 1 per cent of the total foreign
investment of the United States. 5 The main obstacles to greater capital
inflow appear to have been restrictive land laws and uncertainties cre
ated by the independence movement. The attitude of the "Philippines
for the Filipinos" had been nurtured by years of nationalist agitation,
and this was not calculated to breed optimism in the minds of potential
investors about the treatment they were likely to be accorded if and
when independence was achieved.
The Philippines will constitute an expanding market for American
goods only if the natural wealth can be efficiently exploited and the
productivity of the people increased. What is required for this is an
adequate supply of new capital combined with vision and enterprise.
Unfortunately, the climate for private foreign investment in the Philip
pines has deteriorated in the postwar period. Far from attracting the
large amounts of new capital required, the policies adopted have actu
ally repelled foreign investment and have even led many residents of
the country to attempt to get funds out of the Philippines and invest
them elsewhere. The policies that have created this unfortunate situ
ation are in part traceable to the nationalistic distrust of foreign capital
that has its roots in the long campaign for independence. This accounts
for the fact that the Philippine constitution restricts the development
of certain natural resources and public utilities to corporations having
60 per cent Filipino ownership. Americans are guaranteed the same
rights as Philippine citizens by the "parity provision" of the constitu
tion until 1974, but this was forced upon the Philippines through the
Bell Trade Agreement. Discrimination against alien capital is quite
obviously widely accepted as sound policy in the Philippines even
though it cannot at present be practiced against United States capital.
5

Report of the Technical Committee to the President of the Philippines, op. cit.
p. 229.
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As long as a basic hostility to foreign capital exists, investors will tend
to be repelled rather than attracted.
In addition to this, the climate for foreign investment in the post
war period has been worsened by uncertainties about the future of the
currency and the administration of foreign exchange controls. Exchange
controls have been used as a protective device to encourage manu
facturers to undertake production in the Philippines, and as a result,
a substantial amount of private capital, some of it foreign, has been
invested in assorted manufacturing enterprises in the Philippines in
recent years. Though highly profitable, few of these enterprises have
developed any export potential or the ability to survive without sub
sidies and protection. On the other hand, it would be impossible to
measure the amount of investment that has been discouraged by the
existence of controls, but it is no doubt substantial.
The Philippine use of exchange controls presents difficulties for
the businessman, whether he be trader or manufacturer. The admin
istration of the controls tends to be capricious. A plant that may have
been warmly welcomed one year may find itself in difficulty a few years
later because it hasn't qualified for an allocation to import replacement
parts or even adequate supplies of raw materials. Balance-of-payments
crises are recurring affairs in the Philippines and have necessitated
frequent changes in allocations for imports. The most recent switch
came in December 1957, when very severe import cutbacks were an
nounced as a means of meeting the foreign exchange crisis. Some re
laxation has since taken place, mainly because of the outraged protests
of the business community.
The foreign investor is subject to the additional hazard of having
his right to remit profits curtailed and having his capital frozen. These
uncertainties have tended to make the Philippines unattractive to for
eign investors in spite of the advantage offered of a stable and friendly
government and a labor force of good quality. However, American
businessmen who know the country well believe that it has rich po
tentialities. The Philippines should be capable of sound manufacturing
development as well as considerable improvement and expansion in
agriculture, fisheries and the extractive industries. The labor supply
is good. The Filipino worker is intelligent and reasonably industrious.
Although there appears to be surplus labor, wages computed at the
present exchange rate are out of line with other Far Eastern countries
and are held up by a minimum wage law. Adjustments which would
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bring both Philippine prices and wages into line with those of other
countries would provide a far sounder foundation for the development
of new industries and the exploitation of resources than the existing
network of government controls.
The immediate outlook is not bright. In its efforts to spur rapid
development the government has pursued unsound financial policies
in recent years. Last year, foreign exchange payments for imports and
services greatly exceeded current earnings, with the result that foreign
exchange reserves were seriously depleted. Some efforts have been
made to curb imports, but the government appears to be less than fully
aware of the types of measures that are required to put the economy
on a sound footing. An appeal for large scale United States aid is likely,
but this, if granted, would probably delay the adoption of the required
measures, and would therefore only postpone the day of reckoning.
On the positive side it must be noted that Philippine export earn
ings have held up well. It is one of the few countries in Asia that has
managed to increase exports since 1952, the others being Japan, Ceylon,
Malaya and Singapore. The elimination of duty-free entry into the
United States market does not pose as great a problem for the future
of Philippine exports as might be imagined. In the first place the Philip
pines is already much less dependent upon the United States market
than was the case prior to the war. In 1956, only 54 per cent of her
exports were sold to us as compared with 83 per cent in 1938. In the
second place, about 36 per cent of Philippine exports to this country
are on the free list and will be in no way affected by the gradual ap
plication of tariffs provided for under the Revised Trade Agreement.
Finally, sugar, which constitutes about 40 per cent of the value of
Philippine exports to this country, should be able to retain its share
of the market even when subject to the tariff. When it is considered
that the Philippines is physically well suited to the production of sugar,
that sugar workers there are paid only 15 per cent of the wages of
sugar workers in Hawaii, and that shipping charges from the Philippines
to the East Coast are actually lower than the rates applicable to sugar
growers in Hawaii who are compelled to use American bottoms, it is
not conceivable that the Philippines could be priced out of the United
States market by the imposition of a half cent a pound duty.
Other countries have demonstrated that ambition to develop eco
nomically at too fast a rate and perhaps in directions that are not en
tirely sound, can endanger not only economic progress but the living
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standards already attained. Whether or not the Philippines will pursue
this course or switch to a policy that will stress a sustainable rate of
growth and place more reliance on foreign capital and know-how can
not now be foreseen. However, the expression of interest in this area
on the part of American capital could be influential in steering the
country toward the latter course. American business can do much in
bringing to the people of this area an awareness of what American
capital might mean to them, as well as an understanding of the condi
tions that will have to be created to attract foreign capital in signifi
cant amounts.
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in natural resource endowments but poor in terms
of national product per capita. Human and natural resources are used
ineffectively because Indonesia's capacity to introduce improved tech
nology has been retarded by low rates of domestic capital formation.
The volume of international trade per capita is relatively small; its
growth has tended to follow inflows of foreign capital for developing
sources of raw material supply for industrial countries. Low rates of
domestic saving and capital formation have restricted the growth of
exports supplied by domestically owned firms. Similarly, aggregate
demand has been small and relatively stagnant so that Indonesian mar
kets have not offered large and profitable outlets for foreign products.
Indonesia's abundant but virtually untapped reserves of natural
resources, her large population arid the existence of uninhabited fron
tier areas present favorable prospects for rapid economic growth. These
conditions also indicate latent capacity for a rising volume of inter
national trade, if the present barriers to economic growth can be over
come. As a major supplier of industrial products and an important
market for raw materials, the United States would be likely to share
a large part of growing Indonesian foreign trade.
At the present stage of her economic development, Indonesia is
not an important trading partner from the point of view of the United
States. Indonesian demand for American products has fluctuated great
ly, and less than 1 per cent of American exports have gone to Indonesia
in recent years. Generally speaking, Indonesia is not even an important
INDONESIA IS RICH
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supplier of primary products for the American market. The important
exceptions are tin and crude natural rubber; about one-fourth of United
States' imports of these strategic raw materials comes from Indonesia.
Only a small part of United States' import needs for petroleum
Indonesia's most important export-are supplied by Indonesia. Alter
native sources of supply of tin, natural rubber and other United States'
imports are available; Indonesian trade is not a matter of critical im
portance for the American economy or national security.
The reverse is not true, however. The United States is Indonesia's
most important trading partner. In 1956, the United States was Indo
nesia's second customer, absorbing about 16 per cent of Indonesian
exports (by value). Netherlands ranked first with 19 per cent while
Japan was third with 9 per cent. As a source of supply for Indonesian
imports the United States was first in 1956, providing about 16 per
cent of the total, followed by Japan (15 per cent) and the Netherlands
( 10 per cent). These facts support the view that the United States
would very likely become an important beneficiary should Indonesia
expand her share of Free World trade.
Gunnar Myrdal has argued with considerable force that expan
sion of profitable trade relations between developed and underdevel
oped countries requires greater economic integration. 1 The concept of
integration as a prior condition to improvement of trade includes two
important facets: ( 1) national integration as opposed to national disin
tegration, and ( 2) international integration as opposed to international
disintegration. Myrdal perceives an implicit danger in this approach,
however, noting that we cannot assume that greater national integra
tion among trading partners will necessarily promote a more vigorous
and gainful pattern of trade. The two may conflict, and Myrdal ob
serves that processes of national integration in both developed and
underdeveloped countries have, by and large, hampered rather than
promoted international integration since the end of World War I.
Myrdal's provocative analysis provides a useful framework for
studying the underlying factors which are apt to determine the future
of trade between a developed country-the United States-and an un
developed country-Indonesia. Despite the author's misgivings about
venturing into a discussion of essentially noneconomic problems, such
an approach appears to be the only realistic basis for analyzing Ameri1

Gunnar Myrdal, An International Economy: (New York: 1957).
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can prospects for trade with Indonesia. Extrapolations from records
of past trade are apt to be misleading unless the more basic determi
nants of trade are explored. In Indonesia, the processes toward national
integration and disintegration now underway dominate political and
economic performance. More important, the results which emerge from
the interplay of these forces may well reshape the contours of Indonesian
trade from their historical (colonial) pattern into something quite dif
ferent. While it is clearly too early to reach final conclusions about
the implications of post-independence instability for Indonesian eco
nomic development and trade, analysis of the underlying forces toward
integration or disintegration is the only key to gaining even partial
insight into a situation which is hopelessly complex when superficially
viewed.
Myrdal defines integration in terms of equality of opportunity.
Some of the conditions for progress toward this goal, in My�dal's words,
are:
The emergence of a community with ever freer social mobility,
based on a fuller realization of the norms of equality and liberty.
In this community there must be a growing social cohesion and
practical solid�rity. The members must increasingly come to feel
that they belong together and have common interests and responsi
bilities, and they must acquire a willingness to. obey rules that
apply to the entire community and to share in the cost of common
expenditures decided upon by political process. This political
process must assure an ever wider participation on the part of
all citizens. 2
Our analysis proceeds on the assumption that future trade rela
tions between the United States and Indonesia depend more on Indo
nesian progress toward economic integration and the character of such
integration than upon similar changes in the United States. It is pos
sible that this assumption contains an element of ethnocentric orienta
tion; it may even be a defense against subjecting one's own culture to
the cold and uncomfortable knife of objective analysis. On the other
hand, the assumption that the dynamics of Indonesian society will
have greater weight seems to be supported by at least common sense
2

Ibid., p. 11.
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observation. Since Indonesian independence, the volume and composi
tion of American-Indonesian trade have, in fact, been determined large
ly by Indonesia's capacity to export and cyclical fluctuations in world
demand for Indonesia's exports. Since Indonesia's capacity to export
has remained relatively constant, Indonesia's total export earnings have
risen or fallen mainly in response to fluctuations in the prices received
for basic exports such as rubber, tin and copra. Similarly, Indonesia's
imports from the United States have shown a strong response to the
amount of foreign exchange made available to Indonesian importers.
When high world prices for primary products have made more foreign
exchange available, or when the government has allowed an expansion
of imports by reducing foreign exchange reserves, the percentage of
total imports obtained from the United States has risen. When less
foreign exchange has been available for importing, the percentage spent
in the United States has fallen. 3 In technical terms, Indonesian de
mand for American exports has shown a high elasticity to availability
of foreign exchange for import purposes. This is particularly significant
in view of the fact that Indonesia has not had a dollar shortage prob
lem. Rather, reduction in supplies of foreign exchange for import has
tended to induce a shift of demand from American to lower price mar
kets, even though this usually implied quality deterioration. This sug
gests that the growth of Indonesian demand for United States products
is singularly dependent upon Indonesia's obtaining a rising volume of
foreign exchange earnings, not offset by deteriorating terms of trade.
Indonesia's leadership has not yet squarely faced the problems of
expanding the volume and diversifying the structure of exports which
was inherited from colonialism. A broad attack upon these problems
stands high on the reform agenda of the same Indonesian leaders who
fought and won the Revolution. When action is ultimately taken on
these problems it will be significant only if export diversification becomes
an adjunct to a comprehensive development program. The adoption and
prosecution of such a program, however, awaits progress on the more
basic issue of Indonesian economic integration. We reach the conclu
sion, therefore, that Indonesia's trade with the United States-in fact
with Western developed countries as a whole-will tend to follow tra
ditional patterns until Indonesian integration produces basic decisions
3

cf,, Statistics on the geographical pattern of Indonesian trade presented in The
Report of the Bank Indonesia, 1953-54, pp. 88-89 and ibid., 1956-57, pp.
118-19.
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on the nature of the society to be molded from the fragments bestowed
upon Indonesia's leadership by a colonial heritage. In the process of
conquering the forces of disintegration set in motion by the withdrawal
of colonial power, Indonesia's economic relations with the outside
world may be in a constant state of flux. We must be cautious, there
fore, not to generalize or predict from what are essentially transitory
phenomena. Deflection of domestic energies in solving the fundamental
problem of integration may well tend to reduce the volume of Indonesian
trade with all countries (with the possible exception of those which
seek to exploit local instability by encouraging purely political trade).
Indonesia's foreign trade during the first seven years of independ
ence (1950-1956) reflects the essentially stagnant nature of Indonesian
political and economic life prior to the appearance of events (begin
ning in 1956) which culminated in civil war and subsequent economic
chaos. Following the transfer of sovereignty in the last week of 1949,
Indonesia entered upon a period of rehabilitating her economy after
almost a decade of political turmoil. The economic goals of the new
Republic, however, have been expressed predominantly in terms of
policies to destroy the vestiges of the colonial economy by "lndonesiani
zation" of the existing productive apparatus rather than by economic
development which could not fail to displace the economic hold of
colonialism and its supporting groups. The economy has felt a series
of abrupt shocks as a result of these Nationalistic policies, but we cannot
observe progress toward effective economic development. The most
that can be said is that while the economy may have become somewhat
rriore Indonesian in name, its basic structure has not become less co
lonial. In terms of the economy's performance, the evidence attests
only to rehabilitation. Agricultural output was intermittently expanded,
but Indonesia has not reached self-sufficiency in food. National income
has grown fitfully, but when put into per capita terms, production for
domestic use and exports have failed to raise the. standard of living
above prewar levels. Statistics on the economy's net investment rate
suggest that capital formation was scarcely adequate to maintain output
per capita between 1951 and 1955 and that the rate of net investment
has fallen since 1953.4
4

cf., Douglas S. Paauw, "Savings, Investment and Inflation during the Pre-plan
Period (1951-1956)" (Mimeographed, to be published as Chapter 3 in a
study on Financing Economic Development in Indonesia). pp. 5-6.
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Similarly, the structure of Indonesian exports shows no evidence
of domestic economic development. With the exception of sugar, an
important prewar export that has virtually disappeared from the export
account in the postwar period, the variety of Indonesia's exports has
changed little since 193 8. Rubber, oil, tin and copra continue to be
the major export products, but changes in their relative contributions
reveal more narrow export specialization in a few primary products.
In 1939, these four exports produced 57 per cent of total foreign ex
change earnings. By 1956, their contribution had grown to 77 per cent,
with rubber alone representing 40 per cent. 5 This is perhaps the most
basic evidence of the society's failure to exhibit economic progress so
far as its trade with the outside world is concerned. Indonesia has con
tinued to produce primary products for export, and her specialization
in a few, largely unprocessed, goods has increased rather than dim
inished.
Stagnation in Indonesia's export industries-or mere rehabilitation
as opposed to structural change-is also apparent from the behavior of
the physical volume of exports. To get useful data on this variable,
petroleum exports have been eliminated since changes in exports of
these products have, in Indonesia's case, little to do with domestic eco
nomic development. Moreover, disposal of foreign exchange proceeds
from petroleum exports have been subject to special arrangements with
the petroleum companies. With this omission, we reach the conclusion
that the Indonesian economy has failed to expand the physical volume
of exports since independence. Excluding petroleum, exports are still
well below the volume generated by the colonial economy just prior to
World War II. The postwar high was recorded in the export boom
year, 1951. Data on export volume, compared to the base year, 1939,
are presented in Table I.
Although the failure of the Indonesian economy to increase its vol
ume of exports, and to diversify their composition can be attributed
to the continuation of domestic economic stagnation, somewhat closer
scrutiny of specific problems may be helpful. Indonesian literature
suggests that the Indonesian leadership is both aware of and concerned
about stagnation in the export industries. This literature emphasizes
two basic problems: ( 1) failure of Indonesian exports to compete quali
tatively with exports from other primary producing countries, and ( 2)
5

Report of the Bank lndonesia, 1956-57, pp. 116-17.
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TABLE I
Volume of Indonesian Exports, 1938 and 1950-57*
Index number
(1938=100)
Thousand tons
100
4927
1938
50
2420
1950
62
3009
1951
50
2421
1952
53
2594
1953
57
2857
1954
55
2716
1955
51
2508
1956
47
2315
1957
* Excluding petroleum and petroleum products; Source: Reports of the Bank
Indonesia. (Published annually.) The index of crude petroleum products
is: 1938: 100; 1950: 87; 1951: 101; 1952: 115; 1953: 138; 1954: 146;
1955: 159; 1956: 165.

inability of export producers to maintain relative profits positions by
offsetting rising labor costs by technological improvements.
In part these immediate problems in the export industries are related
aspects of an unfortunate Indonesian attitude toward foreign enterprise.
As a strong, go_vernment-supported labor movement has demanded and
obtained rising wages and greater fringe benefits from foreign planta
tion and mining enterprises, some modern export industries have found
profits so jeopardized that they have been forced to curtail their opera
tions. Uncertainty about the future status of foreign enterprise in In
donesia has also deterred cost-reducing improvements and expansion
ary capital investment in these enterprises. Some of the slack has been
taken up by a shift from estate production to smallholders' exports.
The latter are generally inferior in quality and hence command lower
foreign prices. This is precisely what has happened, for example, in
the rubber export industry. In 1938, estate exports of rubber were
slightly greater than small-holders' exports; throughout the period since
independence, on the other hand, the volume of smallholders' exports
of rubber has been almost double that of estates. Natural rubber has
also encountered increasingly stiff competition from synthetics; the
same observation could be generalized to explain the failure of other
traditional exports to reach their prewar volume-fibers and coal may
be cited as additional examples. In other cases, exports have failed
192 American Trade with Asia and the Far East

to reach prewar volumes because independence and subsequent popu
lation growth have resulted in greater domestic consumption. This is
true for sugar, which ranked fourth as a producer of foreign exchange
in 1938, and for such traditional colonial exports as tobacco, spices,
tapioca, tea and palm oil.
This cursory survey does not exhaust the causes of stagnation in
Indonesia's export industries which have, with the exception of petro
leum, failed to attract foreign investment since colonial times. It does
suggest, however, that Indonesia will probably not be able to signifi
cantly expand her share of the world market until greater diversifica
tion of export products is achieved and the growth of exports is de
liberately encouraged in a general development effort. Here a caveat
should be added. Successful diversification will involve substitution of
processed goods for primary products, and, in addition, the develop
ment of new export industries to replace those exports for which world
demand is secularly falling or stagnant, e.g., natural rubber. Neither
objective can be accomplished without accelerating capital formation,
accompanied by the introduction of improved technology and increased
supplies of human skills. This is tantamount to arguing that expansion
of Indonesian foreign trade, with accompanying social gains, cannot
be attained without a broad attack upon the problem of economic
stagnation.
This conclusion brings us back to the nub of our argument. Ab
stracting from the many particular problems that have plagued In
donesia's foreign trade, Indonesian prospects for obtaining a greater
share of world markets-and increased trade with the United States
will be determined by the degree of integration attained by Indonesian
society and the purposes for which the resulting energies are har
nessed. Prognostication on these basic issues, however, requires con
sideration of the noneconomic parameters that lie behind economic
change.
It seems fair to assert that Indonesia's leadership has consistently
sought an easy formula to encourage superficial national integration
without resolving the basic problems obstructing Indonesian unity. The
clear mandate desired from the first national election in 1955 as an
escape from prolonged parliamentary temporization, initiation of a
sanguine but almost painless Five-Year Plan in 1956 and the forced
break with the Dutch over the West Irian issue can be best understood
in this light. The national elections, however, served only to heighten
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the society's political polarization and brought even greater political
indecision than before. The announcement of the Five-Year Plan,
without the capacity to bring it into effect, did little to rally national
support around a central social goal. The last-ditch effort to divert
internal controversy to an external issue by dramatizing the West lrian
dispute, and the subsequent eviction of the Dutch, failed to halt the
political fragmentation of the Republic. Meanwhile, Indonesia's lead
ership has avoided coming to grips with the problems that have con
sistently impeded progress toward the society's integration. The cen
tral government's reluctance to face the issue of its relationship with
the provinces demanding autonomy, as provided by Indonesia's con
stitution, is a case in point.
Indonesian integration and the formulation of prime social goals
were temporarily hastened by the nationalistic fervor which accom
panied the struggle for independence. The Indonesian elite emerged
from this long struggle with a vision of a society to be built in con
formance with traditional, almost intuitive Indonesian conceptions of
democracy6 With the coming of independence, there was a rather wide
measure of agreement among Indonesian leaders about the kind of so
cial and economic integration they envisioned for the future. Apart
from extremists of the right and left, Indonesian leadership acquiesced
in accepting the- short-run prospect of a mixed economy organized along
socialist, cooperative and capitalist lines. This sup�rficial unanimity
postponed to the future settlement of the basic shape of the society's
economic organization. The capitalist sector, virtually synonymous
with foreign enterprise, was regarded as a necessary but temporary
evil. 1 The cooperative sector was viewed as the main avenue through
which traditional Indonesian society could partake of the fruits of in
dependence in the immediate short-run, and dramatic growth of this
sector was anticipated. In the longer-run, virtually all of Indonesia's
leadership hoped to erect a more genuinely socialistic economy, al
though the rate at which socialization should proceed came to be a
moot political issue differentiating party groupings.
Economic development came to be accepted among Indonesia's
6

7

As formulated by Sukarno, for example, in terms of pantja si/a and gotongro
jong. For details of the pantja sila see George Mc. T. Kahin, Nationalism
and Revolution in Indonesia, (Ithaca: 1952), pp. 122-23.
Kahin, op. cit., p. 476.
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political elite as a major social goal. 8 To some, eventual realization
of economic development represented the second stage of the revolu
tion. To many others, social and economic progress were construed to
be almost automatic consequences of political independence. 9 This
superficial acceptation of economic development, it might be noted,
led to the adoption of economic policies which have tended to confuse
economic progress with redistribution of income and ownership. "Ben
teng" policies and "lndonesianization" programs have proved to be dis
appointing in promoting general economic improvement, and these
failures help to explain why economic development goals have not
cemented Indonesian integration. "Often," observed Sjahrir, "we hear
the people's complaints that independence had not brought what they
hoped for - improvement and progress in all fields of life. Many peo
ple also say that the freedom we achieved until now has brought im
provement and progress for a small segment of our community - the
politicians and educated people who now occupy places which were
formerly the monopoly of the colonialists - while for others the situ
ation has grown worse."10
This view leads to the suspicion that the leadership's early diagno
sis of Indonesia's problem of economic development may have been
a shade too superficial to serve as a basis for a program promoting
national integration. Stripped of its usual emotional embellishment,
the Indonesian elite's analysis of the causes of economic stagnation may
be summarized in a few propositions. Indonesia's long history as a
colony is given central importance. The heritage of an underdeveloped
economy with positions of economic power awarded to the Dutch and
their supporting minorities was construed to be the result of conscious
imperial design intended to further the end of colonial exploitation.
Undesirable export specialization in primary products, worsening terms
of trade, unequal distribution of income and heavy profit remittances
8 This conclusion emerges from a statement of findings by Mr. John Rodriguez
who interviewed many political leaders about Indonesia's social goals. Of
all the objectives mentioned, Mr. Rodriguez reports that concensus about
the importance of economic development was greatest.
9 For example, Sujono Hadinoto, former Minister of Trade and Industry (1951),
observed that "national freedom is the gateway to prosperity. The social
structure and the way of life we seek can only be realized after the achieve
ment of independence." Quoted in Kahin, op. cit., p. 323.
10 Sutan Sjahrir, and others, Symposion Tentang Kesulitan-Kesulitan Zamen
Peralihan Sekarang, (Symposium on the Difficulties of the Present Transi
tion Period), (Djakarta: 1953), p. 13.
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to the mother country
all were consequences of the past victimization of a colonial economy by a metropolitan ruler . 11
In adopting this diagnosis of Indonesia's economic backwardness,
the elite was already formulating its agenda for economic reform. It
was believed that political sovereignty would provide the power to
break the grasp of the Dutch and the favored minority groups upon
the Indonesian economy. The policies through which Indonesian en
terprise should be encouraged to replace non-Indonesian control, how
ever, began to force a split among the small Indonesian elite where
relative agreement had existed at the more abstract level. One group
urged that the society's economic goals could be best realized through
economic and social development along Western lines. Through the
efforts of Western-trained intellectuals, such as Dr. Sumitro, a begin
ning was made toward realizing this objective early in Indonesian in
dependence. An "Urgency Industrialization Program" was adopted as
a first step to alter the warped, colonial structure of the economy.
Opposition to this sound but unduly optimistic approach culminated in
the espousal of a fundamentally different approach during the tenure
of the first Ali Sastroamodjojo cabinet (1953-1955). Spearheaded by
Minister of Economic Affairs Iskaq, this group sought to displace
foreign and minority dominance in economic activity by weighting
political and economic advantages in favor of Indonesian entrepreneurs.
Unfortunately, this approach tended to aggravate frictions between Java
and the Outer Islands. By and large, Javanese entrepreneurs have been
the beneficiaries of government largesse, and development of the Outer
Islands has been overlooked in the heat of the struggle to strangle
foreign enterprise (particularly Chinese and Dutch trading positions)
on Java. Whatever else the "Indonesianization" programs have done,
it seems clear that they have failed to promote the integration of Indo
nesian society.
During the years of independence which led up to the recent crisis,
the dichotomy in the leadership's views about economic development
became increasingly pronounced. By 1956, one Western observer,
Benjamin Higgins, distinguished two major groups among "politically
active and articulate Indonesians." One group was described as "eco
nomics-minded,"

-
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This analysis can be seen, for example, in Sujono Hadinoto, Ekonomi Indo
nesia Dari Ekonomi Kolonia/ Ke Ekonomi Nasional, (Djakarta: 1949).
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led by relatively young ( sometimes foreign-trained) intellectuals
who attach high priority to economic and social development of
the country, who feel that this development must follow Western
lines in large measure, and who are willing to cooperate with the
West, at least to the extent of seeking Western technical and
capital assistance from the West, in order to achieve this goal.
The second group was described as "history-minded,"
a mixture of Communists and of a larger number who are nation
alist, conservative (in Western terms), and isolationist. Its leaders
attach highest priority to 'completion of the revolution' in the
sense of eliminating the control over Indonesian national life
exerted by foreigners through economic activity. While favoring
economic and social development, they attach great importance
to the retention of the national culture, language and religion and
to abolishing the remnants of foreign influence. The attitudes of this
group spring in large measure from the country's long history of
resistance to foreign invaders, culminating in the postwar revo
lution.12
At the time of Higgins' writing, he also noted a second cross-party
split: "the Outer Islands against the Center." Higgins' analysis of
these basic differences in the orientation of Indonesia's leaders appears
to have been remarkably perceptive. From our point of view, emphasis
upon growing polarization of the political elite is helpful in shedding
light on what might superficially appear to be puzzling temporization
on the central issues of economic development and the devolution of
political power from the center to localities. In 1956, Indonesia an
nounced its first Five-Year Plan for the development of the economy,
and details of the nature and scope of the Plan were subsequently
published. Later events suggest, however, that Indonesian society was
not sufficiently integrated to enable the government to launch the Plan;
policies inimical to the success of the Plan continued to dominate the
political scene. Throughout 1957, Indonesian political leadership
wrangled over the adoption of President Sukarno's proposals for
12 "Indonesia's Development Plans and Problems," Pacific Affairs, XXIX, (1956),
19.
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"guided democracy" which some Indonesian leaders believed would
seriously impair representative government in Indonesia.13 This con
flict widened the rift between the two leadership groups and broadened
the areas of disagreement to include a choice between pro-Communism
and anti-Communism, a choice which Indonesia had previously sought
to avoid by pursuit of an "independently active" foreign policy. The
dispute over "guided democracy" also tended to promote coalescence
between the two sets of issues which had previously been relatively
unrelated: centralism versus regional autonomy and economic devel
opment versus "Indonesianization." The pro-Western, development
minded group began to join forces with the leaders who sought greater
regional autonomy while the supporters of "Indonesianization" of the
economy have tended to endorse centralization of political functions
in Djakarta at the expense of local autonomy elsewhere. This polariza
tion among Indonesian leadership was given considerable impetus by
the withdrawal of Vice-President Hatta from the government in late
1956. As a relatively pro-Western, moderate Sumatran, Hatta had
undoubtedly restrained the Outer Island dissidents from directly chal
lenging central authority so long as he was believed to be representing
the viewpoint of this group in the Central government. Hatta's resigna
tion was followed by declarations of partial autonomy in several areas
of the Outer Islands·. Hatta's retirement from the active political arena
found him as the leader of the opposition to Sukarno's proposals to
circumscribe Indonesia's constitutional government. 14
The Indonesian army played a major role in bringing to a head
the· conflicts implicit in the dichotomy of the political elite's basic so
cial values. Significantly, much the same ideological cleavage has ex
isted among the army's top officers since the "October 17, 1952 Af
fair"; and a similar sharpening of issues has evolved during the past
few years. 15 The resentments of dissident army officers who have
been highly critical of Central government policies-particularly on the
matter of inclusion of Communists in the executive branch of the gov
ernment-found a natural merger with local dissatisfactions in the
Outer Islands. This merger led to the proclamation of autonomy from
13 cf., Justus Van Der Kroef, "Guided Democracy in Indonesia," Far Eastern
Survey, XXVI, (1957), 113-24.
14 /bid., p. 116.
15 Justus Van Der Kroef, "Instability in Indonesia," Far Eastern Survey, XXVI,
(1957), p. 54.
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Djakarta by military leaders in several outlying provinces and replacing
central control with autonomous government by military junta. It is
significant to note that the first autonomous junta, constituted in Central
Sumatra on December 20, 1956, was reported to enjoy almost com
plete support from local officials and the civilian population.16 This

junta, known popularly as the Banteng Council, developed into the
focus of resistance to the Central government. It became a rallying
point for Indonesian leaders from many areas, including Java, who em
braced ideological positions opposed to those apparently held by lead
ers of the parties with the greatest national power.
There are indications that the widening ideological cleavage
among Indonesia's leaders and the ascendance of the history-minded
group led to a course which placed prospects for economic develop
ment-and even economic stability-in greater jeopardy. The Djuanda
Cabinet was willing to countenance a wholesale eviction of Dutch
civilians over the unrelated issue of the future status of West Irian.
This step will inevitably increase the difficulty of the task of economic
development; it may well place the capital requirements for a program
adequate to break the cycle of economic stagnation beyond the reach
of the Indonesian economy. The loss of Dutch entrepreneurs has re
duced output, and foreign exchange earnings have fallen. These con
sequences have produced greater economic and political instability,
problems which have been the predominant national concern since
1956.
The widening rift between the two ideological camps has also
bred indecision on major reforms which must be undertaken before the
development Plan can be seriously begun. A foreign investment law,
essential to insure at least moderate increases in the inflow of foreign
capital to prosecute the plan, has been before the Indonsian Parlia
ment for four years but favorable action has been obstructed by in
volvement with issues which lie at the basis of Indonesian political am
bivalence.17 Reform of Indonesia's tax structure, which must be used
as a major source of development finance-to say nothing of coping
with inflation-has long been studied by Indonesian fiscal experts. De
cision on this issue, however, concerns the problem of central-local
relationships, and no cabinet, much less Parliament, has yet been able
16 Ibid., p. 52.
17 Higgins, op. cit., p. 121.
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to devise a means of escape uom this political cul-de-sac. Similarly,
it has become politically impossible to plan for the participation of
local communities in the national development plan pending some legal
arrangements for inter-governmental fiscal relationships. Yet, in a
country with Indonesia's historical background, this sector must clearly
play a major role in the financing and prosecution of development
projects - if a democratic model of development is to be successfully
followed.
While Indonesia's leadership has procrastinated in moving toward
a solution of these fundamental problems obstructing national integra
tion and economic development, efforts to build a "national economy"
by replacing foreign entrepreneurs with Indonesians proceeded apace.
Discriminatory and restrictive measures against Chinese and Dutch en
terprises accompanied measures to encourage Indonesians to replace
them. Liberal distribution of import licenses to Indonesians, free
dom from restrictive government regulations, and outright provision
of capital and credit were used to weight competitive advantages in
favor of indigenous entrepreneurs. The "economics-minded" leader
ship, viewing this trend with alarm, has been openly critical. Sjafruddin
Prawiranegara, the former Governor of the Bank Indonesia, and always
an outspoken critic of bad government, declared:
As a result of the substitution of foreign capitalists by Indonesian
capitalists, enterprises which were formerly well run now deteri
orate. . . . This transition is being stimulated by the government
through the issuance of licenses and credits, which amounts to a
large extent to so much squandering, even though it is admitted
that of 100 beneficiaries . . . only 10 or 20 adequately utilize
the chances offered them. 18
Former Vice-President Hatta has frequently deplored these na
tionalistic excesses since benteng policies came to the fore five years
ago. Last year (I 957), he charged that millions of rupiah of public
funds were being wasted by businessmen in league with politicians,
most of whom lack any commercial acumen. 19
It is impossible to conclude that the last few years' events have
advanced Indonesian integration. Conditions in which to launch a pro
gram for a take-off to sustained economic growth have not improved.
18 As quoted in Van Der Kroef, "Instability in Indonesia," lac.
19 Ibid., p. 57.
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In addition to the present political instability, the threat to short-run
economic stability is greater than at any time since independence. The
government deficit, which has consistently been a primary source of
inflationary pressures, is greater than ever before - about 8 per cent
of national income. Prices are reported to have risen by 50 per cent
during the past year-2° Foreign exchange and gold reserves have fallen
to far below their legal minimum as Indonesia has lost foreign exchange
at a more rapid rate than any other country during the past two years.
As economic stability and civil strife have become the paramount prob
lems, the current Five-Year Plan has been virtually abandoned.
These events do not augur well for the growth of Western trade
and investment in Indonesia. Without the persistent efforts of American
petroleum companies to make a success of their Indonesian operations
in spite of great difficulties, Indonesian trade with the West would
already be smaller in volume than two decades ago. Until national
integration is achieved, we may expect a continuation of this unfavor
able trend. Even if integration is achieved, the question of whether
development will follow lines consistent with international comparative
advantages or autarchic patterns will remain. Expansion of Indonesian
trade and investment relations with countries of the Free World will
demand that Indonesia choose to develop in an atmosphere in which
xenophobia and excessive nationalism are held in restraint. Indonesia's
economic endowments provide the basis for considerable economic
growth and vigorous and mutually profitable trade with the outside
world. Whether or not this comes about, and when, depend on the
success of Indonesia's leadership in providing social cohesion with a
democratic basis, and proceeding with a sound development program.
Some remarks, leading to prognostication on this fundamental
question, seem to be called for by recent events which have occurred
in Indonesia. The 1958 crisis appeared to draw the lines of ideological
controversy so sharply that a dominant coalition of leadership groups,
capable of wielding effective national power, may emerge. A number
of Indonesia's most promising members of the "economics-minded"
group joined the rebel government in Sumatra. This includes the for
mer Governor of the Bank Indonesia, Sjafruddin; former Finance Min
ister Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, who had long urged a responsible
20 Greg McGregor, "Indonesia Sinks to Economic Low," New York Times, August
3, 1958.
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approach to economic development; and Burhanuddin Harahap, a for
mer Premier (1955-56), who during his brief tenure, initiated sweep
ing political and economic reforms to reduce government corruption.
Other political leaders representing the same position - Mohammed
Natsir, a leader of the Masjumi party; former Vice-President Hatta; the
Sultan of Djokjakarta (Hamengku Buwono) - while critical of the
drift away from parliamentary government and excessive centralization
of political functions, found their political influence temporarily
eclipsed. The long-standing rift in the army's leadership also followed
lines drawn by the civil war; the anti-Communist, development-minded
group tied their fate to the Rebel government in Central Sumatra.
This includes many who had long voiced their criticism of procrastina
tion, corruption and anti-Westernism in Djakarta: Colonels Lubis,
Simbolon, Husein, Sumual and Warouw. One of Indonesia's most
brilliant and pro-Western army commanders, Colonel Kawilarang, was
relieved of his command of West Java in 1957 and sent to Washington
as a military attache. Kawilarang's reassignment was interpreted to be
a move to avoid opposition to Sukarno's concept of guided democracy.
In early 1958, Colonel Kawilarang left his post in Washington to sup
port the cause of the Rebels.
The fact that an important part of Indonesia's top leadership joined
the group resisting the Central government by armed force, or sup
ported the principle of their defiant opposition, seems to indicate that
the crisis was something more than an expression of mere local dis
satisfaction or a purely military shakeup. While the 1958 conflict may
not have been the definitive struggle between the two ideological groups
so clearly demarcated within Indonesia's political elite, the recent civil
war can hardly fail to weaken prospects for economic growth, despite
the apparent Central government victory. An important segment of
Indonesia's development-minded leadership has been lost for purposes
of National reconstruction. Yet such leadership appears to be the
scarcest of key resources essential to the launching of a successful pro
gram of economic development.
Economic stabilization, as well as economic development, re
quires the resurgence of an economics-minded group in positions of
national leadership. The civil war of 1958 has brought the Indonesian
economy to the brink of disaster. Government expenditures for mili
tary purposes have continued to grow, while tax revenues have fallen.
Deficit financing through the central bank has produced severe infla202
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tionary pressures; a combination of rising prices and lagging wage levels
have reduced real income among wage earners by 35 per cent. 21 For
eign exchange reserves have fallen far below the minimum which In
donesians themselves consider to be a safe buffer stock against short
run fluctuations in export earnings. Indonesia's balance of payments
position has been precarious for the past several years, but it is now
so distorted that substantial external assistance is the only alternative
to dangerous reductions in domestic consumption of foodstuffs and other
necessities. While Indonesia was near self-sufficiency in rice supply a
few years ago, maintenance of the present lower levels of per capita
consumption will require the import of 700,000 tons of rice this year.
A realistic analysis of the causes of Indonesia's unfortunate politi
cal and economic situation should place considerable emphasis upon
the liabilities with which Indonesia entered her new state of inde
pendence in 1949. The terms of independence involved large annual
foreign exchange obligations to the Netherlands. Indonesian nationals
emerged from colonialization with little stake in the Westernized, capi
tal-intensive sector of the economy. Indonesia's present leadership had
virtually no experience in top government positions. The political and
economic instability which the world has witnessed in Indonesia, there
fore, are merely symptoms of a basic readjustment in Indonesian so
ciety. They reflect the growing pains of a newly independent country
without much capacity for short-run growth.
There are encouraging signs that the domestic turmoil associated
with civil war may lead to a new effort to achieve national integration
through effective action on the home front and a foreign policy more
cooperative with the West. In recent months Prime Minister Djuanada's
government has made an effort to weed out from positions of power
the individual leaders who have been most objectionable to the opposi
tion groups. 22 The Central government has also demonstrated a new
willingness to make concessions to the Outer Islands' demands which
led to revolt. A financial agreement between the Central and Regional
governments has recently received Cabinet approval, and the Central
government has announced a plan to allow localities to retain a part
of the foreign exchange proceeds from regional exports. 23 If the way
21

Ibid.

22 Tillman Durdin, "Indonesia Facing Many Problems," New York Times, July
20, 1958, p. 6E.
23 New York Times, July 30, 1958.
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to reconciliation of Central and Local government differences can be
further opened, prospects for national integration will brighten. Dja
karta officials have also appeared to place emphasis upon adopting a
general program to restore economic stability through a sound approach
to economic policy. 2• Finally, relations between Indonesia and the
United States have improved during mid-1958 as a result of modera
tion of official attitudes expressed by both countries. A veteran New
York Times correspondent in Indonesia writes that:
the (Indonesian) government hopes for new foreign credits and
other economic aid, particularly from the United States ... Its
foreign policy is still predicated on nonalignment with either the
Communist bloc or the West, but the outlook is for more coopera
tive relationships between Jakarta and the West than there has
been. 25
The United States faces a new challenge in Indonesia. Substantial
American economic assistance to promote the task of stabilizing the
economy, and later for economic development, might well tend to alter
the present uneasy balance of domestic forces toward integration and
disintegration so thfit a greater measure of general social progress would
be possible. If the United States accepts the challenge, prospects for a
more vigorous and mutually beneficial pattern of trade between Indo
nesia and the United States would tend to become progressively better.

24 Greg McGregor, "Indonesia Sinks to Economic Low," loc. cit.
25 Tillman Durdin, "Indonesia Facing Many Problems," loc. cit.
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As

REPRESENTATIVE of Thailand in the United States, I always
welcome the opportunity of reviewing the possibilities of trade, invest
ment and other activities in the field of business which already exist in
Thailand or may offer themselves in the future to prospective American
investors or business interests.
Before I arrive directly at the core of the problem, however, let
me briefly review· the conditions which now prevail in Thailand, so that
their knowledge may help in the understanding of the whole situation.
In the first place, calls for bids for the large amount of machinery
and equipment we need in Thailand to implement our development
projects have already been made by government departments in Thai
land. Included is equipment needed for the construction of a large
hydroelectric barrage for which the International Bank for Reconstruc
tion and Development has loaned my country a sum of $66 million.
Secondly, I feel compelled to put you on guard against the obses
sion of huge markets represented by a multitude of hundreds of millions
of people, who are pressing hard on the meager resources of their land,
so that little if anything, is left for exchange with the outside world.
My country may have a population of only 21 million, consequently
it seems to offer only a small market to foreign business, but if we take
into account the per capita income of our population, it will be realized
that its purchasing power is proportionately larger than that of some
of the big countries in the area. Thus it can be said that even though
the population of Thailand is only one-eighteenth of another country

206

American Trade with Asia and the Far East

in the region, our national income amounts to as much as one-eighth
of the income of the same country. Naturally, this income is modest
compared with the economically advanced nations of Europe and Amer
ica. That is why, if we try to give a comparative picture, we have to
do it in relation with countries in the same area.
But more importantly, the Southeast Asia region which includes
Thailand contains resources on which the world depends. Besides food
stuff and especially rice which Southeast Asia produces abundantly and
exports to feed the deficit nations of Asia, this region holds an im
portant place in the production of rubber, tin and other minerals such
as tungsten, lead, zinc, copper, manganese, as well as petroleum prod
ucts. By contrast, other regions of Asia seem to have a much less con
siderable share in the supply to the world of international commodities.
Consequently, their trade relations with the rest of the world cannot
assume the same significance as in the case of Southeast Asia.
Furthermore, although Southeast Asia and Thailand may not have
such a huge resource in manpower as the other two big nations of Asia,
China and India, our people are better educated; their literacy rate
is the highest in the whole of the Asian continent. In consequence,
they should be more apt to receive technological training and provide
the skilled labor necessary for the operation of any industry.
Finally, even though my country figures as recipient of foreign aid
from the United States, the United Nations and other agencies such as
the Colombo Plan, the amount of aid it has received is comparatively
smaller than that given to other countries of similar size and popula
tion. On the contrary, we have borne proudly our share of the cost of
our development as may be seen by the loans amounting to some 110
million dollars which have been granted us by the World Bank. In
other words, we are also paying our way toward our development and
do not depend exclusively on outside help.
After giving the background information which, in my estimation,
seems necessary for the understanding of the problem of trade and
investment, let us now try to consider what elements are essential and
perhaps indispensable for the normal development of trade and invest
ment. In my opinion, there are at least three elements. They are:
favorable political climate, adequate administrative policy and setup
and, finally, human and material resources.
When I come to these elements, it is obvious that I can speak for
my country and my country alone.
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With regard to the first element, those who are familiar with my
country for having lived there either in official or private capacity
know for certain that Thailand has been and always wants to be
friendly with the United States and the West in general. Whatever
internal changes may take place, this basic and fundamental policy of
the Thai nation will not be affected, unless, of course, the United States
or the West modifies its policy. At present, many treaties and agree
ments bind our two countries, the most important of which, for our
present purpose, is the agreement whereby investments from this coun
try are guaranteed against all risks of nationalization or expropriation.
American investors, therefore, are fully protected in their investments.
As regards the Thai government itself, I can assert categorically
that my government believes in the free enterprise system as much as
any other country of the free world, It has not fostered socialism and
it has not emphasized Communist achievements in economic or indus
trial fields on the one hand and made urgent appeals to the investors in
the free world on the other. Our trade with Communist countries is
practically nonexistent and where it exists it is confined to nonstrategic
materials, in conformity with our obligations to our allies and as a
member of the United Nations.
It is true, some may say, that the government in Thailand is en
gaging in or has ·some businesses of its own. But any one who is
familiar with the conditions in Thailand and in Southeast Asian coun
tries in general will be able to see without difficulty that the lack of
capital or the slow process of capital formation in those countries cre
ates the necessity for government intervention. If the government
should decide to leave the field of business entirely to private initiative
while private concerns have no means of their own to do it, there will
be no industries at all. But the present government has made it a clear
policy of its own that the very moment private business can take over,
it will completely and irrevocably withdraw itself from such business.
In support of this policy, the government of Thailand has made deep
and substantial cuts in funds allotted to the running of factories or
industrial concerns owned by the government.
A passage of the International Monetary Fund comments on
Thailand:
It is the general policy of the Thai Government to seek industrial
development in the private sector, and to concentrate the Govern208
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ment's development efforts on the provision of social overhead fa
cilities and services, especially in the field of transportation, power
and irrigation.
As to the second element which can help in the promotion of
foreign trade and investment, namely adequate administrative policy and
setup, the Thai government has adopted a number of measures to attain
that objective. In the first place, foreigners and nationals of Thailand
alike are allowed to make remittances abroad, for family maintenance
or study or travel, without any kind of authorization up to a certain sum
( $146 a month). Over and above those sums, foreign concerns are also
allowed to repatriate not only their earnings but also their capital back
to their original countries. The only formality they have to comply with
is to obtain authorization from the Central Bank of Thailand which exer
cises control not to prevent expatriation of capital but for statistical pur
poses. In some cases, when remittances are too substantial, the Central
Bank may ask that these remittances be spread out in successive install
ments in order not to create harmful fluctuations in the exchange rate of
the national currency. But never has the Central Bank refused to au
thorize bona fide repatriation of dividends or capital to foreign enter
prizes. This has been confirmed by a report of the International Mone
tary Fund. Such a liberal policy with regard to exchange control where
it exists is not so common in our present world. Thailand, I think, can
afford to do that, because her financial position is basically sound and our
national currency is backed by some 90 per cent reserves of gold and
hard currency, mainly United States. dollars. It is also of interest to note
that these reserves were increased during the past few years.
In regard to new enterprises, whether foreign or domestic, there
are legal provisions known as the Industrial Promotion Act exempting
them from customs duties on machinery imported and from income tax
for a prolonged initial period. These tax holidays and other measures
which exist also in some other countries desiring foreign investments,
are designed to encourage foreign investors. In Thailand, they begin
to show beneficial effects.
These incentives and encouraging measures for the promotion of
foreign trade and investment, coupled with the guarantee agreement
which the Thai government has signed with the government of the United
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States should provide, so to speak, an iron-clad protection to American
business interests.
May I come now to the third element, namely, the human and ma
terial resources. As I have said before, although my country does not
possess a vast reservoir of human resources as some other Asian coun
tries, our population is comparatively well educated. Provided with
adequate training, our people can undertake any technical job as well
as any other people in the world. There is no such thing, in my view,
as the inherent incapacity of a certain race or a certain people to perform
technical works. The example of Japan is, I believe, sufficient to convince
any one who may have doubt about it.
Our material resources, both tapped and untapped, are also abun
dant. The high-grade iron ore deposits north and south of Bangkok, the
capital city of Thailand, are being exploited on a small scale by a private
Thai firm and possibly also with the co-operation of a well-known West
German steel concern. Another Japanese firm has joined with Thai in
terests to exploit shale oil. So far, few if any American firms have shown
any disposition or interest in these fields. Other resources which I have
mentioned earlier are being exported abroad as raw materials. Those
are tin and rubber as well as some other minerals. They can, of course,
be processed in Thailand with savings on freight charges which, as we
all know, are extremely high. This is what we intend to do.
What do we want in Thailand in terms of trade and investment?
First, and as far as our agricultural products and especially rice are con
cerned, we want to preserve and expand our traditional markets in the
same manner as the United States wants to keep its traditional markets
m this hemisphere. For the other main items of our exports, such as
rubber and tin, we would like to see as do some of our Asian neighbors
such as Malaya, a reasonably stable price maintained. We are apprehen
sive, and I think justly so, of the strong and devastating competition
offered by some synthetic manufacturing processes. For us, these prod
ucts which we export form the mainstay of our economy upon which the
livelihood of millions depends. A few cents fluctuation in price can
cause untold sufferings to hundreds of thousands of families, while a
more diversified economy of an industrially advanced country can ab
sorb without too great effects even the shock of a mild and temporary
decrease in income. It is clear, therefore, that for Thailand and other
Asian countries placed in a similar position, the expansion of our foreign
trade is a vital question on which depends our very existence, not to
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speak of our healthy and normal growth. Consequently, we are willing
to bear our share of responsibility and to go to a great extent to satisfy
legitimate demands.
At the same time, we also realize that trade alone, especially trade
based on exports of primary commodities, can never endure the benefits
that our people are entitled to expect. The undue dependence on far
away markets beyond control or influence, or in fact under the control
of others whose interests are not necessarily concordant with ours, can
not and should not be accepted as an adequate life insurance for our
nations. The real solution lies in gradual and orderly industrialization
of our economy. Such a conclusion, as you may well understand, is
not motivated by reasons of national pride or prestige, the prestige of
possessing one's own industries, but truly by reasons of necessity, the
necessity of our own survival. A nation that depends for its likelihood
on exports of primary commodities to foreign markets will not only be
impoverished because the income derived from the exports of raw ma
terials will never match the high and always rising costs of manufac
tured goods it requires for its consumption and development, but, worst
of all, it will be subject to the whims and fluctuation of foreign markets
and may prosper or starve as a result of administrative ukases which
may be decided upon by some foreign nations.
On the other hand, I think I need make it clear that in pointing
to the necessity for the undeveloped nations to diversify their economy
and engage in some form of industrialization, I do not advocate self
sufficiency or what some European economists might call "autarky."
Such a course of action would, in my opinion, be detrimental to un
developed nations and may even hamper their normal and healthy de
velopment. What those nations must try to do is to strike a happy
balance between production of primary commodities and the setting up
of basic industries and processing industries, especially those which can
make use of raw materials locally available, so that the sharp fluctua
tions in the prices of raw materials in markets abroad may be cushioned
off and their intensity reduced on national markets by the existence of
such industries.
This is what my country intends to do and I do not believe we are
alone in thinking in those terms. However, our financial and technical
capacity is limited and whatever efforts we may exert ourselves will
never be sufficient to enable us to attain our objective. Outside par-
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ticipation is therefore invited and welcome, especially from countries
which are friendly to us and whom we can trust.
What do the nations which invite outside participation have to
offer? In the case of Thailand, I have already outlined the conditions
which outside investors and especially American investors will find in
my country, namely ( 1) a government and people friendly to the United
States; ( 2) abundant natural resources, and ( 3) relatively educated
human resources from which industries can draw an adequate labor
supply. But most important of all, foreign and particularly American
investors will find an almost virgin field for their operations. The in
dustries now existing are so few and so undeveloped that they cater
only to a small fraction of our national needs, the balance of which
has to be satisfied by imports from abroad. New enterprises, therefore,
will not have to face any kind of competition from local industries and
can fully develop their productive capacity to meet ever growing de
mands.
Furthermore, what Thailand can offer which other countries can
not is its centrally strategic position in the heart of surrounding mar
kets of Southeast Asia. Once you are in Bangkok or generally speaking
in Thailand, you are placed at a distance of about two hours plane
flight in all directions from five other capital cities of Southeast Asia.
That explains why many commercial firms, international organizations
and diplomatic missions have chosen to establish themselves at Bangkok
and from there radiate to the other countries of Southeast Asia. There
fore, those enterprises which may open up in Thailand will be able to
supply not only the Thai national market, but also the close-by mar
kets of the surrounding nations of Southeast Asia with a total popula
tion of some 180 million people. This, you will agree, is hardly a
negligible proposition. Therefore, a new enterprise or a new industry
centered at a base where the national government is friendly and as
much dedicated to the concept of free enterprise as that in its homeland,
can set itself up and take advantage of the enormous local needs as
well as the growing demands of the whole region.
American industries, because of their immense productivity, ap
pear to have come to a point of satisfying the normal local consumers'
demands. If such is the case, would it not be wise for America to start
thinking of developing markets abroad which will be able to absorb
some of American products. Asia and Southeast Asia in particular,
for reasons I have already pointed out, seem to be the logical and normal
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markets for overflowing American products. At present, they cannot
properly perform such a role, because of the low income of their popu
lation. But if adequate development is brought about through trade
and investment in some fields of industries which, incidentally, are
different from the more advanced industrial activities of the United
States, greater income will be created in those parts of the world which
will enable their population to buy manufactured products from the
United States. Such an idea is not as theoretical as it appears at first
sight, and if it can be properly explored and put into application, many
of my American friends with whom I discussed this idea seem to agree
with me that it can produce the desired results and bring mutual bene
fits to both the United States and Southeast Asia.
Another practical problem which seems to present an obstacle to
the implementation of a program of foreign or American investment is
the lack of predetermined conditions, well known in advance to foreign
investors and offered to them by the host country. This point suggested
to me by both government and private circles, is certainly well taken
and I am ready, as far as I am concerned, to present to the authorities
of my country any reasonable concrete suggestions. For the moment,
I can say that my country has no objection to working out a reasonable
standard statute to be offered to foreign traders and investors, in addi
tion to the conditions relating to tax and customs duty exemption and
repatriation of earnings and capital which are already known to foreign
investors in Thailand and of which they have been taking advantage
for some time already. Such a statute will have necessarily to be general
in nature and character leaving the conditions specific to any trade
or industry to be spelled out in detail by negotiation between those
industries and the authorities concerned themselves. Such an obstacle,
if it is one, can be surmounted and even easily removed if the two sides,
the host country and the foreign trader and investor, seek mutual
benefit and not one-sided and somewhat monopolistic advantage. Thai
land for one will go a long way to meet any reasonable and legitimate
demands of foreign investors and traders. If those who come to her
are animated by regular business considerations and not by some ad
venturous spirit of "making a fast buck," as we say here, my country
is willing and ready to co-operate with them for mutual benefit. What
we want from abroad, therefore, is not those fly-by-night businesses,
but the sound, steady, and long-range business activities which will
develop our own national resources, our productivity and consequently
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the income of our people. Such development will bring benefit not only
to the investors or traders themselves, but also to the land of their origin
which will find a growing market for its products.
Some of the countries which are not so friendly to the United
States have clearly seen the advantages I have tried to outline and have
already made important inroads in Asia. Should the United States and
the free nations continue to neglect these warnings, this country, and
indeed the whole world, may one day wake up and find that the field
is already taken up by their challengers and antagonists.
Thailand, through her representative, can categorically and sin
cerely affirm that she prefers to do business with the United States
and the free world, if the latter are animated by the same desire and the
same willingness to agree to the reciprocity of our interests and reason
able conditions in carrying out mutual obligations as well as in sharing
benefits. But if we were asked to exceed these limits and to yield to
foreign traders and investors one-sided or monopolistic advantages, my
country, much as it desires to have foreign investments, will not be
able to accept. The time of colonial-type exploitation is, I believe, com
pletely superseded by economic co-operation on the basis of equality
and profit sharing. On this basis, Thailand invites traders and in
vestors of the United States and the free world to come to her soil.
I hope they will hear and heed our appeal for the mutual advantage and
benefit of our respective nations.
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tables are intended to display some of the
leading structural relations and recent trends in United States trade with
Asia and the Far East. The explanatory note preceding the tables in
dicates sources and limitations of the data and special meaning of some
terms. It is to be noted that this paper is an analysis from the viewpoint
of the United States and on the basis of United States trade returns.
Many details 9f the trade are commented on in other papers from the
viewpoint of the trading partners of the United States.
Asian countries supply the United States with substantial propor
tions of a dozen or so commodities, some of which are of considerable
importance to the United States. These countries take a lesser volume
of United States exports which range over a large variety of commodi
ties. United States exports to these countries show an increasing excess
of exports in recent years. Conditions which determine the trade are
the natural endowments of the Asian countries, their increased pace of
development, technological changes in the United States and United
States aid and agricultural policies.
United States imports from Asian countries are concentrated in
a group of a dozen or so commodities. Table I shows that 10 com
modity subgroups listed account for about half the total imports from
the Asian countries - 45 per cent in the two end periods and 65 per
cent in 1948. These same commodities, however, accounted for only
12 per cent to 17 per cent of all commodities imported into the United
States. Import trade with Asian countries is concentrated on fewer
HE ACCOMPANYING

216

American Trade with Asia and the Far East

commodities than import trade in general. The relative importance of
Asian countries as the origin of United States imports has declined from
26 per cent in 1938 to 15 per cent in 1955-57 of total imports. In
1938, 78.3 per cent of these commodity subgroups came from Asian
countries; in 1955-57 this proportion had fallen to 57.1 per cent. This
figure is affected by the decline in the proportion of rubber and tin
originating in Asian countries and by the fact that rubber and tin in
1938 were a more significant component of the commodities listed than
they were in 1955-57: 59.1 per cent as against 37.6 per cent. On the
other hand, other commodities assumed increasing importance. While
total United States imports increased more than six times in value be
tween 1938 and 1955-57, imports of ferroalloys increased more than
15 times, lead nearly 260 times and wool more than 10 times. These
three commodities accounted for only 4 per cent of listed imports from
Asian countries in 1938 but 24 per cent in 1955-57.
Description of the export trade cannot be so readily condensed
since a larger number of commodities are involved and concentration
on a few is less notable. The listed commodities accounted in 1938
for a third of total exports to Asian countries; in 1957 this proportion
had increased to more than one-half - an indication of the shift in
commodity composition of United States export trade to Asia. The
listed commodities have accounted for more than one-half of total
exports. The relative importance of Asian countries as destinations for
United States exports has slightly declined; these countries now account
for less than 15 per cent of total United States exports.
The more important commodity classes were as follows, with
exports to Asian countries as a percentage of exports to all countries:
cotton unmanufactured, 25.7 per cent; petroleum and products, 20.4
per cent; medicinal and pharmaceutical preparations, 24.6 per cent;
machinery and vehicles, 17.9 per cent. These commodities in 1938
constituted 55.6 per cent and in 1955-57, 39.0 per cent of all exports
to Asian countries. Notable increases in proportions of exports destined
for Asian countries occurred in the two subgroups, grains and prepara
tions, and cotton unmanufactured, a result doubtless of aid and agri
cultural surplus disposal policies ( Public Law 480). It is notable also
that exports of autos, parts and accessories to the world between 1938
and 1955 increased nearly five times while these exports to Asian
countries increased only two and a half times.
The United States balance of merchandise trade with Asian coun-
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tries shows a large export excess in postwar years. The ratio of imports
to exports was 77 per cent in 1948 and 74 per cent in 1955-57. The
largest excesses occurred with Japan, Republic of Korea and Taiwan.
The surpluses with India, Pakistan and Republic of Philippines were
also substantial, that of the latter however being much reduced from
1948.
Countries with which United States trade showed a substantial
excess of imports are British Malaya, Republic of Indonesia and Thai
land; smaller import excesses occurred with Ceylon and New Zealand.
These excesses of imports are attributable to United States imports of
rubber, tin, tea, spices and wool.
In point of magnitude, Japan, except in 1948 before postwar
economic conditions had been fully established, is our largest source
of imports, accounting for almost a third of total imports from Asian
countries; it is likewise the largest market for our exports, absorbing
more than one-third of total exports to Asian countries. The largest
single item of trade with Japan is presently the United States export
of unmanufactured, and the import of manufactured cotton.
United States aid has been a significant factor in recent trade with
Asian countries. In the period 1955-57, one-half of all nonmilitary
net grants and credits went to Asian countries, more than 60 per cent
of this portion fo Republic of Korea and Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia,
and 30 per cent to Taiwan, Pakistan, Japan and India.
The principal factors determining the character of United States
trade with Asian countries may be briefly summarized:
1. The United States imports are predominantly products or raw
materials in which the region has a natural advantage
rubber, tea,
spices, jute, tin, ferroalloys and lead.
2. Technological changes in the United States have reduced the
relative significance of our dependence upon Asian countries for rub
ber and tin, but other changes, together with depletion of United States
domestic mineral sources have increased our dependence upon the
region for ferroalloys and lead.
3. There has occurred a net diversion of origin of United States
imports away from Asian countries, not only for the commodity classes
listed in the tables, but for all commodities; the commodities listed,
however, constituted in 1955-57 the same proportion of all imports
from Asian countries as in 1938.
4. The United States aid programs together with crop failures
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in Asian countries are responsible for significant increases in the pro
portion of exports of grains and preparations and cotton manufactures
going to the region.
5. Of the important group of machinery and vehicle exports, Asian
markets absorbed a smaller proportion of United States exports in
1955-57 than in 1938.
6. While the commodity classes listed constituted a slightly smaller
proportion of total United States exports in 1955-57 than in 1938,
they constituted a substantially larger proportion of our exports to
Asian countries.

Explanatory Note to Accompany Tables 1-5.

Sources of data for the tables are:
United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census.
Foreign Commerce and Navigation of the United States, 1938
Foreign Trade Reports, FT 100, FT 120, FT 410, FT 420, Annual
Summary volumes, 1948, 1955, 1956, 1957.
Foreign Grants and Credits by the United States Government, De
cember 1957, March 1958.
Survey of Current Business, April 1958, pp. 20-24.
The term "Asian countries" or "Asia and the Far East" for the pur
poses of this paper is taken to include the following countries, as desig
nated and defined in the above foreign trade reports: India, Pakistan,
Ceylon, Burma, Thailand, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, British Malaya,
Republic of Indonesia, Republic of Philippines, Republic of Korea,
Hong Kong, Taiwan, Japan, Australia, New Zealand. Certain terri
tories are not identical throughout the period of comparison used in this
paper: Republic of Korea and Taiwan would be included in the Japa
nese returns for 1938. The following territories have been considered
equivalent for the pre and postwar comparisons: British India to India
plus Pakistan; Siam to Thailand; French Indo-China to Vietnam, Laos
and Cambodia; Netherlands Indies to Republic of Indonesia; Japan in
cluding Chosan and Taiwan to Japan.
Because of the changes in territory it is in some cases impossible
to make pre and postwar comparisons and so these are omitted. In
other cases the changes of territory do not seriously distort the com
parison. The same statements apply to some of the commodity clas
sifications. The returns are also somewhat distorted by sampling pro
cedures for small-valued shipments and by exclusions of special cate
gory commodities - these matters are explained in the Introduction
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to the Foreign Trade Reports where detailed references are given.
For the descriptive purposes of this paper, and especially for the per
centage statements, these distortions are not of significant proportions.
The particular years were selected to represent the typical pre
war, early postwar and recent trade. The returns for these years are
believed to be dominated by the more fundamental and at least semi
permanent rather than by the accidental determinants of trade.
A recent excellent brief summary and analysis of United States
foreign trade, with which the present analysis of trade with Asia may
be compared, is given in House of Representative Ways and Means
Subcommittee on Foreign Trade Policy, Compendium of Papers on
Foreign Trade Policy, 1957, United States Department of Commerce,
"The Role of Foreign Trade in the United States Economy," pp. 15-22,
and "Recent Developments in United States Foreign Trade," pp. 23-37.
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1. United States Imports for Consumption from Asian
Countries, Principal Commodities, Selected Years,
Proportion of Asian to Total Imports and of
Listed Commodities to all Commodities
(Values in Millions of U.S. Dollars)

TABLE

Commodity
( Schedule A Commodity
or Subgroup No.)
Rubber, milk or latex;
crude n.e.s.
2011000; 2013000
Tin, bars, blocks, pigs,
etc.; ore. 6550000;
6551300
Tea, n. s. p. f.
]521000
Jute & manufactures
Subgroup 37
Ferroalloys
Subgroup 63
Lead, ores, flue dust &
matte, n.s.p.f.; pigs &
bars. 6503000; 6505000
Mica, block Muscovite
over 15¢/lb.; films &
splittings over 12/10,000
in. 5560940; 5561800
Wool, unmanufactured
Subgroup 40
Goat & kidskins, dry &
salted; green or pickled.
0241000; 0242000
Spices
Subgroup 21
Total above
Commodities
Total All
Commodities
Commodities Listed
Above as per cent of
All Commodities

Year

Total .US.
Imports for
Consumption

U.S. Imports from
Asian Countries
Total % of Total
U.S. Imports
126.4
294.9
354.7
38.5
98.6
102.5
17.4
42.1
50.7
31.2
162.9
97.2
2.6
10.8
72.2

97.6
95.4
89.5
85.7
73.2
67.1
95.1
93.3
91.5
83.2
94.9
87.8
14.4
12.4
26.0

12.2
28.5
0.4
12.2
3.8

13.8
22.0
80.0
87.1
52.8

22.6
307.6
271.2
12.0
40.8
20.2
11.1
30.9
36.1

7.0
122.9
97.9
3.7
13.8
7.5
3.8
14.7
16.4

31.0
40.0
36.1
30.8
33.8
37.1
34.2
47.6
46.0

294.9
1,230.1
1,457. I
1,949.6
7,038.4
12,281.7
15.1
17.5
11.9

231.0
785.1
831.4
508.4
1,203.6
1,825.2
45.4
65.2
45.6

78.3
63.8
57.1
26.1
17.1
14.9

129.5
309.1
396.1
44.9
134.8
152.8
18.3
45.1

1938
1948
1955-7 av.
1938
1948
1955-7 av.
1938
1948
1955-7 av.
]938
]948
1955-7 av.
1938
1948
1955-7 av.
1938
1948
1955-7 av.
1938
1948
1955-7 av.

37.5
171.6
]10.7
]8.0
86.8
277.7
0.5
89.4
129.7
0.5
14.0
7.2

1938
1948
1955-7 av.
1938
1948
1955-7 av.
1938
1948
1955-7 av.
1938
1948
1955-7 av.
1938
1948
1955-7 av.
1938
1948
1955-7 av.

55.4

Abbreviations:
n.c.l.: no comparable listing
n.e.c.: not elsewhere classified
n.e.s.: not elsewhere specified
n.s.p.f.: not separately provided for
x sc: except special category
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2. United States Imports for Consumption from Asian
Countries, Selected Groups, Selected Years, with Indexes
of Value, 1938 = JOO.
(Values in Millions of U.S. Dollars)

TABLE

Group

Year

Total All Groups

1938
1948
1955-7 av.
Group 2. Vegetable
1938
products inedible except 1948
fibers & wood
1955-7 av.
Group 3. Textile Fibers 1938
and manufactures
1948
1955-7 av.
Group 6. Metals and
1938
Manufactures except
1948
Machinery & Vehicles
1955-7 av.

Total U.S. Imports
Total U.S. Imports
for Consumption From Asian Countries
Index
Value
Value
Index
1,949.6
100
508.4
100
7,038.4
361
1,203.6
237
12,281.7
630
359
1,825.2
292.7
175.6
100
100
265
780.2
465.9
267
263
770.1
470.6
268
280.8
100
154.0
100
863.6
308
237
364.8
1,000.6
426.9
356
277
158.7
100
41.0
100
832.7
525
133.5
326
2,219.3
722
1,398
296.2

TABLE 3. United States Exports of Domestic Merchandise to
Asian Countries, Selected Subgroups and Group 7, Selected
Years; Proportion of Asian to Total Exports and of Listed
Commodities to all Commodities.
(Values in Millions of U.S. Dollars)
Commodity
Group or Subgroup
Number
130 Grains and Prepa
rations
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Year
1938
1948
1955-7 av.

Exports to
Total U.S. U.S. Exports Asian Countries
to Asian
as % of
Exports
Countries
Total Exports
2.1
4.6
223.5
15.6
1,704.7
266.6
26.4
1,215.5
321.3
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4. United States Exports of Domestic Merchandise to
Asian Countries, Selected Subgroups and Group 7,
Selected Years, with Indexes of Value, 193 8 100.
(Values in Millions of U.S. Dollars)

TABLE

Commodity
Group or Subgroup
Number
Total All
Commodities
130 Grains and
Preparations
330 Cotton
unmanufactured
513 Petroleum and
Products
Group 7 Machinery
and Vehicles
850 Medicinal and
Pharmaceutical
Preparations
865 Chemical
Specialties
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Total U.S. Exports
Year
1938
1948
1955-7av.
1938
1948
1955-7av.

Value
3,057.2
12,532.1
18,286.0
223.5
1,704.7
1,215.5

1938
1948
1955-7av.
1938
1948
1955-7 av.
1938
1948
1955-7av.
1938
1948
1955-7av.
1938
1948
1955-7av.

224.3
511.0
754.8
388.6
657.1
625.9
848.8
3,718.7
6,380.3
17.1
193.2
252.2
29.0
156.6
454.8

Index
100
410
598
100
763
545
100
228
366
100
169
161
100
438
752
100
1,130
1,475
100
540
1,578

Total Exports to
Asian Countries
Value
Index
100
518.0
303
1,567.3
478
2,476.3
4.6
100
5,796
266.6
6,985
321.3
57.6
53.3
268.2
79.3
66.1
81.0
151.8
313.1
574.6
4.2
30.6
44.6
3.3
12.8
71.7
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100
91
466
100
83
102
100
206
379
100
729
1,062
100
381
2,174

TABLE

5. United States Balance of Merchandise Trade with
Asian Countries, Selected Years, and Net
Nonmilitary Grants and Credits, 1955-57.
(Values in Millions of U.S. Dollars)

Net NonmiliExcess
U.S. Imports U.S. Exports
Exports+ tary Grants
for Consump - of Domestic
Imports
Merchandise
and Credits
tion
58.0
14.6
33.4
1938
India
.,.
29.8
297.5
267.7
1948
+
72.4
41
283.6
211.2
1955-7av.
Included in India
1938
Pakistan
7.9
17.0
24.9
1948
+
102.6
67.8
1955-7av.
75
34.8
1.3
15.0
1938
16.3
Ceylon
52.5
19.3
33.2
1948
22.7
9.8
32.5
1955-7av.
+
2.3
2.1
0.2
1938
Burma
+
1.7
4.5
2.8
1948
+
5.9
2.0
1955-7av.
3.9
+
3.0
0.3
3.3
1938
Thailand
49.2
32.9
1948
16.3
56.5
28
39.0
1955-7av.
95.5
4.1
7.2
3.1
Vietnam, Laos , 1938
+
Cambodia
1948
11.0
14.3
3.3
..27.3
291
1955-7av.
61.7
34.4
103.3
112.1
8.8
British Malaya 1938
187.7
1948
269.5
81.8
176.7
1955-7av.
217.7
41.0
1938
41.3
68.8
27.5
Republic of
+
76.9
Indonesia
1948
91.5
14.6
205.3
1955-7av.
108.0
8
97.3
Republic of the 1938
86.3
94.2
7.9
+
1948
227.5
467.8
220.3
Philippines
+
84.7
256.5
1955-7av.
20
341.2
1938
Republic of
Korea
1948
+
1955-7 av.
6.1
186.8
180.7
301
+
17.6
Hong Kong
3.4
1938
21.0
+
79.3
1948
3.6
82.9
1955-7av.
22.4
42.2
64.6
1938
Taiwan
+
4.7
1948
1.0
5.7
+
1955-7av.
7.6
105.3
97.7
99
+
Japan
1938
131.6
238.8
107.2
+
1948
263.2
59.7
322.9
+
1955-7av.
521.9
918.6
396.7
59
+
Australia
1938
8.8
68.8
60.0
113.8
1948
131.8
18.0
1955-7av.
+
168.3
197.2
28.9
+
New Zealand
1938
7.4
23.4
16.0
+
1948
32.8
33.9
1.1
1955-7av.
55.4
25.0
30.4
+
Total All Asian 1938
508.4
518.0
9.6
+
Countries
1948
1,203.6
1,567.3
363.7
+
1955-7av. 1,825.2
2,476.3
651.1
922
Total All
+ 1,107.6
1938
1,949.6
3,057.2
+ 5,493.7
Countries
1948
7,038.4
12,532.1
+ 6,004.3
1955-7av. 12,281.7
1,811
18,286.0
Country

Year
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The relationship
between United States-Asian trade
and
American foreign investment
and technical assistance programs
R. N. Christiansen
Manager,
Foreign Trade Department,
Marshall and Ilsley Bank
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FOR THE PURPOSE of this discussion the Asian countries will be con
sidered as those belonging to the United Nations ECAFE group ex
cluding the China mainland. The period since the late war has seen
the rise of twelve new countries in Asia, all encouraged and in most
ca.ses actively supported by the United States in their struggle toward
independence. W�th the possible exception of Japan, all of the countries
in the ECAFE group base their economies on agricultural and ex
tractive industries. Exports to the United States consist primarily of
petroleum, rubber, teak, coconut products, tea, hides, tin, fish, chro
iµite, abaca, spices and rice. In most of the countries, one, or at best
two, of these primary commodities are the chief means of acquiring
foreign exchange. Imports from the United States into these countries
have consisted chiefly of consumer and industrial goods with the chief
exception being agricultural exports under our PL 480. During 1957,
the United States trade with Asia consisted of imports amounting to
$1.7 billion and exports of $2.86 billion, 13 and 15 per cent respec
tively of the United States total trade.
Two key points stand out as having affected the balance of this
trade in the last ten years. The first, concerning exports from Asia,
is that the primary commodities produced there and exported have
all been victims of severe price fluctuations. Variations of up to 15-20
per cent in a year's time have not been unusual. The volume of these
exports has fluctuated in almost a parallel manner. The result has
been an unstable foreign exchange return to the individual countries
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and a resultant imbalance in their payments accompanied by disloca
tions in the internal economy. Secondly, the price of exports from
the United States has risen almost continuously in the last ten years.
The pressure of the rising United States price structure on the manu
facturer here has resulted in higher and higher export prices on the
commodities required by Asia. This squeeze, namely an uncertain for
eign exchange return for the Asian countries and the steadily increasing
cost of the goods they wish to import, is further aggravated by problems
of population increase and inadequate food supplies. Almost without
exception, Asian countries have tried to remedy their reliance upon
exports of one or two primary commodities by industrialization. The
problem of increased industrialization is fraught with all too numerous
road blocks. The import of capital goods and know-how is only the
first step in solving this problem. Centuries old patterns of social and
economic reform must necessarily be disrupted and such progress calls
for knowledge far beyond the simple ability to manufacture and dis
tribute industrially produced goods.
It is axiomatic, however, that industrialization is brought about
by the import of capital goods and/ or know-how and that these im
ports must be paid for by exports. Asia's share of the world's exports
has declined from 10.7 per cent in 1950 to some 6.6 per cent in 1957.
Further, private commercial investment in Asia by American firms has
been strikingly limited. Even in Japan, the most highly industrialized
country in Asia, while the number of accepted investments has been
high, the total dollar value of these investments has been low. In most
instances, investments have merely complemented existing industries
and have not produced new exchange earners or conversely exchange
saving production facilities. From the standpoint of its trade with Asia,
the United States is faced with the enigma of Asia's continually growing
population clearly aware of its need to buy the consumer and industrial
commodities best produced here, yet at the same time frustrated by
rising prices in the United States, as well as Asia's disability in selling
commodities at steady prices which would make for economic develop
ment and an accompanying rising standard of living.
In order to fill this gap in trade between the United States and
Asia, the United States has undertaken an extensive program of foreign
aid. In 195 6 this aid amounted to $1,600 million and in 19 5 7 ap
proximately $1,790 million. Of this, military supplies and services
amounted to $643 million and $819 million respectively and other aid
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to $959 million and $972 million respectively. Only about $100 mil
lion of the total aid can be considered as private capital investment,
half of which probably consisted of reinvested earnings produced by
some $700 million presently invested in Asia by United States private
entities. The International Cooperation Administration's grants and
loans amounted to $460 million during 1957 while the Export Import
Bank of Washington, D.C. authorized credits totaling about $260 mil
lion. The remaining balance was chiefly made up by the economic
aid portions of our Mutual Security Program. The major portion of
United States aid in recent years has come from our export of agri
cultural commodities under PL 480. These commodities went toward
filling the gap in the supply of foodstuffs. The majority of the Asian
countries are traditionally net importers of foodstuffs. Two years of
crop failures in India and increased populations of other countries
have resulted in a need for vast amounts of rice and wheat which nor
mally would not be required. The Eximbank cotton loan to Japan
and similar shipments of cotton to India have been yearly features of
this disposal of our surplus agricultural stores. The balance of the
Eximbank loans has been spent to purchase industrial goods primarily
of a development nature. Large projects for power development, land
reclamation and ir�igation programs have been featured in recent years.
Loans of this type have been the chief source of sales of American
industrial products to Asia.
On the face of it our aid in terms of both loans and grants
al?-ounts to a sizeable figure and has been increasing over the last five
years. Unfortunately, however, foreign aid in total and United States
foreign aid in particular has not been sufficient to make up the differ
ence in balance of payments dislocations caused by the severe fluctu
ations of basic export commodity prices. The United Nations Economic
Survey of Asia and the Far East for 1957 clearly states that:
. . . the average year-to-year fluctuations in the export earnings
of Asian primary exporting countries were in all cases above 10
per cent, foreign aid received by these countries amounted to no
more than around 5 per cent of their total export earnings in the
postwar period.
While general statements always bear the burden of possible in230
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accuracy when applied to a specific situation, this does not appear to
be the case when one reviews the area country by country, commodity
by commodity. Without fail, actions by the individual governments
such as export tariffs, import tariffs, foreign exchange restrictions, fixed
and multiple exchange rates, government stockpiling programs, fixed
internal wage rates and other similar control measures have been un
able to produce a stable balance of payments situation. International
commodity agreements such as are presently enforced for wheat, tin
and sugar have not been successful. Price differences within the agree
ments due to the lack of homogeneity of the products controlled con
tinue to thwart the best efforts resulting from the agreements.
Unfortunately the area of solution to the problem of increasing
United States trade with Asia does not lie simply in the problem of
competitive export prices for our goods. Indeed, the problem does not
lie wholly in the area of economics. While a stable, healthy economy
in the United States would serve as a reliable base for the sale of
Asia's primary exports and steady prices would be an important factor
in increasing United States-Asian trade, this solution is not sufficient
to alleviate the problem. Foreign aid and chiefly United States foreign
aid is and will continue to be an absolute requirement. Admittedly an
easing in world tensions could divert substantial amounts of our mili
tary aid into the social and economic areas. While this would be a
most welcome change, its possibility in the immediate years seems
rather remote. Concentration of a sizeable portion of the aid extended
toward increasing local production of foodstuffs through intensive and
extensive methods of cultivation would be one first step and a most
fruitful one. This, coupled with apportioning of aid into the develop
ment of industries designed to process the traditionally exported raw
materials and thereby to encourage a greater use of the all too numerous
labor force in adding value to export products, could produce the great
est economic progress in the shortest period. Lastly, a technical as
sistance program such as has been begun in India based on country
to country needs should prove most beneficial for the long term.
While we accept the fact that private investment can show the
greatest short run results, it appears, in solving the problem of aid and
trade between the United States and Asia, that government programs
intelligently planned and executed are the only practical means of ef
fecting a long run solution. Unfortunately, government to government
programs are too frequently the children of vested political interests
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with the resulting tendency towards large scale projects of a monu
mental nature. Industrialization in Asia must be accomplished on a
highly selective basis through government financial aid and technical
assistance and through the encouragement of private entities to invest
whenever possible. A straightforward, step-by-step program, tightly
administered, will achieve the desired results to the benefit of all
concerned.
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Problems of marketing
Far Eastern products
in the United States
with special reference
to Japan
Laurence P. Dowd
Director, Michigan BUBiness Executives Research Conference,
Lecturer in ,\larketing and Foreign Trade,
School of Business Administration,
University of Michigan
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INTRODUCTION

HE CAUSES oF and cures for the current international economic
problems of the Far East have consumed reams of paper and many
hours of discussion in the last few years. That conditions of trade in
which imports have totalled an annual amount nearly twice that of ex
ports cannot continue indefinitely has received much attention. Eco
nomists, usually· emphasizing "pet" theories, have proposed nearly as
many solutions as there are economists. Most of these proposals have
turned on the need to remove restrictions on the import of Far Eastern
products into the United States, on the encouragement of more foreign
·investment in Asia, or on the admittance of the nations as full members
of various international economic and financial agencies. Some, especi
ally "leftish" theoretical economists, have advocated as the solution a
greatly expanded trade with Communist China and the Communist
area in general. Some, and even perhaps all, of these "pet" theories
may have validity; but they tend to be expounded somewhat unrealisti
cally. They do not explain how their proposals can be achieved in
practice. They do not point out, for instance, that the United States
government is strongly politically influenced by special interest groups
and that the practical possibility of lowering restrictions is very remote.
They do not point out that Communism exists only for the benefit of
the Communists. They do not understand or discuss the difficulties of
business organizations which in themselves have no direct influence
over governmental policy. They do not mention, perhaps most im-
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portant of all, that in the final analysis trade depends upon successful
selling by individual business firms.
In this paper no "pet" economic theory will be proposed. Rather,
economic and political theories and policies will be accepted as they
exist-and probably will continue to exist for some time in the future
and the problems of the individual business organization engaged in
trying to export to the United States will be emphasized. As these are
discussed, solutions, where such are possible, will be suggested. Re
member, however, that if the problems of individual firms can be rec
ognized and improvements made, a major step will be taken by the
resultant increase in successful, efficient trade toward solving the inter
national economic problems of the Far East.
The comments which follow are based not only upon the writer's
experience and knowledge as a professor of marketing, but also on
practical experience in foreign trade, including such activities as mem
bership on the Board of Trustees and the Merchandising Committee
of the Washington State International Trade Fair Corporation, an or
ganization established for the primary purpose of increasing Far Eastern
imports into the United States, and a past presidency of the business
men's foreign trade association of Seattle. They also summarize reports
received from businessmen regularly engaged in trade with the Far East.
Some General Economic Considerations

Before particular export problems are discussed some general eco
nomic considerations must be mentioned because of their influence on
solutions of the practical problems. First, the Far East generally is
faced with an ostensibly serious situation in the absence of modem
capital equipment. As a result, much production is carried on with
outmoded machinery or must even rely upon handicraft for the creation
of export commodities. Yet, surprisingly. in part this may be a benefit
rather than a hindrance. Second, for a number of reasons typical en
terprises are operating under unduly high costs of production. This
only naturally tends to cause an impairment in the quality of products.
Third, business is hampered by some unrealistic economic policies,
many of which unfortunately were recommended to the governments
by American economic advisors who had no knowledge of basic eco
nomic conditions in the Far East. Fourth, all countries are highly
dependent upon commodity trade to achieve equilibrium in the balance
of payments. Unlike other areas, few "services" can be rendered to
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others. And fifth, the area is faced with important changes in the nature
of world demand, changes which must be accepted as there is no way
in which they can be influenced. For instance, American women today
prefer nylon stockings to silk with the resultant loss of the previously
highly important market for raw silk; synthetic rubber is gradually re
placing natural rubber; and consumers today want high quality products
of original design rather than the cheap imitations of American products
which sold so extensively in the 1930 decade.
All of these make it difficult for the countries concerned to develop
their export potential. But it makes it more vital that there be a
thorough understanding of marketing methods and techniques and that
intensive effort be devoted to the marketing of their products in the
United States, for only by doing so can these difficulties be overcome.
Marketing Research
Significance of Marketing Research - To plan marketing pro
grams effectively, especially in foreign countries, it is necessary to
know what products customers desire, how many they desire, why they
buy, where they buy and other similar facts. The importance of such
research as an essential of successful selling cannot be stressed suf
ficiently.
One of the most important export problems of producers in the
Far East has been a failure to recognize this need for marketing re
search or to use it extensively. To date, only a few firms have done
anything at all which even remotely could be so classified.
The results of not using this essential tool are readily observed.
'For example, in the last decade in the United States there has been
a notable increase in the knowledge of foreign products as a result of
a number of factors, including residence of service personnel overseas
and increased interest in the Far East in our educational system. Con
sequently, American consumers have come to desire products of the
Far Eastern civilizations and cultures. Yet quality products of those
civilizations are not available in more than limited quantities. No longer
does the consumer want large quantities of cheap imitations of Ameri
can produced products; but Far Eastern producers, particularly those
in Japan, still tend to concentrate on these cheap imitations.
Some Essential Aspects of Marketing Research - One of the
most essential bases for successful selling is to develop products in
accordance with consumer desires. Few firms in the United States try
to market a product without a considerable period of study concerning
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appropriate design. From numerous inspections of Far Eastern prod
ucts at international trade fairs both in the United States and in Japan
there is ample evidence that little product research is undertaken.
Changes in desires in the last twenty years - in fact, even in the last
five years - have not been recognized. Not only do products continue
to be predominantly imitations of American products, but also they
are imitations of products which have not been purchased in large
quantities for some period of time.
Only a modicum of research would quickly reveal the current
consumer preference for products of other cultures. And such research
would have disclosed the more important fact that there are no re
strictive tariffs imposed on such products, for they do not compete
with American production. Hence, exports of these derivatives of well
developed civilizations, produced by highly skilled craftsmen, would
not only add immeasurably to foreign currency earnings but also would
provide a maximum of employment for a skilled labor force.
An aspect of product design necessary for consumer acceptance is
correct naming and packaging. Since a large part of total retail buying
in the United States today is done on a "self-service" basis, packaging
must be such as to attract the customer in the self-service store. Many
hours and many dollars are spent even by small manufacturers in ar
riving at a "brand name" which will be acceptable and will stimulate
purchasers to buy. Even more research is devoted to packaging. Only
a few Far Eastern products are marketed with appealing brand names
or contained in attractive packages. Commonly a plain paper or wooden
box is used which detracts from the salability of the merchandise rather
than adding to it.
Another important objective of marketing research is to establish
a sound price policy. It is axiomatic to American manufacturers and
sellers that product prices must be similar to those of competitors and
discounts or allowances granted to middlemen must be in accordance
with established practices. Of course, if a product is priced too high
it will not sell. But more important, a commodity which is priced too
low also will not sell, for a low price indicates to buyers that it is of
poor quality, and American consumers no longer want low quality
products. Moreover, and of particular significance to Far Eastern pro
ducers, an unduly low price for a product is considered by competitors
to be prima-facie evidence of dumping with consequent pressure placed
on the government for import restrictions. An outstanding example of
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this occurred not long ago in textiles. The Japanese textile industry
produces large quantities of well made fabrics. As a result of failure
to engage in research as to proper prices to charge in the American
market, products were being sold at prices substantially below those of
American manufacturers. Strong pressure for restrictions were exerted,
and this pressure was temporarily alleviated only by the Japanese gov
ernment imposing "voluntary" restrictions on exports. Had the Japa
nese textile industry undertaken marketing research to determine ap
propriate prices and established a sound price policy as a result of the
findings of this research, there would have been no move for import
restrictions.
Marketing research is further essential in determining ways of cre
ating a desire for products. Desire for specific products is fundamentally
created by advertising. Few Far Eastern exporters have discovered the
essential need for advertising for marketing success; those which have
engaged in advertising have paid little attention to appropriate appeals
to stimulate demand. Commonly, advertising by Far Eastern producers
has consisted merely of listing the company name and products pro
duced. This differs widely from methods and techniques used in the
United States. Furthermore, American techniques change rapidly as
new ways of stimulating demand are discovered. Yet as far as can be
determined no :research is being conducted by Far Eastern firms to
ascertain ways in which they can utilize advertising more effectively.
The foregoing paragraphs summarize merely a few ways in which
marketing research can be of great value to producers and exporters
· from the Far East. There are many others which cannot be discussed
here because of limitations on the length of this paper. However, these
paragraphs will serve to point out that, though marketing research is
absolutely essential, it is not being utilized to develop the all important
American market.
Problems of Marketing Research - It may appear difficult for a
business organization in the Far East to engage in analysis of the Ameri
can market. The great majority are small and have available only lim
ited financial resources. Moreover, few businessmen are experienced
in marketing research methods. However, there are a number of ways
in which it can be done even by small firms.
There are in existence in the United States a number of firms which
specialize in marketing research for manufacturers and middlemen.
They adjust their charges for their services depending upon the extent
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of the program desired. This may range from a few dollars to many
thousand. Some of these firms maintain offices in the leading cities
of the Far East and would welcome the opportunity of carrying out a
project for a Far Eastern producer. Any enterprise seriously consider
ing developing its sales in the United States can easily contact one of
these specialist research organizations. Their names and addresses are
available from many sources.
A more immediate method of utilizing the benefits of research is
through seeking the advice and assistance of American sales outlets.
They want to carry products which will sell, and will readily advise
as to what must be done to make products salable. They will advise
on kinds and styles of merchandise which are selling well including
such things as appropriate packaging. But from information furnished
the writer by a number of American organizations specializing in sell
ing Far Eastern products, rather than seeking advice, many Far Eastern
producers have been unwilling to accept suggestions forwarded to
them. Recommendation for creation of new designs have been refused,
proposals to share jointly the costs of advertising have been turned
down, and suggestions as to the best market area in the United States
in which to concentrate sales of products have been ignored.
A preliminary form of marketing research could be carried on at
no expense. In every major city in the countries concerned there are
American cultural centers. These centers maintain extensive libraries
of periodic publications which show not only products currently in
demand but also contain articles explaining successful marketing meth
ods. For those desiring information on the techniques of marketing
research, almost all have the latest textbooks on the subject. Moreover,
in all the embassies and most consulates there are economic and com
mercial libraries which contain many highly useful reference volumes.
For instance, one volume which the writer has found in almost all the
libraries referred to is a United States Department of Commerce publi
cation, Market Research Sources. And all have another extremely valu
able publication by the Department of Commerce, Selling the United
States Market. But it is interesting, though disturbing, to note that these
cost-free sources of information are not being used by those to whom
they would prove most useful. Inquiries made of a large number of
businessmen not only in Japan but also in other countries have revealed
that few had ever been in a cultural center or an embassy commercial
library, and those who had visited these sources had done so for pur239

poses other than engaging in research concerning marketing of products
m the United States.
Until the need for marketing research by Far Eastern business
men is recognized, and until some preliminary education is furnished
as to simple, elementary ways in which research can be undertaken
and utilized, the export potential of the Far Eastern nations to the
United States will not be adequately developed. If and when it is recog
nized that continuous study is necessary concerning marketable products
and methods of marketing products, a long step will have been taken
to reduce existing serious dollar shortages and remove the necessity of
drastic dollar exchange controls.
Product Distribution
Let us turn now to another problem of marketing Far Eastern
products in the United States. This is the physical distribution of prod
ucts. It is apparent from discussions with a large number of Far Eastern
businessmen that a general belief exists that all that is necessary is to
produce; and once the products are created buyers will come to pur
chase. As Peter Drucker ably pointed out in a recent article, one of
the most common weaknesses of underdeveloped areas is a failure to
provide for adequate marketing of products. 1 "Yet marketing occupies
a critical role in respect to the development of ... 'growth' areas. In
deed marketing· is the most important 'multiplier' of such develop
ment." Even Japan, which is by far the most advanced of the Far
Eastern nations, has not recognized the significance of providing ap
propriate means of physical distribution.
· Domestic Channels of Distribution - One of the major shortcomings
of producers in the area is continued reliance on traditional domestic
channels of distribution. With few exceptions, exports are sold through
"trading companies" rather than directly to importers. Though a few
of the trading companies have modernized their methods slightly, con
servatism and traditionalism continue to dominate their business ac
tivities. Study of their marketing policies indicates that they are re
luctant to handle the sale of products other than those which sold
readily in the nineteen-thirties and for which orders can be obtained
without exerting any extensive sales effort. Moreover, rather than
going out and promoting the sale of the products they tend to sit and
wait for buyers to come to them. Until manufacturers abandon these
1

"Marketing and Economic Development," The Journal of Marketing, XXII,
No. 3 (January, 1958) 252-59.
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tradition-bound organizations and directly promote sales in foreign
countries, or until they can convince the trading companies to give up
their traditional conservatism, their export potential will not be devel
oped to the fullest.
Foreign Channels of Distribution - In the years since World War II
many reliable foreign businessmen have visited the Far East to place
orders and establish dependable channels of distribution. But unfortu
nately there have also been a large number of unreliable businessmen.
They are what can only be called "carpet baggers." These latter busi
nessmen have been interested only in making a quick profit for them
selves without regard to the effect on the economies of the exporting
countries or on the long run development of export potential. Most
of these carpet baggers have not had established sales outlets in the
United States and were basing their activities on an opportunity to make
a quick profit by buying cheap and selling dear.
Businessmen in the Far East, unacquainted with fundamental
marketing principles and unable to see the need for long range sound
market development rather than merely making quick sales, commonly
accepted the offers received without questioning the implications in
volved. As long as payment was tendered at the time an order was
placed no questions were asked. They did not realize that such buyers
should have been required to furnish financial references and other
evidence of reliability as is normally provided by reliable American
importers. Nor did they see that, rather than developing export trade,
these unreliable importers were tending to destroy export potential
through failure to establish sound channels of distribution.
Typically, Far Eastern exporters consider the United States as
one market rather than a number of separate and distinct markets.
Moreover, they do not analyze the relation of their productive capacity
to the size of the market with the result that as demand develops they
find they cannot fill orders received within time limits specified. When,
as a result of delayed deliveries of promised quantities, orders are can
celled and importers refuse to engage in further business, they do not
understand that the fault lies in poor selection of channels of distribu
tion rather than in decline in market demand.
Striking in Far Eastern exporters' selection of channels of dis
tribution is an almost universal insistence on selling through importers
located only in the major eastern American cities, particularly New
York and Chicago. With only a quick, superficial glance at population
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distribution and business organization they tend to believe these are the
best outlets for their commodities. Consequently, there is a tendency
to concentrate on establishing contact with buyers in those areas and
to disregard other parts of the country. Actually, in many instances
attempting to develop channels of distribution only through New York
and Chicago is an extremely unwise policy. In the first place, should
an undeveloped market exist in these areas for their products, it would
probably be far in excess of productive capacity. But more important,
by focusing in the eastern half of the United States they are competing
with European producers, many of whom have far more experience in
selling to the United States. Breaking into the market in the face of
such competition is extremely difficult.
The Middle West and Far West remain largely an untapped mar
ket for Far Eastern products; yet it is a market which is potentially
highly desirable and in which channels of distribution could be estab
lished easily. Because of the distance from Europe, producers in that
area have tended to prefer to let the West remain a latent market, at
least up to the present. Because of the geographical proximity of the
western part of the United States to the Far East, substantial distribu
tion cost savings could be effected. Moreover, as a result of closer
cultural contact� with the Far East there has been a larger penetration
of products of that area into the mode of living than has occurred in
the eastern part of the. United States. And Far Eastern products are
better suited to the simplified, functional styles of Western homes and
dress.
One final problem which stands out in foreign channels of dis
tribution for Far Eastern products has been a tendency to insist on
selling only through large national wholesalers or retailers. Inquiries
received from small, though reliable, regional wholesalers located in
cities in such states as Wisconsin and Minnesota are frequently ignored.
Japanese producers and exporters in particular appear uninterested in
developing sales outlets other than such large organizations as Macy's,
Sears Roebuck, Woolworth's, or the Allied Mercantile Corporation.
Yet these organizations are not suitable for developing the exports of
those products having the greatest potential for a balanced economy.
Local or regional wholesalers would be much more suitable for market
development of fine quality products of the essentially handicraft proc
esses.
242

American Trade with Asia and the Far East

Other Marketing Problems
In addition to inadequate marketing research and lack of attention
to appropriate channels of distribution there are a number of other
problems which tend to limit the market development possibilities for
Far Eastern products. It is impossible to present all of them fully; but
they should be mentioned at least briefly.
Quality Maintenance-Most domestic purchasing in Far Eastern coun
tries is based on physical inspection of commodities offered for sale.
Hence, variations in quality are permissible as they can be observed
readily. As a result, far less emphasis is placed on quality control than
in American production. One of the most frequently expressed diffi
culties in buying from Far Eastern sources has been the failure to secure
products of uniform quality. In fact, some American marketing or
ganizations now are reluctant to buy Far Eastern products because of
previous unfavorable experiences. Far Eastern producers must be
made to realize that, since American buyers usually order on the basis
of specification or sample, quality control must be carefully observed.
Delivery - In Far Eastern markets there is much less variation in
volume of sales throughout the year than is usual in the United States.
Time of delivery is of less importance and marketing organizations are
set up with the expectation of irregular delivery. American buyers
place orders and specify delivery dates in anticipation of peak selling
seasons; a failure to receive delivery by the time specified can prove
quite disruptive. A number of importers have advised the writer that
one reason they prefer to buy from European sources is that promised
delivery dates are frequently ignored by Far Eastern sources, with com
modities arriving some time after the selling season has passed. Con
siderable education is needed on the necessity to deliver at promised
times and especially on the importance of not accepting orders unless
it is certain that a specified delivery date can be met.
Guarantee and Servicing - It is relatively uncommon when buying
commodities in Far Eastern markets to receive a guarantee or have the
seller provide for servicing. Rather, a policy of caveat emptor still
tends to persist. With a few notable exceptions, such as the guarantees
and servicing facilities of the Canon and Nikon cameras, this policy
carries over into exporting. But the American buyer knows that from
time to time products of even the best production methods will have
defects or need servicing. Unless confidence is established by furnishing
guarantees, buyers will hesitate to place orders. Abandonment of caveat
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emptor in exporting will serve in large measure to build up confidence
in Far Eastern products and stimulate increased purchasing by Ameri
can importers.
Price Maintenance - In Japan at least, and it is believed in other Far
Eastern countries, the one-price system is almost as universal as in the
United States. Of course, "discounting" of prices is practiced as it is in
the United States; but with few exceptions stores in Japan follow a
one-price policy quite closely. Japanese sellers, having had experience
with American tourists and the carpet bagger importers, seem to have
come to believe that price negotiation is expected when doing busi
ness with the United States. Partly because of this and partly because
of an inadequately developed system of cost accounting and cost con
trols, an initial price will be quoted which they believe to be the highest
they might secure. If this price is not accepted, it will be lowered until
a sale is made. They apparently do not realize that confidence will not
be created by failing to adhere to a one-price system. Furthermore,
Japanese business closely guards business secrets, especially prices paid
for purchases. They apparently do not realize that much price informa
tion is exchanged in the United States between otherwise close com
petitors. When it is determined that sellers are quoting different prices
to buyers in the same class, reliable American firms tend to lose con
fidence and .hesitate to place orders. Reliable American businessmen
can be a great help to the inexperienced Far East.em exporter if they
will do their utmost to ·educate their sources of supply on the adverse
effects of entering into price bargaining.
Conclusions
Of all the aspects of business in the underdeveloped nations of the
Far East marketing is perhaps the most underdeveloped. Yet with few
exceptions, future economic development rests upon successful export
marketing of their products. At the present time their export potential
is being seriously limited because of problems created through lack
of knowledge of modern marketing methods. Education in marketing
cannot come overnight and is not easily acquired. Moreover, educa
tion will not develop until the need is clearly recognized.
Although adequate capital accumulation is an essential problem
of all the countries, it is no greater a problem than adequate market
development. But up to the present time attention of economists and
other experts has been centered in discovering means for providing
for capital accumulation. A shift in emphasis is now needed to place
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equal responsibility on developing efficient marketing methods. And
as the United States is the most advanced nation of the world in devel
opment of marketing methods, the initiative must come from this source.
Initial steps in marketing education must come from American
businessmen doing business with the Far Eastern countries. Sugges
tions for the direct solution of the problems discussed in the previous
pages, including correction of existing disruptive or uneconomic prac
tices, can easily be made. As the importance of marketing research,
appropriate channels of distribution, quality controls, delivery, sound
price policy and other aspects comes to be recognized strong stimula
tion will be provided for internal education by governmental agencies
and educational institutions - education almost totally lacking at
present.
Finally, as the benefits of improved marketing methods in export
ing are observed, these same methods will come to be adopted in do
mestic marketing. At that time the marketing multiplier in economic
development will begin to exert its full force and the countries of the
Far East will experience an era of unprecedented economic advance
ment.
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POTENTIALS DISCERNIBLE IN

1920's

universal dependence on agricultural produc
tion in all countries of Asia in the decade immediately preceding the
first world war. Total needs for subsistence of the many were great.
So were the demands for conspicuous consumption by the rest. Most
processes of production were backward, as measured by standards in
industrialized Western countries. Exceptions were to be found in some
Japanese industries. In the larger countries, India and China, goods such
as textiles, chinaware and jewel ry, in the production of which more
of artistic skill than technical or mechanical efficiency was required, had
become well known in international trade.
The use of savings for investment for production of goods and
services had not been widely institutionalized. This may be explained,
in part, in terms of scarcity of money and a propensity to conserve
savings. Many loans were secured by property or other tangible assets,
but even so, interest rates for most purposes were very high. It is
also true that demand for savings for investment was deficient, relative
to needs of income.
Surprisingly, several of the countries were able to achieve an ex
cess of the value of exports to the United States, Britain and other
countries over the value of imports. However, the difference was not
largely used to purchase capital goods. In nearly all of the countries
harsh restriction of consumption of the one class and self-denial most
THERE WAS ALMOST
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objectionable to the other would have had to be imposed if savings were
to increase at reasonable rates.
The shortage of vitally needed savings may be better explained in
terms of tradition and culture than in economic terms. Inherited status
in most Asian societies had precluded or severely narrowed possibilities
for distinction by individual initiative and achievement, and most of
the higher education had been of a philosophical character. 1
There were other specific reasons why the contributions of Asia
to world trade in this period consisted mainly of agricultural and un
processed mineral products. There was no lack of mineral and poten
tial power resources in Asia, taken as a region. In fact, the countries
of the region are complementary in so far as availability of these re
sources is concerned. As reasons for the slow rates of economic growth
we are to set down instead: (a) lack of skills, (b) shortage of capital,
(c) traditions which emphasized community solidarity and well-being
more than individual initiative and achievement, (d) colonialism, which
required accelerated production of some goods for export without proc
essing or with only the preliminary stages done, and (e) a sense of
sufficiency.
Three examples drawn from widely separated areas of Asia may
be given in some detail: Australia, Indonesia and India. It will be
shown that relatively late or limited development or underdevelopment
in each of these countries has been due to one or more of these causes.
Australia: About 70 per cent of Australia's exports between 1900
and 1914 consisted of wheat, wool and metals. The country was de
pendent on imports for most manufactures. Home factory production
was limited largely to woolen textiles, clothing and foodstuffs. The
war of 1914-1918 was to prove that this dependence, mainly on Britain,
was not inevitable. But the industrial activities of Australia during the
war also proved that a country which industrializes prematurely may
attain to an apparently significant position in international trade only
to have it wrested away by competitors. 2 Trade diversion results and
countries which had participated in promoting the premature growth
may lose much of their gains.
In the immediate prewar era Australia had a sufficient proportion
Maurice Zinkin, Development for Free Asia (London: Chatto & Windus,
1956), pp. 6-7, 179,207.
2 Kate L. Mitchell, Industrialization of the Western Pacific (New York: In
stitute of Pacific Relations), pp. 241-42.
1
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of the prerequisites for indus trialization, but lacked some essential skills,
and also drive. But under pressure of sheer need, due to isolation,
manufacturing was accelerated. By 1920 the value of manufactured
goods produced in a year had increased from £63.3 million to £81.4
million. But more important than this was the fact that heavy industry
had been fairly established. From 1921 until the depression after the
first world war manufacturing processes made the largest contribution
to the value of production.
However, the hastily established wartime industries were unable
to compete, even in the home market, with reviving British and foreign
export industries, and as early as 1921 the government resorted to
tariff protection which was extended to a wider range of industries in
the late 1920's. Moreover, high cost of industrial production, a con
sequence of mushroom growth, required Australia to practice price
discrimination in favor of external markets, if the country was to es
tablish an export trade in manufactures. There appears to be no evi
dence, however, that this was practiced as policy, but the export trade
in manufactures was negligible at the end of the l 920's. The largest
single group of items was raw materials and pastoral goods. 3 The be�
ginning of industrialization in textiles and metals was not an initial
failure. It is clearly evident that the setback which Australia suffered
was due to ins.ufficiency of skills.
Indonesia: The Dutch had established a "culture system" in this
group of colonies as far back as 1830-1870. A land revenue was
exacted in the form of export crops, and additional quantities of these
crops were purchased by the government at prices calculated to bring
large profits when the goods were resold. The only other form of pro
duction encouraged under this, the Van den Bosch Plan, was sub
sistence crops. The plan worked so well that the Dutch treasury, en
riched by the revenue from land, had difficulty in finding ways of in
creasing its expenditure on the same scale. The Dutch, at home, were
not a very enterprising people and seemed to lack the initiative neces
sary to use effectively all the new revenue obtained from sale in Holland
of the crops collected as tax and the quantities purchased at govern
ment prices. So the plan conceived by Joannes Van den Bosch under
pressure from William I to get more profit out of the East Indies res Ibid., pp. 242-43.
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sulted, in conspicuous part, in the famous Treasury surpluses, which
were rather embarrassing.
The plan was ill-conceived. Importation of the cheap agricultural
products, of which coffee was the most sought after, could have resulted
in reduction of Dutch cost of living and consequently production costs,
if there were a wide variety of these products or if they included some
of the main articles of consumption or raw materials for production.
Coffee could not make much of a contribution of this character. 4 But
more important still was the fact that apart from shipping, in which
the Dutch were unusually competent, they were not establishing many
industries that seemed destined to occupy any significant competitive
place in world markets. Holland has grown up mainly as an efficient
agricultural country, with some manufacturing industries, using farm
products.
The peculiar form of prosperity generated by government enter
prise in Indonesia actuated Dutch businessmen to claim a major role.
At the same time a change in organization of production was socially
desirable, for the prosperity which was enjoyed in the colony was not
shared by the growers of the crops compulsorily produced. Thus, a
"Liberal System" was instituted which allowed private enterprise to
acquire plantations formerly managed by the government. A conflict
then arose between planting and manufacturing interests. The planters
could gain by paying low wages and exporting the products, but the
manufacturers, particularly of cotton goods, were interested primarily
in markets, which, it was held, could be expanded by increase in wages.
Hence, chambers of commerce emphasized welfare, which became the
economic objective of an "ethical policy" which succeeded the liberal
policy. Thus at the beginning of this century development by modern
means was avowed as essential policy for promotion of welfare, which
became mixed with ethics. 5
Nevertheless the Dutch government's interest in developing mod
ern industries, or even in improving handicrafts, flagged, up to the end
of the 1920's. Netherlands India was still to be preserved as market
for Dutch manufactures. What capital investment there was in the
4

J. S. Furnivall, "Colonial Policy and Practice," and A. M. Joekes, "Develop
ments in the Administration of Indonesia," in Colonial Administration by
European Powers (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1946),
pp. 21-23, 220-23.
5 Ibid., pp. 223-26.
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1920's was shared by several foreign countries, the largest investments
being those of Holland, Britain and the United States, in that order.
More than half of the external capital was invested in agriculture and
most of the rest in transportation, extractive industries and banking.
The main products were sugar, rubber, tea, coffee, oil palms, to
bacco, cinchona and coconuts. It was an unbalanced economy, based
on foreign needs of raw materials and a few other products. While
dependence on exports was great there was not a sufficient variety of
goods exported for substantial competition in foreign markets when the
prices of some declined. Thus Netherlands India's economy became
very vulnerable to fluctuations in world prices. Even Dutch govern
ment officials were gravely concerned about its unstable character. 6
Inevitably, in the world depression of the early 1930's the value of
Indonesian exports fell. very low, by as much as 67 per cent, while
their volume declined by 17 per cent. This meant, in effect, that a very
unfavorable change in the terms of trade had taken place.
The trade of Netherlands India need not have come to this pass.
Its people, particularly the Javanese, are industrious. The soil and
climate are most favorable to tropical agriculture. There was a very
considerable export trade in sugar with India while the United States
imported $2,500,000 worth of kapok annually. Indonesia was third
in the world as· an exporter of tea, the world's most important source
of quinine, the major tobacco-producing area in the East Indies, and
the chief producer of rubber. To these palm oil may be added, as a
growing industry, in the 1920's.7 The United States also imported rub. ber, copra, tapioca and spices.
But manufacturing industries had not achieved much more than to
supply the home market with basic needs, except in the production of
hats. Bergsmark makes the paucity of mineral resources a sufficient
condition for minimizing the prospects of industrial growth. This could
be true of any country in the short run. Thereafter the development
of skills and the rate of increase in productivity may become the deci
sive factors, as they have been in Japan. The Japanese home market
is now approximately the same as Indonesia's, in terms of population
although not of income. Agricultural productivity is in the main greater,
6
7

Mitchell, op. cit., pp. 197-200.
Daniel R. Bergsmark, Economic Geography of Asia (New York: Prentice Hall,
Inc., 1935), pp. 306-07, 314-18.
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but there is greater diversity of substantial crops in Indonesia. And as
an industrialized country Japan is very deficient in minerals.
India: The potentials of India, which were clearly discernible in
the 1920's, are little realized even today. It was amply evident that
India was not a country whose well-being depended only on agricul
tural improvement and only negligible industrial activities. This had
been its type of economy so long, under colonialism, that it was widely
assumed that the country could have no other. Actually the potentials
for industrial growth, as could be seen in the 1920's, were impressive:
a) The cultivated land of India was approximately nineteen times
that of Australia. This was less than proportionate, but Australia was
able to export more agricultural products than India. The country's
300,000,000 acres of arable land made it, potentially, a leading agri
cultural country, but only in some fields did performance justify its
place among leaders. Toward the end of the 1920's India was the
world's second largest producer of cotton and sugar cane and was pro
ducing 95 per cent of the jute entering international commerce. It
was among the largest producers of tea, grain, sorghums, flax, rice, barley
and corn, and fifth largest producer of wheat. 8
b) India's industrial possibilities in the 1920's could have been
seen in the variety and quantities of mineral resources, the large pro
portion of raw materials in this country's exports, and the population
of 350,000,000, which could become the second largest market in Asia.
In Bergsmark's work, published in 1935, India was credited with
possession of "the materials that go to build up commerce." He was
satisfied that "the products of the geographical regions are sufficiently
varied to encourage domestic trade," and there was excess for export.
A comprehensive picture of industrial activities is presented. The num
ber of workers in manufacturing industries in the late 1920's and early
1930's was about three times the number so engaged in the British
Isles. There were artistic tastes of a high order, but industry generally
was at the workshop stage.9
Works of a less geographical character than Bergsmark's, and of
more economic and social interest, show the possibilities of develop
ment more fully. They note, for example, that mineral resources in
clude superior quality iron ore equal to three-fourths of the reserves
in the United States, large deposits of manganese, bauxite, chromite,
8
9

Ibid., pp. 172, 186, 196.
Ibid., pp. 240, 227-30.
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mica, copper, coal and other minerals. India also possesses sources of
hydro electric power second only to those of the United States. Largely
because of these resources and a heritage of skilled craftsmanship, one
of the later writers, Kate Mitchell, reached the conclusion that India
was, potentially, "one of the most powerful industrial areas of the
world."10 This was much the same as Hubbard's evaluation four years
earlier. 11
Why, then, was India's industrial progress so slow? The answers
seem obvious: lack of capital was noted earlier as a disadvantage in
Asia as a whole, insufficient variety of skills, a capacity to endure
privation, and, most important of all, colonialism. Lack of skills, and
capital are not very satisfactory explanations, for an Indian iron and
steel industry was started as early as 1911, and we have seen that arts
and crafts had been developed, although large-scale production was
not typical. The slow rate of progress from the cottage and workshop
to the modern factory has been due largely to colonialism.
Before India became a British colony there was a widely distributed
handicraft industry which, with agriculture, provided modest living
standards. Colonialism severely disturbed this without improving it,
until wartime needs made improvement imperative but for reasons
other than Indian needs. Instead of importing surplus raw materials
from India and 'investing there in more efficient production of them and
selling manufactured goods to workers engaged in such production,
which could have been· temporarily viable, Britain 'enforced almost free
entry of her manufactured goods, raised high British tariffs against In
dian products and restricted Indian trade with other countries. An
outstanding example of the change in the character of India's foreign
trade was cotton. India had exported cotton goods to the world for
centuries but became an importer of 25 per cent of British cotton
exports. 12
The British economic policy was probably more successful than
could be hoped for. Many handicraft skills were lost to India. This
vital part of the country's economy was virtually destroyed in some
areas and no manufacturing industries were established which replaced
the craftsmen by workers with factory skills. Thus India's production
10

Mitchell, op. cit., pp. 275-77.

G. E. Hubbard, Eastern Industrialization and its Effect on the West (Oxford
University Press, 1938), p. 304.
12 Mitchell, op. cit., pp. 279-80.
11
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in some areas became one-sided and the economy resembled that of
Netherlands India, but more needlessly unbalanced. The policy not
only impoverished the country, thus making it a lesser market for Brit
ish manufactures, but also created the delusion that India must always
be in the main a producer of food and raw materials. That miscon
ception still exists.
It has been mentioned that British wartime needs in the East in
1914-1918 brought a change of policy in favor of Indian industrial
development, but imperial tariff preference which became the dominant
colonial policy from the late 1920's was unfavorable to this change.
This well-known policy, which culminated in the protective decisions
reached at the Imperial Economic Conference held in Ottawa in 1932,
required India, as other colonies, to give tariff preference to British
manufactures in exchange for British preference given to Indian raw
materials. Thus was India's dependence on raw materials again em
phasized, while Indian manufacturing industries, such as they were,
had to compete with British industries at technical disadvantages.
It was obvious that the British policy was directed to the most
advantageous competition possible, with Indian and foreign industries
in the Indian market, when the depression set in. This was part of
an empire-wide effort to secure a larger part of a smaller world trade.
It was impossible of success. The prices of many Indian products fell
very low, so that exports to India could be increased only if British
prices were reduced.
Ceylon: Separation of Ceylon from India, as a region, does not
seem to be fully justified, but there was little choice if India was to be
kept distinct. Ceylon had gained a place in international markets mainly
by exporting rubber, tea, graphite ( which declined in competition), coco
nut products, cinnamon and citronella oil. As a British colony it did not
find a market for most of its exports in Britain. The United States was a
large buyer of Ceylonese rubber and tea.
Siam: Of this country's products which were traded internationally,
teak was very important to Europe as a rot-resisting timber; rice was
an important source of wealth, largely as an export to other Asiatic
countries. Tin and rubber also entered international trade. Manu
facturing had hardly begun, in the 1920's. Trading interest in the
United States was small.
Malaya: Until quite recently a British colony, this country is well
known as a major source of rubber and tin. The United States had
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become the largest importer, mainly of rubber. The consequences of
expansion of production of synthetic rubber to rubber-producing coun
tries were probably greater in the case of Malaya than in that of Indo
nesia or Ceylon. A partial analysis of this is given in a later section.
French Indochina: This country was an exporter of rice in the
1920's, and, of lesser importance, coal and rubber. As in Siam and
Malaya, the prospects for manufacturing seemed to be almost entirely
prospects for establishment of light industries.
Philippines: These islands, too, had essentially an agricultural eco
nomy in the 1920's, but as a colony of the United States they had made
more progress than European colonies in Asia. Although there was
restriction of trade, the United States, as the metropolitan country, took
most of the exports and the Philippines were thus able to consistently
achieve an excess of the value of exports over the value of imports.
The exports were mainly such agricultural products as sugar, hemp,
coconuts, coconut oil, tobacco and timber. There was mutual tariff
preference, but the preference could hardly have had serious adverse
effects, for the Philippines were thus assured of a very large market
and the United States was the most efficient producer of many of their
imports. Thus prices in the United States, of both Philippine exports
and imports, remained the main determinants of the terms of trade.
The islands ·were better endowed with the material prerequisites
for manufacturing industry than most if not all of the countries in this
region of Asia. Typical industries were homecrafts, such as needlework,
and some factories processing agricultural products. The Philippines
possessed iron ore, but the quantities had not yet been established.
Sources of water power existed.
Japan: The story of dependence on agriculture in the 1920's
could be repeated here. The two most important items in the external
commodity trade of this country were raw silk, for which the United
States was the best market, and raw cotton, for which Japan was one
of the best markets of the United States. But Japan had begun to make
active use of the resources it had for industrial development, and by
the end of the 'twenties there was a significant increase in exports of
manufactured goods and imports of raw materials.
The most valuable resources were coal, copper, and sources of
hydro-electric power. In addition, climatic conditions were favorable
to the production of raw silk. But there were some deficiencies which
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were serious disadvantages. The first of these, in order of indispens
ability, was the supply of iron ore.
Industrial growth started with a double dependence on foreign
countries: for metals which were most essential, and for markets. The
latter is always to be expected when a country industrializes faster than
its population acquires new tastes. The dependence was somewhat
offset by three advantages: ( 1) production at home, by intensive cul
tivation, of about 90 per cent of the food consumed, (2) a large labor
force which could be quickly trained, and ( 3) active government aid
to and support of industry. 1 ' It is also to be observed that the textile
industry, in which Japan was gaining most of her industrial successes,
required less steel than other industries which were less important then.
Exports other than raw silk were tea, paper, camphor, menthol
and fish products.
Industrialization in Japan was accomplished under more govern
ment control than is generally known. This began with the rise of the
Meiji after 1868. Government ownership included railways, postal,
telegraph and telephone services, dockyards, clothing factories, and
monopolies of tobacco, camphor and salt. Moreover, extensive control
of industrial financing was instituted. This was done by giving gov
ernment financial support to twenty-five special banks, which enabled
the government to appoint personnel and control policy, including de
termination of priorities.
The beginnings of industrial competition within Asia could be
seen in the I 920's, even though there was little variety in industrial
production there, outside of Japan. China was both market for, and a
competitor of Japan, in the production of raw silk; and India, a large
source of raw cotton, showed evidence of becoming an equally strong
competitor of Japan in the production of cotton textiles. With increased
industrialization in both India and China it could be foreseen that the
rising prominence of Japan in the silk and cotton industries would be
effectively challenged.
It was also evident that Japan was fast becoming a serious com
petitor of both Britain and the United States in the export of cotton
piece goods. The Japanese exports of this commodity rose to 2.8 times
the United States exports and 40 per cent of the exports of Britain. 14
13 Bergsmark, op. cit., pp. 413-15.
14 Ibid., pp. 415, 419, 431.
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In fact Japanese sales of cotton-piece goods increased to such an extent
that it was decided to exclude them at the Imperial Economic Confer
ence held in Ottawa in 1932. Tariffs and quotas were later used for this
purpose in British colonies although the measures also applied to United
States cotton goods, in some colonies, as part of the total foreign sup
ply. The measures failed because the Japanese gained in world markets
as a whole. 15
Formosa: Formerly Chinese, this island was captured by the
Japanese in 1894 and made a colony of the typical European model of
the eighteenth-nineteenth century. By 1929, Japanese capital virtually
monopolized all industry and mining, and averaged about 50 per cent
of all investments in agriculture, commerce, communications and fish
eries. Most of the Chinese, who constituted 94 per cent of the popula
tion, had to earn their living by work in mines and factories. This was
a consequence of monopoly in industry and active government support
of monopoly in Japan. Japan made the country a source of raw ma
terials and food, largely rice and sugar. Other exports of Formosa
were tea, bananas, camphor, coal and ores.
Formosa's trade with Japan increased rapidly, and the sugar pro
duction demanded by Japan made the Japanese self-sufficient in this
product. This _was accomplished by means of subsidy and tariff rn so that
the sugar trade did not result in all the gains which were possible from
it, through competition, for the countries in the. area which had ob
tained the best results.
The Japanese, in adopting the well-known European colonial
policy of obtaining raw materials and foodstuffs from colonies by the
cheapest means possible, discriminated, in effect, against Indonesian
sugar which was obtainable at half the price of the sugar produced in
and imported from Formosa. Thus the self-sufficiency was achieved
at the expense of the Chinese workers in Formosa and the Japanese
consumers.
The large increase in sugar production in Formosa, so that it might
be sold in Japan at artificially high prices, was unfavorable to world
trade in sugar, for toward the end of the nineteenth century world sugar
production was already becoming excessive.
Japanese exports had increased by 326 million square yards by 1938, while
British exports had declined by 615 million square yards. See F. V. Meyer,
Britain's Colonies in World Trade (Oxford: 1948), p. 84.
16 Mitchell, op. cit., pp. 49, 50, 55.
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Korea: Japan made a colony of Korea, too, in 1910, and ordered
production there so as to conform to the same policy that was applied
to Formosa. At first the country was a large exporter of rice to Japan.
It became one of the largest suppliers, and rice was its principal export.
Others were iron ore, soy beans and raw silk, which became an im
portant Korean industry in the 1920's. Its imports were typically those
of a colony. Its external trade was monopolized by Japan.
There was, however, a significant difference. Industrial growth
was permitted because this was expedient for Japanese imperial plans
in China and in Korea itself, and Korea's proximity to China and its
power resources, textile skills and some achievements in the textile in
dustry were favorable conditions. It seems that the plan had a two-fold
objective: first, to accelerate extractive production in Korea for the
purposes of light industries there and in China, and secondly, for use
of heavy Japanese industries at home. There seems to be difference
of judgm ent as to the stage to which such a plan was carried by the
Japanese. Thus Hubbard, in discussing the industrial future of Japan
gives it no space, while Kate Mitchell emphasizes it. 11
Japanese industrial control in Korea was not dissimilar to their
control in Formosa. In the 1920's, Korean capital investments were
already giving way in remarkable degree to Japanese capital in a wide
range of Korean industries. With freedom in Korea and administrative
change in Formosa, Japan has had to face a large decrease in its
measure of self-sufficiency. The Japanese seem to have realized since
that they had little choice in industrial planning, in so far as foreign
markets were concerned. It was evident in the 1940's that they were
unlikely to enjoy the same rate of increase in world textile markets
that they had in the late 1930's. As far as Asian markets were con
cerned, two directions for progress appeared to remain: ( 1) supply of
capital goods to newly industrializing countries in Asia, and ( 2) diversi
fication of manufacturing industries so as to increase exports to these
countries. In both, increasing competition with the United States and
Europe was inevitable.
II
PERIOD 1930-1949: PAINS OF GROWTH AND DIRECTIONS OF CHANGE
Resources and Uses
Several countries of Asia faced a difficult problem of allocation
17 Hubbard, op. cit., ch. III; and Mitchell, op. cit., p. 58.
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of resources, toward the end of the 1940's, when outputs of food and
other agricultural products varied from 86 to 94 per cent of prewar
production. There are several explanations: ( 1) China had not recov
ered from the ravages of war and there were floods and other causes
which slowed the rates of production; (2) because of wartime imposi
tions and expediencies, India, Indonesia, Japan and Pakistan were able
to produce only prewar quantities of coarse grains; (3) Indonesia and
the Philippines, for similar reasons, produced much less than prewar
quantities of sugar. 18
The consequent shortage of food caused priority to be given to
investments in irrigation. This enforced use of resources of itself de
layed progress in industrial production of goods traded internationally.
The following is a summary of the mineral resources and their
uses, in the countries in which they were found in significant quantities.
It is to be observed that in 1949 geological surveys had not been com
pleted in some of the countries:
Coal: China, India and Indochina (in this order of importance).
China's reserves were estimated to be second only to those
of the United States. Coal had been found in several other
countries of Asia, but most of it is of low grade. In India,
about 5,000,000 tons p.a. and in Indochina an unspecified
quantity are used for other than metallurgical purposes.
Petroleum: In Indonesia (including North Borneo, Brunei and
Sarawak), production in 1949 exceeded the prewar rate and
justified at least consideration of plans to build a large mod
ern refinery.
In Burma (including Assam and Thailand) it was not yet
possible to resume commercial production. Estimates could
not be made with reasonable accuracy.
Pakistan: in moderate quantities.
China: the United Nations' Survey included the following
statement: Northwest China might become "one of the most
important oil-bearing zones of the world."
Oil Shale: China was the first of Asian countries to produce oil
from shale. It was estimated in 1949 that the reserves of oil
in this form were 521,000,000 tons. A plant had been con
structed for the production of 70,000 tons per annum, and
18

United Nations, Economic Survey of Asia and the Far East, 1949, pp. 3, 5-6.
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there were by-products of ammonium sulphate, crude paraf
fin and coke.
Oil shale was also found in Burma and India, possibly in
commercial quantities.
Iron Ore: It was estimated that the iron ore deposits in Asia were
10,000 million tons, of which China and India possessed
two-thirds. China had reserves estimated at 4,179 million
tons, including 103 million tons of high grade ore. This ex
cluded 10 million tons in Taiwan (Formosa). India's ore
was reported to include numerous high-grade hematitic bodies.
The Philippines: 21 million tons hematitic and magnetic ores
and 1,000 million tons of laterite.
Malaya exported as much as 2 million tons per annum before
World War II. One deposit was estimated at 30 million tons.
Indochina had planned to produce 400,000 tons per annum.
North Korea was far better supplied than South Korea, but
estimates did not appear to be satisfactory.
Burma had several deposits but it was not clear that their
quality or even quantity had been satisfactorily estimated.
Ceylon had some deposits, which had not been estimated.
Japan was very deficient.
Manganese: India: about 29 million tons, of which large quanti
ties had been exported to Japan, which was deficient.
Philippines, Indochina, Thailand, Burma, Malaya and Indo
nesia also had deposits.
Molybdenum: China had the largest known reserves in Asia,
about eight million tons.
Nickel: Large deposits had been found in Indonesia, and there
were some deposits in the Philippines. It was reported that
in both countries, taken together, millions of tons of laterite
ore existed which contained 0.7 per cent of nickel.
Titanium: Ilmenite is the "chief ore" of titanium. It is used in the
manufacture of alloy steel and high-grade paints. India was
one of the largest producers in 1949. The total reserves of
India, Ceylon and Japan were estimated at 250 to 300 mil
lion tons.
Tungsten: China was the most important producer in the world
and in Asia, and the Soviet Union was China's principal mar261

ket. Other producers and exporters were Burma, Malaya,
Indochina, Thailand and Korea.
Vanadium: There were substantial deposits in India and other
countries of Asia. Japan was deficient.
Source: summarized from United Nations' report cited, pp. 332-50.
Asia is rich in nonferrous metals too:
Antimony: China was the world's largest producer since 1920.
Japan's small reserves were nearly exhausted at the end of
the 1940's. There were then some deposits in Thailand and
Indochina.
Copper: This and zinc were the only minerals of which Japan was
one of the major producers in 1949. The Japanese reserves
were estimated at 2,750,000 metric tons. Other producers
were the Philippines, India, Korea, Burma and China. The
resources of India and China were not being exploited on
a large scale.
Lead and Zinc: Burma led in the production of lead and Japan
in zinc. China was a small producer of both. Indochina was
a large producer of zinc and Thailand a considerable pro
ducer of lead. Indian reserves were reported to be small, but
further surveys seemed necessary.
Tin: Most of the world's reserves of tin had been found in Asia,
mainly in Malaya, Indonesia, Thailand,. China, Burma and
Indochina. Malaya was the world's largest producer. Japan,
a large consumer, had small deposits.
This study was not intended to include all nonmetallic minerals,
yet it may be added that with the exception of sulphur, commercial
quantities of nearly all of them were to be found in Asia in the late
1940's, and the larger quantities of most of them were reported in
India and China.
The minerals listed here include nearly all the more important
minerals traded internationally, as listed by the League of Nations. 19
Some valuable minerals found in Asia, such as manganese, were not
included in the League's list as being among the 23 most important
products in world commodity trade. When two important nonmineral
products of Asia, cotton and tea, are added, 12 of the 23 are found
to have been listed. Asia's share of the exports of some of them was
19

See Network of World Trade, p. 30.
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not large, and the quantities produced in each of the countries of the
world, whether Asian or not, were not separately listed.

Evidence of Industrialization
It must have been realized in reading Section I that in the 1920's
the United States' share of Asia's foreign trade was less than it would
have been but for colonial connections of European countries, and
possibly more than it might have been without the United States' co
lonial connection with the Philippines. In the period to be studied in
Section III, 1951-1956, some changes in the direction of the external
trade of Asiatic countries are to be expected, as results of emergence
of several of the countries from a colonial status, and for other reasons
such as financing by the United States. We may therefore fruitfully
examine some evidence of these changes in the immediate postwar
period.
The table below shows changes in production in major industries
between 1938 and 1949. They are to be considered with due reference
to difficulties and disadvantages already mentioned.
Major Industrial and Mineral Production in
ECAFE Countries, 1938 and 1949
(Thousands of Metric Tons)
Product

1938

Coal .........70,294
Electricity
(million KWH) 2,710
Tin Concentrate
103
Iron Ore
7,717
Pig Iron ...... 1,572
Steel Ingots and
Castings
984
Cement . . . . . . 1,952
Cotton Yam . .
985
Sulphuric Acid ......

.....

.....

* Japan's

Relative Change: 1938=100
1949 Tapan Excluded
Japan Included
50,396
72
79
5,550
100
3,193
1,572

205
97
41
100

151
97*
48
87

1,380
2,615
817
95

140
134
83

72

78

59

production of tin concentrate was negligible.

Source: United Nations, Economic Survey of Asia and the Far
East, 1949, p.22.
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Changes in production usually precede or occur simultaneously
with major changes in the direction of trade. Therefore, due attention
is to be directed to the former, in the late 1940's, when Asian coun
tries were endeavoring to reconstruct their economies. Because of the
emphasis on the ECAFE countries, in the most reliable sources of
information, and as these countries include those which will be most
important, industrially, in the future, we shall be concerned mainly with
this group: India, China, Indochina, South Korea, Indonesia, Malaya,
Pakistan and the Philippines. Data on production in Japan will be
used mostly for purposes of comparison because its greater progress
has placed that country in a separate category.
Some reasons for the slow progress shown have already been given
in this Section, and we are to be mindful also of the five reasons given
in Section I. For further comparison with Japan, with due allowance
for the circumstances of that country then, it may be mentioned that
industrial activity in Japan, as shown by the Index, was 94 in 1949.
The base period used was 1932-1936.
Some of the changes shown might have been reflections of alterna
tive growth. For example, the decline in coal production might have
been due to the increased use of electrical power in India, Pakistan,
the Philippines and Thailand.
It is also necessary to consider the number of these basic products
in the output of which each country, with a substantial potential in
ternal market for consumer goods, achieved a significant increase:
a) China accomplished this in the production of four of these
nine basic products: coal, tin concentrate, iron ore and cotton
yarn.
b) India's ratio was seven of the nine: coal, electricity, iron ore,
pig iron, crude steel, cement and cotton.
c) Pakistan had a ratio of two to nine: coal and electricity.
d) Indonesia, also two: coal and tin.
e) The Philippines, four: coal, electricity, iron ore and cement.
These ratios will assume more significance later, and perhaps most
in Section III. However, it may be observed here that, with the pos
sible exception of the Philippines, the countries which had the larger
ratios were the ones which will be shown, in a subsequent period, to
have accomplished most in industrialization.
As some of these basic products are used to produce machines,
and forecasts or estimates of future trade with other regions must be
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potential internal markets; and (b) the ability of these countries to ob
tain foreign exchange with which to import capital goods, with some
reference to the ability of other countries in the area which are dif
ferently endowed and which adopted different trade policies in the
immediate postwar period.
The main factors seem to be: (I) absorptive capacity for their
products in the countries producing capital goods, world competition
in supplying them, and prices; (Il)variety of exports; (III) sufficiency
of production for internal markets; and (IV) total assets possessed.
Of the five countries selected, China has to be excluded again for
lack of information. This makes for unreality, because of the large
and varied mineral resources, very large potential internal market, and
the beginnings of industrial production, notably textiles, iron ore and
pig iron, steel ingots and heavy chemicals. Also, China had established
considerable trade with some ECAFE countries: Burma, Hong Kong
and Thailand.
India's deficit of $526 million was due mainly to decline in the
rate of production of jute, which was not offset by increase in exports
of cotton and cotton textiles. In less degree it was due to a decrease
in demand in the United States. Another important cause was increase
in imports of capital goods. It seems, therefore, that factors (I) and
(IV) were _the· most effective for the purpose of obtaining foreign cur
rency with which to import capital goods.
India's deficit may be compared with the surplus of $103 million
achieved by Burma, which is not one of the selected countries. First,
the Burmese surplus was of a negative character. It appeared as a re
sult of a people's decision to live within their income, in so far as
imports of manufactures were concerned, rather than to seek to develop
with any sense of urgency, viz. by obtaining loans to purchase capital
goods. It is to be noted, however, that Burma's exports had declined
by $39 million from the total for 1948. Also, imports of its main
export, rice, into the United States, had been decreasing since 19351938. None was imported into this country in 1948-1957, and Euro
pean imports were greatly reduced in the same period. Then petroleum
products, which were second in order of value of Burma's exports,
could be sold in international markets only very competitively.
Burma was still a typical exporter of raw products. Its supply
of iron ore was still doubtful. It possessed some tungsten, copper and
tin, but of the minerals listed in this Section, Burma was a large pro266
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ducer of lead only, and it had only one other relatively minor export,
cotton. Yet Burma would have had to depend mainly on factor (IV)
to raise foreign loans.
There being no other large surplus with which to compare deficits
of any of the selected countries, we proceed with the discussion of
Pakistan, Indonesia and the Philippines.
Pakistan's deficit of $158 million was a result of an almost con
stant value of exports in 1948 and 1949, and a very large increase in
imports in the latter year, including capital goods. The decline in jute
production has already been noticed. Raw jute was Pakistan's second
most important export, and India was practically the whole market.
Therefore, the decline in India's exports of processed jute could have
meant even greater adversity to Pakistan than to India. Imports of raw
jute into Europe decreased greatly in 1935-1938 and 1948-1951, while
imports into the United States increased only slightly. And imports
of processed jute into both Europe and the United States declined in
the same period. Pakistan's only export of comparable value, raw
cotton, had no market in the United States. And the European market,
in quantity terms, was incomparably larger in 1928 than in 1948-1951.
As cotton is sold very competitively in international markets, Pakistan
could hardly depend on this crop to earn a large part of its foreign
currency, when world production was rising again in the late forties
and early fifties.
Therefore, dependence on factor (I) was greatest in so far as ex
port of jute was concerned, and dependence on (IV) was considerable.
Indonesia's export surplus of $27 million in 1949 was remark
able. It was a change from a deficit of $36 million in 1948. Of its
seven more valuable exports, petroleum, which was the first in 1938,
as a percentage of total exports, and second in 1950, was not listed by
the United Nations as having a market in the United States or in Eu
rope. Rubber, the second in 1938 and first in 1950, found a rising
market in both the United States and Europe, but it had to be sold in
competition with rubber from several other countries of Asia, especially
Malaya. This country's other important exports, copra and palm oil,
tea, sugar, tobacco and tin, also were sold competitively. In the import
ing countries there were shortages in the supplies of rubber and tin
but it is unlikely that eager buying produced any very favorable price
effects. The shortages were explained by the United States Depart267

ment of Commerce as relative to potential rather than to actual de
mand.20
The explanation given by the United Nations was that Indonesian
output of petroleum, vegetable oils, rubber and tin increased rapidly
and there was a "slackening of United States demand,"21 a situation in
which there could have been competition among sellers.
At the end of the 1940's, then, Indonesia could depend on factors
(IV) and (II) and, in lesser degree, on factor (I) for purchase of
capital goods.
The Philippines' large deficit of $416 million had become charac
teristic of its external trade. This is to be explained with reference to
its trade relations with the United States. Sugar, which was 43 per cent
of total exports in 1938 was only 15 per cent in 1950. The percentage
of copra and coconut oil, however, had risen from 23 to 54 per cent.
Abaca, the only other principal export, had increased from 9 to 12
per cent.
Reserves of iron ore, manganese, nickel and copper had been
found, but as the main imports of the United States from the Philippines
did not include these, they could not be regarded as immediate means
of obtaining capital goods. However, as Japan is deficient in practically
all minerals except copper, the Philippines could obtain Japanese capital
goods by export ·of some of these products.
The United States could be expected to sustaiq a large Philippine
deficit indefinitely for reasons of defense, but on economic grounds
alone reliance on factor (I) would be doubtful, for purposes of earning
foreign currency, largely on account of world overproduction of sugar
and United States investments in sugar at home and in Cuba. The
three other factors were not much more dependable.
Japan has to be placed in a separate category, as a matured in
dustrial country. Its deficit of $355 million and paucity of material
resources were not light disadvantages, but the country possessed nu
merous industrial skills and already had achieved a wide diversity in
manufacturing. In the period studied in this Section, Japan had already
established large foreign markets and was able to obtain materials from
several foreign sources, including large supplies of raw cotton from the
United States.
20 Survey of Current Business, (March, 1948), p. 21.
21 Ibid., p. 21.
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Ratios of Asia's Trade to World Trade
The absolute changes in the total annual values of Asia's foreign
trade appear to be more reliable information than the ratios of these
values to values of world trade, for the largest ratios have appeared
when the totals of world trade were smallest, in 1928 and 1938. This
is particularly true of exports, in the period of this Section. In the
case of imports, the ratios for 1949 and 1951 are comparable with
those for 1928 and 1938. The following table shows these relationships:
Trade of Countries of Asia and the Far East
in Relation to World Trade
(Billions of Current Dollars 1953)
World Imports
Asian Imports
Percentage
World Exports
Asian Exports
Percentage
Source: United Nations,
1953, p. 1.

1952
1928
1938
1949
1950
1951
79.9
33.6
22.9
59.2
58.9
80.8
9.6
4.6
2.8
7.3
6.2
9.9
12.0
13.7
12.2
12.3
10.6
12.2
71.9
30.8
20.5
54.3
56.1
75.9
7.4
4.8
3.0
5.4
6.8
9.7
10.3
15.4
15.0
9.9
12.1
12.8
A Study of Trade between Asia and Europe,

To attempt to show all the causes of fluctuations in the ratios and
in the totals would be a fruitless effort. Explanation of the failure of
Asia to maintain its ratios of world trade as trade increased, after 1949,
has already been furnished in part, in terms of rates of recovery from
the effects of war, and so on. To these must be added the competition
of other regions in external markets for Asian exports, in Europe, the
United States and in Asia itself.
So much for generalization. A study of trade in the principal
commodities exported should yield specific evidence. For this purpose
the table below should be helpful. In its compilation, the trade records
of British Borneo were included with those of ECAFE countries already
mentioned: Burma, Ceylon, India, Pakistan, Indonesia, Indochina, Ma
laya, Philippines and Thailand.
The United Nations estimated exports of these products as ap
proximately 80 per cent of the total exports of the ten countries in 1938,
1950 and 1951, and placed them in the following order of importance:
rubber, jute and jute products, fats and oils, tea, rice, cotton and cotton
products, tin, metal and other concentrates, petroleum and derivatives,
tobacco and pepper. Thus it can be seen that the principal exports of
Asia consisted almost entirely of raw materials and semi-processed products, up to seven years ago.
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Export Trade of Ten Asian Countries by
Principal Commodities

(Percentages based on 1953 value and total
values in millions of 1953 dollars)
Percentage share of total exports
1951
1950
1938
Commodity
Food Products
5.4
6.2
9.4
Rice
Vegetable Oils and Seeds:
1.5
1.6
1.1
Coconut Oil
4.6
4.4
2.5
Copra
Soybeans
0.1
0.2
2.1
Groundnut
0.7
0.7
0.7
Palm Oil
0.2
0.3
1.0
Linseed and Linseed Oil
0.1
0.1
0.6
Groundnut Oil
7.7
7.3
Total
7.5
1.1
1.0
4.1
Sugar
Aromatic Crops
0.4
0.4
0.4
Coffee
10.5
6.5
Tea
7.5
1.1
1.0
2.1
Tobacco and manufactures
1.1
0.4
1.6
Pepper ( other spices)
Natural Rubber and Fibre Crops
7.2
5.3
5.5
Cotton and manufactures
14.4
9.1
8.3
Jute and manufactures
1.1
0.9
Hemp/abaca
0.8
14.1
27.1
29.7
Rubber and manufactures
0.1
0.1
Coir Fibre
Tin
2.9
Metal
3.2
3.3
1.2
1.9
Concentrate
1.5
Metallic Ores
0.3
1.7
0.1
4.5
4.1
Petroleum and Derivatives
8.0
All Other Commodities
22.3
20.5
18.1
100.0
100.0
100.0
Value (millions of dollars)
1,709
4,764
6,460
Source: United Nations, A Study of Trade Between Asia and Europe, 1953, p. 11.
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This evidence although not conclusive as to the rate of indus
trialization five years after the war, is nonetheless of considerable use
fulness. When it is taken together with the disclosure in the table that
the values of most of the principal commodities exported in 1951,
as percentages of the value of total exports, were less than, equal to,
or only slightly greater than the percentages for 1938 or 1950, it does
appear that need of improvement in productivity was very great.
It is to be observed at once, however, that the evidence was not
equally significant for all the countries. While the value ratio of ex
ports of rice to total exports, in 1951, was 13 per cent less than in
1950 and only slightly more than one-half the 1938 ratio, Burma's
ratio in 1950 was 35 per cent greater than in 193 8. Rice was a princi
pal export of two other countries in the group selected, Indochina
and Thailand, and the ratios for these countries had declined in 1950
by 6 per cent and 4 per cent respectively. In Burma the increase
offset in part the ratio decline of 25 per cent in exports of petroleum
products and 10 per cent in metals and ore. In Indochina there was
a ratio decrease of 14 per cent in exports of maize. Of the three prin
cipal exports only that of rubber increased, by 12 per cent. In Thailand
the relatively small decrease in the export ratio for rice was offset by
an increase in the ratio for rubber, but there was a large decrease in
the ratio for tin.
The export value ratio for petroleum and derivatives for all the
selected countries, for 1951, was 9 per cent less than for 1950 and 49
per cent less than for 1938. The effect on the external trade of Burma
was severe. In Indonesia it was less. The 1950 export ratio was 5 per
cent less than that for 1938.
The 1951 ratio for all countries, for rubber and manufactures,
was more than double the 1938 ratio, and 2.6 per cent greater than
the ratio for 1950, which was 13 per cent greater than that for 1938.
Five of the ten countries were affected, all favorably. This showed that
stability of the foreign markets for, and of the price of, rubber in the
short run, and expansion of these markets as well, were among the
most important immediate needs of Asia in the early 1950's. The five
countries affected were Ceylon, Indonesia, Indochina, Malaya and
Thailand.
The importance of the rubber exports, as a percentage of total
exports, differed widely from country to country. For example, the
1959 ratio for Malaya was 76 per cent. In Indonesia the increase in
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ratio was from 20 per cent in 1938 to 50 per cent in 1950. But Ceylon
had only a modest increase of 4 per cent.
There remain to be discussed (1) the shares of importing coun
tries in the principal exports of the countries of Asia, (2) the principal
exports which the United States and other industrialized countries sent
to Asia, (Japan is here included for reasons of comparison), and (3)
the products of Asia most needed or sought in the United States.
In reading the data immediately following this paragraph it may
be well to keep in mind some known facts: (a) the main part of the
Western European market for Asian goods in the period which this
Section covers was the United Kingdom, France and Germany, and
these countries had greatly to reduce external trade in 1940-1945,
(b) the United States' trade with Asia had to be reduced in the latter
part of this period, but recovery in the United States required much
less time, (c) Japanese external trade, too, had to be curtailed, and
recovery seemed to require less time than Western Europe needed but
more than was necessary for the United States, and (d) some countries
of Asia which were not involved in military operations needed time
for recovery from the consequences of restricted trade. For these rea
sons, mainly, the fluctuations shown between 1938 and 1951 occurred:
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Imports of Selected Products from Asia Into Western c,urope attd the U11ited States
]928

Commodity

Food and Feeding-stuffs

Rice
Beet and cane sugar
Soybeans
Groundnuts
Groundnut Oil
Copra
Coconut Oil
Palm Oil
Oilcake and Meal
Aromatic Crops

855 1074
87 140
1286 714
985 807
1
15
447 372
41
37
8
82
366 592

Tea
Coffee
Tobacco

N

1948

1949

1950

1951

73
14
12
57
21
294
77
90

105
2
7
23
19
367
83
140
54

153
9
38
111
12
341
61
157
66

151
29
372
73
66
680
113
136
84

78

1928

l 935-38

( Thousands of Tons)

United States

1948

1949

1950

1951

219

479

427

619

423
63
65

408
51
16
59

12
524

10
855

174
132
14
71

202
156
118
107

405
48
13

386
52
10
45

208
65
45

229
48
55

189
2
15

219
4
21

171
IO
31

198
10
27

29
23

34
12

40

40

48
1

36
1

Natural Rubber
99
Raw Jute
560
Jute Yams and Manufactures 58
Hemp and similar Fibres 132
Raw Cotton
237
Raw Wool
29
Raw Silk
14

306
523
120
140
257
26
5

446
250
127
52
112
12
1

406
284
87
50
73
14
2

489
346
47
58
93
16
2

614
464
82
57
68
15
2

388
91
258
66

495
77
439
69

723
75
247
49

646
62
216
30

784
75
199
46

705
106
158
75

30
38

18
27

17
3

11

20
4

6
3

41

23

22

68

22

Natural Rubber and Fibres

t;l

1935-38

Western Europe

Other Commodities

49

1

57
57
Source: United Nations, A Study of Trade Between Asia and Europe, 1953, p. 129.

Tin ( metal and concentrate)

36

62

Some of the consequences of the fluctuations, to individual coun
tries, are to be added to the general explanations:
1) Imports of rice from Asia into Western Europe recovered very
slowly and were still relatively small in 1951. This was adverse main
ly to Burma, Indochina and Thailand, for rice was the principal com
modity export of these countries, both in 1938 and in 1950. However,
the ratio of exports of rice to total Burmese exports rose from 44 in
193 8 to 79 in 1950. The ratios for the two other countries decreased
considerably. It was obvious that new imports into the United States
and increase in the imports into Europe were desirable, but in the early
1950's production and export of rice within Asia as a region were
deficient and rice became very expensive.
2) The same analysis could be applied to the Western European
market for tea, but it would have been much less true of the United
States. It was true of coffee in both markets, due, of course, to South
American competition.
3) Imports of natural rubber increased rapidly in Western Europe
and in the United States, but while the increase in European imports
was sustained in all the years for which information was given by the
United Nations, except 1949, and was great in 1950-1951, the imports
into the United States in 1951 were considerably less than in 1950.
It has already been shown that rubber is a principal export of Ceylon,
Indonesia, Indochina, Malaya and Thailand, and .it is known that all
these countries are concerned about the competition of synthetic rubber
in the United States. In so far as it is true that any choice to produce
more synthetic rubber and import less natural rubber was made by
the United States instead of individual producers, security could have
been the sole reason, since reduction of imports from Asia, as else
where, must result at some time in reduction of exports. Moreover,
the short-run market prospects for Asian producers might not diminish
considerably for any appreciable time. For these countries, with the
possible exception of Thailand, do not seem to have any ideological
preference for markets, so that a climinishing market in the United
States and Europe might be offset by an increasing market in the Soviet
Union and/or China, in adclition to whatever sales were possible in
Japan.
4) Imports of raw jute into Western Europe were recovering in
1950-1951, but imports in 1928 were still much larger. Imports of
jute yarns and manufactures in 1951 were larger than in 1928, but this
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increase did not seem sufficient to offset the decline in the imports of
the raw jute. United States imports of raw jute had increased, but im
ports of yams and manufactures had decreased by several times the
difference in weight. In terms of value, the difference was of course
greater still. The countries affected were India and Pakistan. The
decrease in sales was due in large part to decline in production of jute.
In this case as in some others, stability of markets in the importing
countries could have had only a limited effect in sustaining incomes
in the exporting countries. It is impossible to escape always from the
hazards of dependence on a very few export crops to obtain a wide
range of essential imports.
5) The rapid decline in imports of raw cotton into Western Eu
rope may be explained in part as a consequence of increased output
of cotton textiles in India and China, partly as due to slow recovery
of markets for European textiles, when Japanese competition was ris
ing again at the beginning of the 19 50's. The United States was not
an importer, but an exporter of raw cotton, largely to Japan, in that
period. The Asian countries to which cotton was one of the most
important exports in 1950 were Burma, India and Pakistan, but India
had long been exporting cotton textiles, so that the value of Indian
raw cotton as an export was to be expected to decrease. Japan had
regained some of its export markets for textiles in Asia, for example
in Indonesia, where the United States was an effective competitor
with both Japan and the United Kingdom.
For a study of the exports of Western Europe, the United States
and Japan, to Asia, the following table of selected data should suffice
as an aid for the present purpose, the main interest being in indus
trialization and related <:ignificant change:
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Exports to Asian Countries from Western Europe
the United States and Japan
(Millions of dollars at constant 1950 prices)
Year

Western
Europe

United
States

Japan

Food, drink and
tobacco

1928
1938
1949-51

91.6
76.8
112.1

101.9
39.4
182.4

53.4
69.6
4.3

Crude and finished
steel

1928
1938
1949-51

164.8
50.9
77.1

39.3
37.9
42.7

0.7
16.9

Iron and steel
manufactures

1928
1938
1949-51

113.9
74.7
83.6

10.9
6.9
16.5

5.8
10.4
5.1

Nonferrous metals
and manufactures

1928
1938
1949-51

18.2
26.5
28.5

11.2
10.1
17.1

3.0
0.2
1.0

Electrical goods and
apparatus

1928
1938
1949-51

31.1
39.5
61.4

12.9
14.6
39.3

5.8
5.0

Other machinery

1928
1938
1949-51

184.8
142.1
214.6

34.1
38.2
99.5

2.8
67.2
29.3

Transport equipment
including tires

1928
1938
1949-51

87.1
75.0
149.8

52.8
72.5
83.7

2.9
3.0
7.1

Textiles

1928
1938
1949-51

768.5
251.4
280.0

41.1
54.5
146.9

264.9
274.8
147.2

Chemicals

1928
1938
1949-51

106.1
86.5
139.1

23.6
24.9
112.9

Commodity

Source: United Nations, A Study of Trade between Asia and
Europe, 1953,p. 132.
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These items were selected for the purpose of this paper. Some
sub-items and some other items were excluded as unimportant
or less important for the discussion that follows.
If the total values of exports of Western Europe, the United States
and Japan were compared it would be seen that while the value of
Western Europe's exports was greater than that of the United States,
the value of the United States' exports to Asia had increased in 1951
to double the value for 1928, while the values of European and Japa
nese exports had declined. Also, the increase which the United States
enjoyed was very much greater than the total decrease in Japanese and
European export values combined.
A trend in exports to Asia appeared discernible. If we put aside
for a moment the trade in food and drink and some other items, and
consider mainly textiles, metals, fertilizers (which are included with
chemicals) and a few other commodities, we should see some evidence
of such changes in the content of Asian imports ( other than Japanese)
from the most industrialized countries, as would be a consequence of
industrial progress in Asia. We may again take as examples countries
with substantial potential internal markets, India, Pakistan, Indonesia,
the Philippines and China.
Exports of crude and finished steel from the United States and
Japan increased, especially the Japanese exports, while European ex
ports declined. This change may be explained in terms of differences
in freight costs and price competition. Of all these countries only the
Philippines imported a larger value of these products in 1951 than in
1928.
Iron and Steel manufactures: There was a large decline in Asia's
imports from Europe. Imports from Japan also decreased, but imports
from the United States increased. The Philippines was the only country
to import a larger value of these products too.
Nonferrous Metals and Manufactures: Imports from both Europe
and the United States increased. Those from Japan declined. India's
and Pakistan's imports, taken together for 1949-1951, were of a larger
value than for 1928. Those of the other countries, except China, in
creased.
Electrical Goods: Imports from the United States increased three
fold, those from Western Europe doubled, and imports from Japan
declined (from 1938). India's imports of these and other machinery
increased significantly, Indonesia's had recovered and reached the rate
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in 1928; imports into the Philippines increased largely, while those of
China were much less. Imports of electrical goods and other machinery
from Western Europe were still greater than those from Japan and the
United States, but the rate of increase of imports from Europe was less.

Transport Equipment: India and Pakistan were importing a large
part of the increase. Indonesia's imports had declined, the Philippines'
increased and China's decreased.
Textiles: The great decline in exports from Western Europe and
the considerable decrease in Japan's exports (from 1938) were not
offset by the rapid rise in exports from the United States. There was
an almost corresponding decrease in Indian imports, even when Pakis
tan's share was added to India's. Indonesia's imports, too, were less
and China's very much less. Only the Philippines had increased imports.
Chemicals: The increase in imports from the United States was
greater than the increase from Western Europe. Japan did not export
any of these products to Asia. A very large part of these exports went
to India and Pakistan. In 1949-1951, Indonesia's share was the same
as in 1928. The Philippines' imports were more than quadrupled.
China imported considerably less than in 1928.
Placed in order of value importance (at the constant 1950 prices),
the six most important imports of eleven countries of Asia (India,
Pakistan, Ceylon, Burma, Malaya [including Singapore], Indonesia,
Indochina, Thailand, the Philippines, Hong Kong and China) from
Western Europe, the United States and Japan, in 1949-1951, would
be (1) textiles ( consisting largely of yarns and tissues of cotton and
of silk, and artificial fibres), (2) machinery (including electrical goods),
(3) food, drink and tobacco, ( 4) chemicals, ( 5) crude and finished
steel, and ( 6) iron and steel manufactures. Retaining the years selected
for comparison, 1928 and 1949-51, we find the following significance:
a) Imports of textiles by the eleven countries from the United
States, Western Europe and Japan had declined by about one-half
due to recovery of and increase in production in Asia. The United
States had a two-fold share in the exports to Asia: first, as a large ex
porter of raw cotton to Japan, and secondly, as a competitor of Japan
and Western Europe. For example, the United States' share in ex
ports to Indonesia in 1951 (at t�e constant 1950 prices) was $42.4
million worth, and Japan's $51.1 million. Of the rest of the total of
$121.7 million imported by Indonesia from the five most important
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exporters to that country, the United Kingdom's share was $3.9 mil
lion. This may be a partial explanation of Britain's active efforts to
increase textile exports to China.
b) The largest increase was in imports of machinery. This in
crease was to be seen in the imports of all but three of the eleven
countries. The exceptions were Burma, Indonesia and China. Also, the
decrease in Burma's imports was relatively small, by comparison with
imports in 1938. Indonesia's was very small. China's was large, but
the value of that country's imports in 1938 was two and one-third
times the value for 1928.
c) There was a fairly large increase in imports of food, drink and
tobacco, but the difference was smaller than the sum by which the im
ports of these items in 1928 exceeded imports in 1938.
d) A large increase in imports of chemicals, too, was widely dis
tributed among the eleven countries. The exceptions were Indonesia,
which barely maintained its imports, and China, whose imports de
clined considerably, but were double in value the imports for 1938.
e) There was a large decrease in imports of crude and finished
steel. This was noticeably greater in the imports of the larger countries,
India and China. But there was some increase in the imports of
smaller countries, such as Thailand, Indochina, Ceylon and the Philip
pines.
f) Imports of iron and steel manufactures were comparably less.
The distribution was similar to that of crude and finished steel, but in
this case Indonesia has to be included among the larger countries im
porting less. To the smaller countries importing more there must be
added Malaya (including Singapore) and Hong Kong.
III
PERIOD 1951-1956: REAL INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES
Evidence of Needs
The final Section of this paper may well begin with a discussion
of the United States' needs of Asia's goods. This arrangement is ap
propriate especially in view of the fact that Asia's needs of some of
the principal exports of the United States were shown at the end of
the previous Section. It will be shown presently that of the twelve
Asian products which are most essential to the United States, all but
three - tea, pepper and coconut oil - are raw materials. Greater
quantities of these raw materials will be required in Asia as indus
trialization proceeds and markets expand, particularly in the larger
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countries. Larger markets should afford the United States more op
portunities for export, when trade is free or not unduly restricted. It
is difficult to think of prosperity in Asia through industrialization, and,
at the same time, of smaller markets there for United States' machinery
and durable consumption goods. The United States may have sufficient
markets in Asia to pay with commodities for its needs of Asian goods
for a long time. In fact, the manner of taking payment for exports,
if less of the raw materials needed should be available, is a much more
important consideration. The prospect is to import more of Asia's
processed goods.
There are several factors which limit United States' imports from
Asia and would limit exports more than at present, but for loans from
the International Bank, the Export-Import Bank, and, we may add,
the International Finance Corporation:
a) rates of increase of consumption in the United States, of the
products which are Asia's principal exports. The meaning of
consumption here includes use in the processes of production. If,
as Business Week economists have been forecasting in special re
ports to business executives, production in the United States by
1975 will be for 650 million customers abroad and 200 million
at home, thep. we should expect imports from Asia to be greatly
increased,· as the main form of payments. But if, as they also fore
cast, most United States' foreign investments are to be made, in
evitably, in Canada, South America, the Middle East, Africa and
Australia, then Asia's share would be only supplementary.
b) Competition from other countries or regions in markets in the
United States.
c) Competition of United States' producers.
d) Asia's capacity to earn imports: this must be determined in
any country by first, ability to produce and export, and secondly,
eligibility for loans for purchase of producers' goods which would
improve its productivity and consequently its ability to export.
With due reference to these factors, the real needs of the United
States, in the early 1950's may be stated precisely:
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United States Needs of Principal Exports of Asia
Commodity

Percentage of Total
Needs, imported from Asia

Natural rubber

89

Manganese

27

Tin

54

Mica

88

Burlaps

95

Abaca or manila
Hides and skins

65
20

Tea

73

Pepper

93

Coconut Oil

94

Chromite or
chrome ore

13

Tungsten ore

10

Limits Imposed

(a) The rate of increase must be
expected to decline because of
decrease in the rate of output
in the motor vehicle industry.
(c) U.S. synthetic rubber is a com
petitor.
( b) Competition of foreign coun
tries, mainly Ghana, place an
important limit on imports
from Asia, most of which come
from India.
(b) Competition of other countries,
mainly Bolivia, is effective.
(a) Most imports come from India.
There is little competition,
therefore any increase in im
ports depends on use in U.S.
( b) This Indian export, too, has
little competition.
(b) Competition is considerable.
( b) Imports are from India. Com
petition is great.
(b) India and Ceylon have com
petition in the U.S. market.
(b) From India and Indonesia.
Competition from outside of
Asia is small.
(b) Ceylon, Indonesia, Malaya and
the Philippines have little com
petition in the U.S.
(b) The Philippines have much
competition, from Turkey and
elsewhere.
(b) There is little competition.

Sources: International Development Advisory Board, Partners in Progress, (March,
1951 ); and l'.niteu Nations, A Study of Trade Between Asia ,.mJ Europe,
(November, 1953).
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The extent of competition in the United States involves internal
markets which the United States is prepared to concede, as may be
necessary, so that Asia might pay for more exports with commodities.
In so far as we regard needs of Asia's products as vital or essen
tial, and some of them are not obtainable in quantity from other re
gions, our imports must depend on production and use in Asia. Of the
dozen products listed, the United States imports of only five which may
be considered vital amounted in 1950 to 30 per cent or more of total
needs. These are natural rubber, manganese, tin, mica and burlap.
Of the principal exports of Burma, Ceylon, India, Pakistan, In
donesia, Indochina, Malaya, the Philippines and Thailand, which are
most of the countries usually selected by the United Nations as ex
amples for purposes of economic studies and reports, six are not in
cluded among vital or essential needs of the United States as listed
in the sources mentioned above. These are rice, petroleum products,
cotton and cotton manufactures, sugar, tobacco and maize. Rice and
cotton are not produced in Asia in sufficient quantities for a large ex
port trade outside of that region. The shortages may be overcome but
the United States is a producer of both these products and a large ex
porter of cotton and cotton manufactures, even to Asia, so there is
little prospect of any considerable imports of them. Moreover, the
United States is also a producer of the remaining four principal products
of Asia, which are not deemed essential or vital by the authorities
quoted.
It is also noticeable that mineral imports from Asia are mostly
manganese and tin, and that the quantities are, respectively, less than
30 per cent and only slightly more than 50 per cent of total needs. It
is obvious, then, that imports of minerals, too, from Asia are not likely
to increase in large measure in the short or intermediate run because
of imports from other sources and production in the United States.

Need and Progress of Industrialization

There is thus only one course for the future of the external trade
of Asia (with the exception of Japan) with the United States and West
ern Europe, but it may be a broad one. Since the products now avail
able for export will not enable Asian countries in the ECAFE group
to obtain any large increase in incomes, they must diversify production
as speedily as possible, utilizing larger quantities of these products and
exporting less of them. This affords greater rather than less opportuni282
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ties for direct investments in individual countries, conceived for growth
as well as for the benefit of the investors.
There are two forms of investment which are, possibly, being over
looked: ( 1) production of equipment which can be employed effec
tively on small farms, and (2) machinery for small-scale processing
units, both for the countries discussed in this Section and Section II,
and also for those discussed more briefly in Section I. The demand is
likely to increase quickly because several ECAFE countries have
adopted a policy of supporting small producing units and small farms
are typical in many areas. Also, because transition from the workshop
to the factory stage of production will evidently not be a very short-run
process, particularly in the smaller countries which are least endowed
with resources.
Since industrialization in different degrees and for different ob
jectives will become inevitable in practically all the countries of Asia,
the evidence of its progress in 19 51-195 6 should be examined here
for indications of the main directions of investment and comparison of
growth in the main industrial areas. By the mid-1950's it had become
clear that the agricultural base in several of the countries and in the
region as a whole was adequate as a prerequisite for industrialization.
For example, cereal production in the ECAFE countries increased by
10 per cent above the average for 1934-1938. This included an equal
percentage rise in the output of rice, and it was nearly equal to the
rate of increase of world production although production in some
other countries had recovered earlier than in Asia. 22
There are broad similarities in the industrialization, especially
in the larger countries. The rates of growth must be expected to be
greater than individual initiative, as has been noticed in Section I,
would have achieved. In the period between the end of World War II
and the early 1950's lack of individual initiative became a lesser dis
advantage. But more important than this for growth was increase in
public investment, which substituted for private investment in varying
degrees and also stimulated it.
The three main industrial areas of Asia ( excluding Australia),
Japan, India and China, have been rapidly expanding textile production.
India has surpassed Japan in the production of cotton-piece goods. By
1951 Indian exports of these goods, within the region, were much
22

United Nations, Economic Survey of Asia and the Far East, 1954, pp. 1-3.
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larger, as a ratio of Japan's., and its exports to countries outside ex
ceeded Japan's. In 1954 Japan's regional exports were less and India's
had increased, while India's excess of exports over Japan's, to other
regions, was greater. Production in China increased rapidly in the
early 1950's. the rate of output seemed sufficient for competition with
India and Japan but there were no recorded exports, probably because
of the large internal market.
Japan is the leader of the three in iron and steel production, pro
ducing 7.6 million tons, or 70 per cent of the region's total, and was
increasing its rate of output. China became the second largest producer
of steel in the region in 1954. The data published for China were 3
million tons of pig iron and 2.2 million tons of steel ingot. India's
capacity was less than 2 million tons of pig iron, and its production
of steel ingots was 1.5 million tons.
In the production of electric power, too, Japan leads, but rates of
increase in India and China have been very great, 46 and 64 per cent,
respectively, whereas the rate of increase in Japan, which already had
an output incomparably larger than either, was 9 per cent.
Japan produced 50-60 per cent of all cement made in the ECAFE
countries, in 1954. The rate of increase in production was 21 per cent.
China, reported as the second largest producer, had increased its output
by 100 per cept in six years. In about the same period India's output
had increased by 50 per cent.
The engineering industry may show the most significant changes:
in Japan the value of products of engineering was 15 per cent of the
total for manufactures. In northwest China it was 14 per cent. The
index number for engineering industries in India was 131 in 1954,
100 in 1948. The table which follows shows a wider range of indus
trial production:

284

American Trade with Asia and the Far East

Index Numbers of Production
(1948=100)
Weight 1949 1950 1951
CHINA (Taiwan only)
184
157
175
100
Industrial production
124
192
168
8.6
Public utilities
101
152
123
3.8
Electricity
106
87
86
Mining and Quarrying 3.7
98
100
1.8
85
Coal
166
Manufacturing
189
182
87.7
215
221
Food
29.1
147
Textiles
193
276
421
14.6
Chemicals
104
130
216
8.1

INDIA
Manufacturing and mining 100
Mining (coal)
12.0
Chemicals & allied trades 4.9
Metal manufactures
(not machinery)
9.3
Engineering and
electrical goods
5.6
Textiles
61.4
Cotton textiles
43.5
Jute
16.5
Paper
1.5
Manufacture of nonmetallic mining
products (not
coal and petroleum) 1.7
Manufactures of wood 0.2
Food (sugar)
3.5
INDONESIA (1938=100)
Export products
General
Estate
Peasantry
Mining

1952

1953

238
202
168
138
139
249
198
660
238

323
214
186
121
145
348
336
918
263

98
106
114

97
107
129

108
115
145

119
122
204

125
120
260

108

114

119

121

114

121
90
91
85
105

146
82
84
77
111

189
90
93
80
135

170
100
104
87
140

190
102
110
80
142

107
89
93

149
93
91

171
132
104

173
168
139

229
114
120

69
46
103
85

89
49
194
93

105
63
228
103

108
71
184
116

108
75
156
132
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JAPAN

Industrial Production
Public utilities
Manufacturing &
Mining
Mining
Manufactures
Nondurable
Textiles
Chemicals
Durable
Metals
Machinery and transport equipment

100
4.3

124
113

142
122

193
134

213
146

261
160

95.7
12.9
82.8
47.8
17.1
16.7
35.0
12.9

130
115
131
134
128
140
134
176

153
121
156
190
186
203
147
242

210
138
219
254
261
277
220
360

232
142
244
298
298
332
230
386

284
153
304
375
345
423
281
459

14.6

124

117

184

191

248

PHILIPPINES ( 1952=100)

100
Manufactures
100
Nondurable
100
Tobacco products
100
Textiles
Footwear and wearing
100
apparel
100
Chemicals
100
Durable manufactures
Stone, clay and glass
products (including
100
cement)
100
Metal products
100
Electrical appliances
Source: United Nations, Economic Survey of Asia and the
East, 1954, p. 201.

113
111
114
96
116
111
118
108
152
96
Far

The table is, of course, quite incomplete; China ( other than Tai
wan) had to be excluded for reasons already given. Data for Pakistan
would have been helpful, and one of the countries of intermediate area
and population, such as Thailand, must have shown progress well
worth inclusion for comparison.
The data presented here should be studied with reference to the
roles of governments, as public planning and investments are to be
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met with in practically all the countries. The opportunities indicated
must be regarded as opportunities to contribute, through private invest
ment, to the success of broad plans for growth. Dependence on private
initiative is still less in most of the countries, than on state planning.
Although private enterprise is welcomed, there are controls and re
strictions, particularly in Southeast Asian countries. There seems to
be three very prevalent reasons: a tradition of authoritarian politics,
inadequate and therefore unreliable entrepreneurship for the responsi
bilities of development, and intellectual relations with the West at a
time when state responsibility and state planning were emphasized. 23
The industrial structures indicated in the table above appeared
to be quite established, as judged by the results for 1955. In the final
table which follows, information for 1956 is included, partly by estimat
ing. The main importance of this table is that it enables us to discern
a change in the content of Asia's external trade which may become
very important within a decade.

d

E'tl
;:l
� "II

j:i,cn

1,427
1,648
1,035

.9

889
975
673

264
261
158

,S"' �d
-�-o�,:
!Jl:l.
.; §

2,478
2,770
1,529

59
67
42

::;�

dollar)
3,144
2,983
1,560

174
170
69

8

Composition of Imports
Value {in millions)

ECAFE REGION (U.S.
1954
1955
1956 (first half)
476
362
181

Capital goods
co
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23 Claude A. Buss, "Economics and Diplomacy in Southeast Asia," and Charles
J. Shohan, "National Economic Planning," in Southeast Asia in the Coming
World (John Hopkins Press, 1953), pp. 90-91, 97-99.

Burma (kyat)
1954
1955
1956 (first half)

ds

Materials for
capital goods

Co

Ceylon (rupee)
1954
1955
1956 (first half)

952
890
448

128
142
82

130
164
75

186
233
148

India (rupee)
1954
1955
1956 (first half)

2,366
1,441
632

1,759
2,031
1,034

633
556
357

1,797
2,746
1,902

Indonesia (rupiah)
1954
1955
1956 (first half)

3,051
2,641
2,302

1,418
1,535
777

459
670
530

1,977
1,902
1,299

Japan (yen)
252,419
1954
240,071
1955
1956 (first half) 108,434

412,705
457,778
276,212

125,824
134,706
117,570

72,677
56,477
34,878

Malaya (Malayan dollar)
1,669
1954
1,905
1955
1,062
1956 (first half)

624
904
441

454
539
287

389
474
291

Pakistan (rupee)
1954
1955
1956 (first half)

162
206
133

187
164
81

129
155
87

398
412
166

Philippines (peso)
1954
1955
1956 (first half)

460
519
188

168
181
79

112
125
63

225
272
155

Thailand (baht)
1954
3,248
665
3,476
1955
794
1956 (first half)
409
1,674
Source: United Nations, Economic Survey of

565
2,186
763
2,166
383
1,295
Asia and the Far

East, 1956, p. 185.
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The figures given for 1956 must be approximately doubled. When
this is done it becomes clear that while the value of imports of con
sumption goods into several of the countries were about the same in
1956 as in 1954, the values of imports of materials for production of
these goods were considerably greater. There is indication, therefore,
that the ratios of imports of consumption goods to total consumption
had declined. So we should have expected the accompanying evidence
of a large increase in imports of materials for the production of capital
goods, and of capital goods as well.
This change is to be observed in the figures for most of the indi
vidual countries, and it is most noticeable in the data for the countries
where industrialization is increasing most. Even in the figures for some
countries where industrialization is proceeding only moderately the
trend is discernible, and it is to be seen in the values of imports into
the ECAFE region as a whole.
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I

0

INTRODUCTION

i--E OF THE international economic issues that has lately begun
to command increasing interest, thanks to Soviet achievements in other
fields and to the popular press, is the so-called economic offensive of
the Soviet Bloc. Realization of the fact that the Soviet Bloc1 has in
tensified its foreign economic activities, particularly in the less developed
countries of Asia ,and the Middle East, has already posed some hard
and searching questions to this country as to the effectiveness of Ameri
can foreign economic policy and the manner in which adjustments in
the latter may have to be made. Obviously, the economic actions of
the Soviet Bloc, insofar as they do represent a conscious policy and
are integrated with foreign policy in a broader sense, may continue to
gather momentum as time passes. Thus the problems for the United
States, both as the only effective political counterpoise to the Soviet
Bloc and as a leading nation in world trade, have probably only just
begun. In these circumstances, the need for carrying out a searching
appraisal and analysis of this "offensive" should be quite obvious and
will need no further supporting argument.

Parts of this paper were presented to the 1958 annual meeting of the Asso
ciation for Asian Studies at New York City.
1 The term Soviet Bloc is used here to indicate what is sometimes described as
the Sino-Soviet Bloc. The European Bloc thus includes the USSR and the
European satellites-Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Zone of
Germany, Hungary, Poland and Rumania. The entire Soviet Bloc also in
cludes North Korea and, since 1955, North Viet-Nam, but the extra-Bloc
trade of the last two areas is unimportant so far.
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Although newspaper reports have tended to highlight the spec
tacular and have thus concentrated publicity on a few cases where actual
or potential competition between the United States and the Soviet Union
appears on the surface, such instances merely serve to dramatize a
development originating from the Soviet Bloc which, in order for it to
constitute a "threat," must at once be broader and more sustained.
In other words, if, for instance, the Soviet offer to build a steel
mill in India with an annual capacity of one million tons and the vague
talk about the construction of the Aswan Dam were merely isolated
examples, the evidence of a Soviet "economic offensive" would not be
conclusive. The problem assumes a different dimension only when a
determined effort on a broad front to strengthen the economic relations
of the less developed countries with the Soviet Bloc can be discerned.
II
PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE OF THE SOVIET BLOC'S "ECONOMIC
OFFENSIVE"

That there is strong evidence of the Soviet Bloc's intention to
maneuver itself into a favorable economic position vis-a-vis some of
the less developed nations and to make itself indispensable may be seen
in two respects. Limiting ourselves in this paper to the Asian countries
only, we may first point to the fact that credit and technical assistance
arrangements have been made with some of the Asian countries not
only by the Soviet Union itself, but also by the European satellites and
Communist China. As examples we may cite the offers of credit and
technical assistance by East Germany, Poland, Hungary and Czecho
slovakia to India and Indonesia and similar aid provided by Communist
China to Burma and Cambodia, as well as a Chinese grant to the King
dom of Nepal. All of these were made during the last few years. 2
That there is a conscious and concerted effort to lure the Asian coun
tries with financial and technical assistance can hardly be denied. In the
second place, partly as a result of these pacts, but to an even larger
2

For a comprehensive listing of the trade and aid agreements concluded by the
Soviet Bloc with Asian countries see the Council for Economic and In
dustry R(&Search (CEIR) study on "Foreign Assistance Activities of the
Communist Bloc and Their Implications for the United States" prepared
for the Senate Special Committee to Study the Foreign Aid program, 85th
Congress, Washington, D.C., 1957. Cf. also the various reports to Con
gress by the Ad ministrator of the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act
of 1951.
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extent due to the operation of the many trade and payments agree
ments between the Asian countries and the Soviet Bloc, there has been
a sizable increase in the volume of trade between them. This claim
may, in the first instance, be substantiated by studying the available trade
statistics of the Asian countries for recent years. In a study of these
statistics several factors should be fully considered, however.
First, to be meaningful, a comparison of the flow of trade between
non-Communist Asia and the Soviet Bloc at different dates must be
based on a judicious selection of the time period to be examined. For
our purpose we have chosen to make the comparison between 1952
and 1956. The 1956 figures are used simply because they represent
the most up-to-date complete returns available at this writing. On
the other hand, the year 1952 is used as the initial benchmark for a
number of reasons. First, if a specific date is to be chosen to mark
the launching of the recent foreign economic efforts of the Soviet Bloc,
the International Economic Conference held at Moscow in April 1952
would probably present a most convenient and logical starting point.
Moreover, at least one major reason for the Soviet Bloc's efforts in
this field was the adoption of countermeasures in the face of the tighten
ing of export controls by the United States and the Western world in
1952. Although postwar American export controls directed against
the European Soviet Bloc dated from the end of 194 7, while the present
15-nation Consultative Group at Paris and its Co-ordinating Commit
tee (COCOM) were organized as early as January 1950 to exercise
international export controls, the Mutual Defense Assistance Control
Act (Battle Act) of 1951, which imparted a sense of seriousness and
urgency to American export control and facilitated its extension to a
multilateral basis, did not go into full effect until January 24, 1952.3
It was only in April 1952 when the Moscow Economic Conference
was in full swing that the international lists of commodities subject to
total embargo or quantitative control began to resemble closely the
American security lists at that time. Thirdly, as far as the Asian coun
tries are concerned, trade with the Soviet Bloc has largely consisted
of trade with Communist China. Here again, although the United Na
tions decision to impose an economic embargo on Communist China
and North Korea was reached in May 1951, the China Committee
3

For a historical sketch of the United States and international export control
systems see the Ninth Report to Congress under the Mutual Defense As
sistance Control Act of 1951.
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(CHINCOM) of the Paris Consultative Group was established only in
September 1952. As we have pointed out in another connection, 4 Com
munist China's trade with the free world actually took a significant
spurt during 1951 in anticipation of further trade controls by the West
ern world following America's lead in introducing economic sanctions
at the beginning of the year. Finally, 1952 was also the last year pre
ceding the five year plan (1953-1957) of Communist China during
which radical changes in the structure of the economy and less radical,
but nonetheless significant changes in the country's foreign trade po
tentials took place.
Next, bearing the preceding observations in mind, we are probably
justified in stating that whatever changes there may have been since
1952 in the economic relationships between the Asian countries and
the Soviet Bloc in general and Communist China in particular, they are
not the outcome of a single factor, but actually reflect the result of
several diverse, though related, developments. The reaction of the Sino
Soviet entente, along with the European satellites, to the free world's
trade controls which gained in effectiveness in 1952; their autonomous
and aggressive efforts to cultivate economic relations with the Asian
countries and regions, especially those that have "neutralist" political
tendencies and/or are not really parties to the UN embargo; the eco
nomic growth of Communist China and the attending changes in the
composition and volume of its imports and exports; the economic condi
tions of the Asian countries themselves, and the successive revision and
relaxation of the international export control system - all these have
contributed to the expansion of Soviet Bloc trade with Asia. Thus it
would be an oversimplification to attribute this trade expansion en
tirely to the "economic offensive" of the Soviet Bloc although it remains
to be seen whether the other factors have not been in part fostered and
exploited by the Bloc's maneuvers.

4

Yuan-Ii Wu, "Communist China's Trade with the West," The Pacific Spectator,
Stanford, 1953.
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TABLE I - Trade Between Selected Asian Countries and Areas with
the Soviet Bloc-1952 and 1956. (Values in Millions of U.S. Dollars.)
Importing Countries
N
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Exporting Countrie�
and Areas
Burma
Ceylon
India
Indochina
Indonesia
Japan

Malaya
Pakistan
Hong Kong
Aggregate
Total ( Excluding
Hong: Kong)

1952
0.1
26.0
!0.2
0.1

Communist China
Index for I 956
1952=100
1956
14400.0
14.4
147.3
38.3
127.5
13.8

0.6
(a)
83.9
91.0
211.9

11.7
67.4
7.8
15.9
23.8
193.1

120.9

169.3

(a)

11233.3.
19.0
26.2
91.3
140.0

Euro2ean Soviet Bloc
Total Soviet Bloc
Jndex for 1956
Index for 1956
1956
1952=100
1952
1952
1956
1952=100
34.7
20.3
34700.0
0.1
6.9
133.2
2.9
0.2
28.9
38.5
36.5
306.7
588.7
6.2
16.4
50.3
0.1
23.6
121.4
9.8
11.9
240.8
9.8
0.8
0.2
5.9
2950.0
9162.5
73.3
34.4
42.2
30.3
139.3
30.3
113.5
4.5
12.6
35.7
119.6
20.4
17.1
26.2
23.8
91.0
306.8
297.0
113.7
85.1
133.6
103.3
85.1

113.7

Exporting Countries

133.6

206.0

283.0

137.4

Euro2ean Soviet Bloc
Communist China
Total Soviet Bloc
Index for 1956
Jndex for 1956
Index for 1956
Importing Countries
1952=100
1956
1952
1956
1952=100
1952
1952
1956
1952=100
and Areas
0.3
925.0
5100.0
l 5.3
22.2
2.7
2.4
37.5
1388.9
Burma
145.5
1.6
28.1
407.2
1.1
8.0
6.9
29.7
371.3
Ceylon
63.2
6.4
52.2
815.6
40.4
21.5
34.0
73.7
182.4
India
0.1
12.5
0.8
4.1
55.4
4.2
7.4
51.2
8.2
Indochina
426.5
14.5
30.2
1589.5
44.7
3.4
1.9
5.3
843.4
Indonesia
3.0
10.9
83.6
561.1
363.3
17.9
102.5
14.9
572.6
Japan
42.5
176.7
43.1
109.1
3.0
5.3
39.5
48.4
113.9
Malaya
13.9
237.8
2.3
8.8
16.5
I 7.6
11.1
63.0
3.7
Paki.,tan
1.3
125.1
38.5
146.6
181.7
0.5
145.3
182.2
124.3
Hong Kong
33.2
102.7
309.3
289.2
423.3
165.4
256.0
534.0
184.6
Aggregate
Total (Excluding
31.9
320.4
102.2
142.6
218.2
241.6
351.8
110.7
246.7
Hong Kong)
(a) indicates "under $50,000''
.... indicates '·no information"
- indicates "nil"
For 1956, ''Indochina" refers to south Viet-Nam
Source: "·Values Series," International Economic Analysis Division of The Bureau of Foreign Commerce, Department o( Commerce.

Thus qualified, a comparison of the trade statistics of the Asian
countries in 1952 and 1956 shows the following results:
1) In the case of imports from the Soviet Bloc, the total value
rose by 84.6 per cent between 1952 and 1956 (from US $289.2 million
to $534.0 million) if we include as importing nations and areas Burma,
Ceylon, India, the Indochinese states outside Communist control, In
donesia, Japan, Malaya (and Singapore), Pakistan and Hong Kong.
These areas constitute the entire group of free-Asian countries other
than Thailand, the Philippines, Taiwan and South Korea, none of which
reports any direct, overt trade with the Communist countries, as well
as Afghanistan which we shall disregard for our present purpose. If
Hong Kong is excluded, inasmuch as a sizable portion of its imports
is for re-export, total imports of the remaining Asia countries listed
above from the Soviet Bloc increased even more rapidly, i.e., from
$142.6 million in 1952 to $351.8 million in 1956, or by 146.7 per cent.
2) As for individual Asian countries and areas, of the nine listed,
'imports
from the Bloc rose during this period from 13.9 per cent in
the case of Malaya to a whopping 1,288.9 per cent in the case of
Burma. The only exceptions to this rule of spectacular advances were
Indochina and Pakistan, the former attributable to a contraction of the
reporting area to southern Viet-Nam, the latter reflecting the indirect
effect on Pakistan's imports of a drop of cotton purchases by the Euro
pean Soviet Bloc possibly as a result of switching their business to
Egypt and an even larger drop of cotton imports by. Communist China
following the expansion of China's domestic cotton production.
3 ) In the case of exports to the Soviet Bloc, the increase between
1952 and 1956 was 37.4 per cent or from $206.0 million to $283.0
million if exports from Hong Kong are disregarded. If Hong Kong is
included, the change was an increase of only 3.3 per cent, believed
to be due to the expansion of South and Southeast Asia's direct exports
to mainland China, thus bypassing the Hong Kong entrepot.
4) For individual countries with the exception of Hong Kong and
Pakistan which suffered a drop of 73.8 per cent and 82.9 per cent
respectively in their exports to the Bloc during this period, the increase
ranged from 33.2 per cent in the case of Ceylon to 34,600 per cent in
the case of Burma. (The latter's exports to the Bloc rose from a mere
$100,000 in 1952 to $34.7 million in 1956.)
These general observations on Asia's trade with the Soviet Bloc
as a whole may now be further supplemented by the following points
297

dealing with trade between the Asian countries and the major com
ponents of the Soviet orbit; namely, Communist China and the Euro
pean Soviet Bloc, the latter including the USSR and the European
satellites. In this respect we may note:
1) In the case of exports from the Asian countries, between 1952
and 1956, of the nine countries and areas all but Ceylon followed a
common upward trend both in their exports to Communist China and
in their exports to the European Soviet Bloc. Even in the case of
Ceylon, although exports to Communist China in 1956 exceeded the
corresponding figure in 1952 and 1955, they were actually much smaller
than in 1953 and 1954. Thus one might say that the exception was
more illusory than real. As for imports from Communist China and
the European Soviet Bloc, all the Asian countries and areas under
consideration save India, Pakistan and Hong Kong exhibited a common
trend during this period. Hong Kong's declining import volume from
the European Soviet Bloc may be safely disregarded as it was never
large. As for India's imports from Communist China, the apparently
smaller volume in 1956 as compared with that of 1952, in contrast to
the large increase of India's imports from the European Bloc, conceals
the fact that there was actually a rising trend from 1953 on. 5 The
apparently divergeqt trends followed by Pakistan's imports from the
European Bloc and the corresponding imports from Communist China
can perhaps be explained by China's need to narrow .the gap between
her trailing exports to Pakistan and her much larger but fluctuating
import volume from Pakistan, the latter being directly influenced by
the size of China's own cotton and jute crops. Thus, allowing for these
relatively unimportant exceptions, it may be said that Communist China
and the European Soviet Bloc showed the same general movement in
their trade relations with the Asian countries under consideration.
2) Although the European Bloc plays the leading role in expanding
trade between the entire Bloc and the free world, the dominant position
in Asia is occupied by Communist China.

5

See the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act reports for figures in 1953-1955.
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TABLE II - The Role of Communist China in Asia's Trade with the
Entire Soviet Bloc-1952 and 1956.
Export& to Communist China
Imports from Communist
China as Per Cent of Imports
as Per Cent of Exports to
the Soviet Hloc
from the Soviet Bloc

1952
Burma
l 00.00
Ceylon
90.0
India
62.2
Indochina
100.0
Indonesia
Japan
75.0
Malaya
Pakistan
70.2
Hong Kong
100.0
Aggregate
71.3
Total (Excluding
Hong Kong)
58.7

49.6
92.0
18.5
77.9
100.0
62.9

1952
88.9
86.3
84.2
90.2
35.8
83.2
92.9
21.0
99.1
88.5

1956
59.2
94.6
29.2
97.6
67.6
81.6
89.0
79.3
99.7
79.3

59.8

77.6

68.7

1956
41.5
99.5
27.4

.... indicates "no information"

Source: "Value Series," International Economic Analysis Division
of the Bureau of Foreign Commerce, Department of Commerce.
As Table II clearly shows, of all the Asian countries and areas under
consideration, India was the only one that imported more from the
European Bloc during 1956 than from Communist China. In the case
of exports from the Asia countries in 1956, Burma, India, Indonesia
and Malaya presented the four cases out of nine that showed a larger
volume of exports to the European Bloc than to Communist China.
Moreover, only in the case of Burma and India do we observe during
this period any appreciable deterioration of the relative position of
Communist China vis-a-vis the European Bloc both as a customer and
as a supplier. In most other cases, the Chinese were able to improve
upon their initially favorable position relative to the European Bloc.
It is not hard to explain the exceptional cases furnished by India and
Burma as the concentrated effort of the USSR and the European satel
lites in offering them credit, grants and technical assistance far exceeded
similar efforts that were made in other Asian conntries,6 and one is
6

CEIR, op. cit.
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strongly tempted to suggest that the larger imports of Burma and India
from the European Bloc were essentially a result of the extension of
economic aid by the European Bloc while, in the case of India at any
rate, the larger exports to the European Bloc were to a considerable
extent a consequence of the growth of imports from the same quarter.
Accordingly, we may summarize our preliminary findings by stat
ing (1) that on the basis of the trade statistics of the nine Asian coun
tries and areas in 1952-1956 there is, with the exception of Pakistan,
a notable to spectacular advance in the volume of trade with the Soviet
Bloc as a whole; (2) that the same trend is seen both in trade with the
European Bloc and in trade with Communist China; (3) that Com
munist China enjoys a predominant position in the expanding trade
between the Soviet Bloc and its Asian trade partners, the only significant
exceptions being Burma and India; (4) that in the case of Burma and
India the dominating position of the European Bloc is probably at
tributable to the latter's greater economic assistance programs; and (5)
that the decline of Hong Kong's exports to the Soviet Bloc, primarily
Communist China, is a result of China's diminishing dependence upon
the British colony as an enterpot and should not therefore be inter
preted as an exception to the general trend. Clearly, even though these
developments cannot be wholly accounted for by the "economic of
fensive" of th� Soviet Bloc, and that of Communist China in particular,
they are sufficiently suggestive of a deliberate "offensive" as to chal
lenge the imagination.
III
A CLOSER LOOK AT THE GROWING ECONOMIC TIES BETWEEN ASIA
AND THE SOVIET BLOC

However, one must not be carried away by the "impressive" gains
of Soviet Bloc trade and immediately jump to the conclusion that
strong economic ties have already been established with the Asian
countries.
First, let us dispose of a fairly simple matter by pointing out that
the rapid growth of trade with the Bloc was possible partly, if not only,
because the initial volume of trade was extremely small. The aggregate
exports of the nine Asian countries and areas to the Soviet Bloc in 1952
amounted to $297 million only or no more than 4.6 per cent of their
total exports to the world. If Hong Kong is excluded, their total exports
to the Soviet Bloc in 1952 ($206 million) would be less than 3.5 per
cent of their total exports to the world. Similarly, the aggregate im300
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ports from the Soviet Bloc (including Hong Kong's imports) were
$289.2 million in 1952 or only 3.5 per cent of their aggregate imports
from the world. If Hong Kong is excluded, the corresponding ratio
in 1952 would be about 1.9 per cent of their aggregate imports from
the world. It is not surprising, therefore, that a high rate of growth
could be achieved within a short time.
However, one should immediately note that although the ratio of
the aggregate exports of these Asian countries and areas to the Soviet
Bloc had dropped by 1956 to less than 4.1 per cent if Hong Kong's
exports to the Bloc are included, the ratio, excluding Hong Kong, had
risen to slightly over 4 per cent as compared with less than 3.5 per cent
in 1952. The ratio of aggregate imports from the Bloc to total imports
from the world in 1956 reached 5.9 per cent including Hong Kong or
4.2 per cent excluding Hong Kong. Compared with the 1952 figures 3.5 per cent including Hong Kong and only 1.9 per cent excluding Hong
Kong - there were definitely some very significant advances in the
relative sense.
TABLE III - The Relative Importance of Trade with the Soviet Bloc
in the Foreign Trade of Selected Asian Countries.
Imports from the
Exports to the Soviet Bloc as
Soviet Bloc as Per Cent of Total
(Millions of U.S. Dollars)
Imports fromPer Cent of Total Imports from
Exports to
E'l{oorts to World
World
World
World
1956
1952
266.1
242.7
Burma
364.3
315.5
Ceylon
1303.3 1272.1
India
116.7
42.0
Indochina
907.5 882.0
Indonesia
1272.9 2500.6
Japan
1239.7 1360.9
Malaya
340.2
532.5
Pakistan
507.3 561.7
Hong Kong
6461.5 7566.5
Aggregate
Total (Excluding Hong
Kong)
5954.2 7004.8

1952
192.5
357.5
1688.0
448.4
924.0
2028.8
1256.9
609.7
661.4
8167.2

1956
197.4
342.3
1715.5
210.7
853.1
3229.7
1356.8
355.0
799.1
9059.6

0.1
2.4
22.5
17.9
4.6

I.I

7505.8

8?60.5

3.5

1952
(a)
9.2
1.3

1956
14.3
10.6
3.9
2.7
2.9
3.1
6.0
4.2
4.1

1952
1.4
2.2
2.4
1.8
0.6
0.9
3.4
2.9
22.2
3.5

1956
18.9
8.7
4.3
2.0
5.2
3.2
3.6
3.1
22.8
5.9

'1.0

1.9

4.2

0.1

.... indicates "no information"
(a) indicates "under $50,000"
Source: "Value Series," International Economic Analysis Division of the
Bureau of Foreign Commerce, Department of Commerce.

As of 1956, the Soviet Bloc was among the most important trading
partners of only two Asian countries; namely Burma and Ceylon. It
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supplied Burma with 18.9 per cent of the latter's total imports in that
year and took 14.3 per cent of the latter's total exports. Communist
China was primarily responsible for Burma's imports from the Bloc
while the European Bloc was primarily responsible for Burma's exports
to the Bloc. In the same year, the Soviet Bloc was responsible for 10.6
per cent of Ceylon's total exports and 8.7 per cent of the latter's total
imports, with virtually the entire trade carried on between Ceylon and
Communist China.
Certain factors in the Bloc's trade with these two Asian countries
resemble each other closely. The Ceylon trade is conducted principally
under a five-year, renewable barter agreement between Ceylon and
Communist China providing for an annual exchange of 50,000 tons of
Ceylonese rubber for 270,000 tons of rice with any balance to be settled
in sterling. As a result of this agreement, rubber exports to the Soviet
Bloc averaged about 50 per cent of Ceylon's total rubber exports in
1954-56.7 Because of the large rubber export which was especially
attractive to Ceylon at the time the agreement was first put into opera
tion in 1953, as the price paid for the rubber was higher than the then
world market price while the price of rice was lower, China's sterling
indebtedness to Ceylon increased gradually, reaching, according to the
London Economist, 8 13.5 million pounds ($37.8 million) by 1957.
When the renewal of the agreement was under discussion in 1957,
China was in a position to demand another long-term agreement, as
well as more favorable terms, by using this debt as a bargaining counter.
To quote the Economist:
Ceylon now risks losing this credit balance and the Chinese market
if it refuses the Chinese demand, but by accepting, will have to
restrict its imports from other countries, disregard its GATT ob
ligations and become more vulnerable to Chinese pressure in the
future.
The Burma trade follows a similar pattern except that in this case
Burma's problem began with a rice surplus which could not be profitably
disposed of on the world market. Confronted with an estimated export-

1
B

The Economist, London, August 31, 1957, p. 675.
Ibid.
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able surplus exceeding 2 million long tons in 1955,9 Burma was under
standably receptive to suggestions from Communist China and the
USSR each to purchase 150,000 to 200,000 tons of rice from Burma
annually. These figures were subsequently incorporated in separate
trade agreements with the two principal Bloc countries in 1955, and
the USSR quota was later raised to 400,000 tons per annum. 10 The
rice sale to the USSR led to sizable imports from the European Soviet
Bloc, including the notorious case of hardened cement blocks on the
Rangoon docks when they arrived during the monsoon rains. Even in
the smaller deal with Communist China, while the latter was supposed
to provide 60 per cent of the value of the imported rice in Chinese
exports, 20 per cent in re-exports of goods of Russian and Eastern
European origin and 20 per cent in sterling, protracted negotiations by
the Burmese in Peking in 19 55 failed to find enough Chinese goods to
buy, and it was under these conditions that the much-vaunted sale of
Chinese textile machinery was finally concluded with Burma. 11
The experience of Burma and Ceylon, reminiscent of Nazi Ger
many's machinations in an earlier decade, 12 points to the conclusion
that countries depending upon the export of a few primary products
and therefore vulnerable to the latter's often large price fluctuations are
usually in an unenviable bargaining position in dealing with large foreign
state trading organs. On the one hand, they are often lured by the
apparent attraction of long-term bulk purchases. On the other hand,
the possibility of their trading partners' sudden withdrawal of a bulk
purchase, which the government trading agencies are capable of doing,
and the need to settle credit balances owed by their trading partners,
which readily accumulate as a result of the domestic pressures to export,
tend to increase their dependence on their trading partners. This effect
of long-term bulk purchase of some key export commodities by the
Soviet Bloc can be serious even though the amount directly involved
o Far Eastern Economic Review, Hong Kong, July 28, 1955, Vol. XIX, No. 4,
p. 110.
10 CEIR, op. cit. See also the Oriental Economist: Monthly Statistical Bulletin,
Tokyo, September 1956, pp. 10-11.
11 Far Eastern Economic Review, Hong Kong, February 24, 1955, Vol. XVIII,
No. 8, p. 250 March 31, 1955, Vol. XVIII, No. 13, p. 408; and July 28,
1955, Vol. XIX, No. 4, pp. 109-110.
12 Yuan-li Wu, Economic Warfare, (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1952), and es
pecially the Tariff Commission's study quoted therein.
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may be relatively small when compared with the volume of the export
ing country's total exports to the world.
IV
ECONOMIC INTER-DEPENDENCE AND STATISTICS OF THE DIRECTION
OF TRADE

A country's economic dependence upon imports from another
country may be measured by the extent to which domestic consumption
and production would immediately suffer if such imports were no longer
available, the cost at which alternative sources of supply, domestic or
foreign, could be developed, and the length of time required for making
the adjustment. Similarly, a country's economic dependence upon ex
ports to another country may be measured by the extent to which do
mestic income and employment would immediately suffer, the cost at
which alternative markets or areas of production can be found, and the
length of time required to make the adjustment. This concept of a
country's economic dependence upon another may be applied gener
ally except in those cases where the principal economic activity consists
of transit trade such as Hong Kong and, to a lesser extent, Malaya and
Singapore. Bearing in mind the qualitative importance that some com
modities might possess in an economy even when they are traded only
in very small quantities internationally and given the economy's ability
to make adjustments in production and consumption, it is of course
true that the degree of a country's economic dependence upon another
varies with the volume of its imports from the latter that are actually
retained for its own consumption or further production and the volume
of its exports to the latter that actually originate from the stream of its
own production. The question is whether in the case of the Asian
countries and areas the direction of trade statistics we have can provide
such a quantitative index, and in what way it may have to be modified.
As we examine the statistics that purport to show a country's di
rection of trade, we can readily see that as far as export statistics are
concerned, the inclusion of re-exports, without subjecting the previously
imported goods to any substantial transformation, would be a source of
overstatement. In addition, if the direction of trade is based on the
consignment method so that a partner country is credited with an export
if it is the country to which the goods are directly consigned, the re
corded export trade data would tend to be overstated in so far as there
are some exports which are credited to the partner country but which
are destined for further shipment to a third country and are not re304
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corded as goods in transit. On the other hand, the recorded export
figures tend to be an underestimate in so far as there are indirect ex
ports to the partner country via some third country. In theory, these
inaccuracies would not arise if the production-consumption basis is
used in recording the direction of trade so that exports are credited to
the partner country only if the latter is actually the country where the
goods are ultimately consumed or substantially transformed. But in
the case of exports this is not necessarily true in practice as the exporter
is frequently not aware of the final destination of his shipments, this
being so especially when the exports are primary products. The possi
bility of inaccuracy increases if there is some special incentive for the
exporters to make false reports on purpose, such as the existence of an
embargo of certain types of exports to a particular country. Under such
conditions the same reasons would prevail for the possible overestimate
or underestimate of exports as mentioned under the consignment method.
As for the crediting of imports to a particular country, the degree
of economic dependence tends to be overstated when the consignment
method is used if the recorded imports include imports that actually
originate from a third country but are credited to the partner country
as the latter happens to be the place from which the goods are last
directly consigned. On the other hand, the consignment method tends
to underestimate imports from a partner country by omitting indirect
imports via a third country. These sources of inaccuracy do not exist
if the production-consumption basis is used so that imports are credited
to a partner country only if the latter is the primary origin of the im
ports. Since it is generally easier to determine the primary origin of
imports than the place of consumption of exports, the possibility of
inaccuracy through ignorance is minimized. But it should be added,
regardless of the basis of crediting imports to a partner country, where
the system of general imports is used, the import data tend invariably
to overstate the degree of the country's economic dependence on a
partner country if some of the imports are destined for re-export with
out substantial transformation. Fortunately, this source of overestimate
is unlikely to be large except when we deal with countries having a
large entrepot trade. But in such cases, especially if the entrepot trade
is the main economic activity, our concept of economic dependence no
longer applies.
According to their respective national statistics in the case of the
nine Asian countries and areas under study, Ceylon did not include
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re-exports in reporting exports in 1956 while Indonesia and Vietnam
followed the practice of recording "special exports" only. All the other
countries and areas include re-exports in their reported export trade.
The same applies to the Philippines and Thailand which have not been
included in our analysis. As for the basis on which destination and
provenance are determined, India follows the consignment method in
both exports and imports, while Burma, Ceylon, Hong Kong, Japan,
Pakistan and Thailand use the consignment criterion in exports only.
Malaya and Indonesia employ the consumption-production criterion
throughout. 1·1
On the basis of the practice of these individual countries, the logical
conclusion seems to be that as far as imports from the Soviet Bloc are
concerned the figures reported by India tend to understate the extent
of its trade and hence the degree of its economic dependence on the
Bloc as a whole mainly because of the existence of indirect imports
from Hong Kong.
In regard to exports, Japan's exports to the Bloc tend to be under
stated because any re-exports that may be included tend to be small
while there may be a fair amount of indirect exports via Hong Kong.
On the other hand, Malaya's reported exports to the Bloc may be an
overestimate to. some extent as the volume of re-exports tends to be
fairly large in view of the area's entrepot trade while actual, if not re
ported, indirect exports to Communist China via Hong Kong have in
all probability declined following the lifting of the rubber export em
bargo in mid-1956. As for Burma, Ceylon, India and Pakistan, two
opposite influences prevail. First, some indirect exports to Communist
China via Hong Kong undoubtedly exist. Second, there may be some
re-exports included in the reported exports to the Bloc in each case.
Lastly, in the case of Ceylon and Burma, a portion of these exports
to the Bloc may eventually end up in third countries. Thus, Burmese
rice shipments credited to China may actually find themselves in Ceylon
while some of the primary products shipped to Communist China may
be re-exported or transshipped to the USSR. Accordingly, only if we
assume that the indirect trade via Hong Kong is larger than the other
two items combined can we conclude with some assurance that the
13 See United Nations, Direction of International Trade, Vol. VIII, No. 7, pp.
326-28. Cf. also R. G. D. Allen and J. Edward Ely (ed.), International
Trade Statistics (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1953 ), where the criteria
reported are somewhat at variance with the later UN publication.
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reported export figures to the Soviet Bloc of these countries are under
estimates. While such an assumption is probably correct, the element
of conjecture cannot be removed entirely. But it is fairly safe to say
that with the possible exception of Malaya and excluding Hong Kong
it is exceedingly unlikely that the reported exports of all the remaining
countries are overestimates of the true volume which must be con
sidered in evaluating the economic interdependence of the Asian coun
tries with the Soviet Bloc.
Thus we may summarize our findings by stating that both with
respect to exports to the Bloc and with respect to imports from the
Bloc, if Hong Kong is excluded, the total reported figures for the re
maining countries and areas are probably underestimates, but certainly
not overestimates, the probability being somewhat stronger in the case
of imports from the Bloc. The inherent overestimate in the case of
Hong Kong, in the sense the term is used here, is irrelevant as Hong
Kong's main economic role is still that of an entrepot. To this general
conclusion we may append the note that the underestimate in the re
ported figures applies also to Thailand and the Philippines. 14
Since the underestimate, in so far as it exists, is due to indirect
trade via Hong Kong, and since such indirect trade is mainly with Com
munist China, it follows further that Communist China's relative im
portance in the Bloc's trade with the other Asian countries must also
have been understated. In view of the fact that Communist China's
share in this trade is already large on the basis of recorded statistics,
it will be well to examine the Chinese trade efforts a little further.
V
COMMUNIST CHINA'S POLICIES AND PROBLEMS IN TRADING WITH
THE REST OF ASIA

While it would be a serious mistake to regard Communist China's
growing trade with other Asian countries entirely as one of the natural
results of an expanding economy, it would be equally fallacious to treat
it as the outcome of a carefully engineered Chinese plot and nothing
else. Moreover, insofar as Communist China's deliberate policy has
been responsible for the actual pattern and trend of non-Communist
14 A report in Far Eastern Economic Review, Hong Kong, October 4, 1955, Vol.
XXI, No. 13, p. 435, indicated the presence of a fairly flourishing smuggling
trade between Communist China and the Philippines. Thailand's trade with
Communist China has been conducted indirectly but actively through Hong
Kong.
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Asia's trade with the Chinese mainland, the basic structure of this policy
has not remained stationary. This very flexible policy has therefore
not always taken a consistent course in dealing with the individual Asian
countries.
There is little doubt that the predominant motives in Communist
China's attempts to develop trade with other Asian countries immedi
ately after 1951 were, first, to beat the embargo and secondly, to earn
foreign exchange to add to its then depleted reserves. As Ceylon was
not yet a member of the United Nations and did not agree to the em
bargo, the rubber-rice agreement with China was a natural outcome,
especially as the terms of trade appeared to be extremely favorable to
Ceylon at that time.15 The desire to replenish the Communist state's
coffers with foreign exchange, on the other hand, clearly account for
the policy to permit exports to Hong Kong and Japan to exceed the
level of Chinese imports from these two areas year after year .10 Since
the Hong Kong currency earned can be converted into United States
dollars on the free market, while the credit balance with Japan can be
settled in sterling, China's purpose is well served in this manner.
Moreover, as long as Chinese exports to Japan are greater than
Chinese imports from Japan, the impression is given that the Chinese
market is by no means limited by China's ability to pay and the small
volume of trade· between Japan and China can then be blamed upon
Japan's participation in the embargo. Perhaps a similar consideration
entered into Communist China's calculations in allowing Indonesia to
build up a fair-sized indebtedness to China which it must then try to
·settle through the export of rubber and possibly also oil and tin, an of
which were banned items. 11
If the cultivation of Indonesia's trade is built upon the latter's desire
to expand its export of a few primary products, the same may be said
16

Far Eastern Economic Review, Hong Kong, March 31, 1955, Vol. XVIII,

No. 13, p. 408; May 26, 1955, Vol. XVIII, No. 21, p. 671; October 20,
1955, Vol. XIX, No. 16, p. 508; and November 24, 1955, Vol. XIX, No.
21, p. 659.
10 The several semi-official trade agreements between Communist China and
Japanese businessmen have always provided for a trade turnover in which
exports and imports are equal on paper. Actual experience has consistently
resulted in much larger Chinese exports than Chinese imports, a situation
which Communist China could easily have put a stop to if it had desired
to do so.
11 Far Eastern Economic Review, Hong Kong, July 5, and 12, 1956, Vol. XXI,
No. 1, p. 29 and No. 2, p. 62.
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of China's dealings with Burma, Malaya and Ceylon. With the lifting of
the ban on rubber exports to the Chinese mainland by Malaya and
Indonesia the rubber and rice exchange was turned into a more attrac
tive proposition for China and a questionable blessing to Ceylon. Under
the same conditions, the Malayan businessmen's mission to Peking in
1956 was induced to sell rubber to China without any Chinese guaran
tee that the product would be used for nonmilitary purposes only. 18
The case of Burma's rice barter with Communist China and the Euro
pean Bloc has already been mentioned.
A few seemingly curious phenomena stand out in the labyrinth of
trade agreements that Communist China has set up with its neighbors.
Thus, cement was imported from Japan at the same time it was sold
to Hong Kong and Malaya, 19 while rice was purchased from Burma
when it was being sold to Ceylon. One may well wonder why, for in
stance, neither Ceylon nor Burma undertook to effect a triangular ex
change in a way similar to that engineered by the Chinese. The only
logical explanation would appear to be that Communist China, by vir
tue of its monopolization of foreign trade by the state and its control
of domestic prices, is able to pay higher prices for imports and to accept
lower prices for its exports, absorbing the loss domestically through the
government budget or allowing the export producers to be indirectly
subsidized by the buyers of imports while hoping to offset the external
loss through future manipulations of the payments and barter agree
ments, such as by holding up export shipments.
In fact, in order to gain a larger political or economic objective,
Communist China is reported to have employed many of the known
techniques either to reduce foreign competition or to exploit a local
semi-monopoly and an inelastic demand. Trade reports from Hong
Kong have, for instance, repeatedly mentioned the practice of Chinese
"dumping" of light manufactures and other consumer products in Thai
land and Indonesia with its detrimental effect on Hong Kong's own ex
ports. 20 The same effects are also felt by Japan in Southeast Asia.
18 Far Eastern Economic Review, Hong Kong, October 18, 1956, Vol. XXI,
No. 16, p. 515.
19 Far Eastern Economic Review, Hong Kong, October 25, 1956, Vol. XXI,
No. 17, p. 541.
2 ° Far Eastern Economic Review, Hong Kong, July 5, 1956, Vol. XXI, No. 1,
p. 29.
21 Far Eastern Economic Review, Hong Kong, August 23, 1956, Vol. XXI, No. 8,
p, 257.
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Similarly, Chinese rice was reportedly sold in Malaya in 1956 at well
below the price of both local and imported Thai rice. 21 On the other
hand, Communist China is accused by Hong Kong to have time and
again held up shipments of live hogs and other farm products to the
colony in order to secure higher prices and greater profits. 22
Lest the above instances should convey the impression that Com
munist China's external economic relations are managed without a
hitch, let us quote the Communist Minister of Trade in his statement
to the Chinese Communist Party's Eighth Congress in September, 1956:
Sometimes when a temporary surplus was found in certain prod
ucts in the country, the foreign trade department,& were immedi
ately requested to export them. As an example, in 1954, the
reduced output in agriculture affected the production and earnings
of certain industrial undertakings, and capital construction projects
were curtailed. So in 1955 there was found a surplus of such items
as steel products, cement and pig iron. This was only a temporary
phenomenon. But the production departments were afraid lest there
be accumulated stocks, and repeatedly requested the foreign trade
departments to export the said items in quantity in order to support
domestic production.
However, by this year, when the high tide of
_
socialism· arrived, the domestic needs for those items greatly in
creased, and there was a request for the revision of the export plans
which had already been decided upon.23
According to a recent article in the Communist Ta-kung pao, 24
31.5 per cent of China's exports in 1957 consisted of products of in
dustry and mining as compared with only 17.9 per cent in 1952, and
there is a great deal of evidence that products of light manufacturing,
as well as a few simple engineering products, are now entering the
Chinese export market. There are certain advantages to produce con
sumer products for export, 25 and the progress of China's industrializa
tion has definitely enhanced China's export capability. Given this back
ground and the apparent decision of the Soviet Union to give more
22

Far Eastern Economic Review, Hong Kong, July 26, 1956, Vol. XXI, No. 4,

p. 124, and November 15, 1956, Vol. XXI, No. 20, p. 642.
23 Jen-min jih-pao (People's Daily). Peking, September 28, 1956.
24 Article by Wang Ti, Ta-kung pao, Peking, October 13, 1957.
25 Yuan-Ii Wu, "Communist China's Economic Challenge," Current History,
January, 1957.
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impetus to the strengthening of economic ties with the less developed
countries of Asia and the Middle East for political ends, it is indeed
not surprising that we should find developments in China's external
economic relations that lend support to such a policy. But as the
Communist foreign trade minister has pointed out, fervent and capricious
activities in foreign trade do not always reflect astute and devious plan
ning. Occasionally, at any rate, they are actually the result of poor
planning.

VI

THE SHORT-TERM EFFECT OF SOVIET BLOC TRADE WITH ASIA ON THE
UNITED STATES.

From the point of view of the United States, the preceding ap
praisal of the Soviet Bloc's "economic offensive" in Asia and its basic
techniques calls neither for hysterical alarm nor for indolent com
placency. Obviously, the Bloc's expanding economic relations with Asia
must have certain economic effects on the United States, and these must
now be assessed.
We may begin with a short-term analysis, assuming that the eco
nomic structures of the Asian countries in question remain relatively
unchanged and that there is no spectacular economic development.
Within this framework a series of questions may then be posed. Would
trade between the Asian countries and the United States be appreciably
larger in the absence of the former's trade with the Soviet Bloc? Would
there be a change in the nature of their trade with the United States?
What conclusions, however tentative, can be drawn from the develop
ments between 1952 and 1956? As a matter of convenience we may
deal with the problem of the degree to which trade with the Soviet
Bloc has substituted for potential trade with the United States by first
considering the case of Asian exports and then the case of Asian imports.
In selecting one foreign country in lieu of another to sell one's
products to (or to place one's orders in), the principal considerations
are prices ( allowing for quality differences), availability or usefulness
of the means of payment involved, established contacts, and extra
economic preferences. Disregarding any extra-economic preference for
the Soviet Bloc on the part of the Asian countries, we can readily see
that established trade contacts, even up to the end of our period, would
tend to favor the United States. There is relatively little information
on the prices of imports from the Soviet Bloc as compared with United
States prices, and we are perforce unable to take this factor into con311

sideration. Thus the chief economic factor is reduced to a problem of
payments.
If exports to the Soviet Bloc result in smaller exports to the United
States, given the same volume of "compensatory financing,"26 the smaller
dollar earnings would tend to lead to lower imports from the United
States while the higher exports to the Soviet Bloc would induce larger
imports from the Bloc. Similarly, it may be argued that if imports from
the Bloc should result in lower imports from the United States, the
smaller demand for dollar expenditures may lead to smaller exports to
the United States while the larger demand for rubles or the JMP would
lead to larger exports to the Bloc and hence a smaller export capacity
to the American market. Thus, where currency inconvertibility and
trade agreements necessitate bilateral balances, it is not inconceivable
for an all-round reduction of trade between the Asian countries and the
United States to originate either through an initial substitution of Soviet
Bloc products for United States products or through the substitution
of Soviet Bloc markets for the American market.
There are, however, some good reasons to believe that we can go
beyond the preceding general proposition. First, for most Asian coun
tries bent on economic development, the demand for United States
capital goods and other materials is probably so high that while imports
from the Soviet ·Bloc may replace specific imports from the United
States, they are not an active restraining factor in limiting the total
volume of dollar imports. Rather, dollar imports are limited by the
volume of exports to the dollar area, which is true especially in coun
tries having a deficit balance on current account with the United States,
and by the desire to increase dollar balances because of their con
vertibility, which is generally true even in countries enjoying a favorable
balance on current account with the United States. The widespread
practice of exchange restrictions against dollar imports in Asian coun
tries testifies to this situation. Secondly, even if total imports from the
United States are in rare instances reduced as a result of imports from
the Soviet Bloc, the desire to increase dollar holdings alone would
preclude any serious weakening of the desire to export to the United
States. Any reduction of exports to the United States would have to
be explained by a reduction of the capacity to export to the dollar area
following the expansion of exports to the Soviet Bloc. The key to the
26 This should be interpreted to include any planned net addition to the country's
foreign exchange assets.
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problem appears to be whether the Soviet Bloc market has taken Asian
exports away from the American market. What can be said on this
possibility?
Since a full examination of all the exports to the Soviet Bloc from
the Asian countries in question is beyond the scope of the present
paper, we shall limit ourselves to the principal exports of a few coun
tries on which data are readily available. Furthermore, we shall assume
that the "substitution effect" on potential exports to the United States
may be judged according to ( 1) whether the particular export is one
of the Asian country's "important" exports to the United States, (2)
whether its export to the Soviet Bloc is larger than that to the United
States, and (3) whether its export to the Bloc has increased since 1952.
A commodity is regarded as one of the country's "important" exports
to the United States if its value approaches, say, 5 per cent (arbitrarily
chosen) of total United States imports from that country that year.
To simplify description and classification the following number code
is used:
I. ... an "important" export to the United States
II.... not an "important" export to the United States
A .... export to the Bloc exceeding that imported by the
United States
B ....export to the Bloc less than that imported by the United
States
i .... 1956 export to the Bloc greater than the corresponding
value in 1952
ii .... 1956 export to the Bloc less than the corresponding
value in 1952
We further reserve the A category for commodities that are imported
by the United States in noticeable quantities. Goods that are imported
in negligible amounts by the United States or are not imported at all
and that otherwise fall into the A category are described by A1 • Thus
the "substitution effect" on the United States may be ranked for indi
vidual commodities as follows:
Large positive effect ... ...........IAi
Some positive effect ..............IBi, IIAi, and IIBi
No effect....................... IIA 1i
The remaining four categories (IAii, IBii, IIAii and IIBii) may be
treated as cases where the "substitution effect," if any, may have actu313

ally worked the other way, i.e., against the Soviet Bloc, and, as we shall
see, are of no practical significance in our case.
The five largest (in value) commodity exports to the Soviet Bloc
from Japan, India, Malaya and Ceylon and the three largest commodity
exports from Indonesia are individually examined for 1956 and clas
sified according to the preceding grouping. These commodities con
stituted respectively 36.7 per cent, 30.2 per cent, 95.4 per cent, 100
per cent and 91.1 per cent of the above five countries' total exports
to the Soviet Bloc. The result is rather illuminating, to say the least: 27
IAi
IBi
IIAi

Japan

Tndia

Goat skins
Shellac, pepper

Woolen and
worsted fabrics
fron ore,
IIA'i Calcium superphosphate, cement, tobacco
ammonium sulphate, synthetic
yarns and threads
IBii

IIBi

Indonesia

Malaya

Ceylon

Rubber

Rubber

Rubber

Copra,
Sugar

Coconut oil, Cocobeans,
coconuts,
copra,
oil bunker pepper,
coir
Tin

Apparently, by far the largest group of important exports in 1956
from the five Asian countries examined was composed of items little
if any of which was imported by the United States at all and it is doubt
ful that more, if any, could have been sold to the United States if they
had not been exported to· the Soviet Bloc or if they had been exported
in smaller volumes. As for all the other commodities, exports of
which to the Soviet Bloc showed an increase between 1952 and 1956,
one must also refrain from jumping to the conclusion that curtailment
of exports to the Soviet Bloc would have meant larger exports to the
United States in value terms. Where the United States demand is rela
tively important in the world market and where price elasticity may
be small, curtailment of exports to the Soviet Bloc may simply result
in a collapse of prices and even a smaller dollar volume of exports to
the United States. This consideration is particularly relevant in the case
27 The original Asian export figures which are not given here are based on the
Country-by-Commodity Series of the United States Department of Com
merce. The corresponding United States import figures are based on the
Bureau of the Census, United Statese Department of Commerce, United
States Imports of Merchandise for Consumption, Commodity by Country
of Origin, Report No. FTllO, 1956.
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of rubber. Nor should one overlook the potentially restrictive effect
of the sentiments of United States manufacturers whose products may
compete with these Asian exports. Finally, the state of business ex
pansion and government purchases (for stockpiling, for instance,) in
this country cannot but be a decisive factor. While these conclusions
must remain essentially tentative, it would appear that the most im
portant impact of Asia's expanding export trade to the Soviet Bloc
lies in the development of complementary economic relationships be
tween the two areas, marked by an increase in the number of exports
the Soviet Bloc will, while the United States will not, purchase.
To the extent that the limited volume of Asian exports to the
United States independently of the "substitution effect" of exports to
the Soviet Bloc acts as a restraint on the expansion of United States
exports to Asia, it is obvious that the latter could be increased if credits
or grants were available. The relevant point in this connection is whether
the Soviet Bloc's offers of credit to the Asian countries have in any
manner reduced the volume of U.S. investments and grants in the same
area. More precisely, the question is whether specific projects in Asian
countries now receiving Soviet aid would have received American capi
tal in one form or another on comparable terms had Soviet Bloc as
sistance been unavailable. Lack of detailed information on the terms
of such agreements with the Soviet Bloc precludes an unequivocal
answer on this point. But a plausible conjecture is that few of the
projects receiving Soviet capital are such that American private capital
would have been forthcoming on terms that would be even remotely
comparable to Soviet terms and that only governmental credit or grants
might have been made. Moreover, there might conceivably be some
projects that are receiving Soviet instead of United States aid for the
simple reason that regardless of its availability the latter has never been
sought. Such cases would, however, have lo be explained by political
considerations on the part of the Asian countries and not by economic
factors.

VII

THE LONG-TERM EFFECT OF SOVIET BLOC TRADE WITH ASIA ON THE
UNITED STATES

It remains to be seen whether the long-term effect of the Soviet
Bloc's economic and technical assistance to some of the Asian countries
in their economic development is more detrimental to United States
trade with Asia than the short-term effect apparently has been. This is
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particularly significant inasmuch as the Bloc's grants and credits to
Burma, Cambodia and Indonesia alone amounted to an estimated mini
mum sum of $165.4 million during 1956 and 1957 alone while similar
aid to India had reached an estimated cumulative total of $368 million
by the end of 1956. 28 It is reasonable to assume that such aid has not
been provided for humanitarian reasons. But granted that some po
litical and economic advantage may accrue to the Bloc, the question
here is whether United States trade will suffer as a result.
Let us assume that in the long run the Asian countries now re
ceiving Soviet Bloc aid will find themselves economically more devel
oped in the minimal sense of a higher national output, with or without a
per capita increase, marked by the successful completion of at least
some of the projects in which aid receipts have been employed and the
consequent transformation of the economic structure through the re
allocation of available resources. Such economic development has both
its trade-creating and its trade-destroying effects. If, as one may safely
assume on the basis of past experience, the net effect should be trade
creating, there is no prima facie case for projecting that this expanded
trade would fall upon one country instead of another or that, as far as
the United States and the Soviet Bloc countries are concerned, it would
be apportioned behyeen the two according to some formula based on
the relative volumes of assistance they have individually provided in
the past. Thus it is at least theoretically possible for economic develop
ment in Asia promoted by Soviet Bloc assistance to benefit United
Sta�es trade with Asia even more than it will benefit the Bloc's own
trade with Asia. (The same possibility, of course, also exists for United
States aid indirectly to benefit the Bloc's trade with Asia!)
However, we are compelled to take a less sanguine view if as a
result of the Bloc's economic and technical aid to the Asian countries
there is a political reorientation so that discrimination against United
States trade will increase. Alternatively, discrimination against trade
with the United States may be increased if Soviet Bloc trade succeeds
in rising to such a level as to give the Bloc sufficient leverage to exert
economic pressure toward this end. Finally, United States trade with
Asia will suffer if the Bloc's economic assistance helps to transform the
economies of the Asian countries in such a way that expansion of trade
28 See Ui:ited States Department of State, The Sino-Soviet Bloc Economic Of
fem ive in the Far East, February, 1958; also CEIR, op. cit., 1957.
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with the United States would be economically unprofitable. The last
point is worthy of another moment of thought.
As far as we know, a common feature of most economic aid
agreements between Asian countries and the Bloc is the provision of
loan repayments in commodities which are the debtor countries' tradi
tional exports and of which they often have surpluses that cannot be
profitably disposed of elsewhere. While the Bloc's offer of long-term
purchases with or without price stabilization may appear to be a bless
ing in the short run, the long-term effect on the Asian countries may
be the further expansion of the same industries. On the one hand, this
will increase their dependence on the Bloc as a market and hence as
a source of imports. On the other hand, it will weaken the drive for
export diversification on which greater capacity to export to the United
States depends. If the demand for capital goods import can be satisfied
by the Bloc, and if any increase in the demand for consumer goods
import consists mostly of demand for goods that do not belong to the
"luxury" trade which the United States is in a better position to supply,
this failure to expand the capacity to export to the United States may
be accompanied by a lessened demand for imports from the United
States. The dollar shortage suffered by some of the Asian countries
would then disappear, but only because they have become economically
aligned with the "ruble bloc."
Fortunately, none of these effects are inevitable. The United
States' own policy in facilitating the expansion of imports from Asia,
its policy in stepping up economic aid to the Asian countries aimed at
both development and export diversification, and the maintenance of
a high level of economic activity at home will do much to counter the
Soviet Bloc's efforts. One takes pleasure in noting that all these policies
can be defended on grounds independently of the exigencies of the
Soviet "economic offensive."
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